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1 SDLO will be referred to as as LEI, Wageningen University and Research Centre 
(LEI-WUR) in the rest of this volume. 
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The general objective of the project was to analyse the functioning of 
factor markets (land, labour and capital markets) for agriculture in the EU-
27 and candidate countries (one of which – Croatia – has now entered the 
recently enlarged EU-28). The Factor Markets project compared these 
different markets, their institutional framework and their impact on 
agricultural development and structural change, as well as their impact on 
rural economies, for the member states, candidate countries and the EU as a 
whole. The ultimate aim of this in-depth analysis was to contribute to the 
policy reflection at the EU level and provide solid grounds for the design of 
new policy instruments under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and 
also other national regulations.  
The project resulted in the publication of 68 working papers which 
were edited and published throughout its three-year duration, and which 
can be found on the Factor Markets Website http://www.factormarkets.eu 
and on the CEPS website, under the Factor Markets Special Publication 
Series http://www.ceps.eu/category/book-series/factor-markets-
working-papers. The key findings of these papers are summarised in the 
chapters in this volume. At the same time, some papers have also been 
published (or accepted for publication) in academic journals. 
The project was punctuated by a series of meetings: a kick-off 
meeting (21 October 2010, CEPS), a first workshop (18–19 October 2011, 
Milan, Italy), a second workshop (24–25 September 2012, Ljubljana, 
Slovenia), and a final conference (2–4 June 2013, Sevilla, Spain). The final 
conference was jointly organised by the International Agricultural Trade 
Research Consortium (IATRC) on the occasion of its 2013 Symposium. We 
would like to thank Tassos Haniotis of the European Commission – who 
was Chair of the IATRC 2013 Organising Committee – for the excellent 
collaboration with the team leaders in the organisation of this joint event. 
This project benefitted from the support of many teams and 
individuals; we would like thank all the research team leaders and their 
team members for the active role they played in bringing the project up to 
completion. The team leaders were: Štefan Bojnec (UPR), Alessandro Olper 
(UMIL), Jan Pokrivcak (SAU), Ewa Rabinowicz (SLU), Alfons Balmann 
(IAMO), Sophia Davidova (UNIKENT), Jan Fałkowski (UNIWARSAW), 
Lindsay Shutes (LEI-WUR), Trevor Donnellan (TEAGASC), Laure Latruffe 
(INRA), Kyösti Pietola (MTT), Martin Banse (TI), Klaus Salhofer (TUM), 
Paolo Sckokai (UCSC), Davide Viaggi (UNIBO), Eleni Kaditi (KEPE-CEPS). 
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1. FACTOR MARKETS: 
DIVERSITY UNDER A COMMON POLICY 
JOHAN SWINNEN AND LOUISE KNOPS 
1. Introduction 
Well-functioning factor markets are an essential condition for the 
competitiveness and sustainable development of agriculture and rural 
areas. At the same time, the functioning of the factor markets themselves is 
influenced by changes in agriculture and the rural economy. Such changes 
can be the result of technological change, of globalisation and European 
market integration, of changing consumer preferences, and of changes in 
policy. In particular, changes in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
over the past decade have affected rural factor markets.  
The general objective of the Factor Market project was to analyse the 
functioning of factor markets for agriculture in the EU-27, including the 
candidate countries. The Factor Market project compared the different 
markets, their institutional framework and their impact on agricultural 
development and structural change, as well as their impact on rural 
economies, for the member states, candidate countries and the EU as a 
whole.  
This book summarises the main findings of the studies in the project, 
which include both comparative analyses across the member states and 
candidate countries and an in-depth analysis of key issues determining the 
functioning and impact of each of the factor markets for agriculture and 
rural economies.  
The chapters in this book confirm the strong heterogeneity of rural 
factor markets in the EU. As an illustration of the variations in factor 
markets and their governance, consider Figure 1, which shows the share of 
rented land in agricultural land use for all the member states. The figure 
shows the remarkable variety of situations in the EU. While the EU average 
is close to 50%, the share of rented land varies from around 10% to around 
90%. Interestingly, there is no East-West divide since the variations appear 
2 | SWINNEN & KNOPS 
to be equally large in the Western and Eastern member states. In addition, 
there are major differences in land regulations, as we demonstrate in 
Chapter 7. These differences can have major implications for structural 
change and productivity, for income distribution and for the impacts of the 
CAP, with most of the subsidies linked to land. 
Figure 1.1 Share of Land Renting (%) 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
The diversity in factor markets and their governance among EU 
member states is remarkable given that labour and capital markets are 
integrated in an EU single market (as should land acquisitions and 
investments, since these are part of the capital market regulations) and that 
there has been a common agricultural policy and an integrated market for 
the past 50 years. Such variations are likely to have an important effect, not 
just on the functioning of all the factor markets, but also on the 
competitiveness of the agricultural sector, on structural change, and rural 
development in general. These variations are also likely to cause different 
interactions between factor markets and EU policies such as the CAP, as 
they may react differently to reforms, and because they may cause 
differential effects of the reforms.  
The insights we gained from this project, and which are summarised 
in this book, will hopefully contribute to a better understanding of the 
fundamental economic factors affecting EU agriculture and rural areas. 
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This may lead to a better targeting of various policies, such as the CAP, 
environmental policies, etc., with the ultimate aim of improving the 
competitiveness of the sustainability of the sector. 
The book is organised in four parts and in the rest of this chapter we 
summarise the key findings of each one of them. 
2. Rural Land Markets 
Rural land markets have always been, for obvious reasons, very important 
for EU agriculture. However, since the MacSharry reforms of the early 
1990s, many of the CAP payments are linked to land use. The 2003 CAP 
reform reformed the payments but there is still an important link to the 
land markets. Therefore, given the importance of the relationship between 
CAP payments and land markets, an important focus of the Factor Markets 
project has been placed on understanding the interaction between 
agricultural policies and rural land markets. Several studies in the Factor 
Markets project analysed the impacts of agricultural policies on land 
markets, both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective. 
2.1  Impact of agricultural policies on land markets 
In order to correctly model policy impacts on land markets, it is important 
to integrate both first- and second-order (direct and indirect) effects. There 
are many theoretical and empirical studies that have analysed and 
compared the impacts of various income support instruments (market price 
support, production subsidies, factor subsidies, coupled and decoupled 
payments, etc.) on farmers’ decisions and income in developed countries. A 
lot of these studies consider only the direct first-order effects of policy 
instruments since they assume that input/factor prices faced by farmers are 
exogenous and not affected by policy instruments. In addition to these 
direct first-order effects, however, most of the implemented agricultural 
policies also induce further second-order adjustments. Farm subsidies 
affect not only the employed factor reward but, through altered farmer 
incentives, they also affect factor demand, factor prices, inter-sectoral factor 
allocation, factor ownership etc. 
In Chapter 2, Paul Feichtinger and Klaus Salhofer give an overview of 
the literature on the determinants of agricultural land prices and the effects 
of government support policies. Almost all empirical studies on the 
determination of land prices either refer to the net present value method or 
the hedonic pricing approach. While the two approaches have different 
theoretical bases, they converge in their empirical implementation. 
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Empirical studies use a broad range of variables to explain land values and 
the authors organise these into six categories. Their meta-regression 
analysis indicates that, on average, a 10% decrease of agricultural support 
would decrease land prices by 3.3% to 5%. Therefore, a considerable part of 
farm subsidies is captured by initial owners of land instead of operating 
farmers. They conclude that model assumptions, data structure and 
estimation techniques do have a significant influence on capitalisation 
estimates for different support measures. 
In Chapter 3, Pavel Ciaian, d’Artis Kancs and Johan Swinnen analyse 
the effects of the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) with and without farm 
structural change, and focus on how income distributional effects and farm 
restructuring are impacted by the SPS under: alternative entitlement 
tradability, cross-compliance and CAP 'greening' requirements, different 
SPS implementation models, the entitlement stock, market imperfections 
and institutional regulations. The authors find that the SPS implication 
details are very important factors in the distributional effects, since farmers’ 
benefits can range from 100% of the SPS value to a negative policy 
incidence, and farm structural change may also be hindered by the SPS.  
In Chapter 4, Paul Feichtinger and Klaus Salhofer investigate the 
impact of different CAP support measures on land rents and land 
allocation, explicitly taking land heterogeneity into account. They argue 
that price support before the 1992 MacSharry reform and area payments as 
implemented in the CAP and SFPs in the historical model, all favour land 
of higher quality (productivity). This is because of the way area payments 
are implemented in the CAP. By contrast, SFPs in the regional model and 
uniform area payments uniformly distribute support with respect to land 
quality. They find that price support will change land use to a smaller 
extent, as do uniform area payments. SFPs do not change land use 
compared to a situation without support, as long as all land uses are 
entitled to payments. However, SFPs do change land use, compared to the 
situation before the 2003 reform. Some of the land is made idle or converted 
from crop to grassland.  
In Chapter 5, Kristine Van Herck, Johan Swinnen and Liesbet 
Vranken analyse the impact of direct payments (DPs) on land rents in the 
new member states of the EU. Land rents and direct payments increased 
significantly at the time of EU accession. They estimate that up to 25% of 
DPs is capitalised in land rents. In addition, their results show that 
capitalisation of DPs is higher in more credit-constrained markets, while 
capitalisation of DPs is lower in countries where more land is used by 
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corporate farms, reflecting a stronger bargaining position of corporate 
farms in these countries. Their results imply that the functioning of other 
markets (in particular rural credit markets) are not only affecting access to 
land by farmers and structural change, but also influence the distributional 
effects of agricultural subsidies.  
In Chapter 6, Davide Viaggi, Fabio Bartolini, Marco Puddu and Meri 
Raggi analyse the expected effects of the most recent CAP reform of 2013 
on land markets, through a case study on Italy. In particular, they assess 
the potential impact of the proposed policy reform (in particular 
concerning the regionalisation of payments) on land markets. Their results 
point towards a reaction of the land demand and supply to the shift from 
the historical to the regionalised payments, due to the differentiated and 
opposite effects that the reform would have on different farm types and 
sub-regions. They find that the regionalisation would potentially result in 
increased rental prices and in a tendency to re-allocate land. 
2.2 Impact of land regulations  
It is important to take into account the variety of land market regulations. 
Markets for agricultural land are subject to institutional regulations, both 
national and EU-wide. The land market regulations are diverse across 
among EU member states and candidate countries, as is agricultural land 
itself.  
In Chapter 7, Johan Swinnen, Kristine Van Herck and Liesbet 
Vrancken give an overview of land markets and regulations in Europe. 
They document major differences in regulations in both rental and sales 
markets. They develop indicators of land regulation to provide a 
quantitative measure for regulation. They use these indicators to illustrate 
large differences among the old and the new member states. 
In Chapter 8, Laure Latruffe, Laurent Piet, Pierre Dupraz and Chantal 
Le Mouël investigate the influence of land regulations, and their interaction 
with CAP subsidies, on sale prices of farmland in France. They study the 
determinants of agricultural land price in several regions in France over the 
period 1994-2011, using individual plot transaction data, with a particular 
emphasis on nitrate zoning regulations and on agricultural subsidies. They 
find a positive but relatively small capitalisation effect of the total subsidies 
per hectare. The data revealed that agricultural subsidies are capitalised, at 
least to some extent, but the magnitude of such capitalisation depends on 
the region considered, on the type of subsidy considered, and on the 
location of the plot in a nitrate surplus zone or not. Only land set-aside 
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premiums significantly capitalise into land price, while single farm 
payments have a significant positive capitalisation impact only for plots 
located in a nitrate-surplus zone. 
2.3 Impact of climate change, biodiversity and energy policies 
In Chapter 9, Peter Dixon, Hans van Meijl, Maureen Rimmer, Lindsay 
Shutes and Andrzej Tabeau study the impact of climate change and 
biodiversity policies on European land markets. They assess the complex 
interplay between global Renewable Energy Directives (RED) and the 
United Nations programme to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and 
forest Degradation (REDD). They use a recursive-dynamic global 
Computable General Equilibrium model. They find that whilst both RED 
and REDD are designed to reduce emissions, they have opposite impacts 
on land use. RED policies are found to extend land use whereas the REDD 
policy leads to an overall reduction in land use and intensification of 
agriculture. This suggests that the protection of forests and woodlands in 
some developing countries reverses their comparative advantage as they 
move from being land-abundant to land-scarce regions.  
In Chapter 10, Martin Banse, Andrea Rothe, Andrzej Tabeau, Hans 
van Meijl and Geert Woltjer analyse the consequences of enhanced biofuel 
production on agricultural land demand. Their modelling combines the 
analysis of biofuel policies in a multi-sectoral economic model (MAGNET) 
with variation of the functioning of capital and labour markets. The multi-
sectoral modelling system predicts changes in land demand under different 
conditions of how factor markets work. 
2.4 Land distribution and social comparison 
In Chapter 11, Jan Fałkowski takes an alternative perspective by focusing 
on the role of social comparisons in agricultural land markets. In this 
chapter, he investigates the extent to which farmers’ propensity to buy land 
is related to the difference between them and their neighbours in terms of 
land ownership, drawing on the concept of relative deprivation. Using 
micro-level data from the transition period in Poland, he finds that 
interpersonal comparisons may have motivated farmers’ behaviour in the 
land market. He argues that the propensity to purchase land was positively 
correlated with experiencing relative deprivation but that this relationship 
waned over time: late in the transition period it was weaker than at the 
beginning.  
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3. Rural Labour Markets 
For the past century there has been an important restructuring of the 
economies in Europe and, with it, a reallocation of labour. An important 
element of this has been an outflow of labour from agriculture. The creation 
of the EU and the introduction of the CAP has affected this process but not 
halted it. In this process, the functioning of rural labour markets is 
extremely important as it will determine the allocation of labour across 
different economic activities, and as such, affect rural incomes and 
development. 
3.1  Institutional characteristics and modelling of European rural 
labour markets 
Labour markets can contribute significantly to rural household incomes 
and to the competitiveness of farms and the agricultural sector as a whole. 
However, studies also show that, in many regions, such markets do not 
work perfectly and, moreover, that it is crucial to take into account local 
labour market institutions, variations in household characteristics, etc., in 
order to get a good understanding of the functioning and the constraints in 
these rural labour markets. 
In Chapter 12, Jason Loughrey, Trevor Donnellan, Kevin Hanrahan 
and Thia Hennessy give an overview of the functioning of agricultural 
labour markets in the EU and candidate countries. Based on a survey, they 
construct an index of labour market flexibility/rigidity and identify criteria 
that affect the ranking of countries in this index. 
A crucial element in studying rural labour markets is how to model 
the supply of labour. The supply of labour is responsive to changes in the 
real wage in the medium term as higher wages increase the opportunity 
cost of being economically inactive and induce people to enter the labour 
force, while lower wages reduce the opportunity cost and lead to lower 
participation rates.  
In Chapter 13, Lindsay Shutes argues that changes in participation 
rates are seldom captured in standard computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) models used for policy analysis. She therefore introduces labour 
supply curves into the MAGNET CGE model and derives unskilled labour-
supply curves for EU member states and Croatia and Turkey. Including the 
labour supply curves into the MAGNET CGE model affects the estimated 
impact of CAP reform. 
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3.2 Determinants of labour reallocation and agricultural 
employment 
Many households in rural areas allocate labour to activities on and off the 
farm. Most rural economies in the EU are in a dynamic adjustment process 
involving sectoral re-specialisation and spatial relocation of workers 
between industries. In addition, in the new member states and candidate 
countries, the transition and restructuring processes created incentives for 
workers to relocate their labour supply between sectors. Given that the 
incidence of off-farm employment by farmers and their families is an 
important determinant of future structural change within the agricultural 
sector, future productivity levels and the efficient use of the other factors of 
production, it is crucial to understand what determines inter-sectoral 
relocation of workers and off-farm employment and to what extent 
policies, including the CAP, affect this process. 
In Chapter 14, Barbara Tocco, Sophia Davidova, and Alastair Bailey 
explore the determinants of leaving agriculture. Using Union Labour Force 
Survey data, they find that younger individuals are more likely to leave 
farming activities, although the largest outflows of agricultural labour are 
mainly associated with the retirement of older people. Self-employed and 
family workers are generally less likely to leave agriculture and low levels 
of education constrain entry into the non-farm economy. They find that 
labour market conditions at the regional level matter. Differences among 
the selected new member states and the EU-15 can be explained by the 
diverse production structures, suggesting different capacities to release and 
absorb labour. 
In Chapter 15, Alessandro Olper, Valentina Raimondi, Daniele 
Cavicchioli and Mauro Vigani investigate the impact of CAP subsidies and 
the reallocation of agricultural labour. Exploiting the properties of a data 
set covering 150 EU regions during the 1990-2009 period, they find that 
CAP payments contributed to maintaining jobs in agriculture, but that this 
effect is small. They also find heterogeneous effects for different CAP 
payments, with Pillar I subsidies having a larger effect than Pillar II 
payments.  
In Chapter 16, Eleni Kaditi uses data from Greece over the period 
1990-2008 to analyse the impact of CAP reforms on farm labour, with a 
dynamic panel analysis. Family and hired labour are found to be 
substitutes rather than complements, while agricultural support measures 
appear to negatively affect both family and hired labour demand. Also, 
subsidies for rural development do not favour on-farm labour use. 
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Structural labour adjustments are also affected by farm size and location. 
Her results are robust to various estimation techniques and specifications. 
In Chapter 17, Kristine Van Herck, Ruxanda Berlinschi and Johan 
Swinnen provide a hypothesis and empirical evidence for why the impact 
of agricultural subsidies on employment may be small or even negative. 
They argue that the aggregate effect is the result of two opposing sub-
effects: a short-term positive income effect (enhancing employment) and a 
longer-term positive effect on education (by reducing credit constraints), 
which leads to a reduction of labour in the longer term. 
In Chapter 18, Jason Loughrey, Thia Hennessy, Kevin Hanrahan, 
Trevor Donnellan, Valentina Raimondi, Daniele Curzi and Alessandro 
Olper examine the effect of the decoupling of farm direct payments on 
labour allocation in Ireland and Italy. Using a household model, they 
derive the hypothesis that the impact of decoupling on off-farm labour 
supply is dependent on two competing forces: a relative wage effect and a 
wealth effect. The decline in the farm wage relative to the off-farm wage 
makes off-farm work more attractive, thus producing the relative wage 
effect. At the same time, decoupled direct payments provide a new non-
labour source of income thereby generating a wealth effect, reducing 
labour supply. Using data from 2002 to 2009, their empirical analysis 
indicates that decoupling has not had a significant impact on off-farm 
labour supply in Ireland but find a negative relationship in Italy. 
3.3 Impact of labour re-allocation on productivity and rural 
incomes 
The inter-sectoral migration of agricultural labour is a complex but 
fundamental process of economic development, largely affected by the 
growth in agriculture and the rest of the economy, and the evolution of the 
rural-urban relative income gap. Theory and some recent anecdotal 
evidence suggest that, as an effect of large fixed and sunk costs of out-farm 
migration, the productivity gap between the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors behaves non-monotonically or follows a U-shaped 
evolution during economic development. 
In Chapter 19, Alessandro Olper, Valentina Raimondi, Danilo 
Bertoni, Daniele Curzi and Daniele Cavicchioli study the interactions 
between off-farm labour migration, transfer frictions and the persistency of 
income gaps. They analyse empirically the interaction across a sample of 38 
developing and developed countries and of more than 200 EU regions. 
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Their results identify a U-shaped relationship between the productivity gap 
between agriculture and the rest of the economy.  
In Chapter 20, Jan Fałkowski, Maciej Jakubowski and Pawel 
Strawinski use data from Poland to analyse the impact of a diversification 
of rural household income. They investigate rural households’ income 
using propensity score matching methods with data from 1998 to 2008. 
Their results suggest that, in the late 1990s, returns from combining farm 
and off-farm activities were lower than returns from concentrating on 
farming or on self-employment outside agriculture. Returns from 
diversification improved after the accession of Poland to the EU. 
4. Rural Capital Markets 
It is well known that rural capital markets typically work imperfectly, e.g. 
because of transaction costs and informational imperfections. Capital 
market imperfections affect both the supply and demand sides of capital 
markets. A crucial element in the differences between regions is the 
institutional framework for agricultural credit markets in the EU.  
4.1 Institutional characteristics and financial integration of rural 
capital markets 
In Chapter 21, Kristina Hedman Jansson, Ewa Rabinowicz and Carl Johan 
Lagerkvist provide an overview of the institutions that are essential for the 
efficient functioning of capital markets. In particular, they make a 
distinction between formal institutions (rules, regulations, authorities and 
actors) and informal (norms, values and relations). They compare the 
institutional situation in several EU countries and make an attempt to 
develop indicators to measure the performance of the institutions.  
In Chapter 22, Sami Myyra argues that the integration of rural capital 
markets in member states and in the European Union enhances access to 
capital for farmers and rural entrepreneurs, but it also implies risks coming 
from financial market shocks. He analyses the financial integration of the 
EU’s rural capital markets by computing financial indicators of rural capital 
markets. His key indicators measure how rural capital markets are linked 
to the wider capital markets. He also measures and compares the financial 
leverage structure in agriculture among member states.  
Another key institutional factor is the internal financial structure and 
management of farms. 
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In Chapter 23, Jarmila Curtiss, Tomáš Ratinger and Tomáš Medonos 
study the relationship between capital ownership and investment 
behaviour using data from Czech corporate farms. Their chapter explores 
the ownership-investment relationship from 1997 to 2008. They find 
significant differences in the level of investment activity, responsiveness to 
market signals, investment lumpiness, as well as investment sensitivity to 
financial variables among farms with different ownership characteristics. 
They predict that there will be a decrease in the number of owners and an 
increase in ownership concentration in the Czech cooperative and 
corporate farms. 
4.2 Impact of CAP on rural finance and investments 
An important issue is the interaction between CAP payments, credit 
constraints and farm investments. Previous studies suggest that farm 
investment decisions may be affected by the nature of the subsidies: 
coupled payments stimulate farm investments, but decoupled payments 
may not affect investment decisions. A key question is whether these 
results hold if credit constraints are taken into account.  
In Chapter 24, Giovanni Guastella, Daniele Moro, Paolo Sckokai and 
Mario Veneziani analyse the impacts of the 2013 CAP reform on farm 
investments, using a sample of farms specialised in the production of 
arable crops in EU member states. They find that investment demand is a 
function of the type and amount of direct payments. They use the 
estimated coefficients in the investment models yields to simulate the 
farms’ future and expected investment behaviour with the implementation 
of the direct payments reform. The investment in machinery and 
equipment is predicted to improve in several member states following the 
reduction in support levels induced by the policy scenarios considered.  
In Chapter 25, Jan Pokrivcak, Pavel Ciaian and Katarina Szegenyova 
explain that in addition to the demand effects of subsidies, there may also 
be a supply effect on the provision of rural finance. For example, farms may 
use the SFP directly to pay for farm activities and thus substitute for 
missing credit. Subsidies may also affect bank credit if future subsidies are 
used as collateral. This is especially important in the new member states 
and candidate countries, where imperfect competition and unequal 
distribution of bargaining power within the agri-food supply chain can be 
observed. Using Farm Accountancy Data for the period 1995-2007, they 
find that there is a positive effect of subsidies on bank loans, but that the 
effect depends on the farm structure: large farms use subsidies to increase 
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long-term loans, whereas small farms use subsidies to obtain short-term 
loans. 
5. Factor Markets and Productivity 
The explicit incorporation of factor markets and their institutional diversity 
into theory and empirical analysis should contribute to a better 
understanding of the changes in farm sizes and farm structures, income 
distribution and productivity in agriculture. 
In Chapter 26, Martin Banse, Andrea Rothe and Lindsay Shutes show 
how improved modelling of the heterogeneity of factor markets amongst 
EU member states in CGE models can improve model-based analyses of the 
CAP and other policy measures affecting agricultural production. 
In Chapter 27, Martin Petrick and Mathias Kloss examine the 
relationship of productivity in EU agriculture and EU factor markets. They 
estimate production elasticities and shadow prices of factors for a set of 
eight EU member states for the years 2002-08. They find significant 
differences between member states. They also find that marginal returns to 
land, labour and fixed capital are generally low. They conclude that the 
functioning of factor markets plays a crucial role for productivity growth, 
but that the impact of factor markets is heterogeneous across the EU. 
In Chapter 28, Marian Rizov, Jan Pokrivcak and Pavel Ciaian 
investigate the impact of CAP subsidies on the total factor productivity of 
farms in the EU. They use Farm Accountancy Data Network for EU-15 
countries and find that subsidies had a negative impact on farm 
productivity in the period before the decoupling reform was implemented. 
After decoupling the effect of subsidies on productivity became positive in 
several countries. 
Finally, Chapter 29 summarises some key insights from several 
papers by Štefan Bojnec and colleagues on the rural factor markets in three 
candidate countries (Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey). The papers in this 
chapter provide an extensive review of each of the factor markets for each 
of these countries. In the final chapter, Štefan Bojnec explains that, although 
the role of agriculture in the economies of Croatia, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic (FYR) of Macedonia and Turkey has declined over time, it is still 
important in absolute and relative terms compared to the EU economies. 
The prevailing small-scale farm structures provide employment and 
incomes for a large part of rural population. The substantial outflow of 
labour to urban areas and to other countries causes an inflow of 
remittances, which complements the emerging rural capital markets.  
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2. WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THE 
INFLUENCE OF AGRICULTURAL 
SUPPORT ON AGRICULTURAL LAND 
PRICES? A SUMMARY OF RESULTS* 
PAUL FEICHTINGER AND KLAUS SALHOFER 
his chapter gives an overview of the literature on the determinants of 
agricultural land prices. A particular interest is given to the effects of 
government support policies. Almost all empirical studies on the 
determination of land prices either refer to the net present value method or the 
hedonic pricing approach. While the two approaches have different theoretical 
bases, they converge in their empirical implementation. Empirical studies use a 
broad range of variables to explain land values and we systematise these into six 
categories. In order to investigate the influence of different measures of government 
support on land prices, a meta-regression analysis is carried out based on 242 
observations from 26 articles. Results indicate that a 10% decrease in agricultural 
support would decrease land prices by 3.3% to 5%. Therefore, a considerable part 
of farm subsidies is realised by initial owners of land instead of operating farmers. 
Results in regard to differences in capitalisation for different support measures are 
ambiguous. Model assumptions, data structure and estimation techniques do have 
a significant influence on capitalisation estimates. 
 
                                                     
* This contribution is a short version of Feichtinger & Salhofer (2013) published in a 
special issue of the German Journal of Agricultural Economics on “Agricultural Land 
Markets – Recent Developments and Determinants” edited by Hüttel, et al. (2013). 
We would like to thank the publisher, Deutscher Fachverlag GmbH, and the 
editors for the permission to reproduce our results. An earlier version was also 
published as Feichtinger & Salhofer, “The Valuation of Agricultural Land and the 
Influence of Government Payments”, Factor Markets Working Paper No. 10, 
December 2011. 
T 
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1. Introduction 
The question of what determines agricultural land values has occupied 
economists for more than 200 years and has been an important research 
topic in agricultural economics throughout the last century. Although a few 
econometric contributions date back as far as the late 1930s, regression 
analysis of land value determinants took off in the 1960s and has continued 
since then. The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of this 
literature. The study is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the two 
most common theoretical frameworks on which empirical studies in this 
area are based: the net present value method and the hedonic pricing 
approach. Section 3 reviews and systematises the determinants utilised in 
empirical work. Based on an extensive literature review and a meta-
regression analysis, Section 4 summarises our findings on the extent to 
which government payments are capitalised into land values. Section 5 
gives a short discussion of our results.  
2. Net present value and the hedonic pricing approach 
Most empirical studies investigating the determinants of agricultural land 
prices either refer to the net present value (NPV) method or the hedonic 
pricing approach as a theoretical basis. According to the NPV model, the 
maximum price a farmer would be willing to pay for a particular piece of 
agricultural land at a specific time is equal to the summed and discounted 
expected future stream of earnings from this land. Beside the Ricardian 
land rent, which is created by the “original and indestructible powers of the 
soils” (Ricardo, 1817), other returns connected to land may capitalise into 
land prices. This is true to some extent for almost all agricultural support 
programmes. If land is necessary to receive this support, people will take 
expected future earnings from the support programmes into account in 
their willingness to pay. Different support measures may capitalise into the 
land value to a different extent. Beside returns to land and government 
payments, there are other factors which may influence land prices. One is 
competing demand for land for non-agricultural use, i.e. urban pressure.  
Taking these different determinants for land prices into account and 
making some simplifying assumptions, an estimable empirical model of 
agricultural land prices (Li) is outlined in equation (1): 
 ܮ௜ ൌ ߚܴ௜ ൅ ∑ ߚீ,௝ܩ௝,௜ ൅௠௝ୀଵ ∑ ߙ௞ܺ௞,௜௭௞ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௜  (1) 
16 | FEICHTINGER & SALHOFER 
where R is the expected returns to land (Ricardian land rent), Gj is the 
different types of expected government support payments, Xk includes a 
constant and different shift variables accounting for example for urban 
pressure and β, βG,j and αk are m + z + 1 parameters to be estimated. The 
parameters β and βG,j reflect the rate at which land rents and government 
support payments are capitalised into land prices. They ultimately reflect 
the discount rate as well as a growth rate of the associated variables.  
In contrast, the hedonic pricing approach is anchored in consumer 
theory (Lancaster, 1966), and starts from the assumption that the price of a 
good (in our case, agricultural land) can be explained by a set of 
characteristics (e.g. land quality) affecting it (Rosen, 1974). Generally, and 
as an estimable function, agricultural land price is a function of y factors: 
 ܮ௜ ൌ ∑ ߜ௟ܼ௟,௜
௬
௟ୀଵ ൅ ߝ௜  (2) 
where ܼ௟ is the variables representing characteristics with ܼଵ ൌ 1 for 
all i observations. If explanatory variables ܼ௟ include returns from land (or 
some proxy) R and government payments Gj,i, the hedonic pricing 
approach of equation (2) and the empirical implementation of the NPV 
model of equation (1) converge to the same empirical model, though based 
on different theoretical considerations.  
3. Explanatory variables used in empirical applications 
In an effort to explain what determines agricultural land prices as 
discussed theoretically in the previous section, researchers have utilised 
numerous different variables. One way to structure these variables is 
depicted in Figure 2.1, where we define two major groups: 
internal/agricultural variables and external variables.  
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Figure 2.1 Variables used in empirical analysis 
 
Agricultural variables are further split into two subgroups. The first 
is concerned with returns from agricultural production. Hence, variables in 
this category usually represent the returns from land R. Since estimates of R 
are often not available, for example because the shadow price of labour is 
not known, proxies such as market revenues, net income or the price of the 
output are used in empirical work (Table 2.1). Beside those variables which 
try to approximate R directly utilising some monetary measure, there are 
also other non-monetary variables which have a clear influence on returns 
from land, such as yields or soil quality. As described in Section 2, besides 
returns from land, returns from government payments influence land 
prices through capitalisation. As long as government payments are tied to 
the price of agricultural production, as in the case of a price support policy, 
returns to land from production R and from government payments G are 
hardly separable. While some studies use total government payments as an 
explanatory variable of land prices, others split them into different 
categories (e.g. animal payments and area payments). 
Explanation of 
land values
Internal/agricultural 
variables
Returns from 
agricultural 
production
Government 
payments
External variables
Variables 
describing the 
market
Macroeconomic 
factors
Urban pressure 
indicators 
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Table 2.1 Examples for variables used to explain land values 
Agricultural returns – monetary variables 
– Market revenues (Carlberg, 2002; Barnard et al., 1997; Folland & Hough, 
1991; Gardner, 2002; etc.) 
– Returns to land (Goodwin et al., 2005 & 2010; Weerahewa et al., 2008) 
– Net income (Devadoss and Manchu, 2007) 
– Producer price of wheat (Goodwin and Ortalo-Magné, 1992) 
Agricultural returns – non-monetary variables 
– Yield (Pyykkönen, 2005; Devadoss & Manchu, 2007; Latruffe et al., 2008) 
– Soil quality (Barnard et al., 1997; Kilian, 2010) 
– Temperature and precipitation (Barnard et al., 1997) 
– Dummy for  
o Irrigation (Barnard et al., 1997) 
o Presence of intensive crops (Barnard et al., 1997) 
o Special crops (Pyykkönen, 2005)  
– Fraction of cropland (Gardner, 2002) 
– Proximity of a port (Folland & Hough, 1991) 
Government payments 
– Total government payments (Devadoss & Manchu, 2007; Vyn, 2006; 
Henderson & Gloy, 2008; Shaik et al., 2005) 
– One or multiple categories of government support (Goodwin et al., 2003 & 
2005; Pyykkönen, 2005) 
Variables describing the market 
– Manure density (Pyykkönen, 2005) 
– Pig density (Duvivier, 2005) 
– Farm density (Pyykkönen, 2005) 
– Average farm size (Folland and Hough, 1991) 
– Size of the agricultural land market (in the case of Duvivier et al., 2005; e.g. 
the fraction of arable farmland exchanged in a particular district in a 
particular year) 
– Dummy for a specific region 
Macroeconomic factors 
– Interest rate (Weerahewa et al., 2008; Devadoss & Manchu, 2007) 
– Inflation rate (Alston, 1986) 
– Property tax rate (Gardner, 2002; Devadoss & Manchu, 2007) 
– Multifactor productivity growth (Gardner, 2002) 
– Debt to asset ratio (Devadoss & Manchu, 2007) 
– Credit availability (Devadoss & Manchu, 2007) 
– Unemployment rate (Pyykkönen, 2005) 
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Urban pressure indicators 
– Total population (Devadoss & Manchu, 2007) 
– Population density per square kilometre 
– Population growth (Gardner, 2002) 
– Ratio of population to farm acres (Goodwin et al., 2010) 
– Urbanisation categories (Goodwin et al., 2010; 2005, defined through 
proximity to an urban centre) 
– Rurality – fraction of the population living on farms (Gardner, 2002) 
– Dummy variables for metropolitan areas (Henderson & Gloy, 2008) 
– Proportion of the labour employed in agriculture (Pyykkönen, 2005) 
 
Besides returns to land and government payments, there are other 
factors which may influence land prices. The influence of some of these 
factors, in particular interest rates, inflation rates and property tax, can also 
be explained within the NPV model. Here we systematise these external 
variables used in the literature into three groups: variables describing the 
market, macroeconomic factors and urban pressure indicators.  
4. Results from a meta-regression analysis  
Recently, the discussion of the capitalisation of government support into 
land prices has gained importance due to the increasing share of rented 
agricultural area in most parts of the developed world. Here, we apply a 
meta–regression analysis in order to derive some knowledge about the 
extent of capitalisation of different measures of support and to reveal some 
structural differences which may influence the capitalisation ratio.  
Our basic model is an extension of Stanley & Jarrell (1989), 
 ܾ௜௞ ൌ
ߟ଴ ൅ ∑ ߟ௝ܦ௝,௜௞ ൅
௠
௝ୀଵ ∑ ߛ௟ܼ௟,௜௞ ൅ ߝ௜௞ 
௬
௟ୀଵ    ሺ݅ ൌ 1, 2, . . . , ݊ሻ, ሺ݇ ൌ 1, 2, . . . , ݖሻ          ሺ3ሻ 
where ܾ௜௞ is one of n effects reported in primary study k, ߟ଴, ߟ௝, and 
ߛ௟, are parameters to be estimated, Dj,ik are dummy variables representing m 
different categories of government support, ܼ௟,௜௞ are y variables measuring 
relevant characteristics of an empirical study and explaining its systematic 
variation from other results in the literature, and ε௜௞ is an error term 
representing white noise. In our case, ܾ௜௞ is the elasticity of land prices with 
respect to government payments. ߟ଴ may be interpreted as the ‘true’ 
average value of ܾ௜௞ if we do not distinguish between different government 
support policies, i.e. use the default category total government payments. 
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However, theoretically there are differences in the capitalisation ratio of 
government payments depending on the measure of support. This is 
derived from the fact that different government payments have a different 
impact on land rents R. Parameters ߟ௝ capture the differences of particular 
support policies to the average situation. Therefore, equation (3) is used to 
test for two different things. First, we try to investigate if there are different 
support categories which reveal significant different capitalisation rates. 
Second, we try to find out if differences in, for example, estimation 
techniques, included variables and differences in proxies for land rents lead 
to a systematic and significant bias in estimated capitalisation elasticities.  
As summarised in Table 2.2, 242 estimations from 26 articles have 
been included in total. Elasticities vary from -0.408 to 1.184 with a mean 
elasticity of 0.276. In 96% of the cases, the elasticity is between 0.002 and 
0.789. The articles report on average 9.3 different estimates, with a 
minimum of 1 estimate and a maximum of 40 estimates.  
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Table 2.2 List of articles and the reported capitalisation elasticities included in the meta-regression analysis 
Author Title Article Mean Median Max Min. Std. Dev. Obs. 
Barnard et al., 1997 Evidence of Capitalization of Direct Government Payments in 
to U.S. Cropland Values 
1 0.265 0.215 0.690 0.120 0.180 8 
Carlberg, 2002 Effects of Ownership Restrictions on Farmland Values in 
Saskatchewan 
2 0.043 0.030 0.520 -0.408 0.423 4 
Devadoss & Manchu, 
2007 
A comprehensive analysis of farmland value determination: a 
county-level analysis 
3 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020  1 
Duvivier et al., 2005 A Panel Data Analysis of the determinants of farmland price: 
An application to the effects of the 1992 CAP Reform in 
Belgium 
4 0.299 0.285 0.469 0.121 0.100 28 
Folland & Hough, 
1991 
Nuclear Power Plants and the Value of Agricultural Land 5 0.386 0.384 0.427 0.355 0.033 6 
Goodwin & Ortalo-
Magné, 1992 
The Capitalization of Wheat Subsidies into Agricultural Land 
Values 
6 0.380 0.380 0.380 0.380  1 
Goodwin et al., 2003 What's wrong with our models of agricultural land values? 7 0.076 0.061 0.130 0.020 0.049 5 
Goodwin et al., 2005 Landowners' Riches: The Distribution of Agricultural 
Subsidies 
8 0.111 0.042 0.233 0.028 0.086 6 
Goodwin et al., 2010 The Buck Stops Where? The Distribution of Agricultural 
Subsidies 
9 0.041 0.032 0.134 0.007 0.042 8 
Hardie et al., 2001 The Joint Influence of Agricultural and Nonfarm Factors on 
Real Estate Values: An Application to the Mid-Atlantic Region 
10 0.474 0.460 0.605 0.405 0.077 5 
Henderson & Gloy, 
2008 
The Impact of Ethanol Plants on Cropland Values in the Great 
Plains 
11 0.302 0.296 0.372 0.270 0.032 8 
Kilian, 2010 Die Kapitalisierung von Direktzahlungen in 
landwirtschaftlichen Pacht- und Bodenpreisen - Theoretische 
und empirische Analyse der Fischler-Reform der 
Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik 
12 0.282 0.093 0.472 0.093 0.268 2 
22 | FEICHTINGER & SALHOFER 
Latruffe et al., 2008 Capitalisation of the government support in agricultural land 
prices in the Czech Republic 
13 0.205 0.070 0.890 0.040 0.296 10 
Pyykkönen, 2005 Spatial Analysis of Factors Affecting Finnish Farmland Prices 14 0.412 0.344 0.835 0.166 0.256 8 
Runge & Halbach, 
1990 
Export Demand, U.S. Farm Income and Land Prices: 1949 - 
1985 
15 0.322 0.253 1.184 0.051 0.208 40 
Sandrey et al., 1982 Determinants of Oregon Farmland Values: a Pooled Cross-
Sectional, Time Series Analysis 
16 0.228 0.228 0.228 0.228  1 
Shaik et al., 2005 The Evolution of Farm Programs and their contribution to 
agricultural land values 
17 0.256 0.242 0.397 -0.040 0.136 14 
Shaik et al., 2006 Farm programs and agricultural land values 18 0.281 0.274 0.543 0.099 0.119 31 
Shaik, 2007 Farm Programs and Land Values in Mountain States: 
Alternative Panel Estimators 
19 0.429 0.441 0.608 0.224 0.125 15 
Shaik et al., 2010 Did 1933 New Deal Legislation Contribute to Farm Real 
Estate: Temporal and Spatial Analysis 
20 0.378 0.303 0.875 0.103 0.230 18 
Taylor & Brester, 
2005 
Noncash Income Transfers and Agricultural Land Values 21 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100  1 
Veeman et al., 1993 Price Behaviour of Canadian Farmland 22 0.384 0.380 0.470 0.260 0.083 5 
Vyn, 2006 Testing for Changes in the Effects of Government Payments 
on Farmland Values in Ontario 
23 0.130 0.130 0.184 0.075 0.077 2 
Weerahewa et al., 
2008 
The Determinants of Farmland Values in Canada 24 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060  1 
Weersink et al., 1999 The Effect of Agricultural Policy on Farmland Values 25 0.008 0.008 0.013 0.002 0.004 10 
Weisensel et al., 1988 Where are Saskatchewan Farmland Prices Headed 26 0.088 0.275 0.284 -0.342 0.295 4 
Total   0.276 0.208 1.184 -0.408 0.198 242 
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About half of the estimates in the investigated studies use total 
government payments without differentiating between payment categories. 
Hence, we use this as a base line and introduce dummies if government 
payments are split into different types. The groups are: market price 
support (e.g. loan deficiency payments in the US, intervention price in the 
EU), direct payments (e.g. deficiency payments and crop disaster payments 
in the US, area and animal payments in the EU) and decoupled direct 
payments (e.g. counter cyclical payments, production flexibility contract 
payments and market loss assistance in the US, single farm payments in the 
EU). These categories are closely related to the PSE classification of the 
OECD.  
To account for correlation between primary studies, a common 
problem in meta-regression studies, we apply different estimation 
techniques including pooled ordinary least square, weighted least squares, 
and a single estimate per primary study. We do not report the estimation 
results here, but rather summarise our main findings. Average 
capitalisation elasticities over all types of agricultural support are estimated 
to be between 0.245 and 0.355. Hence, a 1% change in support implies a 
change of between 0.245% and 0.355% in land prices. Furthermore, one can 
observe considerable differences with respect to the three different models. 
Based on our meta-regression analysis, we can only confirm a significantly 
higher capitalisation of market price support and direct payments 
compared to the reference category of total government payments in one of 
the three models.  
With regard to the Z variables, results show that taking theoretically 
consistent land rents (returns to land) to explain land values leads to lower 
elasticities of capitalisation at a highly significant level in all models. 
Hence, taking a proxy for land rents (most often revenues or similar 
measures) tends to overestimate the capitalisation effect. Including non-
agricultural variables has a significant negative effect on the estimated 
capitalisation elasticity in at least one of our models. This seems plausible 
based on the omitted variable bias. If land rents and potential non-
agricultural land use are significant in determining land prices, omitting 
one of them would increase the estimated coefficient of the other. 
Significantly higher capitalisation elasticities are observed if primary 
studies consider only arable land in two of our three models. Moreover, if a 
study is based on aggregated data, we can expect higher capitalisation 
elasticities compared with farm-level data. While a multiple equation 
model had a significant positive influence on the rate of capitalisation in 
one, the double-log specification does not influence capitalisation 
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elasticities. With regard to estimation procedures, we find significantly 
higher elasticities if spatial econometric models are utilised. In addition, the 
lag of the independent variable or the lag of the dependent variable had a 
negative influence in least in two of the models. Elasticities in published 
studies are not significantly different from unpublished work.  
5. Summary and conclusions 
Almost all studies analysing the determinants of farmland prices either 
refer to the net present value (NPV) method or to the hedonic pricing 
approach as the basis of their work. The hedonic pricing approach is 
anchored in consumer utility theory and assumes that the observed prices 
of a good (in our case, land) are a function of a set of characteristics which 
define this good. Therefore, empirical models based on the hedonic pricing 
approach can include a multitude of very different explanatory variables, 
as long as those refer to characteristics of land. In contrast, the NPV model 
defines the maximum price somebody (in our case, a farmer) would be 
willing to pay for a particular asset (in our case, a piece of agricultural land) 
as the summed and discounted expected future streams of earnings from 
this asset. While the NPV approach gives a consistent theoretical 
explanation for the relation between land prices and probably the most 
important influence factors – land rents and government payments – it also 
suffers from severe shortcomings if transferred to an estimable empirical 
model for land price determination. First, since expected future streams of 
earnings are not observable, one has to either make strong assumptions or 
lack theoretical consistency. Second, the NPV model does not explain what 
determines land prices beyond expected future earnings and government 
payments. We have discussed that in the econometric adoption of the NPV 
model additional explanatory variables can be introduced as some shifters 
comparable to Goodwin et al.’s (2003) urban pressure indicators. If those 
shift variables are included, the empirical model based on the NPV 
approach and that based on the hedonic pricing approach converge.  
Empirical studies used a broad range of variables to explain land 
prices. We tried to systematise those variables by splitting them into six 
groups. Three groups reflect earnings from land – variables directly or 
indirectly measuring land rents and variables measuring government 
payments. The remaining three groups measure other influence factors – 
variables describing market structure, variables describing macroeconomic 
factors and variables describing pressure from non-agricultural land use. 
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We utilised a meta-regression analysis to investigate if different 
support policies reveal significantly different degrees of capitalisation. 
Results show that a decrease in 10% of support would decrease land prices 
by between 3.3% and 5%. This result indicates that a considerable part of 
farm subsidies is realised by initial owners of land, rather than operating 
farmers. Other results of the meta-regression analysis are to some extent 
ambiguous and depend on applied estimation procedures. We find a 
significant difference in the capitalisation elasticity for market price 
support and direct payments compared with average payments using a 
pooled OLS regression, but not in the other two models, which account for 
non-independence of estimates. Moreover, we were not able to verify 
previous theoretical results regarding the capitalisation of decoupled 
government payments. Although we derive a small positive coefficient for 
decoupled payments in all three models, they are not statistically 
significant. A reason for this result is probably the very small number of 
from only five primary studies. 
Results show that model variables, data variables and structural 
variables have a significant impact on the estimated capitalisation 
elasticities with respect to government payments. 
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3. THE IMPACT OF DECOUPLED 
PAYMENTS ON LAND PRICES IN THE EU 
PAVEL CIAIAN, D'ARTIS KANCS 
AND JOHAN SWINNEN* 
his chapter analyses the income distributional effects of the Single Payment 
Scheme (SPS) in the EU. The authors find that the SPS implementation 
details are highly significant in determining policy rent distribution 
between farmers and landowners. Farmers’ benefits can range from 100% of the 
SPS value to a negative policy incidence. 
 
1. Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to investigate the impact of decoupled 
payments – the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) – on land values in the EU. It 
first summarises the theoretical impacts of the SPS on land values and then 
presents empirical findings from the literature. Understanding the 
relationship between the SPS and land values is relevant in the context of 
the 2013 reform of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), which maintains 
the SPS at least until 2020, although with some modifications. This chapter 
therefore provides important insights into the potential future implications 
of the SPS for the EU land markets. 
The distributional effects of agricultural policy, which Alston & James 
(2002) refer to as the “incidence of agricultural policy”, have been studied 
extensively in the literature. Previous studies have analysed how these 
effects differ among polices (Alston & James, 2002; de Gorter & Meilke, 
1989; Dewbreet al., 2001; Gardner, 1983; Guyomard et al., 2004) and how 
                                                     
* This chapter is based on Ciaian, Kancs & Swinnen, “Income Distributional Effects 
of Decoupled Payments: Single Payment Scheme in the European Union”, Factor 
Markets Working Paper No. 29, July 2012.  
T 
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the results change if one includes more agents along the vertical chain 
(Desquilbet & Guyomard, 2002; Sheldon et al., 2001) or if one takes into 
account imperfect competition (McCorriston & Sheldon, 1991 and Salhofer 
& Schmid, 2004), imperfections in factor markets (Ciaian & Swinnen, 2006; 
2009), or transaction costs and constraints in the implementation of the 
polices (OECD, 2007; de Gorter, 1992; Vatn, 2001).2 
Early studies focused on policies, which were coupled with 
production decisions, e.g. price intervention or production quotas. After 
the decoupling of policy support in the late 1990s in the US and 2003 in the 
EU, more recent studies have analysed the impact of decoupled subsidies 
(e.g. Chau & de Gorter, 2005; de Gorter, 2007; Goodwin & Mishra, 2006; 
Hennessy, 1998; 2004; Serra et al., 2005; Sckokai & Moro, 2006). However, 
few studies have looked at the income distributional effects of the EU 
Single Payment Scheme (e.g. Ciaian & Swinnen, 2006; 2008; Courleux et al., 
2008; Kilian & Salhofer, 2008). 
According to Courleux et al. (2008), Ciaian et al. (2008) and Kilian & 
Salhofer (2008), the impact of the SPS largely depends on the ratio of the 
eligible area to the total number of entitlements. If the allocated 
entitlements are in deficit relative to the eligible area of land, then the SPS 
benefits farms; it is not capitalised into land values. However, if the 
allocated entitlements are in surplus, then the SPS gets capitalised into land 
values. These studies also show that the income distributional effects of the 
SPS depend significantly on the implementation model, i.e. differences in 
the SPS between farms: the larger the SPS differentiation between farms, 
the smaller the capitalisation of the SPS.3 According to Ciaian et al. (2008), a 
further important determinant of the SPS capitalisation is conditionality on 
the cross–compliance. Given that cross-compliance imposes additional 
costs to land use, the net effect of the SPS on land rents will be lower. 
The empirical literature tends to confirm that not only farmers but 
also landowners benefit from agricultural subsidies. According to Goodwin 
et al. (2003); Weersink et al. (1999); Lence & Mishra (2003); Robertset al. 
(2003); Kirwan (2009); Ciaian & Kancs (2012); Barnard et al. (1997); 
                                                     
2 There are also important empirical studies measuring the impact of agricultural 
policies on land markets (Goodwin et al., 2003; Lence & Mishra, 2003). 
3 There is a large related literature on the effects of tradability of production quota 
(Babcock & Foster 1992; Guyomard et al., 1996; Sumner & Wolf, 1996; Boots et al., 
1997; Bureau et al., 1997; Bureauet al., 2001). 
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Michalek et al. (2013), Patton et al. (2008), the capitalisation rate of 
decoupled subsidies is usually found 6% and 80%. Most of the existing 
empirical studies focus on North America (the US and Canada), while far 
fewer papers cover the EU (Patton et al., 2008; Breustedt & Habermann, 
2011; Michalek et al., 2013; Ciaian & Kancs, 2012; Johansson & Nilsson, 
2012; Kilian et al., 2012). 
2. The Single Payment Scheme 
Introduced by the 2003 CAP reform, the SPS was implemented in 2005 and 
it runs until 2013.4 The SPS replaced coupled subsidies, which included 
crop area payments and animal payments. Under the SPS, entitlements are 
allocated as a fixed set of payments per farm. Farms are entitled to yearly 
payments, depending on the number of the SPS entitlements and the 
eligible land they possess. 
When implementing the SPS, EU member states could choose 
between three different SPS implementation models: the historical model, 
the regional model, and the hybrid model. Under the historical model, the 
SPS is farm-specific and equals the support the farm has received in the 
‘reference’ period. Under the regional model, an equal per hectare payment 
is granted to all farms in a given region. The hybrid model is a combination 
of historical and regional models, and has two versions: static and 
dynamic. The key difference between the three models is in the unit value 
of entitlements: under the historical and hybrid models, the value of 
entitlement varies between farms (higher in the former than in the latter), 
whereas under the regional SPS model, all farms in a region have 
entitlements with the same unit value. The main source of differentiation is 
the past (production) coupled subsidies, which determine the SPS value at 
farm level fully in the historical model and partially in the hybrid model. 
The most commonly implemented SPS model in the EU is the historical 
model.5  
                                                     
4 Member states could choose to introduce the SPS either in 2005 or in 2006.  
5 In 2012 the historical model was implemented in Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain; the regional model in Malta and 
Slovenia; the static hybrid in Luxembourg and Sweden; the dynamic hybrid in 
Denmark, Finland and Germany; and a mixed system of historical and hybrid 
models in the UK. Those member states implementing the dynamic hybrid model 
move gradually to a fully regional model. In those implementing the static hybrid 
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In the first year of the SPS implementation (2005 or 2006 depending 
on the country), each farm was allocated a fixed amount of SPS 
entitlements. Since then, farms can activate the entitlements and receive the 
SPS if they are accompanied by an equal amount of eligible land.6 This 
implies that the SPS is indirectly linked to land because, in the absence of 
land, farms cannot activate (cash in) the SPS entitlements. However, the 
SPS is not linked to a specific land area – the SPS entitlements can be 
activated by any eligible farmland in the region. Furthermore, farms can 
expand or decrease their stock of entitlements by buying or selling 
entitlements on the market from other farms. 
Farm eligibility in the SPS is subject to cross-compliance. Each farm 
that receives the SPS must comply with the Statutory Management 
Requirements (SMR), and maintain the agricultural land in Good 
Agricultural and Environmental Condition (GAEC). The SMR are based on 
pre-existing EU directives and regulations in the fields of environment, 
public, animal and plant health and animal welfare. The aim of the GAEC 
is to prevent the abandonment or severe under-management of agricultural 
land. 
3. Theoretical findings 
A set of recent theoretical studies investigated the efficiency and income 
distributional impact of the SPS introduced by the 2003 CAP reform. These 
include Ciaian & Swinnen (2006), Ciaian et al. (2008), Courleux et al. (2008) 
and Kilian & Salhofer (2008). These studies yield several insights. 
The impact of the SPS depends on the ratio of the eligible area to the total 
number of entitlements. If there are fewer entitlements (deficit) than eligible 
land, the SPS leads to land price increases (i.e. is capitalised in land prices). 
However, if there are more entitlements (surplus) than eligible land, then 
the SPS does not cause increases in land prices (i.e. is not capitalised in land 
                                                                                                                                       
model, the regional and the historical shares do not change over time (European 
Commission, 2007). 
6 This setting makes the SPS a different type of subsidy compared to the coupled 
area payment implemented prior to the introduction of the SPS. Under the coupled 
area payment, farms receive payments for the entire area they use for eligible 
crops, whereas with the SPS only a pre-defined quantity of land (determined by 
the number of entitlements) may obtain payments. Further, the value of coupled 
area payment does not vary by farm. All farms receive the same value of payment 
for a given eligible crop in a given region. 
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values). The relative scarcity of entitlements is crucial. The intuition is that 
the more entitlements that are allocated to farms (compared to the eligible 
land), the more farms will compete for the eligible land to activate the 
entitlements in order to cash the SPS. Hence, if there are more entitlements 
than land available (a surplus), the increased demand for land will cause 
land prices to go up. If there are fewer entitlements (a deficit) than available 
land, there is no such demand and there will be no pressure on land prices.  
Table 3.1 reports the number of activated entitlements relative to the 
utilised agricultural area (UAA) for 17 member states in 2010. Despite some 
inherent problems with the data, the table suggests some structural 
differences. In about half of member states reported in the table (mostly 
those with the hybrid model), farms activated entitlements that roughly 
correspond to the UAA (e.g. Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland 
and Sweden), whereas in other member states (mostly with the historical 
model) the ratio of activated entitlements to UAA is significantly below one 
(e.g. France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain). This suggests that there may 
be important differences in the capitalisation rate of the SPS across member 
states. Theory predicts that capitalisation should be stronger in the first 
group of countries than the second.  
Table 3.1 UAA and SPS activated areas in 2010 
  SPS activated area (1000 ha) Ratio of activated area to UAA (%) 
  2007 2009 2011 2007 2009 2011 
Belgium 1168 1151 1153 0.85 0.84 0.85 
Denmark 2679 2643 2627 0.99 1.00 0.98 
Germany  16737 16731 16658 0.99 0.99 1.00 
Ireland 4606 4164 - 1.08 0.99 - 
Greece 5537 5774 - 1.39 1.51 - 
Spain 14959 15368 16445 0.60 0.64 0.68 
France 24151 26140 25730 0.82 0.74 0.88 
Italy 8116 8235 8551 0.56 0.62 0.66 
Luxembourg 124 124 124 0.94 0.95 0.95 
Malta 7 6 7 0.70 0.62 0.62 
Netherlands 1285 1348 1369 0.68 0.70 0.74 
Austria 2721 2696 2680 0.84 0.85 0.93 
Portugal 2418 2342 2295 0.66 0.63 0.64 
Slovenia 428 444 435 0.86 0.95 0.95 
Finland 2304 2288 2277 1.02 1.00 0.99 
Sweden 3146 3036 2991 1.01 0.99 0.98 
UK 15294 14867 15151 0.86 0.86 0.88 
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Note: This table reports only the number of activated entitlements, which is different from 
the total allocated entitlements. Farmers may also hold additional entitlements, which they 
may not be able to use due to the unavailability of eligible land and their sale could be 
potentially constrained by imperfections in entitlement markets and uncertainties related to 
future CAP changes (Ciaian et al., 2010). The data on the amount of these unused 
entitlements are not available. In principle, the SPS activated should not exceed the UAA, 
whereas the total allocated entitlements may exceed the UAA. Note that the number of 
activated areas for SPS may exceed the UAA in the case that farmers receive entitlements on 
common land (e.g. Greece).  
The UAA may not exactly correspond to the eligible area. According to the European 
Commission, "eligible land means any agricultural area of the holding, and any area planted 
with short rotation coppice, that is used for an agricultural activity or, where the area is used 
as well for non-agricultural activities, predominantly used for agricultural activities" 
(European Commission, 2013). 
Source: SPS entitlements: European Commission; UAA used to calculate the ratio of 
activated area to UAA: Eurostat. If data were not available for a given year, the 
value from the previous year was used.  
The share of the payments that is capitalised in land values is larger for 
smaller payments (endowment values) than for larger. As farms with high value 
entitlements compete with farms with low value entitlements, farms 
owning high value entitlements can afford to pay higher rents, but will 
only bid up the rent to the maximum that the low value entitlements can 
(no longer) afford. Therefore, the low value entitlements will determine the 
SPS capitalisation at the margin. 
Capitalisation of SPS in land prices will be stronger in the regional SPS 
model than in the historical SPS model. The different models are reflected in 
differences in the SPS entitlements between farms. With the regional 
model, there is no difference in SPS entitlements among farms, while there 
may be large differences with the historical model. An implication of the 
previous point is that the larger the differences between farms in SPS 
entitlements, the smaller the capitalisation of the SPS, because the smallest 
value will determine the level of capitalisation.  
Capitalisation of SPS in land prices will be affected by the tradability of 
entitlements under some conditions. If the eligible area is larger than the total 
number of entitlements, then with full tradability of entitlements there is no 
capitalisation of the SPS into land values.7 However, the more difficult it is 
to trade entitlements, the more the SPS becomes capitalised into land 
                                                     
7 With surplus entitlements, SPS is capitalised anyway so tradability is less 
important in this case. 
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values. With low tradability, farms are more likely to keep their 
entitlements (instead of selling them) and to use them to compete for land, 
which exerts an upward pressure on land prices. In other words, 
entitlements indirectly become farm specific or practically attached to the 
farmer's land if trade is constrained. In contrast, facilitation of entitlement 
trade may actually play a role in reducing potential SPS capitalisation as it 
will reduce pressure of the SPS on land markets. In principle, full 
tradability cuts the link between land use decisions of farmers and their 
decision to hold or sell (or lease) entitlements.  
Ciaian et al. (2010) document differences among the EU-15 member 
states in the restrictions on trading SPS entitlements. EU regulations allow 
entitlements to be tradable, but under certain constraints. Member states 
have some flexibility in introducing additional country-specific limitations 
on entitlement tradability. Spain, Italy and France have the tightest 
restrictions on entitlement trading. 
Capitalisation of the SPS in land prices is higher when:  
o The supply of land is less elastic (i.e. when it is difficult to use more land). In 
the extreme case, with fixed land supply, the SPS gets fully 
capitalised in land prices, i.e. all the subsidies go to the landowner 
because the land rent increase equals the subsidy per hectare. This 
result holds only if there are sufficient entitlements. In empirical 
studies, land supply elasticities are usually found to be rather low, 
mostly owing to natural constraints.8  
o The substitution between inputs in the production process is more elastic 
(i.e. when it is easy to use land instead of other inputs). With area 
payments, farms have an incentive to substitute other inputs for land, 
which increases land demand and leads to the capitalisation of 
subsidies into land values. Where there is high elasticity of 
substitution between land and other inputs, the impact of an area 
subsidy on land values that is induced will be large.9  
                                                     
8 For example, based on an extensive literature review, Salhofer (2001) concludes 
that a plausible range of land supply elasticity for the EU is between 0.1 and 0.4. 
Similarly, Abler (2001) finds a plausible range between 0.2 and 0.6 for the US, 
Canada and Mexico. 
9 Based on 32 studies, Salhofer (2001) reports average elasticities of substitution 
between land and labour of 0.5, between land and capital of 0.2, and between land 
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Capitalisation of the SPS in land prices is lower with cross-compliance. 
Cross-compliance requirements imply additional costs to land users, which 
reduce the demand for land and thus the (positive) effects of the SPS on 
land rents will be smaller. 
Capitalisation of the SPS in land prices is lower when land prices are 
regulated. Land market regulations in the EU-27 vary strongly among 
member states. Of particular importance for the SPS capitalisation are 
maximum price regulations. The potential capitalisation of the SPS into land 
rents will be reduced in the presence of a rental price ceiling as exists, for 
example, in Belgium, France and the Netherlands. On the other hand, to 
overcome the rental price regulation (i.e. the maximum price intervention), 
farmers will have the incentive to pay unofficial payments (bribes) to 
landowners to prevent the loss of land to competing farms.10  
Capitalisation of the SPS in land prices is higher when SPS reduces credit 
constraints. Many farms, in particular in the poorer rural regions of the EU, 
face credit market constraints. Access to cash payments (the SPS) may 
reduce these credit market constraints either directly, or indirectly through 
easier access to bank loans.11 This will increase capitalisation of the SPS 
because it increases the demand for land.  
(Changes in) capitalisation of the SPS in land prices is more gradual with 
long-term rental contracts. The length of the rental contracts can vary 
strongly – and, often because of regulations, varies strongly among 
member states.12 With short-run contracts (as in Ireland), average rental 
price adjustments can occur quickly; with long-term contracts (as in 
Belgium and France), average rental price adjustments will occur more 
slowly.  
                                                                                                                                       
and variable inputs of 1.4 for Europe. Similar values are reported in Abler (2001) 
for the US and Canada. 
10 Anecdotal evidence suggests that this indeed happens in countries with strong 
rental price regulation (Ciaian et al., 2010). 
11 Ciaian & Swinnen (2009) explain how SAPS payments can be used as collateral 
for working capital in the new member states. 
12 According to Ciaian et al. (2010), the key determinants of rental contract 
durations in the EU are social norms (e.g. in Greece), governmental regulations 
(e.g. there is a minimum of nine years in Belgium and France, six years in the 
Netherlands, and five in Spain), and market institutions (e.g. Germany, Italy and 
Sweden). Moreover, in several countries (e.g. France) even the renewal of rental 
contracts is regulated. 
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4. Empirical findings 
Although there is an extensive empirical literature on subsidy 
capitalisation, to our knowledge only three studies have estimated the 
effect of the SPS on land values (Kilian et al., 2012; Michalek et al., 2013; 
Johansson & Nilsson, 2012).  
Kilian et al. (2012) analyse capitalisation of the SPS in land rental 
prices in 2005 in Bavaria, which implements the regional SPS model. They 
find that 44% to 94% of the direct payments are capitalised into land rental 
prices. This is similar to pre-2003 direct payments capitalisation rates found 
in earlier EU studies (around 40%),13 although Kilian et al. (2012) find that 
decoupling of support increased the capitalisation ratio by more than 15% 
in Bavaria. Johansson & Nilsson (2012) use sales price data for the period 
2007-08, and find a relatively high SPS capitalisation in Sweden. The 
elasticity of agricultural land price with respect to the SPS is estimated at 
0.62, i.e. a 1% increase in the SPS increases land sale price by 0.62%. 
Michalek et al. (2013) estimate the capitalisation of the SPS into land rents 
using farm-level data across the EU-15 for the early period of the SPS 
implementation (2004-07). They find much lower estimates: the average 
level of capitalisation is only 6%.  
However, Michalek et al. (2013) also show that there is a significant 
variation in capitalisation in the EU-15, both among regions and among 
farms. Moreover, the variation is consistent with theoretical predictions 
with respect to lower a capitalisation rate under the historical compared to 
the regional model; the hybrid model has a higher capitalisation rate than 
the historical model.  
This is also consistent with the findings of Johansson & Nilsson (2012) 
for Sweden and Kilian et al. (2012) for Bavaria (Germany). The fact that 
they find much higher SPS capitalisation rates is consistent with i) the 
implementation model – Sweden uses the hybrid model and Bavaria the 
regional model, both of which are expected to have higher capitalisation 
than historic models; and ii) the fact that in both Sweden and Germany the 
entitlement/UAA ratio is (almost) one (see Table 3.1), which, according to 
                                                     
13 Patton et al. (2008) on Northern Ireland from 1994 to 2002 and Breustedt & 
Habermann (2011) for 2001 in Germany find strong capitalisation rates for pre-2003 
direct payments. They both estimate that around 40% of direct payments were 
capitalised in land rents. 
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the underlying theoretical framework, is also expected to cause higher 
capitalisation. 
Michalek et al. (2013) also find that capitalisation is considerably 
higher for low levels of the SPS than for high levels, which is consistent 
with theoretical predictions on the historical SPS model: low SPS levels will 
determine the level of capitalisation (at the margin). The capitalisation rate 
varies between 11% and 94% for SPS smaller than €200/ha – representing 
around 43% of land area (and 51% of the farms) in the EU-15. For larger 
payments (i.e. SPS greater than €200/ha), the capitalisation rate is below 
11%. 
The estimates also depend on the timing of the effects. As rental 
contracts are typically for more than one year, the impact on land rents 
may take some time to materialise. Studies which focus specifically on 
short-term or new contracts find much higher capitalisation rates. For 
example, Patton et al. (2008) only include farms with rental contracts of one 
year in their analysis of Northern Ireland, and exclude all longer-term 
rental contracts. They find that the capitalisation of land-based subsidies is 
more than 100%. Kilian et al. (2012) also find that the SPS capitalisation 
effect is significantly higher for newly signed rental contracts in Bavaria. 
For obvious reasons, land regulations may constrain capitalisation. 
Ciaian et al. (2010) confirm that land regulations in France have lower land 
prices (and constrain their increase). 
The empirical estimation of the impact of cross-compliance costs is 
complicated, because their direct measurement is difficult. These costs are 
linked to farms’ decisions on input allocation and production choices. They 
influence farm activities both directly by impacting the intensity of inputs, 
farm management practices and production, and indirectly through 
secondary effects on farm productivity.14 That said, Michalek et al. (2013) 
provide some indirect evidence that cross-compliance costs may indeed 
reduce the land rents in the EU-15. Similarly, Johansson & Nilsson (2011) in 
their study on land values in Sweden and Kilian et al. (2012) in their study 
on land rents in Germany find that agro-environmental payments are 
                                                     
14 For example, cross-compliance costs related to environmental requirements are 
the sum of the direct input use effects (e.g. reduced use of fertilizers) and change in 
management practices and the indirect productivity effects induced by changes in 
input use and management practices. For this reason, it is difficult to separate them 
from regular farm practices and quantify their impact on land rents. 
38 | CIAIAN, & KANCS & SWINNEN 
negatively correlated with land prices, which suggests that the SPS is not 
sufficient to cover the additional costs associated with cultivating plots 
eligible for this type of payments. 
5. Conclusions 
The objective of this chapter is to analyse the income distributional effects 
in the EU decoupled payments – the SPS – implemented under the CAP. 
We present both theoretical and empirical findings on the impact of SPS on 
land values.  
There is significant capitalisation of the SPS in the EU, but with 
strong variation among regions and among farms. The impact of the SPS on 
land prices depends (inter alia) on the ratio of land entitlements to eligible 
land, (for SPS) the implementation model (historical vs. regional), (for SPS) 
the tradability of the entitlements, the elasticity of land supply, cross-
compliance requirements, land market regulations, credit market 
constraints, the length of the rental contracts, and so on. 
Theoretical findings suggest that the entitlement stock effect, barriers 
to entitlement trade and credit market imperfections and low land supply 
elasticity increase the capitalisation rate of the SPS, whereas cross-
compliance, the tradability of entitlements, variation in the face value of 
entitlements, land market institutions and regulations reduce the 
capitalisation rate of the SPS. These results suggest that the particular 
details of the SPS have highly important implications: farmers’ benefits can 
range from 100% of the SPS value to a negative policy incidence. 
Empirical studies find that between €0.06 and €0.94 per additional 
euro of SPS is capitalised in land prices in the EU, in other words, each 
additional euro of SPS leads to an increase in land rents of between €0.06 
and €0.94. There is stronger capitalisation under the hybrid model than 
under the historical model and low value entitlements are capitalised more 
than high value entitlements. 
Understanding the relationship between the SPS and land values is 
relevant in the context of the 2013 CAP reform. The 2013 CAP reform 
changes both the implementation of the SPS and its budget. Some 
measures, such as the shift from an historical to a regional SPS, will induce 
a harmonisation of payments across member states and across farms, while 
other reforms, such as the progressive reduction of the SPS per farm, will 
cause an increased differentiation in per hectare SPS. Other reform issues 
relate to the linkage of the so-called ‘CAP greening’, the reference period 
for entitlement allocation and the definition of farms eligible for SPS. As 
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indicated in this chapter, different implementation of the SPS leads to a 
variation in its effect on land values, indicating that the changes introduced 
by the 2013 CAP reform may have important implications for EU land 
markets.  
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4. THE IMPACT OF THE CAP ON LAND 
RENTS AND LAND ALLOCATION 
PAUL FEICHTINGER AND KLAUS SALHOFER* 
his chapter investigates the impact of different CAP support measures on 
land rents and land allocation, explicitly taking land heterogeneity into 
account. Price support before the 1992 MacSharry reform, area payments as 
implemented in the CAP, and SFPs in the historical model all favour land of higher 
quality (productivity). This is not true for uniform area payments, but holds true 
for the way area payments are implemented in the CAP. In contrast, SFPs in the 
regional model and uniform area payments uniformly distribute support with 
respect to land quality. With regard to land allocation, the authors were able to 
show that price support will change land use to a smaller extent than uniform area 
payments. SFPs do not change land use compared with a situation without 
support, as long as all land uses are entitled to payments. However, SFPs do 
change land use compared with the situation before the 2003 reform. Some of the 
land is idled or converted from crop to grassland. 
 
1. Introduction 
The EU has devoted a considerable share of its budget to supporting 
European agriculture throughout its history. After decades of price support 
and a decade of coupled direct payments (e.g. area payments and animal 
payments), the 2003 Fischler reform introduced decoupled direct payments 
(single farm payments, or SFPs). The aim of this chapter is to investigate 
the impact of these different governmental support measures of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on land rents and land allocation, 
explicitly taking into account that land is a production factor of 
                                                     
* This chapter is based on Feichtinger & Salhofer, “Influence of the Common 
Agricultural Policy and Heterogeneous Land Quality on Land Rent and Land 
Allocation”, Factor Markets Working Paper No. 38, March 2013. 
T
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heterogeneous quality. While algebraic solutions are provided in 
Feichtinger & Salhofer (2013), in this short summary we concentrate on a 
graphical presentation of our results. After introducing the model in 
Section 2, we present the impacts of different policies in Section 3 before we 
finish with some conclusions. 
2. Ricardian land rent model 
Ricardo (1817) defines rent as “that portion of the produce of the earth, 
which is paid to the landlord for the use of the original and indestructible 
powers of the soil”. In other words, Ricardian land rent is the residual 
returns to land after the costs for all other factors of production are 
subtracted (Featherstone & Baker, 1988).  
Line R in Figure 4.1 depicts the Ricardian land rent for different land 
qualities in a simplified manner. The underlying model by which R is 
derived is based on a Cobb-Douglas production technology with a fixed 
(land) and a variable (non-land) production factor and constant returns to 
scale (Feichtinger & Salhofer, 2013). Farmers are assumed to maximise 
profits and land heterogeneity is considered by a linearly decreasing 
function following Lichtenberg (1989). While the Ricardian land rent is 
measured along the vertical axis, the available amount of land (Amax) is 
depicted on the horizontal axis, with the quality of land continuously 
decreasing from left to right. R represents the land rent or the value of 
marginal product of the input land for heterogeneous land quality and 
without any government intervention (von Witzke et al., 2007). R can also 
be seen as a demand curve representing the maximum willingness to pay 
for renting land of a specific quality for one period.  
Before the 1992 MacSharry reform of the CAP, price support was the 
most common instrument. After the McSharry reform, per acreage area 
payments became prominent. The 2003 Fischler reform introduced 
decoupled SFPs, which farmers receive by activating their SFP entitlements 
and farming a corresponding number of hectares of eligible land. Ciaian et 
al. (2008), Courleux et al. (2008) and Kilian et al. (2012) pointed out that the 
effect of these payments on land rents and land prices crucially depend on 
the implemented model (regional, historical, hybrid) and the ratio between 
entitlements and eligible area. Swinnen et al. (2009) reported that total 
distributed entitlements exceeded or were close to the eligible area in 
Finland, Belgium, France, Germany, Northern Ireland and Scotland in 2007. 
Furthermore, they reported a considerable share of unactivated 
entitlements, ranging from 0.9% to 6.8% for all studied countries. Salhofer 
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et al. (2009) found a small entitlement surplus for Germany in 2005, the first 
year under the Fischler reform. Given this, we consider only the case of the 
number of entitlements being equal to or higher than the eligible area.  
Courleux et al. (2008) and Kilian et al. (2012) find that in the case of 
no entitlement shortage, SFPs are similar to direct payments per acreage. 
Under the regional model, payments per acreage are uniform and hence 
coincide with the case of “uniform” area payments. Under the historical 
model, payments per acreage vary.  
For simplicity we assume here that SFPs depend linearly on land 
quality. The rational for this assumption is that entitlement values were 
derived from the payments received in the reference period 2000 to 2002 
and at that time, area payments for cereals and corn and slaughter 
premiums for bull fattening accounted for the largest share of CAP 
spending (Gay et al., 2005). Arable farming and intensive bull fattening 
tend to take place on higher quality land. In addition, the area payments as 
implemented in the CAP after 1992 were based on historical average yields, 
implying higher payments per acreage for higher quality land. Moreover, 
as part of the sugar market reform in 2006, compensation payments for 
price cuts were also included in SFPs and sugar beet production usually 
takes place on higher quality land. All these arguments support our 
assumption of a strong positive correlation between land quality and 
entitlement values under the historical model. This contrasts with the 
argument that dairy farmers, who use a considerable share of Middle 
Europe’s grassland, received a dairy premium which was fully 
implemented into SFPs in 2007. However, even for Bavaria, an agricultural 
region dominated by dairy farming, we find a medium-to-strong positive 
correlation between soil quality and SFPs.  
Based on this, we consider three different stylised policy instruments: 
(i) a price support policy, where the producer price is set (or subsidised) at 
a level above the market price; (ii) uniform area payments, implying the 
same effects as SFPs under the regional model; (iii) SFPs under the 
historical model.  
3. Effects of policies on land rents and land allocation 
The effects of these policy measures on land rent are depicted in Figure 4.1. 
In the case of uniform area payments and SFPs in the regional model, 
Ricardian land rent increases by the same amount for all acreages, 
independent of land quality. The rent function R is shifted upwards in a 
parallel manner to Rregional/area payments. In contrast, a price support policy 
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clearly favours land with higher productivity. Hence, we observe a rotation 
of the rent function to Rprice support rather than a shift. It is debatable to what 
extent the area payments policy of the 1992 MacSharry reform and the 
AGENDA 2000 reform can be represented by our Rregional/area payment function. 
Area payments in the CAP were defined by a payment per tonne 
multiplied by the average historical yield of a region. Hence, one could 
argue that land quality still played a major role in the amount of payment 
per acreage and that the reform did not change the distribution of rents 
among different land qualities. In this case, the distribution of rents 
between the 1992 MacSharry reform and the 2003 Fischler reform remained 
close to Rprice support rather than to Rregional/area payments.  
Figure 4.1 Land rent function under different policies  
 
As with price support, higher quality land also benefits more per 
acreage than lower quality land with SFPs in the historical model, as 
depicted by Rhistorical. The difference between Rhistorical and Rprice support depends 
on the extent to which SFPs in the historical model correlate with land 
productivity. Given that rents under price support were transferred 
directly into yield-dependent area payments later on, we can also expect 
SFPs in the historical model based on these payments to follow a similar 
distribution with regard to land quality. 
 
 Land ordered  
by quality 
Land rent 
Amax 
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Therefore, what should become clear from the discussion of Figure 
4.1 is the difference between the regional model (or uniform area 
payments) and all the other CAP support measures, which favour high 
quality land.  
While our analysis so far has been concerned with the effects of 
policy instruments on land rents under a given land use, in most cases 
farmers face more than one production possibility and therefore have to 
decide how to allocate their land. To analyse the effects of different policy 
measures under alternative land uses, we introduce an outside option with 
a constant per acreage rent independent of land quality. Our model can 
illustrate, in a very stylised way, the fact that good quality land can be used 
for crop farming where rents vary considerably with land quality, with 
extensive grassland use as an outside option where land quality does not 
play a (considerable) role. It is also a stylised presentation of a situation 
where the amount of land under production is not fixed, since the outside 
option could be to take land out of production.  
In this extended model, a farmer is assumed to maximise total profits 
by allocating land between the two different utilisations in an optimal way. 
We assume the outside option to be eligible to receive SFPs, but not area 
payments or price support. Figure 4.2 shows the land rent function for 
producing the “regular” output (R) and the outside option (O). A* denotes 
the land quality where the land use changes without any government 
support.  
Allocation changes induced by price support (Rprice support) and uniform 
area payments (Rarea payments) are also illustrated in Figure 4.2. Both policies 
shift some land away from the outside option and into production of the 
regular output. Uniform area payments do this to a greater extent (from A* 
to A*area payments) than price support (from A* to A*price support), since the support 
of low quality land is higher with area payments.  
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Figure 4.2 Influence of price support and area payments on land allocation 
 
During the implementation of SFPs as the core innovation of the 2003 
Fischler reform, countries were generally able to choose between a regional 
and a historical model. Figure 4.3 shows that with the introduction of the 
regional or the historical model, both rent functions, producing the 
“regular” good (Rhistorical, Rregional) and the outside option (Ohistorical, Oregional), 
are shifted. This shift is parallel with the regional model, but not with a 
historical model. As both land uses are subsidised, land allocation does not 
change and remains at A*. Furthermore, in the historical model both curves 
are steeper and as with price supports, therefore, higher quality land is 
subsidised disproportionally higher than land of lower quality.  
 Land ordered 
by quality 
Land rent 
O 
A*price support
A*area payments A
*
THE IMPACT OF THE CAP ON LAND RENTS AND LAND ALLOCATION | 49 
Figure 4.3 Influence of SFPs in the regional model and the historical model on land 
allocation 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
Over many decades, government support for EU farmers played a central 
role in the CAP. Major changes occurred in 1992 – from price support to 
coupled direct payments – and in 2003 (implemented in 2005) – from 
coupled to decoupled payments. The objective of this chapter was to 
investigate the impact of different government support measures on land 
rents and land allocation, explicitly taking into consideration that land 
quality is heterogeneous.  
Our main findings can be summarised as follows. Price support 
before the MacSharry reform, area payments as implemented from 1992 
onwards and SFPs in the historical model all distribute farm support 
unequally with respect to land quality. All three support schemes favour 
land with higher productivity. This is not true for uniform area payments, 
but holds true for the way area payments were implemented in the CAP. In 
contrast, SFPs in the regional model (and uniform area payments) 
uniformly distribute support with respect to land quality. Which support is 
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preferable depends crucially on policy objectives. Lower land quality often 
correlates with lower farm income. To this extent, policies favouring higher 
quality land may increase income inequalities in the sector and seem 
inappropriate, or at least inefficient, to support low income.  
With regard to land allocation, we were able to show that price 
support will change land use to a lesser extent than uniform area 
payments, since the latter support low quality land more. If one has the 
goal of keeping as much land as possible in production, then area 
payments on land, independent of land quality, are favourable. Even more 
efficient would be a targeted subsidisation of lower quality land (e.g. less-
favoured areas payments). SFPs do not change land use in comparison to a 
situation without support, as long as all land uses are entitled to payments. 
However, SFPs do change land use in comparison to the situation before 
the 2003 reform. Some of the land is shifted to the outside option, and 
hence might be left idle or converted from crop to grassland.  
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5. DIRECT PAYMENTS AND LAND RENTS: 
EVIDENCE FROM NEW MEMBER STATES 
KRISTINE VAN HERCK, JOHAN SWINNEN 
AND LIESBET VRANKEN* 
his chapter analyses the impact of direct payments (DPs) on land rents in 
the new EU member states. Land rents and direct payments increased 
strongly at the time of EU accession. The authors estimate that up to 25% of 
DPs is capitalised in land rents. In addition, the results show that capitalisation of 
DPs is higher in more credit-constrained markets, while capitalisation of DPs is 
lower in countries where more land is used by corporate farms, reflecting a 
stronger bargaining position of corporate farms in these countries. These results 
imply that the functioning of other markets (in particular, rural credit markets) not 
only affect access to land by farmers and structural change, but also influence the 
distributional effects of agricultural subsidies.  
 
1. Introduction 
The influence of agricultural subsidies on land prices is important for two 
reasons. First, a general purpose of agricultural subsidies is to increase 
farmers’ incomes. However, the positive income effects can be eroded if 
subsidies are capitalised in land sales and rental prices. Second, an increase 
in land sales and rental prices affects land mobility and hence farm 
restructuring. New farmers face a higher initial investment cost and 
existing farmers face a higher cost of expansion. Consequently, the transfer 
of land from less to more efficient users is reduced, which has a negative 
impact on structural adjustments in the agricultural sector.  
                                                     
* This chapter is based on Van Herck, Swinnen & Vranken, “Direct Payments and 
Land Rents: Evidence from New Member States”, Factor Markets Working Paper 
No. 62, August 2013. 
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Several studies have analysed the impact of subsidies on land sales 
and rental prices (Floyd, 1965; Goodwin & Ortalo-Magné, 1992; Hennessy, 
1998; Lence & Mishra, 2003; Guyomard et al., 2004; Chau & de Gorter, 2005; 
Ciaian & Swinnen, 2006; 2009; Kirwan, 2009; Latruffe & Mouël, 2009). The 
vast majority of the empirical studies have dealt with the land market in 
North America (the US and Canada)15 and, in recent years, the EU-15 
(Patton et al., 2008; Ciaian et al., 2010; Breustedt & Habermann, 2011; Kilian 
et al., 2012).  
In this chapter, we estimate the second order effect of agricultural 
subsidies on the rural land market in several new EU member states (EU-
NMS). These data are particularly interesting for studying the influence of 
agricultural subsidies on land prices because EU accession resulted in a 
considerable change in the level of subsidies paid. In the period 2000–08, a 
strong and persistent increase in land rental prices is observed in all EU-
NMS, which was especially strong around the period of EU accession. 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show that there was a strong increase in land rental 
prices just after accession, which coincides with an increase in direct 
payments (DPs) in the same period. Hence, EU accession can be considered 
a quasi-natural experiment to estimate the impact of the increase in DPs on 
land rental prices. 
To our knowledge, there is only one other study that analyses the 
impact of DPs in the EU-NMS. Ciaian & Kancs (2012) investigate the impact 
of the Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS), a system of DPs introduced in 
the EU-NMS, based on farm-level panel data for the period 2004–05. Our 
paper complements this study in three ways. First, country-level subsidy 
data are used in this study, which allows us to exploit variation in the level 
of agricultural subsidies across countries. This is particularly relevant when 
estimating the impact of SAPS on land rental prices because, in the case of 
SAPS, there is no variation in the per hectare subsidy among farms within 
one country. Second, by covering the period 1994–2009, both the post-
accession period and the pre-accession period are included. Third, while 
Ciaian & Swinnen (2006; 2009) have shown theoretically that credit and 
land market imperfections may affect capitalisation of agricultural 
subsidies into land prices, this study is the first to analyse this empirically.  
                                                     
15 See, for example, Barnard et al. (1997), Lence & Mishra (2003), Goodwin et al. 
(2003), Goodwin et al. (2005), Kirwan (2009), Goodwin et al. (2011), Kirwan & 
Roberts (2010), Hendricks et al. (2012), Kropp & Peckham (2012) and Vyn et al. 
(2012). 
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Figure 5.1 Evolution of land rents in the selected NMS (€/ha) 
 
* Rental prices are real 2010 prices. 
Source: authors’ calculations based on the constructed sample. 
Figure 5.2 Evolution of DPs in the selected NMS (€/ha) 
 
* DPs are real 2010 prices. 
Source: authors’ calculations based on the constructed sample. 
DIRECT PAYMENTS AND LAND RENTS: EVIDENCE FROM NEW MEMBER STATES | 55 
2. Empirical approach 
The sample used in the empirical analysis includes 6 NMS: the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia. We use yearly 
data from 1997 to 2009 for the Czech Republic, from 2001 to 2009 for 
Hungary, 2004 to 2009 for Latvia, from 2000 to 2009 for Lithuania, from 
1994 to 2009 for Poland, finally from 2001 to 2007 for Slovakia. This results 
in an unbalanced panel data set with 61 observations.  
To control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, which may 
lead to an inconsistent estimate of the capitalisation rate, we control for 
country fixed effects. The fixed effects capture all time-invariant 
heterogeneity between countries such as soil characteristics, environmental 
and climatological conditions as well as time-invariant differences in 
regulations and institutions. Further, we also control for a number of other 
factors, such as for example agricultural yields, farm income and EU 
accession. 
3. Empirical results 
We find that DPs have a positive and significant impact on land rents, 
indicating that there is rent extraction of government payments by 
landowners. This impact is not only statistically significant, but is also 
economically significant. An increase of one additional euro per hectare in 
DPs increases land rents by 13 to 25 euro cents, corresponding to a 
capitalisation rate of 13% to 25%. Since renting is widespread in several EU-
NMS and most landowners are absentee landowners who live in urban 
areas or who are no longer active in agriculture, the payments will flow out 
of the agricultural sector and are, to a large extent, missing their goal of 
improving the livelihoods of rural inhabitants. 
In addition, we find that the level of capitalisation depends on market 
imperfections. In particular, credit market imperfections are important as 
well as the country’s farm structure, which affects transaction costs and 
imperfect competition (bargaining position) in the land rental market.  
Capitalisation of DPs is higher in more credit-constrained markets, 
with the level of capitalisation ranging from 40 euro cents (in the case of 
poorly functioning credit markets) to 16 euro cents per additional euro of 
DPs (in the case of well-functioning credit markets). DPs may reduce 
farmers’ credit constraints, for example because farmers may use them as 
collateral for bank loans (Latruffe et al., 2010). As a consequence, the 
marginal productivity of agricultural land increases which will in turn 
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boost the demand for agricultural land, as theoretically shown by Ciaian & 
Swinnen (2009). 
With respect to farm structure, we find that capitalisation of DPs is 
lower in countries characterised by a significant share of agricultural land 
used by corporate farms, reflecting a stronger bargaining position of the 
farmers. Per additional euro of DPs, the level of capitalisation in the land 
rental price ranges from 21 euro cents, if all land is used by individual 
farmers, to 4 euro cents if all land is used by corporate farms. Hence, in the 
countries where the farm structure is dominated by corporate farms, the 
level of capitalisation of DPs is found to be lower, suggesting that 
transaction and stronger bargaining positions of the tenants temper 
capitalisation.  
4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we analyse the impact of increasing DPs on land rents in six 
new EU member states. In these countries, agricultural subsidies largely 
increased as a result of their EU accession. We find that up to 25% of DPs is 
capitalised in land rents. In addition, the results show that capitalisation of 
DPs is higher in more credit-constrained markets, while capitalisation of 
DPs is lower in countries where more land is used by corporate farms, 
reflecting a stronger bargaining position of corporate farms in these 
countries. 
All this clearly illustrates the importance of reforms focused on 
improving the bargaining position of farms and on improving access to 
input and output markets, and particularly credit markets, as well as of 
reforms of sectors ‘surrounding agriculture’. Such reforms are not only 
crucial to improve access to land by farmers and to induce structural 
change in the sector, but also to ensure that agricultural subsidies are not 
missing their goal of improving the livelihoods of rural inhabitants in the 
EU-NMS.  
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6. THE IMPACT OF THE 2013 CAP 
REFORM ON LAND MARKETS IN ITALY 
DAVIDE VIAGGI, FABIO BARTOLINI, 
MARCO PUDDU AND MERI RAGGI* 
he connection between policy and other context variables and land markets 
is at the core of the policy debate, including the present reform of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The current proposals for the post-
2013 CAP will include the switch of the payment regime from an historical to a 
regional basis. This component, as well as the greening and other ‘micro-
provisions’ can have an effect on the land markets. The objective of this chapter is 
to assess the potential impact of the proposed policy reform (in particular 
concerning the regionalisation of payments) on the land market. Attention will 
focus on changes in propensity to rent-in and out and in transactions due to the 
proposed provisions for the post-2013 CAP. To achieve this goal, the authors 
jointly use: a) a survey of farmers stated intention, and b) a mathematical 
programming model simulating the land markets in different policy scenarios. Both 
are applied to a case study at the scale of the province of Bologna, Italy (NUTS 3). 
The results of the model corroborate the results from the survey, though the model 
is much more reactive to policy changes, while the survey has a larger share of “no 
changes”. Both hint at a relevant reaction of the land demand and supply to the 
shift from the historical to the regionalised payments, due to the differentiated and 
opposite effects that the reform would have on different farm types and sub-regions. 
The payment would be more capitalised into the land value, at the margin, as long 
as it is less constrained by the ownership of entitlements. As an effect, the 
regionalisation would potentially result in increased rental prices and in a 
tendency to re-allocate land. 
 
                                                     
* This chapter is based on Viaggi, Bartolini, Puddu, Minarelli & Raggi, “The Impact 
of the SFP System on Italian Farmland Prices and Tenure Contracts”, Factor 
Markets Working Paper No. 65, August 2013. 
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1. Introduction 
The agricultural economics literature has highlighted the effects of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on factor markets (Ciaian & Swinnen 
2006; Bartolini et al., 2011) and, specifically, it has studied the way in which 
the CAP reforms have changed these effects over time. Many papers show 
a close relationship between the effects of policy on the production factors 
prices, which are consequences of supply elasticity as well as of factor 
substitution possibilities (Floyd, 1965; Bierlen et al., 2000; Goodwin et al., 
2003; Ahearn et al., 2005; Latruffe & Le Mouël, 2009). Several works aim to 
estimate the effect of policy payments in terms of their capitalisation into 
land value or land rental prices, and to calculate a share of capitalisation 
depending on type of policy support (Ciaian & Swinnen, 2006; Courleux et 
al., 2008; Latruffe & Le Mouël, 2009).  
The literature also underlines the effect of policy changes on the 
reallocation of productive factors over time (Bartolini et al., 2011). Several 
papers in particular analyse the effects of decoupling, introduced in 2003 
by the Fischler reform, on the dynamics of the exchange of land. They aim 
to identify the determinants of capitalisation of payments into land prices, 
including the distribution of payments between beneficiaries, in connection 
with the possibility of exchange of entitlements and in relation to the ratio 
between eligible area and number of entitlements owned (Le Mouël, 2006; 
Balkhausen et al., 2008; Courleux et al., 2008; Kilian & Salhofer, 2008; Viaggi 
et al., 2010).  
Studies focusing on the effect of different policy scenarios on the 
changes in land demand or land rented/sold are often derived from or are 
expressed through changes in the marginal value of land (Viaggi, 2009; 
Bartolini et al., 2011). Mathematical programming models have been used 
to simulate the impact of policy reforms considering also changes in farm 
size under different price, policy, and cost scenarios.16 This typology of 
models also has an important use in analysing competition for land 
allocation between different farms, measuring the effects of drivers of 
changes through the marginal value of land (Galko & Jayet, 2011). Finally, 
some studies using these instruments aim to investigate farmers’ 
investment (including land) behaviour and to evaluate the impact of 
different CAP scenarios, with a special focus on the Single Payment 
                                                     
16 See Zimmerman et al. (2009) for a review of relevant models applied to structural 
change 
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Scheme, to contribute to the understanding of the relation between policy 
design and farmers' behaviour (Gallerani et al., 2008b; Viaggi et al., 2011b). 
Several papers also use econometric models to address the effects of 
changes in policy mechanisms or property rights systems on the number of 
land markets transactions (Bierlen et al., 2000; Le Mouël, 2006; Ciaian et al., 
2008; Gallerani et al., 2008a; Jin & Jayne, 2011). In some cases, the analysis 
rests on surveys of intentions, for example to investigate farmers’ decisions 
on land idling in a 2003 CAP reform scenario (Bougherara & Latruffe, 
2010), or to identify the determinants of intended changes in farm size 
under two different CAP scenarios – Health Check and the complete 
abolition of CAP payments) (Bartolini & Viaggi, 2013). Transaction costs in 
land exchange and imperfections of the land markets, such as imperfect 
competition, can be very significant. This has proved to be particularly 
relevant in developing land markets, such as those of central and eastern 
European countries (CEECs), where the combination of imperfect 
competition and transaction costs has a strong impact on land prices 
(Swinnen, 1999; Ciaian, 2007). 
Given the complexity of factors affecting land markets and the impact 
of policy, ex-ante estimation of the impacts of policy changes always 
remains difficult. In this respect, survey-based stated intentions and 
modelling-based simulations may yield different but complementary 
results (Viaggi et al., 2011a). 
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate the impact of the post-2013 
CAP policy instruments on the land market in the province of Bologna, 
Italy. Attention is particularly focused on the regionalisation of the single 
farm payment regime. To pursue this objective, this chapter combines 
insights from a survey carried out in Bologna to understand the effect of 
the reform through stated intentions of the farmers (Raggi et al., 2013) with 
a modelling simulation exercise carried out in the same province. The 
modelling component builds on a previous paper (Puddu et al., 2012), and 
the farm household investment model of the paper has been revised and 
extended in order to simulate the demand curve for land by individual 
farms in different policy scenarios. 
On the practical side, the chapter aims to contribute an ex-ante 
understanding of the potential effects of the reform on land values and 
propensity for transaction. From the methodological point of view, the 
chapter aims to explore different ways to integrate very detailed farm-level 
investment model output and survey information in more simplified farm 
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models suitable for providing regional simulations concerning land 
markets. 
In the next section, we first recall the main features of the post-2013 
CAP reform. In the subsequent section, we describe the methodology, 
followed by the main results. After that, we provide a discussion, followed 
by conclusions and final remarks. 
2. The direct payment in the post-2013 CAP reform 
At the time this work was carried out, the most up-to-date information 
about the post-2013 CAP was available from the official proposal published 
in October 2011 (COM(2011)625/3). In Italy, it will include the switch of the 
payment regime from an historical to a regional basis. The regionalised 
payment is a homogenous payment per hectare for farms in the same 
region, and will be distributed on the basis of the farm area on which some 
agricultural activity is carried out. This payment will then lose the 
connection with the per hectare payment in the three-year reference period 
(2000-02) and the entitlements owned by the farmers. In addition, the 
farmers can obtain payments on all of their operated land area. The 
mechanism of payment will be based on disentangling the single farm 
payment into four separate components: basic payments, a greening 
component, payments to less-favoured areas, and payments to young and 
small farms. The basic payments will be assigned to active farmers. These 
limitations do not apply to farmers that receive less than €5,000 in direct 
payment. The greening component of the payment is assigned to farmers 
entitled to a payment under the basic payment scheme and that comply 
with some ecological prescriptions. The application of greening and the 
relationship between provision of environmental good in the first and 
second pillars of the CAP are central to the ongoing scientific debates about 
greening payments (e.g. Matthews, 2012). 
3. Methodology 
The methodology follows a framework that represents a combination of 
two exercises conducted in parallel. We performed a survey of farmers’ 
stated intentions concerning future reforms, in order to provide empirical 
information on the reaction to the reform. A selection of survey 
information, together with demand curves for land obtained from an 
extended farm household investment model developed in previous works, 
is then used to feed a mathematical programming model for simulation. In 
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the remaining of this section, we first describe the survey and then the 
modelling framework. 
The survey was conducted in the early summer of 2012 on a random 
sample of 350 farm households out of 7379 beneficiaries of CAP payments 
located in Bologna province. The questionnaire was been completed 
through a telephone interview which focused on farmers’ intentions about 
land expansion/reduction conditional on the introduction of some specific 
measures of the post-2013 CAP reform proposal. More specifically, they 
were asked to state intentions about renting in/out more/less land and 
buying/selling more/less land assuming the introduction of the 
regionalised payments, the greening and the capping measures in 
comparison to what their would have done under a baseline scenario (the 
current CAP system). The sample has been proportionally stratified by 
altimetry location (mountain, hill, Bologna hill, plain) and by the amount of 
CAP payments received in 2011 (below and above the mean). The 
questionnaire was divided into different sections: first, information about 
farm characteristics, labour features and market strategy was requested; 
then, CAP payments and generic planned future activities were requested; 
next, questions concerning expansion/reduction intentions under the 
current CAP and under the post-2013 CAP proposal were asked; and 
finally, personal and household characteristics were requested.  
The farm characteristics relate to farm size, location, legal status, 
main farm specialisation, typology of crops and animal breeding, intensity 
of livestock production, surface allocated to agro-environmental or 
ecological measures, and area invested in photovoltaic or biogas systems. 
In the same section, information on land rent in and out, on the 
increase/decrease of land owned or rented in the previous years (from 
2002), and on the presence of relatives among owners or tenants of the farm 
was collected. Concerning labour characteristics, information about the 
number of household members working full-time or part-time on the farm 
and the number of full and part-time external workers on the farm was 
collected. Farm characteristics were investigated through questions about 
marketing strategies for selling farm production, farm specialisation, 
production contracts implemented, and use of the internet to buy inputs or 
sell outputs. Regarding the CAP payments, information on the amount of 
payments, number of entitlements owned and the amount of other 
payments received in 2011 was collected. Moreover, the respondents were 
asked to quantify how the farm revenue is affected by those payments. 
Generic questions on intentions were also asked about the adoption of new 
technology and on intentions to remain in activity in the next years. The 
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percentage of total gross family income coming from farming was also 
investigated in this section. Household information was collected through 
questions concerning the gender of family members, the number of minors, 
the number of family members over 65 years old and the number of 
unemployed. Personal characteristics requested related to farmer age and 
education level, with the latter divided into eight categories ranging from 
no title or primary school to PhD. An outlier was excluded from the 
analysis. The main descriptive statistics about the sampled farms are 
reported in Table 6.1. More information is available in Viaggi et al. (2013b). 
Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
 
The modelling component of the paper is based on mathematical 
programming applied to the set of individual farms of the sample. Ciaian et 
al. (2012) and Puddu et al. (2012) developed a theoretical analysis of the 
Category Variable (code) Variable (description) Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
d_hillBo 1 if farm located in Bologna area 350 0.102857 0.304207 0 1
d_hill 1 if farm located in hill area 350 0.16 0.367131 0 1
d_mountain 1 if farm located in mountain area 350 0.102857 0.304207 0 1
d_plain 1 if farm located in plain area 350 0.634286 0.482319 0 1
d_disadv 1 if the farm is in a disadvantaged area 350 0.331429 0.471401 0 1
d_rentOut 1 if the farmer have land rent out 348 0.051724 0.221788 0 1
d_rentIn 1 if the farmer have land rent in 349 0.335244 0.472753 0 1
d_saleCon 1 if have contracts to sell products 348 0.33046 0.471056 0 1
d_livestock 1 if carries out livestock farming activities 349 0.106017 0.308302 0 1
d_fruits 1 if main specialization is fruits 349 0.083095 0.276421 0 1
d_mixedcrop 1 if main specialization is mixedcrop 349 0.272206 0.445735 0 1
d_cereals 1 if main specialization is cereals 349 0.469914 0.499811 0 1
HectLanProp Farm total area in property 349 29.73066 107.5369 0 1870
d_AATs 1 if is a small farm (AAT <=10 hectares) 349 0.492837 0.500667 0 1
d_AATms 1 if is a medium small farm (AAT >10 <=50 hectares) 349 0.383954 0.487045 0 1
d_AATml 1 if is a medium large farm (AAT >50 <=100 hectares) 349 0.083095 0.276421 0 1
d_AATl 1 if is a large farm (AAT >100 hectares) 349 0.040115 0.19651 0 1
d_ExPartT 1 if have external worker part time 349 0.091691 0.289003 0 1
d_ExFullT 1 if have external worker full time 349 0.057307 0.232761 0 1
d_HPartT 1 if have Household worker part time 349 0.183381 0.387534 0 1
d_HFullt 1 if haveHousehold worker full time 350 0.871429 0.335204 0 1
d_Unemployed 1 if presence of unemployed in the household 346 0.054913 0.228141 0 1
d_Over65 1 if presence of over 65 on household 350 0.537143 0.499332 0 1
d_higheduc farmer with high school, degree or PHD title 350 0.294286 0.456373 0 1
d_LowEduc farmer with no title, primary or middle school title 350 0.705714 0.456373 0 1
Age Age of respondent 347 63.29683 13.96263 25 92
d_livOnFarm 1 if live on farm (alone or with family or only the family) 347 0.85879 0.348741 0 1
d_Exit 1 if farmer intend to leave farm activity  350 0.145714 0.353325 0 1
d_Sellpro 1 if sell products to processing firms 350 0.071429 0.257908 0 1
d_selldea 1 if sell products to wholesale dealer 348 0.321839 0.467854 0 1
d_sellcoo 1 if sell products to cooperative  347 0.636888 0.481591 0 1
d_sellcon 1 if sell products to consumers 347 0.198847 0.399709 0 1
d_sellotfa 1 if sell products to another farm  347 0.083574 0.277147 0 1
importSFP Amount of Single Farm Payment received 257 7539.428 26404.53 36 350000
ImpOthPaym Amount of other CAP payments received 25 27418.4 66675.45 200 310000
NEntitlem2011 Number of entitlements owned 44 55.29545 188.2768 1 1200
ImpPayOnRevenue Average influence of CAP payments on revenue 253 2.217391 1.437927 1 6
Geographical characteristics
Farm characteristics
Household characteristics
Farmer characteristics
CAP payments
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impact of regionalisation on land prices in a two-farm setting and a 
simulation of farm-level demand curves. Puddu et al. also developed a 
model to simulate the effects of regionalisation (intended as the move from 
historical payment to fully regionalised) in the province of Bologna. 
Starting from the regionalised model developed by Ciaian et al., we first 
apply a simple profit maximisation model to simulate changes in land 
operated, in which profit is a function of available land, without specifying 
the way of accessing the land (ownership or rent). An alternative modelling 
framework is also used, explicitly considering ownership versus renting 
and including transaction costs, following the model developed by 
Deininger et al. (2008) and Bartolini & Viaggi (2013). 
Using the simulation model, the effect of the post-2013 CAP reform 
on the land market in the area is calculated as the difference between the 
current situation and the new situation, assuming a redistribution of the 
total amount of payments in the area based on a regionalised payment. 
In order to calibrate the model using data from the survey, we base 
the land demand function on information about the demand slope 
(function) and the amount of land available. In the model, we use the 
individual farms in the Bologna province assuming that altogether they are 
representative of the dynamics of the area. We assume that land can only 
be traded within each sub area of the study area (there are four sub areas: 
mountain, hill, Bologna hill and plain). 
A major issue concerns the reference area for the calculation of the 
regionalised payment. First, we assume that the regionalised payment will 
be uniform across the whole area and calculated based on the total 
SFP/UAA of the area; an alternative hypothesis simulated is that the 
regionalised payment is uniform within each sub area. 
Based on the rationale of the policy instrument, it would be 
reasonable to assume that entitlements (on the historical basis) do not affect 
the marginal value of land for most the farmers in the area (see also 
Bartolini & Viaggi, 2013). 
A detailed description of the model and of the calibration procedure 
is described in Viaggi et al. (2013b). 
4. Results 
Stated intentions, from the survey, on changes in farmland size as a 
consequence of the introduction of specific measures of regionalised direct 
payments, compared to the situation with the present CAP, show a similar 
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trend across the different options tested, with value of change below 13%. 
The option of “no change” covers the majority of the sample (Table 6.2). 
Table 6.2 Pattern of responses to regionalised payments 
CAP Measure Change Mode Frequency Percent 
Regionalisation 
Expansion 
buy 36 12.04 
rent 38 12.71 
Reduction 
sell 10 3.34 
rent 23 7.69 
 
The results of the model are illustrated in Table 6.3. The 
regionalisation of payments causes an increase in total income from €5.119 
million to €5.698 million as a result of the fact that with the regionalised 
payments, land allocation is not driven by entitlements and hence land is 
allocated reflecting the private optimum without any policy-driven 
distortion. 
Table 6.3 Main results of the model 
 Baseline  
(historical 
SFP) 
Regionalised 
payment 
Regionalised 
payment 
per zone 
Total gross margin (€ million) 5.991 6.509 6.892 
Marginal land value     
Mountain 200 372 251 
Hill 350 509 542 
Bologna hill 350 506 404 
Plain  600 744 789 
N. farms 349 160 160 
N. farm transaction costs model    
TC=0  122 117 
TC=0.1  223 152 
TC=0.2  292 211 
TC=0.3  320 265 
 
The total income does not differ between the two regionalisation 
options, due to the fact that land allocation and also the total amount of 
payments distributed are the same. 
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There is an increase in marginal land values as revealed by the land 
constraints in the model (which could hint at an increase in land prices). 
This may be due to two main effects: 
• The regionalised payment directly affects the marginal value, 
differently from the historical payments, constrained by the 
mechanism of entitlements. 
• There is an increase in the marginal productivity of land due to better 
re-allocation of land. 
The marginal value of land (and supposedly the income) per zone 
changes between the two regionalised options, as they imply a different re-
distribution of payments across areas. In particular, the uniform 
regionalised payments would yield relevant increases in the marginal value 
of land in mountain areas. 
The results also indicate a major tendency to re-allocate land, which is 
concentrated in only 160 farms (less than half). This does not differ between 
the two regionalisation options, due to the fact that land is constrained to 
being re-allocated within the same zone and the optimal allocation does not 
change with the level of regionalised payments. 
The model including transaction costs corroborates the same ideas, 
but also emphasises that the actual land re-allocation would depend on the 
actual transaction costs. The effects of assumptions about transaction costs 
are twofold. First, there is an effect of model calibration, and second, 
assuming transaction costs, the differential of marginal value of land across 
farms is greater and this yields different results (more intense re-allocation) 
in the option with zero transaction cost (less farms remaining). Increasing 
transaction costs causes a reduction in land exchanges and hence a higher 
number of farms remaining. It is expected that there is no difference 
between the two regionalisation hypotheses. 
5. Discussion 
This work uses survey and modelling information to assess the impact of 
post-2013 CAP reforms. Altogether, the results of the model are consistent 
with the results from the survey. In particular, both hint at the fact that 
there are farms in the area interested in selling/buying land in opposite 
directions in the case of regionalisation. However, the high level of “no 
changes” in the survey (also the consequence of uncertainty in future value 
of payments under the regionalised regime), which is normal when 
comparing modelling results with actual intentions, reveal that any change 
would occur much more gradually than indicated by the model. Both 
68 | VIAGGI, BARTOLINI, PUDDU & RAGGI 
survey and modelling results are generally consistent with the previous 
literature in terms of stated reactivity to policy reforms and direction of 
changes. This is also due to the fact that the model design is largely 
theoretically driven. 
This work is affected by several limitations. A key limit is the current 
uncertainty about the CAP reform (still in a phase of negotiation). This does 
not allow for realistic hypotheses about the actual details of the allocation 
mechanisms in each area. 
Another set of limitations derives from the characteristics of the 
model, which uses a very simplified approach not including specific 
technical constraints, land uses and technologies. In addition, in spite of the 
use of transaction costs, the model cannot be deemed to fully incorporate 
obstacles to land transaction, including distance effects, life cycle of the 
farms and so on, as well as other factors affecting land values and 
transactions. As a result, the changes due to the reform and the related 
economic effects are certainly overestimated.  
6. Conclusions, policy implications and further research  
Modelling and survey information show a reaction in land demand to the 
shift from historical to regionalised payments. Regionalised payments seem 
to be capitalised more into the land value, at the margin, as long as they are 
less connected to entitlements. As a result, regionalisation would cause 
increased rental prices in the study area. From an economic point of view, 
however, overall agricultural income would benefit from regionalisation 
due to a more efficient allocation of land.  
The reaction is strongly influenced by the previous historical system 
of distribution of payments. In fact, the quantity of entitlements owned 
before the reform and their link with farm area is the key factor affecting 
the change in land demand resulting from the upcoming reform and how 
each farm would interact with the market. The difference in historical 
payments and the hypotheses about how the regionalised payments will be 
calculated also strongly affect the outcome of the modelling exercise. 
Hence, the choice of the distribution of the national ceiling, which affects 
the budget available to the basic payment, and the territorial level at which 
payments will be uniformly applied will be particularly decisive. 
In terms of policy implications, two main messages arise. First, 
regionalisation is desirable if the objective is efficiency. Second, if there is 
also a concern over destabilisation of land markets and distribution of 
income, a cautious (evidence-based) choice of the areas for uniform 
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payments and a gradual move from the historical to the regional system 
would be advisable. 
A straightforward development of this work would be the revision of 
the model once the reform is approved and the implementation process 
better clarified. In addition, new instruments could be included and/or 
better developed in the analysis, such as greening or capping. Another line 
of investigation is the use of a dynamic model, which could better account 
for the process of adaptation, or a more realistic specification of spatial 
interactions, allowing for distance and neighbouring effects. 
 
This work does not necessarily reflect the view of the European Union and 
in no way anticipates the Commission’s future policy in this area. 
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7. LAND MARKET REGULATIONS 
IN THE EU 
JOHAN SWINNEN, KRISTINE VAN HERCK 
AND LIESBET VRANKEN* 
n this chapter, the authors develop a set of regulatory indices to assess the 
importance and stringency of land regulations in the EU. These indices show 
that there are major differences among EU member states in the regulation of 
land markets. Some countries, such as France, have a high regulatory index for 
both rental and sales markets, while others, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, 
have a high regulation index for rental markets but not sales markets (or vice versa 
in Poland and Hungary). Then there is a group of countries (including the Czech 
Republic, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland and the UK) with very little 
regulation in either land rental or sales markets. Interestingly, regulation of land 
markets and land exchange are not closely aligned with simple regional or 
institutional macro-clusters. Moreover, the strongest regulations are not in the 
former communist eastern member states of the EU but in some of the western 
(long-term capitalist) countries. 
 
1. Introduction 
Land markets play a crucial role in EU agriculture and, with the shift to 
direct payments and SFP/SAPS, an increasingly important role in the CAP 
as well.  
There is a vast literature on the role of land rights and institutions for 
optimal land exchange (for reviews see, for example, Binswanger et al., 
1995; Platteau, 2000; Keefer & Knack, 2002; Deininger, 2003). The creation of 
                                                     
* This chapter draws heavily on the work published under Factor Markets Working 
Paper No. 14 and Working Paper No. 15. These papers have now been updated 
and integrated in Swinnen et al. (2013). 
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optimal land institutions attracted renewed attention in the 1990s because 
of its central role in the transition process in former communist countries in 
East Asia, the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe (Lerman et al. 2004, 
Rozelle & Swinnen, 2004; Swinnen et al., 2006) and more recently because 
of the large-scale land investments in developing countries (Deininger, 
2013).  
The optimality of specific land institutions is conditional on the state 
of the economy and government policies (Sadoulet et al., 2001). Therefore 
one would expect to observe similar types of land governance (how land is 
exchanged and what is regulated by the state) in countries which are close 
in their economic development, geographic location and political 
institutions. Yet, it is remarkable how much variation one observes 
empirically in institutions for land exchange and in land regulations among 
EU countries and among countries within the EU which are relatively close 
in geographic location and economic development.  
In this chapter, we present key findings on differences in the nature 
and regulation of land markets among EU countries. We refer to Swinnen 
et al. (2013) for more details and for explanations for the observed 
differences.  
2. Land market regulations in the EU 
A central element in the choice between buying and renting land is the 
trade-off between security of operation (access to land) and liquidity 
(allocation of capital). Both are affected by the state of the economy but also 
by government regulations. Land regulations can importantly affect 
property rights, tenure security and access to land for farmers (Swinnen, 
2002). Land regulations also affect the distribution of economic rents and 
the distribution of policy rents (Ciaian & Swinnen, 2009). 
There are major differences among EU member states in regulation of 
land markets.17 In some countries, land prices and rental contracts are 
regulated by the government, in others not. One can identify several 
categories of land market regulations: (1) measures to protect the tenant, (2) 
measures to protect the owner-cultivator, (3) measures to protect the 
owner, and (4) measures to prevent fragmentation.  
                                                     
17 We refer to Swinnen et al. (2013) where we have developed a series of 
hypotheses to explain these differences in land markets among countries. 
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To assess the importance and stringency of land regulations and to 
indicate the differences between countries, we have collected data on land 
regulations and have developed a set of regulatory indices to compare 
countries. We use 15 variables to construct the four indicators.18 The 
information on the underlying variables is obtained from interviews with 
local land experts in each of the countries and from a series of country 
studies of land markets (Ciaian et al., 2010).  
2.1 Measures to protect the tenant 
Land market regulations aiming to protect the tenant include regulations 
that impose a minimum rental contract duration, maximum rental prices, 
automatic rental contract renewal, conditions for rental contract 
termination, and a pre-emptive buying right of the tenant.  
Maximum rental prices are stipulated in agricultural land legislation in 
Belgium, France and the Netherlands. Maximum rental prices depend on 
the agronomic quality (expected marginal productivity) of a plot. In 
Austria, rental contracts need to be approved by the Grundverkehrsbehörde, 
and this authority can reject the rental transaction when the rental 
determined in the contract is 50% higher than the average price in the 
region. 
In several countries, the national legislation stipulates a minimum 
duration for a rental contract. This is the case in Austria, Belgium, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia and Slovenia. In many EU 
countries, rental contracts are automatically renewed.19 Moreover, in 
Belgium, France and the Netherlands, the (automatic) extension of a rental 
contract can only be prevented by the owner under certain specific 
conditions (e.g. when the owner or close relative wants to use the land 
him/herself). Otherwise the rental contract is automatically renewed with 
the previous tenant.  
                                                     
18 For a detailed discussion of the variables used to construct the indicators, we 
refer to Swinnen et al. (2013). 
19 Land rental contracts in Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Slovakia and Slovenia are automatically renewed for the length of the initial 
contract period in case the owner nor the tenant wants to end the contract. In 
Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany and the UK, rental contracts are extended 
year-by-year. 
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Tenants have a pre-emptive right to buy the land in Belgium, France, 
Italy, Portugal, Sweden, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and 
Slovenia. 
2.2 Measures to protect the (local) owner-cultivator  
Land market regulations which aim to protect the owner-cultivator include 
restrictive conditions on the owner (such as nationality), maximum sales 
prices, pre-emptive buying rights for neighbouring farmers, and maxima 
on the transacted area.  
Restrictions on foreigners to buy (or rent) land are especially important in 
the new EU member states (NMS) (Swinnen & Vranken, 2009; 2010). These 
restrictions were introduced at the moment of EU accession to prevent 
foreign investors, attracted by low land prices due to the large income 
differences and poor-functioning rural credit markets. Virtually all NMS 
have some restrictions but the precise nature differs among countries.20  
Restrictions other than nationality for landowners exist in Austria, 
Denmark, Hungary and Poland. In Austria, new owners of agricultural 
land should have their residence relatively close to the plot and have a 
proof of competence in the agricultural sector (through experience or 
education). In Poland also, farmers should have a proof of competence in 
the agricultural sector (through experience or education). In Hungary, there 
is a legal obligation for the new owner to cultivate the land.  
In France, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Portugal and Slovenia, neighbouring 
farmers have a pre-emptive right to buy when a plot of agricultural land is 
sold. 
In none of the countries is there a well-defined maximum sales price, 
but in Austria, France and Poland, the government can interfere in the sales 
                                                     
20 In Hungary, Latvia and Poland, no company with majority foreign ownership 
can buy land. In Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia, foreign 
individuals (“natural persons”) are only allowed to buy a plot after renting and 
farming the plot for at least three years. In Lithuania, foreign natural persons are 
allowed to buy agricultural land if they have been staying and farming in the 
country for at least three years or they are married to a national citizen. In Bulgaria 
and Romania, foreign natural persons are allowed to buy agricultural land if they 
intend to settle and farm in the country. Interestingly, Finland and Greece also 
restrict foreigners from renting or buying agricultural land in specific regions.  
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market of agricultural land if the sales price of agricultural land is 
considered too high. 
Limitations on the amount of land owned or transacted exist in Denmark, 
France, Hungary and Lithuania. In France, the SAFER can refuse a 
transaction if it considers the amount of land that is sold to be too high. In 
Hungary, an individual farmer can own and cultivate up to 300 hectares, 
while a legal entity (farming company) is not allowed to own any 
agricultural land and can only cultivate up to 2,500 hectares of (leased) 
land. In Lithuania, there is an upper limit on the amount of land that can be 
owned by a natural person or a legal entity (up to 500 hectares).  
2.3 Measures to protect the landowner and prevent fragmentation 
Regulations to protect the landowner include minimum rental prices and 
maximum durations of contracts. Countries with a maximum duration on 
rental contracts are Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Poland and Sweden. 
Austria, the Czech Republic and France also regulate the minimum rental 
price.  
Regulations to prevent land fragmentation include regulations on 
minimum plot size and pre-emptive buying rights of the co-owner. Pre-
emptive rights for the co-owner to buy land exist in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia. A legal 
minimal plot size exists in six countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany, 
Lithuania and Slovakia.  
2.4 Indicators of regulation 
Figure 7.1 presents the four indicators of regulation as well as an aggregate 
indicator, the total regulatory index (TRI), which is a measure of the total 
amount of regulations in the land market. It is clear that there is a large 
difference among the EU countries in land market regulations, and again 
the variation in interventions is not a simple East-West divide. Among the 
new and old member states, there are both strongly regulated and very 
liberal approaches to land governance.  
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Figure 7.1 Land regulation indicators 
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Among the 24 EU countries for which we have data, the most 
regulated land ‘markets’ are in France (TRI = 9) and Hungary (TRI=8). In 
France, regional organisations – the SAFERs – determine a minimum and 
maximum price bracket within which the tenant and the owner can agree a 
contract price. These organisations effectively control the local land 
markets through their powers to buy, sell and rent out agricultural land. 
Effectively, they ensure that land is only owned by working farmers. The 
SAFERs also control the level of farm restructuring and growth by 
requiring farmers to obtain authorisation from them for farm expansion. In 
Hungary, land can only be owned by individuals or families (“natural 
persons”), and not by farming companies which operate a large share of 
the land. Ownership is restricted to Hungarian nationals and owners have 
an obligation to farm the land. The most liberal regulations exist in Ireland 
(TRI = 0), Greece (TRI = 0.25), and the UK (TRI = 0.5) among the old 
member states, and in Romania (TRI = 1.5) and Czech Republic (TRI = 2.5) 
among the new member states.  
The aggregate numbers may bias to some extent the conclusions, in 
particular for countries with medium levels of the TRI. For example, 
Belgium has a TRI of 5 but all the regulations are in the rental market, 
which is very important in Belgium (approximately 70% of the land is 
rented) and which is highly regulated: the tenant protection indicator (TPI) 
is 5 which is the highest of all countries (together with France). However, 
they have no other regulations (the other indices are all 0). The Netherlands 
is similar to Belgium in that it has quite significant regulations in the rental 
markets to protect the tenants (TPI = 4) but no other land regulations (other 
indicators are 0). This contrasts with France, which has extensive 
regulations both in the rental and in the sales markets.  
Another example is Poland with a total regulation index of 6.5, but 
with a large difference between the sales and rental market regulations. In 
Poland, where most of the land is owned and operated by (small) family 
farms (only 20% is rented), there is very little protection for tenants (TPI = 
1) but significant regulations protect (family) farms who operate on land 
they own: their owner protection index (OPI) is 3.5. Together with 
Hungary, where the OPI = 5, this is the highest of all the countries.  
3. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we document large variations in land regulation among EU 
member states. Some countries, such as France, have a high regulatory 
index for both rental and sales markets. Others, such as Belgium and the 
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Netherlands, have a high regulation index for rental markets but not sales 
markets, and Poland and Hungary vice versa. Then there is a group of 
countries (including the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland and the UK) with very few regulations in either land rental and 
sales markets. Interestingly, regulation of land markets and land exchange 
are not closely aligned with simple regional or institutional macro-clusters. 
Moreover, the strongest regulations are not in the former communist 
eastern member states of the EU, but in some of the western (long-term 
capitalist) countries.  
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8. THE INFLUENCE OF AGRICULTURAL 
SUBSIDIES AND REGULATIONS ON 
SALE PRICES OF FARMLAND IN FRANCE 
LAURE LATRUFFE, LAURENT PIET, 
PIERRE DUPRAZ AND CHANTAL LE MOUËL* 
n this chapter, the authors investigate the determinants of agricultural land 
price in several regions in France over the period 1994-2011 using individual 
plots transaction data, with a particular emphasis on agricultural subsidies 
and nitrate zoning regulations. They found evidence that agricultural subsidies 
capitalised at least to some extent. However, the magnitude of such a capitalisation 
depends on the region considered, on the type of subsidy considered, and on 
whether the location of the plot is in a nitrate surplus zone or not.  
 
1. Introduction 
The influence of agricultural subsidies on farm land prices has attracted a 
large body of research in the economic literature. The main issue is 
whether, and by how much, subsidies increase agricultural land prices. A 
positive influence on price would reveal that part of the subsidies are 
capitalised into land prices, indicating that landowners are beneficiaries of 
public support, generally unintended by governments. While this leakage 
                                                     
* The authors are grateful to Sylvain Cariou for his help in preparing the database. 
This chapter summarises the key insights on the empirical analysis of the influence 
of agricultural subsidies on sale prices on French farmland. The full paper with 
details on methodology and results is available as Latruffe, Piet, Dupraz & Le 
Mouël, “Influence of Agricultural Support on Sale Prices of French Farmland: A 
comparison of different subsidies, accounting for the role of environmental and 
land regulations”, Factor Markets Working Paper No. 51, June 2013. 
I 
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of public funds to potentially non-agricultural or former agricultural 
stakeholders instead of supporting active farmers’ income is problematic, 
the increase in land prices caused by subsidies is, in addition, detrimental 
to young farmers willing to settle. The literature is relatively consistent 
regarding the empirical evidence of the capitalisation of public subsidies 
into land prices (Latruffe & Le Mouël, 2009): government subsidies are 
major contributors to agricultural land price increases; they are generally 
found to account for 15-30% of the price of land. 
In this chapter, we investigate the capitalisation of agricultural 
subsidies into land sale prices in France in 1994-2011. Our contribution to 
the literature is threefold. First, we provide a recent analysis of this issue, 
while previous papers on France are largely out-dated (Goodwin & Ortalo-
Magné, 1992; Cavailhès & Degoud, 1995). Second, we consider several 
types of subsidies. It is generally accepted that different subsidies 
contribute differently to land prices due to their varying objectives and 
implementation schemes and schedules (Patton et al., 2008; Latruffe et al., 
2008). Third, we investigate the issue of public support capitalisation, 
taking into account that the market for farm land is affected by regulations, 
related or unrelated to land – such as prohibited land ownership for 
specific entities, regulated prices, pre-emptive rights for specific buyers and 
zoning regulations – which may restrict the mobility of land uses. 
2. The case study regions 
We use data from individual land sale transactions in several regions in 
France. These regions are very different in terms of farm structure and 
production specialisation and, therefore, in terms of main subsidies 
received, but also in terms of non-agricultural demand for land. Figure 1 
shows the studied regions’ locations in France and their main agricultural 
productions in 2010. 
Brittany is a NUTS2 region located in western France consisting of 
four NUTS3 sub-regions. The region has a strong agricultural nature. The 
farming structures are characterised by medium-sized farms with respect 
to the national average, and dairy and granivores as the main types of 
farming. The urban and agricultural pressures on agricultural land are 
stronger in Brittany than in the other regions analysed, due to its 
attractiveness for new inhabitants and for tourism, and due to the 
significant livestock dejections which urge farmers to find surfaces for 
manure-spreading. Limousin, a NUTS2 region in central France consisting 
of three NUTS3 sub-regions, is characterised by a hilly landscape and 
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cattle-raising (beef and sheep). A large part of the region is covered with 
permanent grass, and farms are medium-sized. Finally, Meuse is a NUTS3 
region in eastern France. Farms are on average large. Field crop production 
– in particular, production of cereals, oilseeds and protein crops – prevails, 
followed by dairy farming. 
France has applied a two-stage zoning based on the European Nitrate 
Directive. Municipalities are first classified as belonging to a vulnerable 
zone or not. In such zones, the use of land for specific purposes may be 
prohibited and farming practices may be restricted. The second stage, the 
nitrate surplus zoning (zone d’excédent structurel, or ZES), which includes 
municipalities where nitrate from livestock source exceeds 170kg per 
hectare of utilised agricultural area (UAA), imposes stricter regulations. 
Brittany is affected by livestock pollution, resulting in the whole region 
being classified as a vulnerable zone, and half of its municipalities come 
under the nitrate surplus zone. By contrast, NUTS3 Meuse is only partly 
classified as a vulnerable zone but is not concerned by the nitrate surplus 
zoning, and NUTS2 Limousin is not classified in either zone. 
Figure 8.1 Location and main types of farming of the regions studied 
 
Source: Authors’ 2010 SSP agricultural census – ©IGN 2011, Geofla® 
3. The land price database 
The land price database (the PERVAL database) that we used was obtained 
from notaries and consists of all transactions of agricultural land that 
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occurred in the regions over the period studied. We considered only arable 
land and pasture which was non-built and already tenanted by a farmer or 
not. Because the smallest plots exchanged were sold at very high prices, 
reflecting the fact that future conversion to development use is anticipated 
for such plots, we restricted the database to plots with an area equal to or 
above ten hectares. During the period studied (1994–2011), 2,772 such 
transactions occurred in NUTS2 Brittany, 774 in NUTS2 Limousin and 739 
in NUTS3 Meuse. Taking all regions together, plots sold of 10 hectares or 
above were, on average, 19.9 hectares in size and priced at €2,795 per 
hectare. 
The occupations of both the seller and the buyer are some of the 
transaction characteristics which are available in the land sales database. 
Two thirds of the plots are bought by farmers. In France, specific private 
bodies have the public mission of regulating the transactions in order to 
limit price speculation, avoid farm fragmentation and promote the 
settlement of young farmers. Each transaction is notified to these bodies, 
called the SAFER (Sociétés d’Aménagement Foncier et d’Etablissement Rural), 
which operate at the NUTS3 level. If the SAFER believes that a transaction 
is a threat to farm consolidation or settlement, or may be governed by price 
speculation, it can stop the transaction. It then tries to convince the seller 
and the buyer to change the transaction on an amicable basis and, if this is 
not possible, it pre-empts the plot and has five years to sell it back at a 
lower price or to another buyer. In the PERVAL database, the SAFER 
intervenes (by buying or re-selling a plot) in 16% of transactions. 
The municipality in which the plot is located is also available in the 
PERVAL database, enabling each transaction to be related to agricultural 
subsidies and revenue as well as to other variables such as the 
municipality’s demographic characteristics and the zones it may come 
under. 
4. Methodology 
Because data regarding agricultural revenue and subsidies are not directly 
available from public statistics at the municipality level, they were 
estimated in a first stage of the analysis. The second stage of the analysis 
consists in regressing the transaction price on these proxies and the other 
variables mentioned above. 
The dependent variable used for the second-stage estimation is the 
deflated price per hectare of agricultural land sold in plots with an area of 
ten hectares or more. The explanatory variables which were expected a 
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priori to influence the land price are, first, the basic determinants of land 
price based on the present value model: on the one hand, revenue from 
agricultural use, which is separated into a market-based component (M) 
and a government-based component (G), and on the other hand, potential 
revenue from non-agricultural use. 
An approximation of the agricultural revenue (M) and agricultural 
subsidies (G) at the municipality level was obtained through a first-stage 
regression. The revenue variable is the pre-tax profit from which we 
excluded subsidies to avoid double counting. Six types of subsidies could 
be considered, namely total agricultural subsidies and five different 
components: CAP first-pillar coupled direct payments to crops and herds; 
CAP first-pillar land set-aside premiums; CAP first-pillar decoupled single 
farm payments (SFPs); CAP second-pillar less-favoured area (LFA) 
payments; and CAP second-pillar agri-environmental payments to 
extensive grazing livestock. The deflated revenue and subsidies were 
regressed on crop areas and herd numbers (observed at NUTS3 level) as a 
system of stacked equations using the seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) estimator. Then, the resulting estimated coefficients were used to 
generate projections at the municipality level from crop areas and herd 
numbers observed in the agricultural censuses. To account for the size of 
the municipality, the revenue and subsidies projections were divided by 
the municipalities’ UAA. 
Potential revenue from non-agricultural use was not observed. For 
this reason, following the literature, we proxied it by two variables: the 
population density in the municipality where the plot is located, and a 
dummy indicating whether or not the municipality is part of an urban area. 
In addition to these basic determinants suggested by the present 
value model, we controlled for the size of the plot sold, whether the buyer 
was a farmer, and the municipality’s area. We also included year dummies 
and NUTS3 region dummies. Finally, we considered regulations that may 
affect the price of agricultural land. The first regulation variable related to 
zoning based on the Nitrate Directive; the zoning dummy variable took the 
value 1 if the municipality was in the nitrate surplus zone, and the value 0 
otherwise. The second regulation variable took the value 1 if the seller or 
buyer was a local SAFER, and 0 otherwise. 
We performed regressions on a sample consisting of all three regions 
together, and on the samples of each region separately. In addition, for all 
four samples, we performed one regression including the total subsidy 
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variable and one regression including the five different types of subsidies 
instead. 
5. Findings 
First, we found that agricultural revenue generally has no significant 
influence on land price, contrary to what can be expected from the present 
value model. One reason may be that the original variable (i.e. pre-tax 
profit) used to construct our proxy variable, which is the only one that was 
available from the statistics, may not be the best representation of income 
generated by farming activities on land because it is too low in the 
accounting balance sheet. The gross margin would be a better candidate 
but was not available in the original database. Another reason may be that 
the revenue variable was proxied at the municipality level and not at the 
level of the plot itself. 
Second, we found evidence that agricultural subsidies actually 
capitalised at least to some extent in the price of land in the regions studied 
over 1994-2011. However, the magnitude of such a capitalisation depends 
on several factors. One varying factor is the region; for the sample 
including the three regions together, we found a positive but relatively 
small capitalisation effect of the total subsidies per hectare. However, this 
effect is differentiated according to the region in question. In NUTS2 
Brittany, the positive effect is significant only for plots located in the nitrate 
surplus area and is greater than in both other regions. As for these two 
other regions, the effect is greater in NUTS2 Limousin than in NUTS3 
Meuse. Another varying factor is the type of subsidy. When considering all 
regions together, we found that only land set-aside premiums significantly 
capitalise into the price of land, whether the plot is located in a surplus 
zone or not. The capitalisation effect is high, suggesting a scarcity effect due 
to the requirement to withdraw land from production. In addition, SFP has 
a significant positive capitalisation impact only for plots located in a 
surplus zone.  
Third, we found a significant influence of regulations on land price. 
Regarding land transaction regulations, plots purchased or re-sold by 
SAFER were found to be significantly more expensive. This finding is 
counterintuitive, as SAFER are expected to contribute to alleviate 
speculation on land prices. One reason may be that SAFER do not always 
use their pre-emptive right with a view to keeping land price low; they 
may also pre-empt land that is up for sale to change the buyer, to limit farm 
fragmentation, or to support the settlement of young farmers. Another 
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reason may be that SAFER’s intervention with a view to keeping the price 
low may occur for specific land, which is more expensive than the average 
agricultural land. The interactions with the SAFER variable and the subsidy 
variables were not significant. By contrast, we found some significant effect 
of subsidy variables interacting with the zoning regulation variable: in 
NUTS2 Brittany, where the nitrate surplus zoning is implemented, the 
capitalisation of subsidies is significant for plots located inside the zone but 
not for plots located outside the zone, revealing a restriction on land 
mobility in the surplus areas. This suggests that public intervention in the 
form of nitrate zoning regulations may affect land mobility in favour of a 
specific use of land and may increase the degree of capitalisation of 
subsidies in agricultural land price, possibly an unintended consequence as 
it goes against the government objective of supporting farmers’ income. 
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9. THE IMPACT OF GLOBAL RED AND 
REDD POLICIES ON EUROPEAN LAND 
MARKETS 
PETER DIXON, HANS VAN MEIJL, 
MAUREEN RIMMER, LINDSAY SHUTES 
AND ANDRZEJ TABEAU* 
orldwide biofuel production has expanded rapidly over the past decade, 
driven by renewable energy directives and high crude oil prices, as well 
as a growing interest in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. There are 
increasing concerns, however, that the demand for land for biofuel production may 
be leading to increased deforestation. The United Nations REDD programme seeks 
to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation by protecting and 
managing forests and woodlands. Any effort to limit deforestation is, however, 
likely to limit the land available for agricultural production, including biofuel 
production stemming from RED policies. This chapter examines the impact on 
European agricultural land markets of global renewable energy directives (RED) 
and the programme to limit deforestation and forest degradation (REDD). The 
authors adopt a scenario approach using the MAGNET global computable general 
equilibrium model and find that, in contrast to global trends, both renewable 
energy and forest protection policies may boost European agriculture. The policies 
increase the demand for crop land in Europe, partly offsetting the trend towards 
intensification. Overall, the authors find that Europe appears to experience net 
gains from global efforts to increase biofuel use and protect forests, experiencing 
higher agricultural production and trade, with only small increases in land prices 
and food prices faced by consumers.  
                                                     
* This chapter is an extension of Dixon, van Meijl, Rimmer, Shutes & Tabeau, “RED 
vs. REDD: Biofuel Policy vs. Forest Conservation”, Factor Markets Working Paper 
No. 41, May 2013. 
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1. Introduction 
A rapid growth in worldwide biofuel production has been observed since 
2001, driven by renewable energy directives (REDs) and high crude oil 
prices, as well as a growing interest in reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. There are increasing concerns, however, that the demand for 
land for biofuel production may be leading to increased deforestation 
(Banse et al., 2008; Banse et al., 2011; Hertel et al., 2010), resulting in 
biodiversity losses and higher GHG emissions. Deforestation and forest 
degradation, together with peatland emissions, have been shown to 
account for between 15% (Van der Werf et al., 2009) and 20–25% of 
greenhouse gas emissions, a total that is higher than the entire contribution 
of the transportation sector (Myers, 2007). 
The United Nations’ REDD programme seeks to reduce emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation by protecting and managing 
forests and woodlands (UN-REDD, 2011). Any effort to limit deforestation 
is also likely to limit the land available for increasing agricultural 
production, including biofuel production stemming from RED policies. The 
restriction of available land by REDD policies is therefore likely to change 
the pattern of comparative advantage in agricultural production between 
countries, leading to changes in agricultural prices, trade and food security. 
However, the effect on European agricultural markets, together with the 
land use impacts of REDD policies on European land markets, are not well 
understood and, to date, there have been no studies of the interaction 
between REDs and REDD and little discussion in the policy arena. 
This chapter examines the impact on European agricultural land 
markets of global REDs and the REDD programme aiming to limit 
deforestation and forest degradation REDD. We adopt a scenario approach 
using the MAGNET21 global computable general equilibrium (CGE) model 
as outlined in Dixon et al. (2013). The advantage of this modelling approach 
is that the feedback effects between agricultural, biofuel, energy and other 
markets are well captured (Rajagopal & Zilberman, 2007).  
2. Modelling framework and scenario definitions 
Capturing the interaction of RED and REDD policies requires a global 
multi-sector approach that accounts for both the changes in restrictions on 
                                                     
21 The Modular Applied GeNeral Equilibrium Tool (MAGNET) is an applied 
computable general equilibrium model developed at LEI, The Hague, Netherlands. 
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land availability arising from the REDD agreements and changes in energy 
and agricultural markets arising from biofuel directives.  
The policy scenarios are implemented in the MAGNET model, a 
multi-regional, recursive-dynamic, applied general equilibrium model 
based on neo-classical microeconomic theory (Nowicki et al., 2009; van 
Meijl et al., 2006). The model is calibrated to version 6 of the GTAP 
database (Dimaranan, 2006), which contains detailed production, bilateral 
trade, transport and protection data characterising economic linkages 
within and among regions. All monetary values of the data are in millions 
of US dollars and the base year for version 6 is 2001, which is updated to 
2010 using macroeconomic and yield data. The 88 regions in the GTAP 
database are aggregated to 45 regions for simulation purposes, with the 
results presented here for two groups: Europe and Global. Similarly, the 57 
sectors identified in the database are aggregated to 26 sectors that produce 
28 products, including land-using agricultural sectors such as rice, grains, 
wheat, oilseed, sugar, horticulture, other crops, cattle, pork and poultry, 
and milk; the petrol sector that demands fossil (crude oil, gas and coal) and 
bioenergy inputs (ethanol and biodiesel); and by-products of biofuels 
production.  
The MAGNET model contains a number of advanced features 
pertinent to modelling the impact of RED and REDD policies on land and 
agricultural markets in Europe. These include factor market 
representations of imperfectly substitutable types of land, a land use 
allocation structure, segmented labour and capital markets in agriculture 
and non-agriculture, and a new land supply curve to address large 
reductions in the amount of available land for agriculture (Dixon et al., 
2013). Biofuel production is included by introducing the production and 
use of ethanol and biodiesel and their by-products. Blending targets are 
included in the model via an end-user tax on motor-fuels that is used to 
subsidise biofuel production and stimulate production up to the level 
implied by the blending target.  
We define three scenarios: the ‘business-as-usual’ scenario projects 
the development of the global economy to 2030; the RED scenario 
implements worldwide biofuel blending targets; and the REDD scenario 
restricts the amount of land available for agriculture through the protection 
of forests in addition to the worldwide biofuel policy. The assumptions for 
each of these scenarios are given in Table 9.1. Together, the scenarios show 
the impact of RED and REDD policies on land use, land prices, agricultural 
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production, food prices and food security in Europe and worldwide up to 
2030. 
Table 9.1 Scenario assumptions 
  Business-as-usual RED REDD 
   GDP1 Populationa Yieldsb Biofuel share 2010 
Biofuel 
share 2020 
Land 
availabilityf 
World 100 21 39 0.1 - 20.6c 3 - 25d -35 
Europe 50 -1 20 1.7e 10e -4 
a Growth over the period 2010-2030 (USDA, 2010). 
b Average growth over the period 2010-2030, weighted by land area (Bruinsma, 2003). 
c Ranges from 0.1% in former Soviet Union, China and Indonesia to 20.6% in Brazil (see 
Dixon et al. 2013 for more details) 
d Ranges from 3% in Canada and Oceania to 25% in Brazil (see Dixon et al., 2013 for more 
details) 
e Percentage of first-generation biofuels in transport fuel (Europe = EU27), simple average 
over countries in each region. Calculations based on Sorda et al. (2010). 
f Percentage change in potential land availability due to forest and woodland conversion 
restrictions. IMAGE model calculations based on Stehfest et al. (2010). 
European GDP is projected to increase by 50% between 2010 and 
2030, compared to a doubling of world GDP over the same period. Per 
capita GDP in Europe will increase as the population is projected to fall 
slightly, in contrast to a 21% increase globally. Yield growth in Europe is 
below the global average of 39%, at 20% over the same period. The biofuel 
share needs to increase from 1.7% to 10% to meet the European RED by 
2020. Finally, the reduction in land availability implied by the REDD policy 
is much lower in Europe than in the rest of the world. Globally, land 
availability is projected to fall by 35%, compared with only 4% in Europe. 
Note that the RED scenario introduces the blending targets on top of 
the business-as-usual scenario assumptions. As such, a comparison of the 
RED and business-as-usual scenarios shows the impact of the biofuel 
policy. The REDD scenario introduces the reduction in land availability 
implied by the REDD policy in addition to the blending targets and 
business-as-usual scenario assumptions. A comparison of the RED and 
REDD scenarios therefore captures the effect of the forest protection policy.  
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3. The impact of RED and REDD policies on European land 
and agricultural markets 
In assessing the interaction of global REDs and the REDD programme to 
limit deforestation and forest degradation, we find that economic and 
population growth, together with biofuel policies, increase the demand for 
agricultural products and agricultural land use. The increased demand for 
land is met in part by increased yields and in part by the conversion of 
forests and woodlands. The introduction of a REDD policy to protect 
forests and woodlands limits the supply of land suitable for agricultural 
production worldwide, leading to the intensification of production and 
higher land prices. 
These headline results are shown in more detail for Europe and the 
world in Figure 9.1. The results for the business-as-usual scenario indicate 
that the evolution of European land markets differs significantly from the 
global trend between 2010 and 2030. Land under cultivation in Europe is 
projected to fall by 7% by 2030, compared to a projected increase of 8% 
worldwide. These projections are consistent with a European agricultural 
sector that remains stable but experiences intensification through yield 
growth, thereby reducing the land required for production. This 
intensification leads to lower land prices in Europe. Globally however, the 
increase in agricultural demand outstrips yield growth leading to land 
extensification and higher land prices. 
The introduction of worldwide REDs increases the demand for land 
both in Europe and worldwide due to the increased demand for 
agricultural products for biofuel feed-stocks. Although globally the 
expansion in land area approaches, but does not encroach upon, the area 
protected under REDD (see dark grey column in Figure 9.1), regional 
differences mean that the expansion in biofuels following the RED policy 
may be achieved at the cost of deforestation.  
 
THE IMPACT OF GLOBAL RED AND REDD POLICIES ON EUROPEAN LAND MARKETS | 93 
Figure 9.1 Agricultural land use in 2030 (2010=1) and maximum available land 
relative to 2010 land under cultivation (2010 land under cultivation 
equals 1) 
 
Source: MAGNET model simulations. 
The implementation of the REDD policy to protect forests and 
woodlands leads to significant decreases in agricultural land availability 
worldwide (as shown by the reduction in the height of the global land-
availability column in Figure 9.1). The reduction in land availability 
reduces worldwide land under cultivation by 8% compared to the RED 
scenario. The impact of REDD on land use is particularly strong, more than 
offsetting the increase in land use due to the RED policy and lowering the 
amount of land under cultivation to below business-as-usual levels.  
In contrast to this global trend, the protection of forests worldwide 
causes the amount of land under cultivation in Europe to increase slightly 
by 2% compared to the RED scenario. Indeed, Europe is the only region in 
which agricultural land use increases as a result of the REDD policy. This is 
due to an improvement in Europe’s comparative advantage in agricultural 
production brought about by the minimal requirements placed on land 
conservation in the region under the REDD policy and the long-term trend 
towards land intensification. Greater requirements for forest conservation 
in other regions increase average global agricultural prices by 17%, 
compared to only 5% in Europe where land is less scarce. The changing 
pattern of land scarcity following REDD is clear from Figure 9.1: economic 
and demographic trends mean that the ratio of land available under REDD 
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to land in use in 2030 is greater in Europe (1.205) than globally (1.045), 
making land relatively less scarce in Europe. This boosts European 
agricultural production and agricultural exports. Europe’s trade balance in 
agricultural products improves against a backdrop of slowing worldwide 
agricultural trade in which the volume of worldwide agricultural exports 
decreases by 5% following the implementation of the REDD policy.  
The impact of RED and REDD policies on real land and agricultural 
prices are shown in Figure 9.2. Land prices in the business-as-usual 
scenario are projected to be 27% lower by 2030 in Europe, compared to 47% 
higher worldwide. Agricultural prices, both within Europe and worldwide, 
are expected to fall by 2030, by 25% and 23% respectively, due to lower 
intermediate input prices and technological change that reduces the 
amount of inputs required to produce a unit of output. The impact of 
changes in the land price on agricultural prices depends upon the share of 
land in agricultural production. Regions that favour extensive agriculture, 
and therefore use a large amount of land to produce agricultural products, 
experience greater impacts on agricultural prices than regions with 
intensive agriculture for which land costs are a smaller share of production 
costs. 
Figure 9.2 Real land prices and agricultural producer prices in 2030 (2010=1) 
 
Source: MAGNET model simulations. 
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Although agricultural prices are generally projected to fall over the 
period in all scenarios, higher land prices lead to relatively higher 
agricultural prices after the introduction of the RED policy, and still higher 
prices after the introduction of the REDD policy. The introduction of 
biofuels policies pushes up European land prices by 14%, which is slightly 
below the global average of 16%. That is, instead of falling by 27% as in the 
business-as-usual scenario, the average real land price falls by only 17%.22 
The higher land prices lead to agricultural prices that are 1.5% higher in 
Europe and 6% higher worldwide.  
The impact of the REDD policy on land prices is particularly 
pronounced, increasing land prices in all regions including Europe. Land 
prices increase by a further 14% in Europe and 34% worldwide after the 
introduction of the REDD policy, which translate into agricultural price 
rises of a further 3% in Europe and 11% worldwide. The RED and REDD 
policies therefore lead to higher agricultural prices relative to the business-
as-usual values, although even with both policies in place, agricultural 
prices still remain below their 2010 level in both regions. 
Agricultural production is projected to increase by 0.3% in Europe 
and 28% worldwide by 2030. These increases in agricultural production can 
be met by increases in land area under cultivation (extensification) or yield 
growth (intensification) as shown in Figure 9.3. Although European 
agricultural output is projected to remain stable to 2030, the results indicate 
that there will be a trend toward intensification, with the same amount of 
output being produced from a smaller land area due to yield growth. This 
pattern differs from the global average, where the increase in agricultural 
production is met by increases in both yields and land area. Within Europe, 
the small increase in agricultural production of 0.3% is met by a 7% fall in 
land area and an 8% increase in yields. Globally, the 28% expansion in 
agricultural production is achieved through an 8% growth in land area and 
a 19% growth in yields.23 
                                                     
22 Note: 0.828/0.725 = 1.142. 
23 Figure 9.3 shows changes in logarithms multiplied by 100. Thus a 28% increase is 
shown as 25% [= 100*ln(1.28)]. Use of logarithms avoids having a residual in the 
decomposition of output growth into the contributions of area and yields. 
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Figure 9.3 Decomposition of percentage change in agricultural output by land area 
and yields, 2010-2030  
 
Source: MAGNET model simulations. 
The introduction of the RED policy leads to slightly higher 
agricultural production growth in Europe (1.7% higher) and worldwide 
(1.5% higher), with the extra production in Europe absorbed by extra 
demand for biofuel use within the region. The expansion is brought about 
by greater land use in both regions and a slight improvement in yields in 
European agriculture.  
The extensification that occurs under the RED policy contrasts with 
greater intensification worldwide under the REDD policy. The protection 
of forest and woodlands reduces global agricultural production by 1.9%, 
which more than offsets the increase brought about by the RED policy. 
Global agriculture intensifies as higher land prices reduce land under 
cultivation and increase yields by causing more units of capital and labour 
to be employed per unit of land. In contrast, lower relative land prices 
improve Europe’s comparative advantage and boost production by a 
further 5%. The expansion is met by both improvements in yields and 
increased land under cultivation. 
The results so far suggest that the introduction of the UN REDD 
policy to protect forests and woodlands will boost agricultural production 
in Europe, intensify global agriculture and increase agricultural prices. The 
implications of these higher agricultural prices for food consumption are 
shown in Figure 9.4. 
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Figure 9.4 Consumer food prices and household food consumption in 2030 
(2010=1) 
 
Source: MAGNET model simulations. 
The impact of the RED and REDD policies on consumer welfare and 
global food security can be evaluated by considering the impact on food 
prices and food consumption of households, where higher prices and a 
reduction in food consumption is taken to mean a worsening of welfare 
and food security. Overall, the consumption of food in both regions slightly 
decreases as a result of the RED and REDD policies, due to a small increase 
in consumer prices, but the impact of the REDD policy is unequally 
distributed worldwide with some regions experiencing relatively large 
reductions in food consumption. This result suggests that any growth in 
income from the expanding agricultural sector in Europe is outweighed by 
higher consumer prices. 
4. Summary 
Our findings suggest that in contrast to global trends, both renewable 
energy and forest protection policies will boost European agriculture. The 
policies also lead to more demand for land for crop cultivation, partly 
offsetting the trend towards intensification in Europe. The trend towards 
intensification in Europe, plus relatively low forest protection 
requirements, improves Europe’s comparative advantage in agricultural 
production, accounting for the different response in this region. Overall, 
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Europe appears to experience net gains from global efforts to increase 
biofuel use and protect forests, experiencing higher agricultural production 
and trade, with only small increases in land prices and food prices faced by 
consumers.  
We also find that RED and REDD are feasible from a worldwide 
perspective, although there are some regional concerns over food security 
that need to be addressed. Countries directly affected by forest and 
woodland protection would be the most economically vulnerable when the 
REDD policy is implemented. The full REDD policy setting, however, 
foresees providing compensation to these countries to cover their economic 
losses. The RED policies are typically achieved through greater 
extensification, whereas the restriction on available land for agriculture 
under REDD leads to a greater intensification of agriculture. That said, real 
food prices are still lower than the 2010 level, even with the RED and 
REDD policies in place.  
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10. ACCESS TO CAPITAL AND 
AGRICULTURAL LAND DEMAND 
MARTIN BANSE, ANDREA ROTHE, ANDRZEJ 
TABEAU, HANS VAN MEIJL AND GEERT 
WOLTJER* 
his chapter analyses the consequences of enhanced biofuel production in 
regions and countries of the world that have announced plans to implement 
or expand on biofuel policies. The analysis considers biofuel policies 
implemented as binding blending targets for transportation fuels. The chosen 
quantitative modelling approach is two-fold: it combines the analysis of biofuel 
policies in a multi-sectoral economic model (MAGNET) with systematic variation 
of the functioning of capital and labour markets. The chapter adds to existing 
research by considering biofuel policies in the EU, the US and various other 
countries with considerable agricultural production and trade, such as Brazil, 
India and China. Moreover, the application multi-sectoral modelling system with 
different assumptions on the mobility of factor markets allows for the observation of 
changes in economic indicators under different conditions of how factor markets 
work. 
 
1. Introduction 
Since 2001, a rapid growth in biofuel production has been observed, driven 
by high crude oil prices as well as by growing interest in reducing 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. High oil prices encouraged innovations 
to reduce crude oil consumption and triggered governments all over the 
                                                     
* This chapter is based on Banse, Rothe, Tabeau, van Meijl & Woltjer, “Will 
improved access to capital dampen the need for more agricultural land? A CGE 
analysis of agricultural capital markets and world-wide biofuel policies”, Factor 
Markets Working Paper No. 48, May 2013. 
T 
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world to stimulate the production and consumption of biofuel. To assure a 
certain level of reduction of GHG emissions, mandatory targets (e.g. 
binding blending targets) have been established. These quantitative 
measures set targets for the share of renewable fuels (biofuel) in fuel 
consumption (Sorda et al., 2010).  
The consequences of biofuel policies on agricultural markets and 
GHG emissions have been analysed in numerous papers (Rajagopal & 
Zilberman, 2007; OECD, 2008; Al-Riffai et al., 2010; Banse et al., 2008; Hertel 
et al., 2010). Apart from the impact on agricultural and food markets, these 
studies also focus on direct and indirect land-use effects of biofuel 
mandates. Dehue & Hettinga (2008) report prepared for the Gallagher 
Review and the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency report by 
Eickhout et al. (2008) provide much higher estimates of the agricultural 
land requirements of the EU mandate; numbers for the respective studies 
are about 50, 20–30 and 19–31 million hectares. At the same time, Banse et 
al. (2008), using the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model LEITAP, 
projects a similar increase of the biofuel feedstock prices as the OECD 
(2008). Additionally, a study by Mulligan et al. (2010) shows that changes 
in crop area from a marginal change in demand for particular biofuels 
produced by different models differ significantly.  
Studies analysing biofuel policies have a strong focus on land-use 
changes but often do not consider the possibility of intensifying land use by 
increasing the use of capital. Reducing the pressure on land use is one of 
the main challenges to guarantee the increase in agricultural production to 
meet an increasing demand for food, feed, fuel and fibre. Therefore, the 
analysis presented here shows how improved access to capital affects 
agricultural production and consequently helps to reduce the pressure on 
land use arising from obligatory biofuel mandate implementation on a 
global scale. 
2. Quantitative approach 
The quantitative approach is based on Version 6 of the Global Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) data (Dimaranan, 2006). The GTAP database 
contains detailed bilateral trade, transport and protection data, 
characterising economic linkages among regions, linked together with 
individual country input-output databases, which account for intersectoral 
linkages. All monetary values of the data are in US$ millions and the base 
year for Version 6 is 2001, which is updated especially for biofuel data 
including supply, demand and trade as well as policy measures.  
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The extensions with regard to capital demand have been already 
outlined in Shutes et al. (2012). The specification of the capital market has 
been improved through the introduction of capital vintages or sector-
specific capital or by allowing for different types of investment good. Here, 
we implement a sensitivity analysis on the parameters which determine the 
capital market modelling in MAGNET for the substitution elasticities 
between capital and other factors, as well as the parameters that govern the 
movement of capital between agricultural and non-agricultural markets. 
2.1 MAGNET model 
The economic model is the MAGNET (Modular Applied GeNeral 
Equilibrium Tool) model, which is a multi-regional, multi-sectoral, static, 
applied general equilibrium model based on neo-classical microeconomic 
theory (see Woltjer & Kuiper, 2013). It is an extended version of the 
standard GTAP model, Hertel (1997) and builds on the LEITAP model 
(Nowicki at al. 2009; van Meijl et al., 2006).  
This chapter mainly refers to options to modify the mobility of factors 
(a) within one sector, and (b) between different sectors. The first option will 
affect the degrees of substitutability between different inputs in the sectoral 
production function, while the second option will model how easily one 
factor (e.g. capital applied in agriculture) can be transferred to sectors 
outside agriculture. 
Intersectoral factor mobility refers to the speed with which factors 
move between sectors in response to changes in relative returns. Keeney & 
Hertel (2005) motivate the introduction of segmented factor markets with 
four observations: the role of off-farm factor mobility in farm incomes, co-
movements in farm and non-farm wages, steady off-farm migration, and 
persistent rural-urban wage differentials (Keeney & Hertel, 2005, pp. 6–7). 
The model includes a variant with a constant elasticity of transformation 
(CET) function that Keeney and Hertel use and a variant where an 
econometrically estimated dynamic mobility equation of capital and labour 
between agricultural and non-agricultural markets is modelled. Capturing 
these features better represents agricultural factor markets in MAGNET 
and improves long-term projections by accounting for off-farm factor 
movements such as labour migration with a substitution of agricultural 
labour by new invested capital.  
Two types of factor markets for mobile factors are implemented in 
MAGNET: un-segmented, and segmented with mobility between the two 
sectors governed by a CET function. The un-segmented variant follows 
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standard GTAP. The segmented market with CET function variant follows 
GTAP-AGR as presented by Keeney & Hertel (2005).  
The separation of agricultural and non-agricultural markets leads to 
separate market clearing conditions and different factor prices in the two 
markets. The segmented factor markets module links to the rest of the 
model through input or endowment prices and the factor market clearing 
condition. The endowment price is defined as the market price for the 
factor endowment plus any taxes on factor use. As there are two markets 
for factors in the segmented market (agriculture and non-agriculture), the 
endowment price is defined as the agriculture market price plus taxes in 
the agricultural market and as the non-agriculture market price plus taxes 
for the non-agricultural market.  
Although there are two distinct markets for mobile factors in the 
segmented factor markets module, capital can still move between the two 
markets. Indeed, extra capital needed in the non-agricultural sector must be 
pulled from the agricultural sector and vice versa. The movement of factors 
between agricultural and non-agricultural markets is determined by 
changes in relative prices and an elasticity of transformation (CET 
function). In the absence of available data on the underlying barriers to 
factor mobility, Keeney & Hertel (2005) introduce a CET function in GTAP-
AGR to ‘transform’ agricultural capital into non-agricultural capital. This 
option in MAGNET follows the set up in GTAP-AGR as documented in 
Keeney & Hertel (2005). The transformation of factors between the two 
markets is governed by the elasticity of transformation. The transformation 
elasticity is set at -1 for all factors and regions in the first instance and 
modified under the systematical sensitivity analysis. 
3. Scenario results 
3.1 Scenario description 
While the main focus of the analysis is on the option to reduce land use 
changes under improved access for agricultural sectors to capital markets, 
the main driver in the chapter is the introduction of binding biofuel 
mandates in different regions and countries. The scenario-setting is built on 
a reference scenario ‘No Biofuel Mandate’ (NoBFM) that assumes no 
mandatory use of biofuel consumption in any part of the world. In 
addition, we run a single-biofuel policy scenario experiment. 
Glob-BFM scenario with mandatory biofuel mandate implemented 
for the EU and the US together with the following countries: Brazil, 
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Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, India, Indonesia, 
Philippines, South Africa, and Thailand.  
Based on this setting, we use the Glob-BFM as the reference to see 
how (a) improved substitutability of agricultural land with capital, and (b) 
improved access of agriculture to capital markets ease the pressure on 
global land-use changes induced by worldwide biofuel policies.  
3.2 Scenario setup 
In the biofuel mandate scenario, we fixed the share of biofuels in fuel used 
for transportation in 2020. To achieve this policy target, a subsidy on 
bioenergy inputs in the petrol sector increases endogenously to make 
bioenergy inputs competitive with crude oil inputs. The following section 
will present the results for the reference scenario, which does not assume 
any enforced mandatory blending target. Due to limited space, the impacts 
of biofuel policies are presented only at the aggregated regional and 
commodity level.  
To show the impact of an improved mobility of capital within and 
across sectors, we applied the following scenarios: 
1. CES-CAP: a systematical variation of the CES elasticity for capital in 
the agricultural sectors by -75%, -50%, +50% and +100% relative to 
the initial level. 
2. CET-ALL: a systematical variation of the CET elasticity for capital 
and labour between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors by -
75%, -50%, +50% and +100% relative to the initial level. 
3. CET-CAP: a systematical variation of the CET elasticity for capital 
only between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors by -75%, -50%, 
+50% and +100% relative to the initial levels. 
The variation of the CET elasticity for all factors (capital and labour) 
and for capital only should help to identify the impact of improved inter-
sectoral mobility of capital relative to improved mobility of both capital 
and labour together. It should be mentioned that for the scenarios 
analysing a systematical variation of the CES and CET elasticities, each 
variant of the model has been run twice, once without binding biofuel 
targets and a second counter-factual with binding biofuel targets under the 
same level of CES and CET elasticities.  
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3.3 Scenario results 
As already mentioned, the main goal is to illustrate the impact of changing 
factor mobility. However, the next two figures show the impact of a 
worldwide implementation of biofuel policies on world agricultural prices 
and land use to give a first glance at the underlying ‘scenery’.  
Figure 10.1 Change in real world prices in 2020 relative to no binding biofuel 
mandates, % 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
World prices of agricultural products tend to increase with enhanced 
biofuel consumption as a consequence of biofuel policies. This is especially 
the case for those products that are directly used as biofuel crops. Figure 
10.1 presents the changes in real agricultural prices relative to a situation 
without (binding) biofuel policies. Under biofuel mandates international 
grain and oilseed prices increase by more than 25% relative to the ‘no 
biofuel’ scenario.  
In all regions, mandatory blending also leads to a moderate increase 
in total primary agricultural output and consequently higher land demand 
(Figure 10.2). Land use increases in all regions compared with no binding 
biofuel mandates. With mandatory biofuel policies implemented on a 
global scale, agricultural land use increases by around 4.5%.  
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Figure 10.2 Change in agricultural land use in 2020 relative to no binding biofuel 
mandates, % 
 
Notes: All BioF Reg covers all regions listed above with the two subsets ‘EU&US’ and ‘Rest-
Mandat’. All other regions that do not apply binding biofuel policies are aggregated 
under ‘NoBioF-Reg.’ 
Source: Own calculations. 
These results should illustrate the general tendencies after biofuel 
mandates have been implemented on a global scale in different countries 
and regions. The following graphs show how the significant impact on 
agricultural markets in term of price changes, production and land uses 
might alter if capital becomes more mobile at the intra-sectoral level (i.e. 
within the agricultural sector with a higher substitutability between capital 
and other factors) and at the inter-sectoral level (i.e. between the 
agricultural and the non-agricultural sectors) with a higher (factor-) price 
responsiveness to changes in the ratio capital use within the agricultural 
and the non-agricultural part of the economy.  
Similar to the presentation of the general outcome of the 
implementation of biofuel polices, we show the impact on world 
agricultural prices.  
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Figure 10.3 CES elasticities: change in real world agricultural prices in 2020 
relative to standard CES elasticity values under Glob-BFM scenario, % 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
A variation of intra-sectoral mobility of capital due to change in the 
CES elasticity of capital in the production function has only limited impact 
on world agricultural prices. With lower CES elasticities, which imply a 
stickier and ‘slower’ change in the composition of factor use under 
changing factor prices, world prices of crops used for biofuel production 
are slightly higher. With higher CES elasticities, wheat prices will be 
around 0.5% lower compared with the standard elasticity setting in the 
Glob-BFM scenario (Figure 10.3). 
Figure 10.4 CET elasticities: change in real world agricultural prices in 2020 
relative to standard CET elasticity values under Glob-BFM scenario, % 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
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If we assume an increase in inter-sectoral mobility of factors between 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, the impact of world agricultural 
prices become more evident. With lower inter-sectoral factor mobility, we 
see that for all arable crops used for biofuel production world prices are 
much higher compared with the standard CET elasticity values under the 
Glob-BFM scenario (Figure 10.4). Under CET elasticities, which are 75% 
lower compared to the standard assumptions, world prices for wheat are 
more than 20% higher. Higher inter-sectoral factor mobility will dampen 
the increase in world prices and with CET elasticities twice as high 
compared to the standard setting, wheat prices will be more than 5% lower 
compared to the standard assumptions under the Glob-BFM scenario. 
How do these results correspond to the changes in agricultural 
production? Under lower inter-sectoral factor mobility we observe a higher 
level of agricultural prices than under the standard assumption. Figure 10.5 
shows the impact of a systematical variation in the CET elasticities on the 
level of agricultural production. The higher level of prices under lower 
inter-sectoral mobility is mirrored by a higher level of agricultural 
production, which is at first sight a little bit counter-intuitive. Lower inter-
sectoral mobility means lower use of labour and capital compared to the 
standard scenario outcome. This is, however, only part of the picture! In 
agriculture, land is sector-specific and acts as the limiting factor to 
agricultural production. With higher prices, land rents also increase and it 
becomes profitable to expand land use (see Figure 10.6). Under lower factor 
mobility, agricultural production becomes more land-intensive and less 
labour/capital-intensive. Hence land use increases dramatically on the 
global scale. 
The asymmetric figure of price change (i.e. higher increases in 
prices/production under low factor mobility and relatively lower decreases 
in prices/production under higher factor mobility) is due to the sector-
specificity of land in agriculture where, for most arable crop products, land 
rents are the largest part of total value added and the mobile part of labour 
and capital gains make up only a relatively small share of total value added 
in arable crop production. 
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Figure 10.5 CET elasticities: change in world agricultural production in 2020 
relative to standard CET elasticity values under Glob-BFM scenario, % 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
With lower inter-sectoral factor mobility, agricultural land use 
expands as a consequence of biofuel mandates implemented on a global 
scale by almost 290 million hectares, which is equivalent to 5.4% of global 
agricultural land use. Higher inter-sectoral factor mobility will ease the 
pressure on expanding agricultural land use and around 80 million 
hectares less will used compared with the standard assumption of factor 
mobility. Here, employment and capital use in agricultural increases. If the 
inter-sectoral factor mobility is altered for capital only, the effects become 
much smaller (right-hand side of Figure 10.6). 
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Figure 10.6 CET elasticities: change in agricultural land use in 2020 compared 
with standard CET elasticity values under Glob-BFM scenario, million ha 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This chapter shows the consequences of different degrees of factor mobility 
in agricultural production under the assumption of enhanced biofuel 
production in those regions and countries of the world which have 
implemented biofuel policies in the form of mandatory blending targets of 
transportation fuels. The chosen quantitative modelling approach is the 
multi-sectoral economic MAGNET model with a systematical variation of 
the inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral factor mobility.  
The simulation results of the model show that biofuel policies have a 
pronounced impact on the markets for grains, oilseeds and sugar, but a 
rather limited impact on the production level of aggregated primary 
agricultural output. At the global level, the EU and US biofuel policies 
contribute to the increasing demand for biofuel crops. However, other 
countries that also introduced mandatory biofuel targets, such as Brazil, 
Canada, India, Philippines, South Africa and Thailand, contribute to an 
even greater extent to increasing world prices for agricultural products 
driven by food use for fuel.  
With increasing agricultural output, total agricultural area is 
projected to increase by 5%, while production of biofuel crops increases by 
around 19% indicating a more intensive production of biofuel crops at the 
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global level. Even the strong increase in crop production in countries 
implementing biofuel policies exceeds domestic supply, and the imports of 
these biofuel crops from other parts of the world which do not implement 
biofuel policies are projected to increase significantly.  
The analysis shows that apart from direct effects of an enhanced 
demand for bioenergy on production and land use, the indirect effects of 
biofuel policies dominate. Additional production of biofuel crops within 
and outside countries with voluntary and mandatory biofuel policies leads 
to strong indirect land-use changes and associated GHG emissions. 
The systematical variation of factor mobility indicates that the 
‘burden’ of global biofuel policies is not equally distributed across different 
factors within agricultural production. Agricultural land as the pre-
dominant and sector-specific factor is, regardless of the degree of inter-
sectoral or intra-sectoral factor mobility, the most important factor and 
limits the expansion of agricultural production. More capital and higher 
employment in agriculture eases the pressure on additional land use, but 
only partly. To expand agricultural production on the global scale would 
require adapting both land and mobile factors to increase total factor 
productivity in agriculture in the most efficient way. 
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11. THE ROLE OF SOCIAL COMPARISONS 
IN AGRICULTURAL LAND MARKETS: 
EVIDENCE FROM POLAND 
JAN FAŁKOWSKI* 
hile many factors have been studied in relation to the functioning of land 
markets, the role of land distribution has received relatively little 
attention. In this chapter, the authors ask to what extent farmers’ 
propensity to buy land is related to the difference between them and their 
neighbours in terms of land ownership. To this end, they employ the concept of 
relative deprivation. Drawing on micro-level data from the transition period in 
Poland and using both OLS and instrumental variables strategy, they find that 
interpersonal comparisons with others in his or her reference group may have 
motivated a farmer’s behaviour in the land market. In particular, the propensity to 
purchase land is positively associated with experiencing higher relative 
deprivation. In addition, this relationship waned over time in a predictable manner: 
late in the transition period it was weaker than at the beginning of the period.  
 
                                                     
* This research has been conducted within the Factor Markets project co-financed 
by the European Commission and the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher 
Education. The author would like to thank Bogdan Buks for the data, Natalia 
Jabłonowska, Paulina Kwaśniewska and Olga Sykut for their assistance with the 
data and Alfons Balmann, David Bullock, Alan Matthews, Oded Stark, Jo Swinnen 
and conference/seminar participants in Trento, Kiel and Seville for helpful 
comments and suggestions. 
This chapter summarises the key insights on the role of social comparisons in 
shaping farmers’ behaviour in land markets in Poland. The full paper with relevant 
background information, methodology and analysis is available as Fałkowski, 
“Does it matter how much land your neighbour owns? The functioning of land 
markets in Poland from a social comparison perspective”, Factor Markets Working 
Paper No. 59, August 2013. 
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1. Research question and motivation 
Many factors have been studied in relation to the functioning of land 
markets. In fact, the literature on agricultural and development economics 
offers a number of theoretical as well as empirical studies that aim at 
explaining both determinants of land market operations and their impact 
on poverty, efficiency of resource allocation and equity in rural areas (for a 
comprehensive literature review, see Binswanger et al., 1995; Deininger & 
Feder, 2001; and Otsuka, 2007). That said, and notwithstanding important 
contributions that have considerably improved our understanding of 
factors driving farmers’ participation in land transactions, there are still 
some important questions that largely remain without answers. For 
instance, relatively little attention has been paid to the way in which 
farmers’ behaviour in land markets is affected by land distribution. In 
particular, surprisingly little is known to what extent a decision to purchase 
land could be an effect of social comparisons, i.e. to what extent farmers are 
motivated to buy more land if others in their reference group have larger 
land endowments.  
This is all the more interesting as this relative lack of studies 
investigating the role of social comparisons is in a stark contrast to the 
long-established arguments and interest that economists have placed on 
the fact that an individual’s behaviour is affected by his or her neighbours’ 
behaviour (Markowitz, 1952; Becker, 1974; Clark & Oswald, 1996). This is 
also in contrast to the existing evidence emphasising the role of social 
groups in affecting farmers’ behaviour or subjective well-being (Burton, 
2004; Kuehne, 2013; Van Landeghem et al., 2013).24 Indeed, based on the 
existing literature, one may assume that farmers’ utility does not depend 
solely on individual achievements but also on how are they perceived 
within the local community. 
In this chapter, we develop this line of reasoning and ask to what 
extent farmers’ propensity to buy land is related to the difference between 
them and their neighbours in terms of land ownership. To this end, we 
employ the concept of relative deprivation (Stark, 1984; Stark & Taylor, 
1991). Borrowed from the literature on migration, this concept allows us to 
relate the behaviour of an individual to the behaviour of other members 
from the group with which comparisons are made.  
                                                     
24 There is also a political economy literature on the role of relative deprivation to 
induce political actions (e.g. Swinnen, 1994). 
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As an empirical illustration of these considerations, we use the 
evidence on the functioning of land markets in Poland during the transition 
period. The choice to focus on Poland and this particular period can be 
justified on several grounds, two of which seem to be especially important. 
First, studying land markets in Poland should be of relevance given the fact 
that the local agricultural sector has been very fragmented. Therefore, at 
least some land consolidation seems to be necessary. In this context, a 
better understanding of the determinants of local land market operations 
could be of relevant from point of view of the efficiency of resource 
allocation. Second, looking at the transition period provides a unique 
opportunity to study the period when land markets had only started to 
function after being heavily regulated or structurally blocked during 
communist times (Halamska, 2001; Gorlach, 1989). While one may assume 
that a shift from a centrally planned economy to a market economy has 
certainly strengthened the role of economic motives in influencing 
individuals’ behaviour, it is interesting to see to what extent land market 
participation could have also been driven by non-economic values related 
to land ownership. To support the idea that these latter values might have 
indeed played a role, one may recall findings from other studies pointing to 
the fact that land ownership is often a source of political power 
(Binswanger et al., 1995; Banerjee & Iyer, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2008; 
Baland & Robinson, 2008; Baldwin, 2013) or can be indicative of 
individuals’ socio-economic status and a source of their identity (Platteau, 
2000; Burton, 2004; Cheshire et al., 2013; Kuehne, 2013). The importance of 
land in facilitating access to credit (via acting as a collateral) or providing a 
social security net, again showing that the role of land may go beyond a 
mere means of production, should also be recognised. For these reasons, 
people may want to maintain at least the same level of land endowments as 
is common in their social group.  
That said, it is reasonable to assume that the relative position 
considerations might have affected farmers’ participation in land 
transactions differently over time. This could be linked to the fact that 
social relations in rural areas have been a subject to a thorough 
reorganisation relating to the processes of modernisation and globalisation 
(Bryant 1999; Johnsen 2004). There is no doubt that during the last two 
decades, economic aspects of land ownership in Poland have gained 
importance and this refers not only to the role that land plays as an input to 
agricultural production. Land has more and more speculative value (as 
urban demand rises) or serves as a store of wealth (which should also be 
seen in the context of direct payments introduced in Poland after joining 
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the EU in May 2004). In consequence, with time, land ownership might 
have lost an important part of its non-economic functions (see 
Kochanowicz (2008) for a related discussion). 
Overall therefore, in this chapter we study whether farmers’ 
participation in land transactions is driven, at least partly, by concerns 
about their relative position. More specifically, we aim to verify two 
hypotheses. First, we hypothesise that a farmer's propensity to purchase 
land would be stronger if he/she has less land endowments than his/her 
peers from the reference group. Second, we expect the effect of social 
comparisons to weaken over time and to be stronger at the beginning of the 
transition period than at the end of this period.  
2. Data and empirical methods 
2.1 Data 
To study the effect of social comparisons on farmers’ land market 
behaviour, we use data from 74 Polish villages. We look at three waves of 
the survey conducted in 1992, 1996 and 2000. In our econometric 
modelling, we use roughly between 3300 and 3800 observations, depending 
on a year and the estimation specification.  
Unfortunately, our data are not panel observations. Nevertheless, we 
are able, to a limited extent, to control for dynamic effects at the household 
level. This is because each wave that we use provides retrospective 
information on the events that happened four years earlier. Most 
importantly, we are able to document some associations between 
interpersonal comparisons in year t0 and farmers’ behaviour in land 
markets in the next four years (t0; t0+4). This is notable as it allows us to 
assume that what we capture is the effect of relative deprivation on land 
market behaviour and not vice versa. Further, it also enables us to take into 
account the fact that the decision to buy land and its realisation could be 
spread over time.  
What should be noted is the fact that within the surveyed villages, all 
farming households were approached. Given our focus, this is a very 
important characteristic of the dataset that we use. Thanks to this, our 
sample contains immediate neighbours that are likely to constitute a 
natural reference group for each other. In effect, even if we assume that 
some of these households refused to answer the questionnaire, we can be 
sure that our sample contains a substantial share of relevant peer groups 
with which farmers compare themselves. This is particularly worth noting 
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since other studies often investigate the phenomenon of social comparisons 
in larger administrative units and may suffer from measurement error 
related to the fact that the reference group is defined over entities that are 
too large. The approach that we adopt allows us to minimise such risk.  
Our data provide quite detailed information on farmers’ participation 
in land markets. As we are interested in studying the impact of social 
comparisons on farmers’ propensity to buy land, this feature of our dataset 
presents an important advantage. However, it also has an important cost. 
The main problem is that, while offering considerable information on land 
issues, our dataset has a rather limited coverage of other socio-economic 
characteristics of the surveyed households. This in turn increases the risk of 
omitting from the analysis some factors that could be important in shaping 
farmers’ propensity to participate in land purchases. We try to minimise 
this problem by using various econometric techniques (see below). 
Nevertheless, this shortcoming should be kept in mind when interpreting 
our results. 
2.2 Empirical approach 
As our data are not panel observations, information provided in each 
survey-wave is used in a separate regression. Given the dichotomous 
nature of our dependent variable (equal to 1 if households bought land in 
the period (t0, t0+4) and 0 otherwise), our basic estimates are obtained from a 
logit model. We test the robustness of these estimates to changing the 
econometric specification (to a linear probability model) and the estimation 
sample. Further, to address potential concerns related to the omitted 
variables bias we also apply an instrumental variables strategy. This is 
done in order to check whether the findings from logit/OLS (ordinary least 
squares) models are not driven by an unobserved heterogeneity. This 
cannot be excluded, especially in the light of data limitations mentioned 
above. Our instruments include the land Gini coefficient at the village level 
and the interaction terms between this coefficient and two dummies 
indicating small and large farms, respectively (defined as farms 
larger/smaller than the 66th/33rd percentile of farm size distribution). It is 
assumed therefore that the way in which land is distributed in the village 
would directly affect a farmer's distaste for relative deprivation in land 
holdings and otherwise not influence his/her propensity to buy land. The 
two interaction terms are included as additional instruments in an attempt 
to account for the fact that the impact of land Gini on the relative 
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deprivation of large-scale farmers would be different from on the relative 
deprivation of smallholders (negative and positive, respectively).  
Our main variable of interest included in the set of covariates is a 
measure of a potential dismay from having less land resources than other 
people living in the same village. More specifically, we use a relative 
deprivation index, calculated as the proportion of those in a farmer's 
reference group whose land endowments are larger than the farmer's times 
their mean excess land (Stark & Taylor, 1991).  
Other covariates that we add in our models include variables 
measuring the farmer’s access to credit, utilised land holdings, age and 
education of farm manager and number of household members. We also 
control for village fixed effects. These variables aim at capturing the main 
factors/motives mentioned in the literature as being likely to affect farmers' 
behaviour in land markets. To take account of village-specific variance in 
the error term, all our models are estimated with robust standard errors.  
3. Main findings and conclusions 
Before reporting results from econometric models, we start by presenting a 
general pattern that seems to come out from a descriptive analysis. 
Interestingly, our data suggest that the relative deprivation index at time t0 
importantly varies across different groups of farms, depending on their 
activity in land markets in the period (t0; t0+4). In particular, on average, this 
index takes the highest values among those farmers that later decided to 
buy land; medium values among those farmers that in the next four years 
decided not to participate in land market transactions; and the lowest 
values among farmers that in the next four years decided to sell at least 
part of their land. This pattern seems to be consistent over time and can be 
observed in all survey-waves that we have at our disposal. The differences 
in average relative deprivation between these different groups of farmers 
seem to decrease with time, however. The differences in relative 
deprivation between those that bought and those that sold land were 
highest for the period 1988-1992, and lowest for the period 1996-2000. What 
should be noted is that these observations are in line with both hypotheses 
formulated above. However, they are based on simple averages. Thus, they 
clearly do not allow for any definite statements. Therefore, in the next step 
we look at the data in a more rigorous way. Below, we report the main 
findings that arise from our econometric modelling.  
Subject to some caveats, our results consistently show that 
interpersonal comparisons with people from the relevant reference group 
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may indeed motivate farmers’ behaviour in land markets. More 
specifically, we document a positive association between an index of 
relative deprivation in land holdings and a farmer’s propensity to purchase 
land. Further, in accordance with expectations, this relationship waned 
over time and was weaker at the end than at the beginning or in the middle 
of the 1990s. It should be emphasised that this general picture seems to be 
consistent across different model specifications and estimation samples. 
Importantly, estimates from logit/OLS are qualitatively the same as those 
obtained from an instrumental variables' method. The latter, though, are 
less precise. We also check if the relationship between relative deprivation 
and propensity to land purchases exhibits non-linearity. Our results 
suggest that at the beginning of the transition period, the effect of relative 
deprivation assumed the form of an inverted U-shape. At the later stages of 
the transition, though, the coefficient on the square term is statistically 
indistinguishable from 0, thus suggesting a linear relationship.  
As regards the other covariates, their impact on land purchases is in 
accordance with expectations that could be formulated based on the 
literature. In particular, we find a positive impact of total utilised area. This 
clearly shows that farmers' behaviour in land markets is importantly driven 
not only by relative, but also by absolute land endowments. In fact, the 
absolute effect seems to be much larger in magnitude than the relative 
effect. The incidence of buying land is also higher among younger farmers 
and among households of larger family size. We also document a positive 
impact of access to bank credit, confirming that external financing could be 
indispensible for farmers to participate in land purchases.  
That said, clearly a question remains as to what extent the 
relationship that we document reflects causality. As mentioned earlier, our 
data capture farms’ socio-economic characteristics only to a limited extent. 
In effect, it may be argued that our main variable of interest captures also 
other unobservable factors. For instance, we do not control for farms' 
productivity and thus it may be argued that the relative deprivation effect 
can capture also the effect of economies of scale.25 Therefore, even though 
we resort to an instrumental variables method, our findings may still be 
biased due to an unobserved heterogeneity and this should be kept in 
mind.  
                                                     
25 Please note however that we do control for farms’ land and labour.  
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Nevertheless, the correlations that we report are quite robust. In 
effect, they show that the issues in question should receive more attention. 
While suggesting that relative considerations may matter for farmers' 
behaviour in land markets, our findings point to a result that, to the best of 
our knowledge, has not been investigated elsewhere. In fact, the only paper 
(of which we are aware) that tries to bring a social comparisons perspective 
into the debate on land issues is that by Van Landeghem et al. (2013). The 
focus of this study, however, is different from ours in that it concentrates 
on the relationship between (relative) land endowments and subjective 
well-being.  
Our findings could be also of relevance to policy-makers. What they 
seem to suggest, for instance, is that, holding other things constant, state 
efforts to promote land market operations could be less effective in regions 
where land holdings, though very fragmented, are more or less equally 
distributed. This is because in such a case, the relative consideration motive 
would not provide farmers with incentives to increase their land possession 
regardless of actions undertaken by the state. The opposite could be 
expected where the land distribution is more unequal. In this case, 
however, one could pose the question of whether the stimulus from the 
government is too big or not needed at all. This is because, again holding 
other things constant, it could be argued that in this scenario, farmers' 
propensity to participate in land markets would be high anyway, precisely 
due to the relative deprivation effect.  
Overall, we believe that the association that we document could 
broaden our understanding of factors determining farmers’ behaviour in 
land markets. Thus, we hope that, even if we are not able to ascertain 
causality, the analysis which we present here can form a basis for further 
interesting research. Additional robustness tests of findings reported could 
be one potential line of research. Providing evidence for other countries 
also seems promising. Finally, investigating the exact mechanisms through 
which the importance of relative deprivation may change over time is 
something that could significantly improve our understanding of the issues 
in question. Looking at the reorganisation of rural areas in response to the 
processes of modernisation and globalisation could be a starting point for 
such an analysis.  
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12. AGRICULTURAL LABOUR MARKETS IN 
THE EU AND CANDIDATE COUNTRIES 
JASON LOUGHREY, TREVOR DONNELLAN, 
KEVIN HANRAHAN AND THIA HENNESSY* 
he well-functioning of factor markets for capital, land and labour are crucial 
conditions for the competitiveness and growth of agriculture. In the case of 
labour, institutions and regulations may give rise to agricultural labour 
market heterogeneity which could have important effects on the functioning of the 
labour market and other agricultural factor markets in EU member states. At the 
same time, the functioning of the labour market and markets for other factors of 
production are influenced by changes in agriculture and the rural economy and in 
EU policies.  
This chapter first defines the institutional framework for the labour market 
and identifies the most important elements of the labour market institutional 
framework to be analysed further. Based on the literature, a survey to characterise 
the agricultural labour markets was undertaken. This survey was implemented for 
a selection of EU27 and EU candidate countries, with responses based upon expert 
opinion. In turn the survey data was used to construct an overall index of labour 
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“Agricultural Labour Market Flexibility in the EU and Candidate Countries”, 
Factor Markets Working Paper No. 49, June 2013. 
T 
AGRICULTURAL LABOUR MARKETS IN THE EU AND CANDIDATE COUNTRIES | 125 
market flexibility/rigidity for the countries examined. The authors present the 
results for each country in terms of the overall index and the relevant sub-
components. In so doing, they are able to rank countries on a labour market 
flexibility scale and pinpoint specific criteria which affect the ranking of the 
countries in this index. 
 
1. Introduction 
Labour is one of three crucial elements in production that economists refer 
to as factors of production. The economics literature has long recognised that 
well functioning factor markets are vital conditions for fostering growth 
and maintaining international competitiveness (Van Bavel et al., 2009). It is 
important to recognise that the policy, regulatory and legal environment, 
along with prevailing social norms such as customs and traditions, can 
affect how well or how poorly these factor markets operate. Within the EU 
these factor markers are influenced by conditions that exist at either a 
widespread EU level or at a more localised national level. Therefore, the 
characteristics of factor markets across the EU member states are not 
necessarily uniform. 
The Factor Markets project was established to explore this factor 
market heterogeneity in the context of agriculture, with a view to providing 
policy-makers with a better understanding of the heterogeneity which 
exists in factor markets across the EU and candidate countries. In so doing, 
the work aims to identify the constraints which current factor market 
characteristics present to the facilitation of better functioning markets and 
better growth opportunities within the EU. 
In this chapter, the focus is on the market for labour, specifically 
labour associated with agriculture. This chapter draws together a number 
of strands of work so that ultimately an index of labour market 
flexibility/rigidity is created, which allows the countries under study to be 
ranked according to a series of criteria associated with the agricultural 
labour market.  
The initial objective of this work was to identify the main criteria of 
interest in describing the institutional framework of the labour market. 
These include factors such as ease of engagement and disengagement from 
employment in the sector, measures of human capital and mechanisms to 
enhance human capital, wage-setting arrangements, the extent of union 
power and labour mobility. A survey questionnaire was used to gather 
data on the institutional framework of the labour market in selected 
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countries in the EU-27 and in Croatia and Macedonia, based on the 
parameters and associated market characteristics identified in the previous 
drafts of this chapter. This survey was designed by Teagasc (Irish partner), 
in conjunction with the University of Kent (UK partner). The survey 
requested basic data on the structure of the employment market, labour 
legislation, wage-setting mechanisms, unions, taxation and social benefits, 
education and training, labour mobility and general features of agriculture. 
In this chapter, we present the results from our survey data and 
develop an index measure to describe the overall characteristics of the 
labour market for each country under study. In so doing, we are able to 
rank countries on a labour market flexibility scale and to pinpoint specific 
criteria which affect the ranking of these countries in this index. 
2. Summary statistics from the survey data  
In this section, we provide a summary of some statistics based upon the 
responses to some of the key survey questions. We begin this analysis with 
the questions relating to the hours of work of legislation. 
2.1 Hours of work legislation 
The survey found that maximum hours of work legislation exists in all of 
the countries examined. There is some variation in the maximum hours of 
work across the countries surveyed. The limit in most countries is 40 hours 
per week, but the survey results indicate that the limit is higher in Croatia, 
Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK. The lowest limit in terms of working 
hours was found in Belgium where the maximum is 38 hours per week. 
Our Belgian expert points out, however, that there can be adjustments 
depending on the sector and the specific circumstances. Other countries 
allow for an expansion in working hours over the normal limit, but only for 
a short number of weeks. In general, it was found that the maximum hours 
of work legislation applied to the agriculture sector and that the maximum 
hours limit is broadly similar to that in operation in the rest of the 
economy. One exception appears to be Croatia, where the maximum limit 
for agriculture of 52 hours is much higher than that for the rest of the 
economy of 42 hours per week. 
2.2 Hiring and firing process 
Respondents were asked to consider the hiring and firing process in the 
countries under study and indicate the ease or difficulty employers faced in 
hiring and firing of employees. This question was asked in respect of the 
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wider economy and also specifically in the context of the agriculture sector. 
The hiring of employees in agriculture is described as ‘relatively difficult’ 
in most countries with the exceptions of Greece, Ireland, Macedonia and 
Slovakia, where the hiring process is described as ‘relatively easy’. The 
firing of employees is described as ‘relatively difficult’ in most countries 
with the exceptions of Belgium, Ireland, Macedonia and Slovakia, where 
the description is ‘relatively easy’. Some country experts described the 
hiring or firing processes as ‘neither difficult nor easy’, but these were a 
small minority of the overall sample. 
2.2.1 Wage-setting 
Survey respondents were asked to detail the existence of minimum wage 
legislation throughout the wider economy and the agricultural sector. It 
was found that minimum wage legislation is relatively widespread across 
the survey countries. However, respondents indicated that Finland, 
Germany, Italy and Sweden do not have minimum wage legislation 
throughout the wider economy. Some of these countries have industry-
level agreements regarding levels of minimum pay rather than national-
level minimum wages. For example, in the case of Italy, it was indicated 
that there are 15 regional agreements in addition to 8 industry-level 
agreements and 100 agreements at the province level. 
Respondents were also asked to indicate the monetary value of the 
minimum wage in the wider economy and specifically in agriculture. The 
results for the specific case of agriculture are presented in Figure 12.1. We 
include the hourly minimum wage in euros but we also adjust for 
differences in GDP per person (PPP) using Eurostat data. In some 
instances, the minimum wage applies to monthly incomes. In those 
circumstances, we have used Eurostat data on average working hours to 
estimate the minimum wage per hour. The minimum wage applies to 
monthly income in Belgium, Macedonia, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia 
and Slovakia.  
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Figure 12.1 Minimum wage in the agriculture sector (adjusted and unadjusted for 
GDP) 
 
 
Figure 12.1 shows that the agriculture minimum wage is highest for 
employees in Ireland, France and the Netherlands. The minimum wage is 
lowest for employees in Macedonia, Croatia, Poland and Slovakia. 
Adjusting for differences in GDP per capita does not appear to change the 
country rankings to any great degree. France has the highest minimum 
wage after adjusting for GDP, while Macedonia still has the lowest 
minimum wage. The gap between the countries with the highest minimum 
wage and those with the lowest minimum wage declines somewhat after 
the adjustment for differences in GDP per capita, but large differences are 
still evident. The picture is very similar for the minimum wage in the 
general economy. 
It is notable that in some countries, the minimum wage varies 
according to the level of job experience, age or education. In the case of 
Belgium, the minimum wage for uneducated agricultural employees is 
€8.34 per hour but it is greater for educated workers, at €9.20 per hour. In 
Greece, the minimum wages varies according to experience. The minimum 
wages listed here refer to the situation in 2011 and there may have been 
more recent changes in some countries. Where the minimum wage varies 
according to age, experience or education, we have applied the minimum 
wage for those employees with the lowest minimum wage. We include a 
question in the questionnaire as to whether or not the minimum wage 
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varies according to the above variables and the responses form part of the 
overall index. 
2.2.2 Taxation and social benefits 
The survey sought information on the design of the unemployment benefit 
system in the countries under study. It was found that the duration of 
unemployment payments is generally one year, although there are 
exceptions where the duration of payments was indicated as indefinite (in 
Belgium and Ireland, for example). There may have been an issue here with 
the interpretation of the question and the precise terminology that is used 
to describe different forms of payments that can be received when an 
individual is out of work. In any event, the survey indicated that in general 
farm operators are not entitled to unemployment payments.  
In addition to the survey question on benefit duration, we used 
Eurostat data on the size of the tax wedge for low wage earners in each 
country. This variable was calculated based upon the tax rate as a 
percentage of the gross wage which includes both employer and employee 
social insurance. The results are presented in Figure 12.2 and show that the 
tax wedge for low wage earners is usually between 30-45% of the gross 
wage. The tax wedge is highest for Belgium, France and Germany, and 
lowest in the case of the UK and Ireland. 
Figure 12.2 Tax wedge (percentage of gross wage) for low wage earners in 2011  
 
Source: Eurostat (2013). 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
BE FR DE IT MK SE HR SI FI SK GR PL NE UK IR
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f G
ro
ss
 W
ag
e
130 | LOUGHREY, DONNELLAN, HANRAHAN & HENNESSY 
2.2.3 Education and training 
The survey sought details on the system of agricultural training 
qualifications that exist in the countries under study. The results indicated 
that most countries appear to have a system of agricultural qualifications in 
place. A further question sought information on whether it was now 
mandatory for farmers to acquire such qualifications, and it was indicated 
that this was not the case in the countries under study. 
Respondents were asked for information on the typical level of 
education among farm operators. While the responses indicated that there 
is some variation in the education level of farmers across the countries 
examined, there is no regional pattern to this. The UK and Poland were 
notable outliers from the remaining countries. For the UK, the survey 
indicated that the level of educational attainment among farm operators is 
likely to be higher than the average for the wider population, while by 
contrast in Poland it was indicated that the level of educational attainment 
among farm operators is likely to be lower than the average for the wider 
population. For the remaining countries, it was held that there was no 
discernable difference in the education level of farm operators and the 
wider population. 
Similarly in the case of agricultural employees, it was found that their 
education level was above average in the UK. By contrast, the education 
level of farm employees in Macedonia and Slovakia was considered to be 
below the average of the wider populations. For most of the remaining 
countries, it was indicated that the education level of farm employees was 
broadly similar to that of the wider population. 
2.3 Labour mobility 
The study is concerned with labour mobility, both in terms of the 
movement of labour between economic sectors and the geographic 
mobility of labour. Respondents were asked to indicate whether labour 
market measures exist for farm operators, a mechanism which can facilitate 
the movement of labour between economic sectors. It was found that 
labour market measures are not generally targeted to farm operators in 
most of the countries under study, the exceptions being Greece, Italy, 
Macedonia, Poland, Slovenia and Sweden. By contrast, active labour 
market measures are quite widely available for farm employees, with 
Belgium, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Slovakia as notable 
exceptions. 
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Respondents were asked to indicate the level of car ownership per 
adult as a measure of mobility (it is recognised that this variable is limited 
in the sense that countries have different population densities and different 
levels of public transport provision). There was quite a wide spread in the 
level of car ownership across the surveyed countries. One might expect this 
to be strongly correlated to the level of GDP per capita, and by and large 
this was the case. Rates of car ownership are highest in Italy, Germany, 
Belgium and France, and lowest in Greece, Macedonia and Poland. The 
number of cars per 1,000 adults exceeds 400 in all countries with the 
exception of Macedonia. However, there were some outliers, with the UK 
and Finland reporting lower levels of car ownership than some less affluent 
EU member states. 
Figure 12.3 Cars per 1,000 members of the adult population 
 
2.3.1 Home ownership 
Respondents were asked to provide information on the level of home 
ownership in the countries under study. The level of home ownership 
could be seen as an indicator of labour mobility, with higher levels of home 
ownership seen as a limiting factor in terms of the mobility of labour 
(Oswald, 1996). We find that home ownership is lowest in Germany, 
Sweden, the Netherlands and France, and highest in Macedonia and 
Greece. 
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Figure 12.4 Percentage of home ownership in the countries under study 
 
2.3.2 Employment of foreign workers in agriculture 
Questions were also asked about the extent to which foreign workers were 
present in the agriculture sectors of the economies under study, in 
comparison with other low-skilled sectors in these countries. In general, it 
was found that foreign workers either from within other EU member states 
or outside of the EU remain relatively uncommon (exceptions being the 
labour market in Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands). However, it was 
indicated that the prevalence of such workers is generally on the increase, 
with France and Macedonia notable as exceptions to this trend. 
2.3.3 Unionisation 
Questions relating to the level of union density were included in the 
questionnaire. Having gathered all of the data on union density, we 
concluded that it would be best to omit unionisation from the analysis. In 
making this decision, we took into account some qualitative feedback from 
the experts regarding the usefulness of farmer union density as a proxy for 
union power. In addition, it appeared from the results that farmer union 
density was weakest in countries where there is a reputation for strong 
farm union power. 
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3. Construction of an agricultural labour market 
flexibility/rigidity index 
The final step in this work was the development of a labour market 
rigiditiy/flexibility index. Indices of this kind have been developed in the 
past for the wider labour market (Nickell & Layard, 1999). Essentially, this 
involved collating the data from the survey and ascribing a value to the 
response to each question. These values were then added together to 
provide an overall index value. 
One consideration which immediately arises in the compilation of 
indices of this kind is whether and how the responses to particular 
questions should be weighted to provide an overall index measure for each 
country. The procedure which was followed in this case involved creating a 
score for each of five separate categories (labour legislation, wage-setting, 
taxation and social benefits, education and training, and labour mobility). 
Each of these individual category scores was in turn based on responses to 
several questions within that category. Questions within a category were 
weighted in some cases, so that particular questions did not overly 
influence the score compiled for that category. 
For summing the category scores to provide an overall index measure 
it was decided to go for a simple unweighted approach. It should be noted 
that alternative approaches can also be used which can involve a 
consultative process to determine how category scores should be weighted. 
For example, an expert panel can be assembled in order to achieve 
consensus on whether specific categories should carry a higher or lower 
weighting. However, for the purposes of this study, it was decided to allow 
the category scores to remain unweighted, as we were concerned that 
consensus on a weighted scheme would not easily be achieved, especially 
since the work involved a multi-country analysis.  
Within each category, the maximum score was 1. Values closer to 1 
are an indicator of greater labour market flexibility and values closer to 0 
indicate less labour market flexibility. To make the construction of the 
index as transparent as possible, the individual category scores for each of 
the countries under study are included in the stack bar chart in Figure 12.5. 
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Figure 12.5 Overall index of agricultural labour market flexibility/rigidity 
 
 
In Figure 12.5, we can see that there is some variation in the value of 
the overall index between countries. The results suggest that Macedonia, 
Greece and Italy are among the most flexible in terms of agricultural labour 
markets. By contrast, France, Netherland and Belgium are the least flexible, 
with each having particularly low scores for the wage-setting category.  
This is partly a function of being among the countries with the 
highest minimum wage levels. In all three countries, wages are typically 
determined through collective bargaining or through a mixture of collective 
bargaining and individualised firm level bargaining. Macedonia and 
Greece score very highly in most categories. Labour mobility is a key driver 
of flexibility in the case of Greece, while wage-setting appears to have a big 
impact on the result for Macedonia, partly due to the low minimum wage. 
Looking at the country rankings, it is possible to discern some level of 
inter-regional variation. The three countries with the highest labour market 
flexibility scores – Macedonia, Greece and Italy – are neighbouring 
countries. Equally, the three countries with the lowest labour market 
flexibility scores – Belgium, Netherlands and France – are also 
neighbouring countries.  
It is notable that the category with the biggest variation is wage-
setting, where Macedonia and Germany have the highest score. It is also 
interesting to observe than some of the countries which are categorised as 
least flexible in terms of the overall index score highly in terms of the 
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labour legislation variable (indicating that labour legislation in these 
countries is weaker than elsewhere). Just two Mediterranean countries are 
included in the study and both appear to have more flexible labour markets 
than northern European countries. 
For the vast majority of countries in the study, there was very little 
difference in the overall labour market flexibility score. However, there 
were still noticeable differences in the composition of the overall scores, 
reflecting the existence of some heterogeneity in the category level scores. 
For this middle range of countries, the contribution of each factor to the 
overall index scores varies. This emphasises the importance of using a wide 
variety of criteria to measure labour market flexibility in a country, since 
individual labour market flexibility component scores for that country may 
not be a good proxy for overall agricultural labour flexibility in that 
country. The same observation can be made with respect to inter-country 
studies of labour market flexibility.  
The above point can be illustrated by conducting some sensitivity 
analysis on the index by removing particular components from the index to 
see the impact this has on the ranking of individual countries. We present 
the overall index in Figure 12.6 having omitted the wage-setting 
component and show how this affects the relative ranking of countries in 
comparison with Figure 12.5.  
Figure 12.6 Overall index without wage-setting component 
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Figure 12.6 shows that the UK moves from fifth to second in terms of 
overall flexibility with the exclusion of the wage-setting component. 
Germany has the least flexible index measure if one excludes the wage-
setting component, largely driven by low scores for education and training 
as well as labour mobility. France and the Netherlands remain close to the 
bottom of the list after the exclusion of wage-setting. 
We present the overall index in Figure 12.7, having omitted the tax-
benefit component. Sweden has the third most flexible agricultural labour 
market if one excludes this tax-benefit component. This represents a 
movement of four places in the overall rankings. The relative ranking for a 
number of other countries moves by two places but Macedonia and Greece 
remain the most flexible with Belgium, France and the Netherlands the 
least flexible. 
Figure 12.7 Overall index without tax-benefit component 
 
4. Conclusion 
Overall, this survey has found differences between the agricultural labour 
market characteristics in member states across the EU and in the candidate 
countries considered. These differences are not particularly extreme when 
looked at in the aggregate. It was found that the most flexible labour 
markets exist in Macedonia and Greece, while the least flexible agricultural 
labour markets were found to be in Belgium, the Netherlands and France. 
The two main factors contributing towards low agricultural labour 
market flexibility in the Netherlands and France are the wage-setting 
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mechanism and relatively low scores in the education and training 
categories. The low score in the case of Belgium can be attributed to low 
scores for the wage-setting mechanism and labour mobility. Macedonia 
and Greece score very highly in most categories. Labour mobility is a key 
driver of agricultural labour market flexibility in the case of Greece, while 
wage-setting appears to have a big impact on the result for Macedonia, 
partly due to the low minimum wage. 
Looking for the countries with similar overall labour market 
flexibility scores, we still find that there is some heterogeneity in the 
institutional features of these labour markets. This is an important finding 
for policy-makers since it demonstrates the importance of measuring 
agricultural labour market flexibility across a wide range of criteria. This is 
because individual features of a labour market may not be indicative of the 
extent of overall agricultural labour market flexibility. This point is 
emphasised by the fact that we found that the labour market flexibility 
measure was quite sensitive to the criteria included/excluded from that 
measure. This in turn influenced the relative ranking of countries in terms 
of their agricultural labour market flexibility/rigidity.  
If policy-makers deem it desirable to increase labour market 
flexibility, the approach required will need to be tailored to the causes of 
agricultural labour market inflexibility. Our study finds that these causes 
differ across the countries under study. Ultimately, this implies that a 
common European approach to enhancing agricultural labour market 
flexibility may be inappropriate. 
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13. LABOUR SUPPLY CURVES FOR EU 
MEMBER STATES AND CANDIDATE 
COUNTRIES: AN APPLIED GENERAL 
EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 
LINDSAY SHUTES* 
he supply of labour is responsive to changes in the real wage in the medium 
term as higher wages increase the opportunity cost of being economically 
inactive and induce people to enter the labour force, while lower wages 
reduce the opportunity cost and lead to lower participation rates. Changes in 
participation rates are, however, seldom captured in standard computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models used for policy analysis. This chapter introduces a more 
sophisticated modelling of medium-term labour market functioning in European 
member and candidate states through the introduction of labour supply curves into 
the MAGNET CGE model. The authors introduce the theoretical foundations of 
the labour supply curve that define the relationship between the labour supply and 
the real wage. They then empirically derive unskilled labour-supply curves for all 
member states along with Croatia and Turkey. The analysis of these supply curves 
shows that the new member and candidate states have systematically lower average 
wages than the EU-15 countries and are often less labour-constrained. Integrating 
the labour supply curves into the MAGNET CGE model and using the extended 
model to evaluate the impact of CAP reform under different labour-market 
assumptions, shows that the addition of labour supply curves is a valuable one. The 
new specification yields results that fall between the two extremes of spare capacity 
and full employment, capturing the relative flexibility of the labour markets across 
Europe and producing more nuanced welfare results. 
                                                     
* This chapter is based on Shutes, “Labour Supply Curves for EU Member and 
Candidate States: An applied general equilibrium analysis”, Factor Markets 
Working Paper No. 26, June 2012. 
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1. Introduction 
The supply of labour endowments is often taken to be exogenous in 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, that is, determined outside 
the system by such factors as population growth. While this may be true in 
the longer term, in the shorter term the supply of labour to the market is 
influenced the real wage. Higher wages increase the opportunity cost of 
being economically inactive and induce people to enter the labour force, 
while lower wages reduce the opportunity cost and lead to lower 
participation rates. Participation rates vary greatly across Europe, ranging 
from 78% in Denmark to 46% in Turkey in 2007, but this heterogeneity is 
seldom captured in standard CGE models (Shutes et al., 2012). 
This chapter presents the theoretical and empirical foundations of 
labour supply curves for the member and candidate states and their 
introduction to the MAGNET CGE model. Labour supply curves capture 
the relationship between real wages and employment, allowing for 
differences between member and candidate states and variable 
participation rates. The impact of the extended labour market 
representation economies is shown using a stylised policy experiment in 
which first pillar support to member states is reduced by 50%.  
2. Extending the modelling of the labour supply 
2.1 Current specification 
Typically, the relationship between the supply of labour and the real wage 
is modelled in one of two ways in CGE models. The two specifications 
operate at the extremes of labour market functioning, either by assuming 
an infinite supply of workers at a fixed wage or a fixed supply of workers 
with flexible wages. A visual representation of these two labour market 
specifications is given in Figure 13.1. The left-hand panel reflects an 
assumption of spare capacity in the labour market. A shift to the right in 
the demand curve for labour under this assumption is met fully by an 
increase in the number of workers employed with no impact on the wage 
rate. The right-hand panel shows the opposite extreme, in which all labour 
is fully employed and any additional demand is immediately translated 
into higher wages. 
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Figure 13.1 Labour market functioning in standard CGE models 
 
 
2.2 Labour supply curve 
The labour supply curve offers an intermediate choice in which increases in 
the demand for labour increase both the real wage and employment. The 
extent to which increases in demand are translated into wage increases 
depends upon the proximity of the current employment level to the total 
amount of available labour, reflecting the scarcity of labour. The 
functioning of a labour market with an upward-sloping labour supply 
curve is shown in Figure 13.2. Countries whose current employment levels 
are relatively far from the maximum available amount of labour (LMAX) 
have labour markets with relatively shallow labour supply curves, while 
countries with employment levels close to the maximum available amount 
of labour operate with steeper labour supply curves to reflect the scarcity of 
labour. 
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Figure 13.2 Labour market functioning under an upwards-sloping labour supply 
curve 
 
 
Defining the relationship between wages and labour supply in this 
way captures cross-country heterogeneity in the scarcity of labour. This 
enables the heterogeneous response to the same increase in demand to be 
captured. As shown in Figure 13.2, the same increase in demand has 
different effects for countries that are on the shallower part of the supply 
curve compared with those on the steeper part. For countries with relative 
spare capacity in labour, the increase in demand is met by an increase in 
supply with only a small effect on wages, albeit more than under the strict 
spare capacity assumption shown in Figure 13.1. In contrast, the same 
increase in demand in countries with relatively scarce labour (nearing full 
employment) leads to only small increases in employment, with large 
increases in the wage needed to attract the additional workers into the 
labour market. 
The specification of a labour supply curve for inclusion in the 
MAGNET CGE model follows that of the land supply curve in Van Meijl et 
al. (2006) and the labour supply curves for minority groups in Berrittella 
(2012): 
ܮܾܽ݋ݑݎܵݑ݌݌݈ݕ ൌ ܮܯܣܺ ൅
ߚ
ݓܽ݃݁ן
  ሺ1ሻ 
where LabourSupply is the number of employed workers at the given 
wage rate, LMAX is the total population of working age, β is a negative 
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parameter calibrated on the current level of employment and wages, and α 
is the power of the function. The equilibrium wage rate and employment 
determines the vertical position of the curve, while the proximity of the 
equilibrium employment level to the maximum available number of 
workers and the power of the function determine the shape of the curve. 
2.3 Empirical labour supply curves for the European states 
Empirical labour supply curves are derived for the supply of unskilled 
labour in member states, Croatia and Turkey for 2007 (the starting year of 
the MAGNET model). The curves are grouped by size of country and 
presented in Figures 13.3 to 13.5.26 Each curve is shown for a range of wage 
rates of between 30% and twice the 2007 equilibrium wage (indicated by 
the diamond-shaped marker).  
Four sets of data are required to derive the labour supply curve for 
each country: the labour supply by skill type (employment),27 the total 
population of working age by skill type, the real wage and the value of the 
power of the function (α, here assumed to be equal to 1). The value of the β 
parameter can then be calculated from these values. Employment data for 
the member and candidate states are extracted from the ILO LabourSta 
database28 along with data on the population of working age. Real wages 
are calculated as the total value of payments to labour divided by the 
number of employees in each sector.  
Among the small European countries, the new member states have 
systematically lower wages than the EU-15 countries (Figure 13.3). The vast 
majority of the smaller European countries are constrained in the supply of 
unskilled labour, as shown by the strong upward slope of the curves. The 
exceptions to this are Slovakia, Croatia and Lithuania, which are on the 
flatter part of the curve indicating that only small increases in the wage 
                                                     
26 In this context, ‘small’ countries have a working-age population of fewer than 2.5 
million, ‘medium’ countries have between 2.5 million and 5 million members of 
working age, and ‘large’ countries more than 5 million. 
27 The skilled labour category used in the GTAP database corresponds to ILO 
categories 1-3 and the unskilled category categories 4-9 (Dimaranan & Narayanan, 
2007). The armed forces are allocated to the unskilled labour group. The share of 
known skilled and unskilled labour in total employment is applied to all 
uncategorised workers and used to group the population of working age. 
28 The download date was 2 May 2012. 
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would be needed to bring about an increase in the supply of unskilled 
workers. The clear outlier of this group of small countries is Luxembourg, 
which has a high equilibrium wage but also near full employment of the 
working-age population. Very large increases in wages are therefore 
needed to induce even small increases in the labour supply. 
A similar although less pronounced pattern can be observed in the 
empirical labour supply curves of medium-sized European countries 
(Figure 4). The new member states had lower wages in 2007 than the 
medium-sized EU-15 countries, with the exception of Portugal. The curves 
of the new member states are also slightly shallower that those of the older 
member states. The equilibrium employment points of both Sweden and 
Austria are near the vertical portion of the labour supply curve, suggesting 
that increased demand for unskilled labour in these countries would be 
mainly translated into higher labour prices. The candidate country of 
Croatia had one of the lowest average wage rates, but slightly higher than 
EU member states Slovakia and Lithuania.  
The disparity between wage levels among the EU-15 countries and 
the new and candidate states is even more distinct among the larger 
European countries. The labour supply curves for the larger countries, as 
shown in Figure 13.5, are clearly clustered into two groups: the upper 
group of EU-15 member states with higher wages and steeper labour 
supply curves, and the lower group of new and candidate member states 
with lower wage levels and shallower supply curves. This analysis shows a 
clear difference in the average wage levels of the EU-15 and newer member 
states, and highlights that the market for unskilled labour in the new and 
candidate states shows some spare capacity while that of the older member 
states is more closely approaching full employment. As such, an increase in 
the demand for unskilled labour in the new member states will have less 
impact on wage rates than the same increase in the EU-15 countries.  
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Figure 13.3 Labour supply curves for small European member and candidate states 
 
Figure 13.4 Labour supply curves for medium European member and candidate 
states 
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Figure 13.5 Labour supply curves for large European member and candidate states 
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database are aggregated into six commodities: cereals, vegetables and fruit, 
animal products, other crops, manufacturing, and services 
4. Effects of changes in the labour market specification on 
the results of a CAP reform scenario 
The supply of endowments in an economy and the ability to take on or 
shed workers in response to economic shocks and policy changes are 
important determinants of macroeconomic performance. Factors comprise 
a significant share of production costs for firms and form the major source 
of income for households. As such, the supply of factors provides a link 
between the production and consumption sides of an economy and, to the 
extent that GDP is measured by value added, is the primary determinant of 
national income. Given the key role of factors in the economy, it is expected 
that changing the labour market specification will change the outcome of 
policy simulations. 
The results of three simulations in which the same change in CAP 
policy is analysed with different labour market assumptions are presented 
in this section. A priori expectations suggest that a 50% reduction in first 
pillar support in member states will increase production costs, resulting in 
a contraction of the agricultural sector. This expectation is largely borne out 
in all countries and agricultural sectors across the EU as shown in Figure 
13.6. The large contractions are seen in the Luxembourg cereals and crops 
sectors (17% and 12% respectively), the Irish vegetables and fruit sector 
(12%) and the Finnish animal sector (10%). The average contraction across 
the EU member states is greatest in the crops sector (4.5%) and lowest in 
the animal products sector (1.6%), with cereals, vegetables and fruit falling 
between these two extremes.  
Although the general pattern is one of contraction in the agricultural 
sectors, the reduction in first pillar support increases production in some 
sectors in some countries. The agricultural sector in Croatia, Turkey and the 
rest of world region expands as rising costs in the EU leads to relatively 
cheaper prices in these regions, boosting demand. A similar effect drives 
the expansion in agriculture in some of the smaller countries, such as the 
Netherlands and Malta. The expanding countries, although member states, 
are recipients of lower levels of initial support from the CAP. Cutting the 
support to these countries therefore leads to smaller increases in 
production costs, making their agricultural products relatively cheaper. 
The expansion by 4.8% of the cereals sector in the Netherlands, for 
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example, is due to export-led growth brought about by relatively cheaper 
prices compared with other member states. 
The change in the output of the agricultural sectors from the CAP 
reform scenario is also shown for each of the labour market specifications 
in Figure 13.6. While the change in labour market functioning does not alter 
the overall conclusions from the results, it does lead to different results. An 
assumption of full employment in unskilled labour leads to smaller 
contractions in all agricultural sectors in all countries than the assumption 
of spare capacity. This stems from the assumption of mobile unskilled 
labour across sectors. Under full employment, the wage rate adjusts to 
ensure that all labour that is released from the agricultural sector is 
employed by other sectors. The assumption of mobile labour, however, 
means that this reduction in wages is equalised across all sectors and it also 
reduces the wage bill in agriculture. This reduction in wage costs means 
that production costs and thus output contracts by less than in the case of 
spare capacity where the released workers return to the inactive pool 
having no effect on the equilibrium wage rate.  
The introduction of a labour supply curve produces results that fall 
strictly between those of the spare capacity and full employment scenarios, 
as expected. The proximity of the result under the assumption of an 
upward-sloping labour supply curve depends upon the shape of the curve: 
countries with flatter curves and, therefore, more spare capacity in 
unskilled labour experience changes in the agricultural sector closer to the 
spare capacity results. Conversely, countries with steeper labour supply 
curves experience changes in the agricultural sectors that are closer to the 
full employment results. As such, the introduction of a labour supply curve 
for unskilled labour slightly dampens the effects of the cut in the budget of 
the CAP compared with the standard model specification of fully 
employed unskilled labour. 
While the largest difference in the expansion of the agricultural 
sectors under the various scenarios is still relatively small (0.7% for the 
cereals sector in Greece), the impact of changing the labour market 
specification on the supply of labour and wages is more marked. The 
percentage change in the wages of unskilled labour resulting from a 50% 
cut in first pillar support to member states is shown in Figure 13.7. The 
reduction in support to agriculture reduces the demand for unskilled 
labour and lowers wages in the member states, as more unskilled labour is 
available for use in other sectors. Wages increase by more under the 
assumption of full employment as other sectors are enticed to ‘mop up’ the 
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excess labour. As expected, wages under the labour supply curve 
assumption also increase, but by less than the full employment scenario to 
reflect the fact that the economy can also adjust the total number of people 
in employment. Wages do not alter under the assumption of spare capacity, 
as all adjustment is made through the number of people employed. 
Countries near full employment (such as the Netherlands) show changes in 
wages that are similar under the full employment and labour supply curve 
assumptions. 
Figure 13.6 Percentage change in the output of agricultural sectors  
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Figure 13.7 Percentage change in the unskilled wage rate  
 
Note: Results are ranked by the size of the labour-supply curve effect and overlaid rather 
than stacked. 
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Figure 13.8 Percentage change in the quantity of unskilled labour  
 
Note: Results are ranked by the size of the labour supply curve effect and overlaid rather 
than stacked. 
The changes in the quantity of the unskilled labour employed tell a 
similar story, as shown in Figure 13.8. The quantity of labour adjusts most 
under the spare capacity assumption where all adjustment takes place 
through the employment level. Some reduction in employment also takes 
place under the labour supply curve assumption, as expected. There is no 
change in employment under the full employment assumption, where all 
adjustment takes place through the wage rate.  
These relatively large changes in employment and wages in some 
countries have important implications for welfare, as shown in Figure 13.9. 
Consumption by households, considered here as a proxy for welfare, is 
reduced in all the contracting member states. The reduction in welfare is 
more pronounced under the assumption of spare capacity, as some workers 
will have been made unemployed as a result of the CAP reform.  
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Figure 13.9 Percentage change in consumption by households (welfare) 
 
Note: Results are ranked by the size of the labour supply curve effect and overlaid rather 
than stacked. 
The specification of the labour market therefore has a small effect on 
the impact in the agricultural sector but a relatively large impact on the 
welfare effect of a cut in first pillar support. Improving the modelling of 
factor markets in the member and candidate states is thus important for 
capturing not only the heterogeneity of labour markets, but also the welfare 
effects of policy reform. 
5. Conclusions 
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impact of CAP reform under different labour market assumptions shows 
that the addition of labour supply curves is a valuable one. The new 
specification produces results that fall between the two extremes of spare 
capacity and full employment, captures the relative flexibility of the labour 
markets across Europe and produces more nuanced welfare results. 
 
References 
Berrittella, M. (2012), “Modelling the labour market of minority ethnic groups”, 
Journal of Policy Modeling, 34(3). 
Dimaranan, B. and B. Narayanan (2007), “GTAP 7 Data Base Documentation – 
Chapter 12.B: Skilled and Unskilled Labor Data”, Global Trade Analysis 
Project, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 
(www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/res_display.asp?RecordID=2936) 
Shutes, L. (2012), “Labour Supply Curves for EU member and candidate states: An 
applied general equilibrium analysis”, Factor Markets Working Paper No. 
26, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. 
Shutes, L., A. Rothe and M. Banse (2012), “Factor Markets in Applied Equilibrium 
Models: The current state and planned extensions towards an improved 
presentation of factor markets in agriculture”, Factor Markets Working 
Paper No. 23, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. 
Van Meijl, H., T. van Rheenen, A. Tabeau and B. Eickhout (2006), “The impact of 
different policy environments on agricultural land use in Europe”, 
Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment, 114(1). 
154 | 
 
14. DETERMINANTS TO LEAVE 
AGRICULTURE IN THE EU 
BARBARA TOCCO, SOPHIA DAVIDOVA 
AND ALASTAIR BAILEY* 
he aim of this chapter is to shed light on the key issues and constraints 
affecting EU agricultural labour markets, and to empirically explore the 
mobility of farm labour and its reallocation across sectors. In the context 
of an enlarged EU, this work provides valuable insights for policies that aim at 
improving structural development in the agricultural sector. The authors 
summarise the key results from their empirical work exploring the labour 
reallocation from agriculture to the non-farm economy in five selected EU member 
states. The concluding remarks contain some policy recommendations to ease 
limitations in both the supply and demand side of rural labour markets. They 
conclude that market intervention is needed to reduce key distortions and to foster 
rural development. 
 
1. Background 
Well functioning labour markets ensure an efficient allocation of labour 
and promote the competitiveness and growth of agriculture and the wider 
rural economy. Since rural development depends on the existence of a 
                                                     
* This chapter is based on the following Factor Markets Working Papers: Tocco, 
Davidova & Bailey, “Key Issues in Agricultural Labour Markets: A Review of 
Major Studies and Project Reports on Agriculture and Rural Labour Markets”, 
Factor Markets Working Paper No. 20, February 2012; Tocco, Davidova & Bailey, 
“Supply and Demand Side Limitations Affecting the Structure of Agriculture and 
the Rural Economy”, Factor Markets Working Paper No. 21, February 2012 and 
Tocco, Bailey & Davidova, “Determinants to Leave Agriculture and Change 
Occupational Sector: Evidence from an Enlarged EU”, Factor Markets Working 
Paper No. 46, May 2013. 
T 
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competitive multi-sectoral economy, it is fundamental to understand the 
factors that determine the reallocation of agricultural labour across sectors 
and the impediments which may hinder its mobility (Dries & Swinnen, 
2002). The recent past has seen European agriculture undergo significant 
structural change. According to the 2009/2010 Eurostat Farm Structure 
Survey, in the last decade there has been a clear reduction in both the 
number of agricultural holdings and in the size of the farm labour force in 
the EU (Eurostat, 2012). As supported by the statistical findings, structural 
change remains an ‘ongoing process’. In particular, the labour market has 
been subject to several adjustments that have led to an outflow of labour 
from agriculture, which has also been accompanied by the reallocation of 
labour by farm residents from farm to off-farm work.  
However, agriculture in some member states is still characterised by 
a surplus of labour and hidden unemployment, implying that farming 
provides sub-optimal incomes. With the two recent waves of enlargement 
of the EU, in 2004 and 2007, the spatial heterogeneity of rural areas has 
been accentuated. This heterogeneity generates quite diverse conditions 
across member states and it becomes important to examine the differences 
between labour markets and investigate whether the low mobility of 
workers is the product of labour market impediments. It is of course 
possible that preferences for, and pride in, agricultural work may be an 
alternative explanation for a lack of outward mobility from agriculture, 
especially in some more advanced economies of the older member states 
(the EU-15). Nonetheless, structural constraints and market imperfections 
may instead be the main barriers for entry in non-farm jobs in some other 
less developed markets, such as the new member states.  
2. Main determinants of agricultural labour mobility 
Understanding the labour allocation decisions of farm workers has always 
been of great interest to the academic and policy communities. Before 
studying the mobility of labour, it becomes important to get a deeper 
understanding of the determinants of agricultural employment. In 
particular, the residential choice of individuals and the existence of market 
imperfections, such as imperfect information, may have a significant 
impact on the occupational choice. As emphasised by Johnson (1991), 
individuals are faced with an occupation-residential choice paradigm, 
whereby their choice to be engaged in farming places a restriction on their 
residential choice, and likewise their choice of a farm residence reduces 
their employment opportunities across sectors. Furthermore, the 
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geographical dispersion of the agricultural industry and its rural location 
imply that there are high costs of obtaining information about off-farm 
employment, which may lead to a lower probability of moving and 
switching occupational sector (Huffman, 1977). 
The high costs of moving, also due to the distance between rural and 
urban markets, would suggest that people in rural areas could be ‘trapped’ 
in their occupational choices. Moreover, as pointed out by Corsi & Findeis 
(2000), persistence in a particular state, or state dependence, may explain a 
certain rigidity in off-farm labour adjustment and the tendency for 
individuals to remain in the same employment situation. Hence, the 
decision to work in agriculture may be a ‘choice’ which is constrained, to 
varying degrees, by individual and locational variables.  
The vast empirical literature has mainly focused on the determinants 
of labour adjustments in rural areas and on the allocation decisions across 
activities. The starting point for any empirical investigation has been 
provided by the two-sector model of rural-urban migration by Todaro 
(1969) and Harris & Todaro (1970), where individuals are predicted to 
migrate if the expected urban-rural income differential exceeds migration 
costs, and the expected income in the urban sector equals the market wage 
times the probability of finding employment. The choice of occupation is 
determined by the utility differential from the two sectors (agriculture and 
non-farm employment) minus the transaction costs, i.e. the inter-sectoral 
relocation costs: the search costs of finding employment and the costs of the 
loss of agricultural skills (Kancs et al., 2009; Van Herck, 2009). Moreover, 
since households’ decisions stem from the maximisation of utility derived 
from income and non-income factors, changes in labour policies and 
institutional reforms (such as privatisation, liberalisation, restructuring, 
etc.) also affect the opportunity cost of labour and are therefore included as 
determinants of labour adjustments. For a comprehensive review of major 
studies and project reports on agriculture and rural labour markets, see 
Tocco et al. (2012a). 
The main exogenous factors which have been identified as important 
for the labour allocation decisions of individuals on and off the farm, and 
their mobility across sectors, include the following:  
• Individual characteristics: age, education, experience, gender, marital 
status, race.  
• Household characteristics and life cycle: presence of children, age of 
children, household size.  
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• Farm characteristics: farm size, output mix, capital stock, land 
ownership, technology, farm productivity/efficiency, on-farm 
diversification.  
• Financial characteristics and other benefits: farm income, non-labour 
(unearned) income, farm subsidies, social benefits, fringe benefits, 
non-pecuniary benefits linked to the job and residence. 
• Locational and labour market characteristics: unemployment rate, 
wage rate, labour market services/access to job information, distance 
to urban centre, population density. 
Overall, human capital and life-cycle theories are the most influential 
explanations for understanding the mobility of agricultural labour 
(Huffman, 1980; Rizov & Swinnen, 2004), although demand-side conditions 
are also fundamental, so that differences among regions and countries, 
which reflect level of development, relative importance of agriculture and 
more generally conditions in the macroeconomic environment, need to be 
taken into account. Furthermore, the structure of the farm and its 
production characteristics – in particular, its size, specialisation, and 
technology – are key determinants of the demand for on-farm labour.  
3. Key issues and constraints in agricultural labour markets 
The review of the empirical literature has also shed light on a series of 
market imperfections, as well as structural impediments, which often 
characterise rural labour markets. The high costs of movement which are 
associated with rural markets, and which may be exacerbated for farm 
families if the market for land is underdeveloped or inefficient, and the 
distance between rural settlements and cities entail limitations in the 
occupation/residential choice of individuals. 
In this context, Tocco et al. (2012b) seek to identify and classify the 
constraints in rural labour markets from both the supply and demand side. 
This identification is important as it allows us to highlight the inefficiencies 
and the failures of labour markets and to understand their potential impact 
on labour allocation, which becomes essential for policy design.  
From the supply point of view, low levels of education, skills, 
training and experience in agriculture represent an important supply-side 
limitation which constrains the supply of skilled labour from the 
agricultural sector and constitutes a barrier for those seeking alternative 
employment. Not only do poor skills result in low productivity in 
agriculture, but they also restrict the choice of work that can be undertaken 
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in other sectors, and often lead to lower paid, part-time or seasonal work. 
Since education has been found to influence entry to the non-farm 
economy, it follows that low levels of training and transferable skills 
constrain workers’ ability to take up off-farm work. Therefore, general and 
specific education, vocational training and work experience affect the 
mobility costs and influence labour allocation decisions (Macours & 
Swinnen, 2005), constituting a significant impediment to labour mobility 
and therefore to an efficient allocation of labour (Dries & Swinnen, 2002). 
Moreover, as emphasised by the European Commission (2006), 
demographic ageing in rural areas is an important issue, as it reduces the 
future labour supply of the working age population, which results in lower 
productivity growth and may hamper economic development. The 
agricultural sector often employs the less skilled and the elderly who, being 
less mobile and flexible, stay and work in farming. Where agriculture 
represents the main employer of labour in rural areas, this effect can be 
significant. This also leads to an inefficient labour allocation on agricultural 
holdings as well as to an impoverishment in terms of human capital in 
comparison to other sectors (Van Herck, 2009).  
Particular state pension schemes can influence this demographic. For 
instance, Pietola et al. (2003) find that higher retirement benefits in Finland 
during the early retirement programme have accelerated the rate of exit 
from the sector, particularly of lower income farmers. In Poland, a special 
pension provision for agricultural workers may have influenced the 
present structure of keeping the ‘golden’ one hectare to qualify as a farmer. 
However, in many of the new member states, such as Romania, the value of 
pensions is low and many pensioners engage in agricultural activities to 
supplement their income (Copus, A. et al., 2006; Tocco et al., 2012c). In 
other countries, such as Germany, an agricultural holder has to pass on the 
farm to a successor in order to be eligible for a pension scheme, leading to a 
small share of holders aged over 65. 
Another important supply-side constraint in agriculture concerns the 
limited access to land and capital, which is worsened by imperfections in 
the credit market, and thus the inability to access credit. As a consequence, 
social capital and family links play a key role in agriculture, as they provide 
access to capital and land needed for farming, hence reducing the 
probability of unemployment for farm household members (Swinnen et al., 
2001). Therefore, the large share of employment in agriculture, often 
characterised by a surplus of labour and hidden unemployment, implies 
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that agriculture can provide a minimum source of income for those less 
skilled, older and generally less mobile individuals. 
Hidden unemployment and labour immobility can also be a 
consequence of imperfect information, i.e. poor or incomplete information 
about the location and availability of jobs or better employment conditions 
(Kancs et al., 2007). Significant costs of job search may exist in agriculture 
and the seasonal demand for labour in farm production leads to 
uncertainty over the obtainment of wage labour (Ellis, 1993). As 
emphasised by the ILO (2008), information is a vital resource and policy 
tools therefore need to be in place to ensure that rural workers are aware of 
job opportunities, in order to promote rural employment and mobility. In 
this regard, information and communications technologies are fundamental 
for the facilitation of employment services. 
Rural areas, in comparison to urban areas, are usually lagging in 
terms of GDP per capita and other socio-economic indicators. While this 
results in lower standards of living, incomes, and a limited access to 
services and quality products (European Commission, 2006), it also fuels a 
vicious circle of slow economic growth. Such a situation makes it harder to 
attract and retain skilled individuals, who are instead pulled into more 
prosperous regions. Unfavourable labour market conditions, and 
specifically the lack of jobs opportunities, especially for women and young 
people, represent one of the main demand-side constraints to rural labour 
markets and to the mobility of agricultural labour (Juvančič & Erjavec, 
2005).  
Growth in rural areas and in agriculture depends on investments in 
physical infrastructure, such as roads and telecommunications, in 
agricultural research and extension, and in public health and education. 
Rural areas are often characterised by poor infrastructure, with poorly 
maintained roads and difficult access to information and communication 
facilities (Swinnen et al., 2001). This not only constitutes a mobility 
constraint for non-farm employment, but also increases the uncertainty and 
restricts market opportunities for farmers (ILO, 2008). As emphasised by de 
Janvry et al. (1991), poor infrastructure, non-competitive markets and poor 
information all lead to high transaction costs.  
One of the stylised facts of rural areas is the relatively high level of 
both direct and hidden unemployment (Davis & Pearce, 2001). High 
unemployment levels in rural areas are often of a structural nature, due to 
insufficient education and skills of workers. This would imply that there is 
an imbalance between the supply and the demand for labour, due to a 
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mismatch between the skills that workers are supplying and the skills that 
firms are demanding. Therefore, due to inadequate specific education and 
vocational training, individuals are handicapped in their attempts to find 
alternative employment. 
Low mobility of rural households and high levels of on-farm 
employment despite small farm assets would suggest that there are very 
few opportunities for alternative income sources and jobs outside 
agriculture (Juvančič & Erjavec, 2005), which constitute structural 
impediments for labour adjustments. As suggested by the ILO (2008), rural 
non-farm activities are often constrained by low market demand, especially 
in those rural areas with low population density and a high percentage of 
poverty. On the other hand, smallholders are constrained by a lack of 
access to inputs and services, as well as low human capital and 
inappropriate technology, which prevent them from diversifying into 
higher-value products. 
A further limitation concerns the seasonal nature of agricultural 
activities, which causes fluctuations in both labour demand and supply and 
results in seasonal employment patterns, seasonal migration, sharp wage 
variations, widespread unemployment and the dominance of casual over 
regular employment (ILO, 2008). Seasonality in supply can also be a 
significant constraint to the development of the non-farm rural sector. 
Rural people are subject to seasonal migration, as they are pulled into 
agriculture during the peak season and are released during the slack 
season, seeking other employment opportunities or becoming unemployed. 
Furthermore, risks of weather and volatility of prices also tend to reduce 
the demand for labour. 
In the EU, within the new member states the disparities between 
rural and urban areas are accentuated. It is worth stressing here that rural 
areas in these countries suffer from a less-developed tertiary sector, lower 
levels of GDP per capita and lower employment rates. Furthermore, 
despite the high share of people working in the agricultural sector, their 
specific agricultural training and productivity levels are generally quite 
low. Therefore, in the context of an enlarged EU where the structure of the 
agricultural sector presents heterogeneous conditions across member 
states, it becomes important to examine the differences within labour 
markets and investigate whether the low mobility of workers reflects the 
presence of some structural constraints, which prevent entry in non-farm 
jobs.  
DETERMINANTS TO LEAVE AGRICULTURE IN THE EU | 161 
4. Trends and differences in agricultural employment in 
five selected EU member states 
The empirical analysis upon which much of the following discussion relies 
focuses on five selected EU member states, specifically three new member 
states – Hungary, Slovakia and Poland – and two of the EU-15 – France and 
Italy – as reference cases. The selection of countries reflects an attempt to 
compare more mature labour markets with less productive ones and also to 
capture the substantial differences in the structural organisations of the 
farms and other labour market conditions. Therefore, we explore to what 
extent differences in the farm structure and regional labour market 
conditions matter for structural change in employment patterns. 
In the last two decades, the level of agricultural employment in the 
EU has declined quite quickly, with sharp reductions in the number of 
people employed in the sector and in the share of agriculture in total 
employment. The different paths of structural change are depicted in 
Figure 14.1, comparing the five member states since the 1990s.  
Figure 14.1 Trends in structural change, 1990–2010 
 
Source: Tocco et al. (2013). 
The largest drops are associated with the first years of transition in 
the new member states, particularly in Hungary and Poland. Despite the 
diminishing share in agricultural employment, in 2010 the sector still 
represented an important source of income and development for the rural 
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community, providing labour for around two million people in Poland, 
accounting for 12.8% of total employment.29 The numbers for the other 
countries are Italy with 867,000 people (3.8%), France with 750,000 (2.9%), 
Hungary with 169,000 (3.8%), and Slovakia with 75,000 (3.2%)30.  
The dataset used in the analysis in the EU Labour Force Survey (EU-
LFS), expanded with additional macro indicators to take into account 
different economic and labour market conditions as well as farm structures 
across regions (European NUTS-2 level). These additional variables have 
been extracted respectively from the Eurostat Online Database and the 
Farm Structure Survey. The period of analysis is 2003–08. Some key 
descriptive statistics of the agricultural sample are discussed below (Figure 
14.2). 
Low levels of formal education and training are evident in the five 
member states, with trends varying across the countries. In general, most of 
the agricultural workers have attained medium education (with the 
exception of Italy), although the share of high education is much lower in 
comparison to non-farm sectors. Moreover, the majority of workers are 
above 45 years of age, with almost 20% aged between 55 and 64, suggesting 
a demographic ageing of the workforce. The diverse conditions of the 
agricultural sector are also represented by the different types of workers. 
Employees represent a majority in Slovakia (85%) and in Hungary (68%), 
whereas self-employment is dominant in Poland (68%) and France (58%). 
Italy has an equal distribution of these two types of workers (46% 
respectively). Although family-workers are only a minority, they constitute 
22% in Poland.  
 
                                                     
29 This represents the second largest figure in the EU-27 in absolute and relative 
numbers following Romania with 2.8 million people, equivalent to 30.1% of the 
total employment. 
30 In reality, the persons involved in agriculture are much more numerous, since 
these data only cover those people who are in the 15-64 working age category and 
work in the primary sector as their main activity. On the other hand, the farm 
labour force represent all people who, having reached their schooling-leaving age, 
carry out farm work, thus including the non-regular labour force, i.e. part-time and 
seasonal workers (measured in annual work units, or AWU).  
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Figure 14.2 Some descriptive statistics: education, age and worker status 
 
Source: Own figure based on the EU-LFS. 
One of the striking differences across countries concerns the structure 
of agricultural holdings. Small farms of less than 8 ESU (European size 
units) are predominant in the new member states, with a particularly large 
share of farms under 2 ESU in Hungary (86%), Poland (65%) and Slovakia 
(90%). Commercial holdings are instead more common in the EU-15, so 
that large farms (over 8 ESU) represent the majority in France (73%). Italy 
is, to some extent, a special case. 70% of its farms are classified as small, 
with approximately 35% of farms under 2 ESU, a further 35% between 2-8 
ESU, and the remaining 30% in the larger class. According to our sample, 
the type of farming is mainly specialised in crops, whereas mixed crops 
and livestock systems are generally more important for the new member 
states. In general, production and specialisation patterns matter for the 
different labour requirements, as some activities are more labour-intensive 
and/or have a more seasonal demand for labour. Moreover, their 
association with credit availability may also have an impact on the demand 
for labour. 
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5. Empirical strategy: sequential labour decisions  
We draw upon the empirical work of Tocco et al. (2013), which explores the 
main determinants affecting the decisions of individuals to work in the 
agricultural sector and subsequently exit agriculture and switch 
occupational sector. The labour decisions of individuals, across two 
consecutive periods, can be summarised by the following decision tree 
(Figure 14.3). The branches of the tree constitute three sequential decisions: 
a) work in non-farm activities or in agriculture; b) conditional on this, 
remain in the agricultural sector or leave; c) for those who leave, move to 
non-employment (retirement or unemployment) or to other sectoral 
employment (industry/services). 
Figure 14.3 Decision tree of labour outcomes 
 
Based on the EU-LFS data sample, Table 14.1 summarises the 
frequencies of the different labour outcomes in the selected member states. 
First of all, it is clear that the large majority of agricultural workers 
remained in the farm sector in the following period. Data shows very large 
flows towards inactivity as opposed to other sectoral employment, thus it 
seems that structural change is mainly driven by retirement. Entry in non-
farm sectors reaches significant figures only in Italy, followed by Poland 
and Hungary.  
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Table 14.1 Frequencies of labour outcomes based on the sample 
Labour choice France  Hungary Italy Poland Slovakia 
Non-farm activities 47,188 225,651 499,394 124,492 92,486 
Agriculture 1,587 15,099 24,536 27,150 4,565 
Stay  1,389 13,394 21,585 25,622 4,149 
Leave 198 1,705 2,951 1,528 416 
Industry 24 368 511 427 84 
Services 72 340 787 289 57 
Unemployment 46 350 308 143 136 
Inactivity 56 647 1,345 669 139 
Source: EU-LFS. 
One of the issues in estimating the exit decisions of agricultural 
workers is that these individuals might not be a random sample from the 
total population. Some unobserved characteristics which may affect the 
probability of agricultural employment in the first place would imply that 
these workers constitute a self-selected sample, and thus their occupational 
decisions may be different from those in non-farm activities (Heckman, 
1979). Therefore, the empirical methodology consists in employing a 3-step 
multivariate probit where we control for selection bias at two stages – the 
decision to work in agriculture and then, including only those who work in 
agriculture, to exit farming. Lastly, the third stage considers those workers 
who were previously employed in agriculture and left the sector, and 
examines the probability of a switch to non-farm sectors.31  
6. Main findings from the empirical analysis 
The key findings from the empirical analysis are summarised here. First of 
all, younger individuals (15–24 years) are generally more mobile and 
responsive to economic stimulus and may leave the sector for other non-
farm jobs or to become temporary unemployed (frictional unemployment). 
Nonetheless, the main outflows from agriculture are associated with those 
individuals over 55 years old, who are more likely to exit agriculture and 
leave the labour force altogether. This would suggest that the largest 
outflows from the sector are associated with retirement. 
                                                     
31 The empirical approach, which is an extension of the bivariate probit with 
selection, is explained in more detail in Tocco et al. (2013). Refer to the paper for 
the complete output tables, t-statistics and other empirical issues.  
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Moreover, people with low levels of education are found to be 
constrained from leaving the farm labour market and entering the non-
farm economy, which implies that they do not seem to possess those 
transferrable skills necessary to move across activities.  
Job attributes are quite important for the decision to leave 
agricultural employment so that in comparison to employees, self-
employed individuals and family-workers are less likely to exit agriculture. 
This supports the assumption that employees are the most flexible category 
of worker, responsive to the market wage and off-farm opportunities. Self-
employed individuals, possibly due to the ownership of specific capital 
assets or other personal motives, are more reluctant to exit their business, 
whereas family-workers are usually tied by family responsibilities or may 
find provisional work and subsistence in the farm household, often 
contributing to a ‘surplus of labour’ in agriculture.  
Labour market conditions constitute important pull factors for 
attracting labour out of agriculture. Here, a high population density and, 
more importantly, a low unemployment rate increase the probability of 
entering the non-farm economy. Moreover, a high wage differential 
between the non-farm and farm sectors also increases the likelihood of a 
sectoral switch, which is consistent with the fact that individuals respond to 
market incentives and regional labour market conditions. A high ratio of 
regional non-farm to farm employment, which would capture the 
absorption capacity of the non-farm economy, has a strong pull effect, 
particularly in Italy. The opposite result in the case of Poland could be due 
to a large labour turnover and high competition, which would see 
agricultural workers flow into frictional unemployment. 
Finally, the empirical analysis has also highlighted the impact of 
heterogeneous farm structures, especially between new member states and 
the EU-15. Farm characteristics are found to have different impacts on the 
outflows of labour from agriculture. For instance, the size of the farm at the 
regional level captures differences in the organisational structure of the 
business (or farm household) and thus implies different constraints or 
prospects for farm survival. In Hungary, regions with a large share of very 
small farms are associated with higher rates of farm exit, suggesting that 
these farms are the first to disappear in the process of structural change. 
Conversely, very small farms, and especially subsistence farms, in Italy and 
Poland appear to play a buffer role and thus prevent major outflows of 
labour. The mixed evidence in the results reflects the different 
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organisational and production structures, suggesting different capacities to 
release and absorb labour.  
7. Policy implications 
Bearing in mind that the inefficiency of the labour market is an important 
factor behind the lack of competitiveness of rural areas in Europe, the key 
message from the research summarised here is that locational 
characteristics, skills mismatch and insufficient information appear to be 
the most important impediments to inter-sectoral and spatial mobility of 
labour.  
The movement into retirement appears to be an important outflow of 
labour from the farm workforce. Structural change in agriculture that 
increases land consolidation and sees agriculture’s share of the workforce 
decline is likely to be highly dependent on the way land is passed from one 
generation to the next and, importantly, upon how the next generation 
decides to employ that land. The efficient functioning of land market 
institutions will likely affect the decisions the next generation makes at this 
key juncture. If land transfer is costly, then their initial decision to engage 
or not in agriculture may be constrained. Retirement policies, and 
associated conditions for pensions and further CAP entitlement access, may 
also influence the decisions of the next generation at this point. 
Since labour markets are central to the determination of the allocation 
of labour, the efficient functioning of the rural labour market is extremely 
important for the income and development of people residing in rural 
areas. Rural regions in Europe are characterised by heterogeneous 
conditions due to socio-economic and geo-political differences. Some rural 
areas, especially those which are more remote, depopulated and dependent 
on agriculture, are the ones more at risk, as they face particular challenges 
in terms of growth, jobs and sustainability (European Commission, 2006). 
Despite some large disparities in the economic conditions across individual 
member states, rural areas in general show a lower degree of economic 
development than urban areas.  
As shown by the empirical analysis, education and training are 
important determinants of inter-sectoral mobility. Nonetheless, the levels of 
education, skills and training of farm workers are particularly low. 
Therefore, rural development policies must focus on the promotion of 
extensive programmes to support education and vocational training and to 
invest in human capital in rural areas. Expenditure on education should be 
targeted towards upgrading managerial and employability skills, with the 
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purpose of improving factor mobility and a more efficient allocation of 
labour. This might improve labour productivity in, and incomes from, 
agriculture and other rural non-farm enterprises by shifting those people 
who are currently under-employed into alternative activities and reducing 
unemployment. Moreover, investments in human capital and support 
programmes to enter more productive activities could also facilitate an 
increased diversification of rural areas. Non-farm activities are extremely 
important in terms of rural development, as they absorb the excess labour 
from agriculture and represent a survival strategy for many rural 
households by providing income and employment. More importantly, 
emphasis should be placed on the development of rural small and 
medium-sized enterprises, which tend to be labour-intensive and thus are 
likely to absorb labour.  
Investment in infrastructure remains crucial for improving rural 
labour markets, for strengthening rural-urban linkages, and thereby 
facilitating market access and creating better employment opportunities. A 
further focus point consists in supporting agricultural extension as well as 
small business development, reducing capital constraints and providing 
access to credit, markets, technical information and assistance. Adequate 
transport and communications are necessary in rural areas to stimulate 
productivity, provide linkages with the wider economy and thus lead to 
improved and more efficient labour outcomes. In addition to this, the 
government can play a role in bridging the gap of incomplete information 
by strengthening market information systems and assisting rural 
households in finding more and better employment and training 
opportunities. In this respect, labour market institutions can improve 
information about markets, such as providing more information on job 
opportunities to ease the search for a job. Improving factor mobility, and 
hence the smooth transition across activities, would improve the 
functioning of labour markets, with important consequences for the income 
and the development of people in rural areas.  
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15. AGRICULTURAL LABOUR AND FARM 
SUBSIDIES: NEW EVIDENCE FROM 
THE EU 
ALESSANDRO OLPER, VALENTINA 
RAIMONDI, DANIELE CAVICCHIOLI 
AND MAURO VIGANI* 
his chapter summarises the main results reported in Olper et al. (2013), who 
investigated the relationship between CAP subsidies and the reallocation of 
agricultural labour. Exploiting the properties of a large data set covering 
150 EU regions during the 1990-2009 period, this study found robust evidence 
that CAP payments contributed significantly to maintaining jobs in agriculture. 
However, the economic magnitude of this effect is quite low, and strongly 
heterogeneous across different CAP payments, i.e. Pillar I subsidies exert an effect 
more than two times greater than Pillar II payments.  
 
1. Introduction 
The creation and maintenance of jobs in agriculture and in rural areas has 
been a traditional CAP target, and an objective recently re-stated and 
emphasised by several EU official documents (e.g. European Commission, 
2010; European Parliament, 2010).32 However, the effectiveness of subsidies 
                                                     
* This chapter is based on Olper, Raimondi, Cavicchioli & Vigani, “Does the 
Common Agricultural Policy Reduce Farm Labour Migration? Panel data analysis 
across EU regions”, Factor Markets Working Paper No. 28, July 2012. 
32 The European Commission reflection on the future of the CAP, “The CAP 
Towards 2020” (EC, COM(2010) 672), explicitly addressed agricultural and rural 
labour issues in several sections of the document. Labour and rural areas 
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in maintaining the labour force in the agricultural sector is unclear and the 
empirical evidence is still largely inconclusive. Over the last 50 years, EU 
countries have experienced dramatic adjustments in their agricultural 
labour markets, showing an impressive off-farm migration. Surprisingly, in 
the most recent decades, we do not find any substantial reduction of the 
migration rate, a stylised fact that is at odds with €50 billion per year of 
income subsidies spent through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  
During the 1990–2009 period, the off-farm migration rate across the 
EU-15 regions was about 2.5% per annum.33 This average value masks 
substantial differences both over time and, especially, across countries and 
regions. The off-farm migration rate was equal to 3.02% over the 1990–99 
period, going down to 2.06% in the period 2000–09. However, this lower 
rate is largely attributable to a value close to zero in 2008 and even slightly 
negative in 2009, probably as an effect of the 2008 commodities price spike 
and of the 2009 global crisis. Across EU regions, the net farm migration rate 
shows great variation (Figure 15.1). Consistent with expectations, there is a 
negative relationship between the level of development and the rate of off-
farm migration, as less developed regions are still in structural 
transformation. However, this negative relation is weak.  
A central question analysed in this chapter is the extent to which farm 
subsidies played a role in affecting these patterns of off-farm migration. 
Mainly due to data limitations, existing evidence concerning the effect of 
CAP subsidies on off-farm labour migration has been quite inconclusive. 
This evidence is mostly confined to specific countries or regional case 
studies, only rarely focusing on the European-wide perspective 
(Shucksmith et al., 2005; Petrick & Zier, 2011; 2012). Thus, although 
interesting and often rich in detailed interpretations, such studies only 
measure the CAP effects within a single country or region, an approach 
that has the advantage of keeping factors such as institutions fixed. 
However, these studies are difficult to generalise to other countries and 
regions where there are wide differences in development, labour market 
institutions and farming structures.  
                                                                                                                                       
employment issues are also well represented in the recent European Parliament 
document on CAP reforms, “On the Future of the CAP after 2013” (EP 439.972).  
33 Regional off-farm migration rate, ݉, is estimated as 
݉ ൌ ሾܮ௜௧ିଵሺ1 ൅ ݊ሻ െ ܮ௜௧ሿ ܮ௜௧ିଵ⁄ , where ܮ௜௧ is the stock of agricultural labour in the 
region i and year t, and ݊ ൌ ሺܮ௧ െ ܮ௧ିଵ ܮ௧ିଵ⁄ ሻ is the growth rate of the total labour 
force. See Olper et al. (2012) for details.  
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Figure 15.1 Average annual off-farm migration rate, 1990–2009 
 
Source: Authors computation based on data from Olper et al. (2012). 
This chapter summarises the main findings reported in Olper et al. 
(2012) on the effect of CAP subsidies on off-farm migration across the EU 
regions. The chapter starts with a short review of the empirical literature to 
date. In Section 3, after a non-technical discussion of the method, key 
results are presented in term of the estimated off-farm migration elasticity 
to CAP payments. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
2. The empirical literature to date 
Table 15.1 summarises the empirical literature on the effect of farm 
subsidies on the agricultural labour market. Theoretically, these studies can 
be divided into two main approaches: studies based on household models 
to analyse the impact of subsidies on the allocation of household labour 
(Lee, 1965; Becker, 1965); and those based on models of occupational choice 
to investigate the process of entry and exit from the agricultural sector 
(Todaro, 1969; Harris & Todaro 1970; Mundlak, 1979). The above 
distinction is also reflected in empirical works, with studies at the farm-
household level largely based on micro farm-level data, and studies on the 
inter-sectoral reallocation of agricultural labour conducted at the aggregate 
(country or regional) level.  
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Table 15.1 The labour effect of farm payments: The literature to date  
 
 
Micro-data allow us to address individual adjustment behaviour in 
response to changes in factors affecting household utility, such as different 
revenues sources. For example, Mishra & Goodwin (1997), focusing on 
farm households in Kansas, found that policy changes that reduce farm 
income support can increase off-farm employment of the operators and 
Author Country Data level Empirical 
methods
Period Data structure Output variable Type of Subsidy Subsidy net 
Effect
Additional 
information
Barkley (1990) US Aggregate OLS 1940-1985 Time series Out farm labour 
migration
Direct payments
0
Goetz and Debertin (1996) US Aggregate OLS 1980-1990 Cross-section Population out-
migration
Federal farm program 
payments +
Mishra and Goodwin (1997) Kansas Household Tobit 1992 Cross-section Off-farm labour 
supply
Federal farm program 
payments −
Goetz and Debertin (2001) US Household OLS 1987-1997 Cross-section Net farm exit rate Federal farm program 
payments
−
Goodwin and Holt (2002) Bulgary Household Probit + others 1995 Cross-section Off-farm work 
participation
Social benefit 
payments
−
Pietola et al.  (2003) Finland Household Multinomial 
Probit
1993-1998 Panel Out farm labour 
migration
Per hectar subsidies 0
El-Osta et al. ( 2004) US Household Tobit 2001 Cross-section On-farm labour 
supply
AMTA, loan 
deficiency, disaster 
and market loss 
payments
+  (on-farm)    
− (off-farm)
Heterogeneity 
effects across 
subsidies
Foltz (2004) Connecticut Household Probit 1996-2001 Panel Farm exit rate Price support 
subsidies
−
Goodwin and Mishra (2004) US Household OLS 2001 Cross-section Off-farm labour 
supply
Decoupled  payments
−
Serra et al. (2005) Kansas Aggregate Probit 1994-2000 Cross-section Off-farm labour 
supply
Decoupled payments
0
Glauben et al. (2006) Germany Household OLS 1991-1999 Cross-section Out farm labour 
migration
Sectoral subsidies 
payments 0
Benjamin and Kimhi (2006) France Household Multinomial 
Logit
2000 Cross-section On-farm work 
participation
Direct payments for 
young farmers
−
Ahearn et al.  (2006) US Household Probit 1999 vs. 1996 Cross-section Off-farm work 
participation
Coupled and 
decoupled payments −              
Key et al.  (2006) US Household OLS 1992 and 1997 Cross-section Off-farm labour 
supply
Federal crop insurance 
subsidies and total 
government payments
−
Breustedt and Glauben 
(2007)
110 EU 
regions
Aggregate OLS 1993-1997 Cross-section Out farm labour 
migration
Direct payments and 
price support
−
Dewbre and Mishra (2007) US Household OLS 1998-2001 Cross-section On farm work AMTA, loan 
deficiency, disaster 
and market loss 
(AMTA)    
+ (coupled)
AMTA are 
decoupled, other 
subsidies coupled
Goodwin et al. (2007) US Household Probability-
weighted 
bootstrapping
2003-2004 Cross-section Off-farm labour 
supply
Coupled and 
(decoupled) payments
− (decoupled)  
+ (coupled)
Hennessy and Rehman 
(2008)
Ireland Household Probit /OLS 2002 Cross-section Probability (hours) of 
off-farm participation
Decoupled payments
+                   
Gullstrand and Tezic (2008) Sweden Household Logit 1989-2003 Panel Out farm labour 
migration of salaried 
Objective 1 Structural 
Funds Programme 0
Pufahl and Weiss (2009) Germany Household Propensity 
Score Matching
2000-2005 Panel On-farm labour 
supply
Agri-environment 
programs +             
Van Herck (2009) 144 EU 
Regions
Household Logit 2005-2006 Cross-section Out farm labour 
migration
Coupled and 
decoupled payments
+
Uchida et al . (2009) China Household D-in-D 
Matching 
1999-2004 Panel Off-farm labour 
supply
Payment for 
ecosystem service
+
Becker et al. (2010) EU NUTS 2 Aggregate Regression 
Discontinuity 
Design
1989–2006 Cross-section Total Employment 
growth
Objective 1 Structural 
Funds Programme 0
D'Antoni and Mishra (2010) US Aggregate Autoregressive 
distributed lag 
d l
1940-2007 Time series Out farm labour 
migration
Direct  payments
−
Petrick and Zier (2011) 3 East-
Germany 
landers
Aggregate LSDV 1999-2006 Panel Out farm labour Coupled, decoupled 
and rural development 
CAP payments
+             
(0 livestock 
payments)
Heterogeneity 
effects across 
subsidies
Salvioni and Sciulli (2011) Italy Household Propensity 
Score Matching
2003-2007 Panel On-farm family labour Rural development 
Program
+             
(0 LFA)
Petrick and Zier (2012) 3 East-
Germany 
landers
Aggregate GMM 1999-2006 Panel Out farm labour Coupled, decoupled 
and rural development 
CAP payments
0
Corsi and Salvioni (2012) Italy Household Tobit 2002-2008 Panel Off-farm labour 
participation
Decoupled payments 0
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their spouses. Similarly, El-Osta et al. (2004) showed that US Agricultural 
Market Transition Act (AMTA) payments tend to increase the hours 
operators work on-farm and vice versa. The majority of farm-level studies 
are based on a cross-sectional approach. However, there are also important 
examples of micro-data analysis based on panel data (Pietola et al., 2003; 
Gullstrand & Tezic, 2008). One of the main shortcomings of these studies is 
the short time period normally involved, an issue that makes it difficult to 
isolate all the farmer adjustment processes due to the changes in 
agricultural policy (Glauben et al., 2006).  
The analysis at the aggregate level is, in principle, less data 
constrained, providing results with broader coverage. The process of 
labour migration from one sector to another is assessed by controlling for 
structural variables such as country or regional relative income, 
unemployment, population densities, and institutional and policy 
variables. The econometric approaches of aggregate studies range from 
cross-sectional to time-series analyses and, more recently, to panel data 
methods and also quasi-experimental approaches.  
The seminal work of Barkley (1990) used a two-sector occupation 
choice model on a large time series (from 1940 to 1985) to analyse the 
labour migration out of agriculture in the US, using government payments 
as a key variable. Results show that the effect of farm support on 
agricultural labour is negative but insignificant. D’Antoni & Mishra (2010) 
extended Barkley’s sample to 2007, accounting also for dynamics, through 
an autoregressive distributed lag model. By taking dynamics into account, 
the farm support effect on off-farm labour migration becomes significantly 
negative.  
At the EU level, many studies have investigated the effect of CAP 
payments, as well as of specific national public policies (see Table 15.1). 
From both household and aggregate level studies, the evidence of the direct 
(and indirect) effect of CAP subsidies on off-farm labour 
participation/migration is inconclusive, ranging from negative even to 
positive. Moreover, results are often confined to specific countries or 
regions (Pufahl & Weiss, 2009; Hennessy & Rehman, 2008; Gullstrand & 
Tezic, 2008), mainly as a consequence of data limitation at the EU regional 
level. Several studies used a cross-sectional approach (e.g. Breusted & 
Glauben, 2007; Hennessy & Rehman, 2008; Van Herck, 2009), while those 
which performed a panel data analysis considered only a single country 
and/or specific policy measures (e.g. Gullstrand & Tezic, 2008; Pufahl & 
Weiss, 2009; Salvioni & Sciulli, 2011). 
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Only a few studies have worked at the overall EU level. Breusted & 
Glauben (2007) investigated the effect of total farm subsidies on off-farm 
labour migration in 110 EU NUTS 2 regions, finding that CAP payments 
slowed down structural change in the period 1993–97. Van Herck (2009) 
used a multinomial logit approach to investigate the main destination of 
households exiting the agricultural sector. Coupled, decoupled and total 
subsidies showed a positive effect on off-farm migration for 144 NUTS 2 
EU regions, mainly as a consequence of secondary order effects. Finally, 
within this literature the works of Petrick & Zier (2011; 2012) represent two 
relevant exceptions. They used difference-in-difference and dynamic panel 
models, respectively, and exploited the entire portfolio of CAP payments, 
showing an employment effect on CAP subsidies which goes from weak 
but positive to zero. However, their results focused on just three East 
German regions and are hardly extendible to the EU as a whole. 
To sum up, actual evidence concerning the effect of CAP payments 
on off-farm migration is not only quite inconclusive, but also suffers from 
several drawbacks. First, the evidence often comes from cross-sectional 
inference, and when panel data are used the time coverage is short. Second, 
it is largely focused on country or regional case studies whose findings are 
difficult to generalise to other countries and regions. Third, it rarely takes 
into account the entire portfolio of CAP payments. Last, but not least, no 
particular effort has been taken to account for potential problems of 
endogeneity bias of CAP payments.  
3. New evidence on the CAP subsidies effect on 
agricultural labour 
3.1 Theoretical and empirical background 
From a theoretical point of view, Olper et al. (2013) rely on the theory of 
occupational choice and labour migration decision, which has its roots in 
the Todaro (1969) and Harris & Todaro (1970) two-sector model, 
subsequently developed by Mundlak (1979) and Barkley (1990). In this 
model, there is no room for uncertainty, capital market restrictions and 
adjustment costs (see Breustedt & Glauben, 2007).  
The economy is disaggregated into two sectors: agriculture (i) and 
non-agriculture (j). Individuals choose between working in the agricultural 
or the non-agricultural sector by comparing their expected discounted 
lifetime utility in the two sectors. Assuming that the price of the composite 
consumption good equals one, the utility (V) derived from one occupation 
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is a function of the expected income (Y) and the time spent working (L), 
plus exogenous shifters (Z). An individual selects one occupation over the 
other at time t, such that max ׬ ݁ି௥௧ ܸሺ ௧ܻ, ܮ௧, ܼ௧ሻ݀ݐ, with r the discount rate, 
and ߲ܸ ߲ܻ⁄ ൐ 0.  
Thus, when the income level in non-farm occupation is higher than 
that in the farm sector, farmers are expected to move away from 
agriculture. However, even though non-farm income may be higher than 
that associated with farming, such a difference may be discounted by the 
probability, ݍ௝௧, of finding a job in the industrial sector. The off-farm 
migration will occur when the expected lifetime utility in the non-farm 
sector – net of the costs ܥ௧ associated with changing job – exceeds the 
expected lifetime utility in farming. The net migration out from agriculture, 
݉, is then a function of the arguments of the utility functions in the two 
sectors, and includes the income, the labour force, the probability of finding 
a job, the costs of migration, the age structure, ݃, and other personal 
characteristics of the farm population, namely ݉ ൌ ݂൫ܻ, ܮ, ܼ, ݍ௝, ܥ, ݃൯. 
Next, defining the relative income between the non-agricultural and 
agricultural sectors by ݎ݅ ൌ ௝ܻ ௜ܻ⁄ , clearly the theoretical model predicts that 
߲݉ ߲ݎ݅⁄ ൐ 0. Thus, other things being equal, to the extent to which farm 
subsidies, ݏ, will contribute to a shrink in relative income, they will 
negatively affect off-farm migration, namely ߲݉ ߲ݏ⁄ ൏ 0. The empirical 
identification of this direct effect of farm subsidies on off-farm migration, 
together with other effects on the demand for agricultural labour, 
represented one of the main objectives of the Olper et al. (2012) study. 
The predictions above have been tested econometrically in a sample 
of 150 EU-15 regions in the period 1990–2009, using both static and 
dynamic panel estimators, to account for the adjustment nature of the 
migration process and the possible endogeneity of CAP payments. 
Empirically, one of the main challenges is how to measure the policy 
variables at the regional level.34 To overcome these issues, the study 
                                                     
34 Previous studies followed two main approaches: measuring a regionalised 
producer subsidy equivalent (PSE) as in Anders et al. (2004), Tarditi & Zanias 
(2001) and Hansen & Herrmann (2012); using FADN data as in Shucksmith et al. 
(2005), and combining the same source with Eurostat Regio-New Cronos database, 
assuring to the former also a time variation, as in Esposti (2007). However, as 
discussed in Olper et al. (2012) both these approaches have some limitations, 
especially due to the impossibility of investigating the possible differentiated effect 
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adopted a new strategy, measuring CAP payments over the net farm 
income using only Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) data at the 
regional level. The key advantage of this approach is the possibility of 
splitting CAP total payments into their different components: coupled and 
decoupled payments of Pillar I, as well as agri-environmental payments, 
less-favoured areas (LFA), investment aids and a residual category called 
‘other’ subsidies of Pillar II. 
Figure 15.2 Average CAP payments over farm income, 1990–2009 
 
Source: Authors computation based on data from Olper et al. (2012). 
For illustrative purposes, Figure 15.2 reports the 1990–2009 average 
amount of total CAP payments relative to farm income (payments/VA) 
received by the considered EU regions. The pattern that emerges is quite 
close to previous findings (e.g. Shucksmith et al., 2005). In particular, there 
is strong variability in the amount of farm income due to CAP payments. 
The average level in the considered period (33%) masks a large variability 
across regions, which range from close to 0% to above 80%, especially in 
some central and northern Europe regions. However, the correlation 
between the distribution of CAP support and the level of development, 
                                                                                                                                       
between coupled and decoupled payments, as well as the effect of different Pillar II 
subsidies 
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measured as real GDP per capita, is always very low: ԟ0.084 for total CAP 
subsidies, ԟ0.152 for Pillar I payments, and 0.05 for Pillar II payments.  
3.2 Main findings 
Overall, the econometric results strongly support the model predictions, 
namely that CAP subsidies as a whole have played a role in keeping labour 
forces in agriculture. However, the economic magnitude of the overall 
effect is not particularly high and, interestingly, strongly heterogeneous 
across different CAP payments. A simple comparison between the off-farm 
migration effects of CAP payments is reported in Figures 15.3 and 15.4, 
using the respective (absolute) elasticities, estimated from the econometric 
regressions reported in Olper et al. (2012).35 Several interesting patterns 
emerge. First, a 10% increase in total CAP payments leads to a decrease in 
off-farm migration of about 1.72% when the effect is estimated using the 
static fixed effects model. The value rises to 1.90% and 2.46% when 
dynamics and endogeneity are accounted for. Considering our preferred 
estimate coming from the dynamic model, that controls for the endogeneity 
of CAP payments, meaning that, without subsidies, the EU-15 net off-farm 
migration rate would be equal to 3.2% per year, instead of the current 2.5%.  
This average effect cancels out relevant differences across CAP 
instruments. The long-run elasticity of Pillar I payments, equal to about 
0.274% when dynamics and endogeneity are considered (column 3), is 
indeed about 2.7 times higher in absolute value than the elasticity of Pillar 
II policies. Within Pillar I, the coupled payments display higher absolute 
elasticity than decoupled payments, while across Pillar II instruments, 
investment aids display the highest absolute elasticity to off-farm 
migration, and this elasticity is the only one with a positive effect. Thus, 
considering the value of the above elasticities, one can conclude that, if the 
labour effect of CAP payments is high on the EU policy agenda, then the 
                                                     
35 These elasticities are estimated at the sample mean using the following formula: 
డ୪୬ ௠
డ୪୬ ௦
ൌ ߚ ௦ҧ೔೟
௠ഥ೔೟
, where ݏҧ௜௧ and ഥ݉ ௜௧ are, respectively, the sample mean of the specific 
CAP subsidy and of off-farm migration, while ߚ is the estimated marginal effect of 
the CAP subsidy. Note that, to make figure 3 and 4 more readable, we report 
absolute elasticities, although all the estimated elasticities of farm migration to CAP 
payments are negative, but the elasticity to investment aids is positive and always 
significant.  
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most effective policy tools to reach this objective would be coupled 
payments, followed by decoupled payments, ceteris paribus.  
 
Figure 15.3 Off-farm migration elasticity to CAP payments  
 
Notes: The figure reports the (absolute) elasticity of off-farm migration to CAP payments, 
namely the percentage reduction in off-farm migration for an increase of the 
respective CAP subsidies of 1%. This is because the estimated elasticity are always 
negative. The term Static, Dynamic, and Dynamic+endogenous refer to the 
econometric approach used to estimate the underline parameters. See Olper et al. 
2013, for details. 
Source: Authors computation based on data from Olper et al. (2012). 
0.000
0.050
0.100
0.150
0.200
0.250
0.300
Total payments Pillar I payments Coupled 
payments
Decoupled 
payments
Pillar II payments
Static Dynamic Dynamic + endogenous
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Figure 15.4 Off-farm migration elasticity to Pillar II payments  
 
Notes: The figure reports the (absolute) elasticity of off-farm migration to CAP payments, 
namely the percentage reduction in off-farm migration for an increase of the 
respective CAP subsidies of 1%. This is because the estimated elasticity are always 
negative, but the investments aids subsidies. The term Static, Dynamic, and 
Dynamic+endogenous refer to the econometric approach used to estimate the 
underline parameters. See Olper et al. 2013, for details. 
Source: Authors computation based on data from Olper et al. (2012). 
 
Another way of interpreting the economic magnitude of these 
findings is through a back-of-the-envelope calculation. Olper et al. (2012), 
focusing on the off-farm migration effect of total CAP payments, found the 
following numbers. Every year, CAP payments prevented a flow of off-
farm migration of around 27,000 agricultural workers. In percentage terms, 
this means a reduction in farm labour migration ranging from a minimum 
of about 6%, in the more conservative estimate, to a maximum of 20%.36 
Therefore, a conservative view is to interpret these numbers as saying that 
CAP subsidies might generate a reduction in off-farm migration, although 
the effect can be rather moderate. 
                                                     
36 This values range is obtained taking into account of the confidence interval of 
our estimation, namely its uncertainty. 
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4. Concluding remarks 
Understanding the effect of CAP policies is important, as a deeper 
comprehension of their incidence would allow the design of better policies. 
This chapter has summarised the main findings reported in Olper et al. 
(2013), who investigated how different CAP subsidies affected off-farm 
migration across 150 EU regions over the period 1990–2009. Within the 
standard neo-classical two-sector models, inter-sectoral labour migration is 
affected by across-sector income differences, ceteris paribus. Thus, as far as 
CAP subsidies have been effective in transferring income to farmers, they 
should have contributed to a reduction in the rate of off-farm migration. 
We find strong support for this expectation.  
An interesting implication of the study, which comes from the 
structure of the conceptual model, is related to the ‘efficiency’ of CAP 
payments in transferring income to farmers. Although several previous 
works have documented an overall inefficiency of (coupled) agricultural 
payments (e.g. OECD, 2001), our results seem to partially contradict this 
conclusion. This appears in line with most recent evidence showing that 
farmers gain from 60% to 95% of the value of CAP coupled payments, and 
only a marginal fraction of such payments is capitalised in land rent 
(Michalek et al., 2011).  
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16. THE IMPACT OF CAP REFORMS ON 
FARM LABOUR STRUCTURE: 
EVIDENCE FROM GREECE 
ELENI A. KADITI* 
he labour force in the agricultural sector declines over time, and the 
reallocation of labour from family members to hired workers is observed. 
Using farm-level data, this chapter analyses the on-farm labour structure in 
Greece and assesses the factors driving its evolution over the period 1990-2008. 
The impact of agricultural policies and farm characteristics is examined in a 
dynamic panel analysis. Family and hired labour are found to be substitutes rather 
than complements, while agricultural support measures appear to negatively affect 
both family and hired labour demand. Decoupled payments and subsidies on crops 
have a significant impact on both labour sources, as well as subsidies for rural 
development that do not favour on-farm labour use. Structural labour adjustments 
are also the result of farm characteristics, such as farm size and location. The 
results are robust to various estimation techniques and specifications. 
 
1. Introduction 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been reformed on many 
occasions, evolving into a multifunctional policy aimed at economic 
efficiency, strengthened competitiveness as well as social and territorial 
balance, among other things The CAP has effectively moved away from 
supporting commodity prices to supporting producers’ income and rural 
development in order to ensure sustainable farming, contribute to farms 
growth or survival, and provide basic public goods realigning with 
consumer concerns (OECD, 2011). Thus, the CAP plays a significant role in 
                                                     
* This chapter is based on Kaditi, “The Impact of CAP Reforms on Farm Labour 
Structure”, Factor Markets Working Paper No. 63, August 2013. 
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fostering prosperity in rural economies, and policy-makers argue that it is 
of vital importance for maintaining the farm labour force (European 
Commission, 2005). However, its effectiveness and efficiency in achieving 
its objectives have been strongly criticised. 
For instance, agriculture in Greece is fully regulated by the CAP and 
remains the most heavily subsidised sector, yet the rural economy has 
undergone significant changes over the last two decades and the 
agricultural sector has experienced a sharp decline in its relative size as 
well as structural labour adjustments. Greek agriculture was traditionally 
dominated by family farms with a near absence of hired labour. A decline 
in both the absolute level and the relative importance of farm labour is 
currently observed, accompanied by the reallocation of labour from family 
members to off-farm workers (Labrianidis & Sykas, 2010). The continuous 
CAP reforms have essentially resulted in lower competitiveness, reduced 
farm income, and greater demand for hired labour (Kasimis & 
Papadopoulos, 2005). 
Along with the gradual implementation of more decoupled 
payments, four major driving factors have been affecting the Greek farm 
labour structure as well. First, the restructuring of labour markets has been 
associated with the expansion of non-farm rural employment sectors (e.g. 
tourism) that increased the alternative employment opportunities of 
farmers and endorsed their pluriactivity (Kasimis et al., 2000). Second, a 
dual labour market was developed leading to the division of the labour 
force and the segmentation of labour markets into the so-called 'primary' 
and 'secondary' markets. In the former, workers are well paid and benefit 
from full-time employment and security, whereas flexibility, seasonality, 
low wages and uncertainty characterise the 'secondary' market (Labrianidis 
& Sykas, 2009). Third, the roles of family farm members have been 
redistributed due to the entrance of women in non-farm employment, and 
labour deficiencies have been observed owing also to the unwillingness of 
young natives to work in agriculture and to the retirement of the older 
farmers (Cavounidis, 2006). Finally, migrant labour complemented family 
labour by filling seasonal deficits and allowing for a more flexible 
combination of capital and labour in the production process (Jentch, 2007). 
A wide range of approaches and disciplines have been used to 
examine such structural changes in farm labour markets and the factors 
that affect labour decisions. Various studies have used the theoretical 
framework of the farm household model to analyse farmers’ time allocation 
(off-farm labour participation or part-time labour) (Kimhi, 2000; Corsi & 
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Findeis, 2000; El-Osta et al., 2008). A few studies have simultaneously 
examined the demand for hired labour and the supply of family labour 
(Huffman, 1991; Benjamin & Kihmi, 2006). Job creation and destruction 
models are employed to explain intra-sectoral job flows (Dries et al., 2010). 
Considerably fewer studies use these models to assess the impact of 
agricultural policy reforms on farmers’ behaviour and the different labour 
market participation strategies (Weiss, 1997; Hennessy & Rehman, 2008). It 
is generally concluded that in developed countries, the share of hired 
labour in total farm labour has increased over the last decades (e.g. Blanc et 
al., 2008). The key factors contributing to the reduction of family farming 
are the agricultural support measures and migrant labour. However, it is 
evident that their impact on farm labour structure is complex and difficult 
to predict. For instance, the institution of family farming is competitive 
because of the lower transaction costs within families compared with hired 
labour, so that the use of family labour may be preferred (e.g. Schmitt, 
1991). In any case, the introduction of decoupled payments is likely to 
decrease the incentives to produce and therefore may have negative effects 
on the use of production factors (e.g. Swinnen & Van Herck, 2010). 
Using Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) data at the farm 
level, the objective of this chapter is to analyse the on-farm labour structure 
and to assess the factors driving its evolution in Greece over the period 
1990-2008.37 The factors that influence farms’ decisions concerning the use 
of both family and hired labour will be examined, identifying also the 
agricultural support measures that have an impact on the different types of 
on-farm labour. 
2. Methodology 
2.1 Empirical model 
In the present analysis, a neoclassical labour demand model is used, and 
labour demand of farm i is assumed to be denoted by: 
 ܮ௜஽ ൌ ܮ஽ሺ݌, ݓ, ݎ, ݏ, ௜ܶ , ܪ௜ሻ (1) 
where p is the vector of output price, w is the wage rate, r is the vector 
of other input prices, s denotes subsidies, T is for technology and H is for 
the farm-specific characteristics. The output produced by the farm 
household, and thus the labour demand, depends on: (i) the production 
                                                     
37 Source: "EU-FADN – DG AGRI". 
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technology; (ii) the expected profits from selling the produced output, i.e. 
output prices; and (iii) the relative prices of the production factors, i.e. 
input prices (Kancs et al., 2009). 
Labour use of farm i at time t can therefore be represented 
empirically by the following baseline equation: 
 ݈௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܵ௧ିଵ ൅ ௜ܺ௧′ ߚ ൅ ݑ௜௧ (2) 
Agricultural payments are assumed to be predetermined instead of 
strictly exogenous, so that lagged levels are used as independent variables 
– and as instruments in the estimation methods presented below. To 
resolve the problem of endogeneity bias due to farm heterogeneity or 
selection bias, farm- and time- fixed effects are used. That is, the 
disturbance term is specified as a two-way error component model: 
 ݑ௜௧ ൌ ߙ௧ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧ (3) 
Farm heterogeneity is denoted by µi, which is the unobserved or fixed 
farm-specific effect; while year-specific dummies, αt, are included to 
account for common trends in labour use. Equation (2) is therefore 
equivalent to a difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation (Olper et al., 
2012). 
The dependent variable lagged by one period is also introduced as an 
explanatory variable. The significance of this term will indicate that labour 
demand at the farm-level is dynamic. The equation to be estimated in this 
case is given by: 
 ݈௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߣ݈௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܵ௧ିଵ ൅ ௜ܺ௧′ ߚ ൅ ߙ௧ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧ (4) 
Parameters λ and β are to be estimated, and a set of additional 
explanatory variables are used in a dynamic panel-data analysis to 
determine the significance of agricultural payments for farm family and 
hired labour, taking into account important factors related to farm 
characteristics, such as specialisation and location. 
In terms of agricultural support measures, total subsidies, subsidies on 
crops, subsidies on livestock, support for rural development, coupled payments 
and decoupled payments are used as instruments for the Common 
Agricultural Policy. A dummy variable for the Fischler CAP reform is also 
included to isolate the structural effects of decoupling that cannot be 
captured by a mere change of transfers measured in monetary values. This 
is equal to one after 2005, and zero otherwise. The impact of CAP reforms 
on farm labour markets is not clear a priori. Receiving a farm subsidy 
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conditional on farm production encourages farm work by family members 
and thus reduces the demand for hired labour. Yet, direct payments 
coupled to certain production activities may induce additional employment 
if more (hired) workers are required to maintain these activities. If direct 
payments are fully decoupled, either they will not affect labour use or they 
may result in farmers reducing family labour, i.e. supply of off-farm labour 
will increase (Hennessy & Rehman, 2008). The impact of decoupled 
payments on hired labour is also ambiguous and depends on whether 
family and hired labour are substitutes or complements. Moreover, rural 
development payments may increase labour use assuming higher output 
prices or reduced production costs, making it essentially easier to hire (or 
fire) workers. 
Farm-specific variables likely to be associated with higher labour use 
are as follows.38 The labour cost is expected to have a negative impact on 
labour demand, as labour is considered to be a normal good. The impact of 
the cost for hired labour on family labour is expected to be positive, 
assuming the two labour inputs are substitutes. The cost of labour is 
measured by the ratio of wages over the hours of hired workers. The land 
cost is likely to negatively affect labour demand, as this is a main input for 
farm production. This cost is measured as the rental per hectare of rented 
land for those farms using external land. The output cost may be positively 
related to labour use, as higher sales revenue could be associated with farm 
expansion. This variable is the ratio of farms’ sales revenue over the 
production quantity. As larger farms and farms using irrigation are likely 
to use more labour, size indicates each farm’s economic size expressed in 
European Size Units (ESU), and technology is proxied by the UAA in 
hectares under irrigation. Specialisation is likely to denote higher seasonal 
labour needs, as crop farms rely more on seasonal labour and livestock 
farms hire workers on a permanent basis. The standard groups of farms 
determined according to their specialisation and provided by FADN are 
used for this parameter. The localisation variable is a dummy parameter on 
less-favoured areas (LFA), while rented land is the share of rented land in 
total UAA. Both parameters are likely to be negatively related to labour 
use. Each farm’s operators age is also included, as older farmers are 
expected to be more experienced, but they need more help in operating 
their farms. 
                                                     
38 Cost variables are normalised using output, while agricultural support measures 
are divided by ESU to avoid capturing size effects. 
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Equation (2) is estimated using fixed-effects estimators. An F-test 
indicated that fixed-effects were significant in all specifications. To estimate 
Equation (4), a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) procedure is used, 
following Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). The 
Windmeijer (2005) biased-corrected two-step robust standard errors are 
reported. 
Finally, the direct implication of heterogeneous farm labour is that 
the notion of a single demand curve for farm labour should be abandoned. 
On-farm demand of family and hired labour is therefore considered 
separately and is measured in annual work units (AWU). 
2.2 Data and descriptive statistics 
Data for 19 sequential years (1990-2008) were retrieved for Greece from the 
FADN dataset, which includes physical, structural, economic and financial 
data for about 5,000 farms. An unbalanced panel data is used for a 
maximum of 91,357 observations. Descriptive statistics for the variables 
included in the empirical estimations are shown in Table 16.1. 
Table 16.1 Descriptive statistics 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Family labour, AWU 1.446 0.614 0.040 5.982
Hired labour, AWU 0.212 0.549 0.000 19.273
Utilised agricultural area, ha 10.099 11.726 0.000 235.770
Size, ESU 14.212 11.441 2.002 196.778
Total output, € 19,457 18,327 0.000 584,613
Rented land, Ha 4.744 10.353 0.000 235.770
Total subsidies, € 4,187 5,668 0.000 119,614
Subsidies on crops, € 2,771 4,780 0.000 119,159
Subsidies on livestock, € 557.9 1,658 0.000 31,209
Support for rural development, € 192.1 1,012 0.000 83,129
Decoupled payments, € 620.2 2,449 0.000 101,578
Labour cost, wages/labourHired (€/hour) 2.732 0.771 0.000 15.045
Land cost, rental/rented land (€/ha) 243.8 319.8 0.000 10,360
Output cost, sales revenue/production (€/ton) 217.4 473.7 0.000 19,815
Technology, UAA under irrigation (ha) 3.954 5.502 0.000 91.700
Age, years 50 13 17 99
Note: All value variables are deflated by the national consumer price indices with base 
year 1990. 
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3. Empirical results 
The results of the fixed-effects estimations are reported in Table 16.2. It is in 
general indicated that agricultural support measures are among the 
variables that have a statistically significant impact on both family and 
hired farm labour. Agricultural payments negatively affect labour use, 
especially family farm labour. Hired labour is negatively related to 
decoupled payments, while there is no statistically significant impact of 
crops and livestock subsidies on hired labour. In addition, support for rural 
development increases demand for family labour, while it does not increase 
the use of hired labour. The dummy used to capture the structural changes 
due to the Fischler reform indicates that decoupled payments may favour 
the use of labour as a production input, but the overall impact of subsidies 
on labour demand is estimated to be negative. 
Table 16.2 Empirical estimations, Fixed-effects 
 
Family 
labour 
Hired 
labour 
Family 
labour 
Hired 
labour 
Family 
labour 
Hired 
labour 
Total subsidies -.000028
*** 
(0.000) 
-.00002*** 
(0.000)  
   
Coupled payments 
  
-.00003*** 
(0.000) 
-.00001 
(0.171) 
  
Decoupled payments 
  
-.000018* 
(0.098) 
-.00012*** 
(0.000) 
  
Subsidies on crops 
   
 -.00003*** 
(0.000) 
.00002 
(0.735) 
Subsidies on livestock 
   
 -.00001 
(0.637) 
.00002 
(0.452) 
Support for rural 
development    
 .00019*** 
(0.000) 
-.00014*** 
(0.005) 
Fischler dummy .1212
*** 
(0.000) 
.0173*** 
(0.003) 
.1199*** 
(0.000) 
.0289*** 
(0.000) 
.1158*** 
(0.000) 
.0223*** 
(0.000) 
Labour cost .0286
*** 
(0.000) 
-.1493*** 
(0.000) 
.0286*** 
(0.000) 
-.1492*** 
(0.000) 
.0288*** 
(0.000) 
-.1492*** 
(0.000) 
Land cost -.1807
*** 
(0.000) 
-.1040** 
(0.045) 
-.1792*** 
(0.000) 
-.1176** 
(0.023) 
-.1765*** 
(0.000) 
-.1097** 
(0.035) 
Output cost -.1466
*** 
(0.000) 
-.0092 
(0.778) 
-.1468*** 
(0.000) 
-.0078 
(0.812) 
-.1477*** 
(0.000) 
-.0106 
(0.746) 
Size .0068
*** 
(0.000) 
.0096*** 
(0.000) 
.0068*** 
(0.000) 
.0095*** 
(0.000) 
.0068*** 
(0.000) 
.0097*** 
(0.000) 
Technology .0021
*** 
(0.000) 
.0017** 
(0.020) 
.0021*** 
(0.000) 
.0014** 
(0.044) 
.0023*** 
(0.000) 
.0016** 
(0.027) 
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Specialisation .0054
*** 
(0.000) 
.0009 
(0.600) 
.0054*** 
(0.000) 
.0013 
(0.453) 
.0052*** 
(0.000) 
.0009 
(0.606) 
LFA .0022 
(0.738) 
-.0057 
(0.474) 
.0021 
(0.743) 
-.0053 
(0.505) 
.0017 
(0.791) 
-.0055 
(0.487) 
Rented land .1058
*** 
(0.000) 
-.0547*** 
(0.000) 
.1054*** 
(0.000) 
-.0511*** 
(0.000) 
.1045*** 
(0.000) 
-.0551*** 
(0.000) 
Age -.0003 
(0.296) 
.0012*** 
(0.002) 
-.0003 
(0.302) 
.0012*** 
(0.003) 
-.0003 
(0.334) 
.0012*** 
(0.002) 
Region and year fixed effects are included in each regression. The P-values are reported. 
Number of observations: 73,364. Significance levels: 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.1*. 
In terms of the farm-specific variables, the cost of hired labour 
significantly influences the demand for both family and hired workers. The 
positive effect of the labour cost on family workers indicates that the two 
types of labour are substitutes rather than complements. This can be 
considered as an indication of migrant labour used to substitute family 
labour owing to the unwillingness of farmers’ children to succeed their 
parents and the expansion of non-farm rural employment sectors (e.g. 
tourism) that increased alternative employment opportunities for farmers. 
The costs of both land and output negatively affect labour use, while 
the estimation for the share of rented land is positive only for the case of 
family labour. This may be explained by the fact that expansion of a farm’s 
operations is possible when additional unpaid family workers are 
available, while the option of hiring labour to be used for rented land 
increases the cost of production in two major inputs simultaneously. Farm 
size and the proxy for technology are positively correlated to labour use, 
implying that larger and more efficient farms require more labour sources. 
Regarding specialisation, it appears that only family labour use is 
positively affected, while the impact of the localisation dummy is not 
significant. Finally, the age of the farm operator positively affects hired 
labour demand, as older farmers are likely to need more help provided by 
hired workers. 
The estimations of equation (4) are included in Table 16.3. The 
coefficient of the lagged variable for family labour is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficients for hired labour are 
also significant but with a negative sign, indicating that farms which 
already have hired workers are less likely to further increase this input of 
production in the future. On the other hand, agricultural support measures 
appear to negatively affect both family and hired labour demand, as 
expected, while coupled payments and subsidies on crops have a 
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significant impact on both labour sources. Moreover, subsidies for rural 
development do not favour on-farm labour, similarly to the other payments 
that discourage farm labour demand. Family labour is particularly affected 
by the introduction of decoupled payments, as indicated by the estimated 
coefficient for this parameter and the dummy variable for the Fischler 
reform. Regarding the estimations of farm-specific characteristics, the 
coefficients on LFA and age appear to be negative and statistical significant 
in all specifications, while the remaining coefficients are similar to those 
obtained in the previous estimation case. 
4. Conclusion 
The prevalence of family-based forms of production and the relatively 
limited extent of hired labour have long characterised the farm labour 
structure in Greece. Yet, substitution of unpaid family labour by (migrant) 
hired labour has occurred and much of the work previously carried out 
within the framework of the family is now undertaken by workers for 
wage. Trends show that while farm labour has declined significantly over 
time, this trend has been coupled with an increasing proportion of the farm 
labour force that is hired.  
In particular, off-farm employment of family members increases, as 
well as the proportion of the total farm labour force that is hired. Family 
labour is reduced mainly due to the low profitability of farming, the 
attractiveness of alternative employment opportunities, the ageing of farm 
population, and the increasing outflow of young natives from rural areas. 
At the same time, (migrant) hired workers are willing to undertake 
unskilled, temporary and low wage tasks in the farm labour market. 
Changes in farm structure, technological innovation and agricultural policy 
reforms are likely to have an impact on the trends observed in farm labour 
force. 
This chapter examined a set of explanatory variables used in a 
dynamic panel data analysis to determine the significance of agricultural 
payments for farm family and hired labour, taking also into account 
important factors related to farm characteristics, such as specialisation and 
location. The analysis showed that in Greece, family and hired labour are 
substitutes rather than complements, while agricultural support measures 
appear to negatively affect both family and hired labour demand. 
Decoupled payments and subsidies on crops have a significant impact on 
both labour sources, as well as subsidies for rural development that do not 
favour on-farm labour use. Farm-specific characteristics, such as farm size 
THE IMPACT OF CAP REFORMS ON FARM LABOUR STRUCTURE: EVIDENCE FROM GREECE | 195 
and age of the farm operator, also appear to have a significant impact on 
farm labour. The results were robust to various estimation techniques and 
specifications. 
Table 16.3 Empirical estimations, GMM estimations 
 
Family 
Labour 
Hired 
Labour 
Family 
Labour 
Hired 
Labour 
Family 
Labour 
Hired 
Labour 
Labour .1821
*** 
(0.000) 
-.1186*** 
(0.000) 
.1758*** 
(0.000) 
-.1190*** 
(0.000) 
.1787*** 
(0.000) 
-.1178*** 
(0.000) 
Total subsidies -.000061
*** 
(0.000) 
-.000031*** 
(0.000)  
   
Coupled payments 
  
-.000044*** 
(0.002) 
-.000027*** 
(0.000) 
  
Decoupled payments 
  
-.000098*** 
(0.000) 
-.000063*** 
(0.000) 
  
Subsidies on crops 
   
 -.000043*** 
(0.003) 
-.000025*** 
(0.000) 
Subsidies on livestock 
   
 .000066 
(0.166) 
.000044 
(0.889) 
Support for rural 
development    
 -.00038** 
(0.050) 
-.00027** 
(0.017) 
Fischler dummy -.0414
*** 
(0.000) 
.0044 
(0.497) 
-.0343*** 
(0.000) 
.0061 
(0.346) 
-.0395*** 
(0.000) 
.0054 
(0.413) 
Labour cost .0076
** 
(0.023) 
-.0999*** 
(0.000) 
.0076** 
(0.024) 
-.0993*** 
(0.000) 
.0074** 
(0.028) 
-.1005*** 
(0.000) 
Land cost -.0524 
(0.591) 
-.0259 
(0.631) 
-.0733 
(0.473) 
-.0313 
(0.539) 
-.0550 
(0.579) 
-.0213 
(0.697) 
Output cost -.1042 
(0.111) 
-.1341 
(0.111) 
-.1016 
(0.122) 
-.1303 
(0.124) 
-.1029 
(0.118) 
-.1355 
(0.106) 
Size .0136
*** 
(0.000) 
.0305*** 
(0.000) 
.0131*** 
(0.000) 
.0307*** 
(0.000) 
.0143*** 
(0.000) 
.0311*** 
(0.000) 
Technology -.0064 
(0.136) 
.0036 
(0.440) 
-.0063 
(0.154) 
.0031 
(0.505) 
-.0082* 
(0.078) 
.0028 
(0.560) 
Specialisation .2206
*** 
(0.000) 
.0654*** 
(0.008) 
.2322*** 
(0.000) 
.0702*** 
(0.005) 
.2232*** 
(0.000) 
.0651*** 
(0.008) 
LFA -.4017
*** 
(0.000) 
-.2295*** 
(0.010) 
-.4008*** 
(0.000) 
-.2288*** 
(0.010) 
-.4129*** 
(0.000) 
-.2299*** 
(0.010) 
Rented land .7988
*** 
(0.000) 
.0686 
(0.644) 
.8873*** 
(0.000) 
.1199 
(0.422) 
.7864*** 
(0.000) 
.0510 
(0.730) 
Age -.0307
*** 
(0.000)  
-.0101** 
(0.017) 
-.0304*** 
(0.000) 
-.0096** 
(0.022) 
-.0307*** 
(0.000) 
-.0098** 
(0.021) 
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Values in the parentheses are Windmeijer-corrected Robust Standard Errors. Tests of 
autocorrelation were computed based on Arellano & Bond (1991). The results presented 
strong evidence against the null hypotheses that the overidentifying restrictions are valid, 
and that there is zero autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors at order 1. There is also 
no significant evidence of serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at order 2. Year 
fixed effects are included in each regression. Number of observations: 73,364. Significance 
levels: 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.1*. 
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17. HOW SUBSIDIES MAY REDUCE 
AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT: 
THE IMPACT ON CREDIT CONSTRAINTS 
AND EDUCATION  
KRISTINE VAN HERCK, RUXANDA 
BERLINSCHI AND JOHAN SWINNEN* 
gricultural employment is found to be responsive to relative changes in 
returns to agricultural labour. Given this responsiveness, one would expect 
that a technological change or a government policy that causes farm 
incomes to increase, such as an agricultural subsidy programme, would have a 
positive impact on agricultural employment. However, despite massive subsidies 
agricultural employment in industrialised countries has been steadily decreasing 
over the past decades. In this chapter, the authors provide a new explanation for 
this puzzle, namely the positive impact of increased farm income on the educational 
level of farmers’ children. If farmers are credit constrained, they may underinvest 
in their children’s education. An increase in farm incomes will then allow more 
farmers to educate their children and if higher educated children are less willing to 
become farmers, increased farm incomes may in the long run lead to a reduction of 
labour supply in the agricultural sector. The authors provide both theoretical and 
empirical evidence supporting this argument. 
 
                                                     
* This chapter is based on Berlinschi, Swinnen & Van Herck, “Trapped in 
Agriculture: The Impact of Credit Constraints on the Educational and 
Occupational Choice of Farmers’ Children”, Factor Markets Working paper No. 39, 
May 2013. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy is to protect 
farmers’ income to ensure a fair standard of living for the European farm 
population, and one would expect agricultural subsidies to have a positive 
impact on agricultural employment (or at least to mitigate the reduction). 
This is consistent with basic economic models of labour allocation, 
which conclude that agricultural employment is responsive to relative 
changes in returns to agricultural labour. Given this responsiveness, one 
would expect that a technological change or a government policy that 
causes farm incomes to increase, such as an agricultural subsidy 
programme, would have a positive impact on agricultural employment. 
However, despite massive subsidies agricultural employment in 
industrialised countries has been steadily decreasing over the past decades.  
A striking example of this evolution is a country like Spain, where at 
the beginning of the 1970s almost 30% of the population was employed in 
the agricultural sector, while currently the share is barely 5% despite the 
fact that subsidies have increased substantially over this period.  
Cross-country observations suggest the same conclusion: there is no 
evidence of a positive correlation between agricultural subsidies and 
agricultural employment. If anything, the relationship is negative. In the 
OECD, the outflow of labour from the agricultural sector over the 1987–
2007 period was strongest in the countries where farmers have been 
supported most heavily.39  
Of course this negative correlation does not imply causality. Other 
factors, such as overall income growth, may have been important 
determinants. Moreover, the relationship could be due to reverse causality: 
the political economy of subsidies is such that farmers from countries 
where the farming population is small are more able to put pressure on 
politicians to increase agricultural subsidies (see Swinnen, 1994).  
Therefore, the relationship which measures the correlation of changes 
presented in Figure 17.1 is more intriguing. Over the past 20 years, the 
decline in agricultural employment is lowest in countries with the strongest 
                                                     
39 Similar results hold within the agricultural sector in several European countries. 
For example, data for Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal show that in 
the subsectors where agricultural subsidies were higher, agricultural labour 
outflow was stronger in the period 1990–2007 (Swinnen & Van Herck, 2010).  
HOW SUBSIDIES MAY REDUCE AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT | 201 
subsidy reduction or, vice versa, the decline is strongest where subsidies 
increased the most.  
While these are aggregate figures, more careful and detailed analyses 
also yield results which do not support the ‘simple story’ of the impact of 
subsidies on agricultural employment. Some studies find a positive impact 
(e.g. Pietola et al., 2003; Foltz, 2004; Key & Roberts, 2006; Breustedt & 
Glauben, 2007), others find no impact (e.g. Barkley, 1990; Mishra et al., 
2004; Glauben, et al., 2006) and yet others find a negative impact (e.g. Goetz 
& Debertin, 1996; 2001; Hoppe & Korbi, 2006; Petrick & Zier, 2011). Studies 
in this volume confirm the mixed results. Olper et al. (2013) find evidence 
that CAP subsidies contributed to maintaining jobs in agriculture but with 
a small impact. Eleni Kaditi (2013) finds that subsidies have a negative 
impact on employment in Greek agriculture. 
Figure 17.1 Change in agricultural labour and PSE* (1987–2007) 
 
*The Producer Support Estimate (PSE) is “an indicator of the annual monetary 
value of gross transfers from consumers and taxpayers to support agricultural 
producers, measured at farm gate level, arising from policy measures, regardless of 
their nature, objectives or impacts on farm production or income”. 
Source: OECD, ILO, national statistics. 
Explanations in the existing literature are that (an increase in) 
subsidies may also have an indirect (second-order) negative impact on 
agricultural employment, which in some circumstances depending on the 
country and/or time period, may dominate the direct (first-order) positive 
impact, i.e. the direct income effect. Subsidies may lead for example to 
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capital-labour substitution (Goetz & Debertin, 1996) or to a reduction of the 
credit constraint hampering farm expansion, enabling farmers that want to 
expand their farm size to purchase the land of those who want to stop their 
activities (Goetz & Debertin, 2001).  
In this chapter, we provide an alternative explanation looking at 
longer-term adjustments. This is the effect of an increase in farm income on 
the educational level of farmers’ children and the resulting impact on 
employment choices in the next generation. In many European countries, 
as in many other parts of the world, the majority of farmers are self-
employed household farmers. As a result, an important share of the long-
term decline in agricultural employment is due to farmers’ children 
choosing to work in the industrial or service sectors rather than taking over 
their parents’ farm.40 For example, in 2008 only 27% of the Dutch farm 
operators over 50 years’ old indicated having a successor (De Bont & Van 
Everdingen, 2010). The situation is even worse in Flanders (Belgium), 
where only 13% of the farmers reported having a successor (Vlaamse 
Overheid, 2009). Where farmers are credit constrained for education, 
increasing farm incomes may allow farmers to increase their investment in 
their children’s education. If children with higher education levels are less 
willing to work in the agricultural sector, then one long-term effect of an 
increase in farm income may be to reduce agricultural employment.  
2. Theoretical framework 
We develop a theoretical model of two periods with intergenerational 
investment in education, building on Acemoglu & Pischke (2001). The 
economy is composed of farmers with heterogeneous incomes. In period 
one, each farmer decides whether to use his income for consumption and 
savings or to invest part of it in his child’s education. In period two, each 
child decides to work in the agricultural sector or in the industrial/service 
sector (non-agricultural sector).  
We show that in the presence of credit constraints, agricultural 
subsidies may have two opposite effects on agricultural employment. The 
first effect is an increase in farm income, which, for a given education level, 
induces more children to opt for the agricultural sector, since it improves 
                                                     
40 There is a large literature analysing intergenerational farm transfers and its 
determinants (e.g. Kimhi, 1994; Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000; Kimhi and Nachlieli, 
2001; Mishra et al. 2004; Glauben et al., 2006).  
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the relative (economic) returns in the sector. The second effect is that, in the 
presence of credit constraints, subsidies allow more farmers to educate 
their children, increasing the attractiveness of jobs in the non-agricultural 
sector for those children with returns to education assumed to be higher in 
the non-agricultural sector. The combined effect of agricultural subsidies on 
agricultural employment depends on the income distribution in the 
agricultural sector and the cost of education. When the proportion of 
credit-constrained farmers and the cost of education are sufficiently high, 
the long-run impact of an increase in farm income through subsidies is 
more likely to be negative. 
3. Empirical framework 
To empirically test the theoretical predictions, we use data from the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP). The sampling scheme of 
the panel survey enables to identify identical individuals and households 
in different years. This unique feature of the dataset allows us to analyse 
the educational and occupational decisions taken by parents and children. 
We use a sample of parents and their children based on information 
obtained from 1994 (to analyse the educational choice) and 1999 (to analyse 
the occupational choice). 41 We selected households in which at least one of 
the parents was self-employed in the agricultural sector in 1994 and at least 
one of the children was enrolled in an advanced stage of the educational 
system in 1994 such that the child finished his/her education by 1999.42,43 
This resulted in a dataset of 109 households from Portugal (48), Italy (32), 
Ireland (21) and Spain (8).  
We estimate a recursive simultaneous bivariate probit model as in 
Hennessey & Rehman (2007). This model consists of two simultaneous 
                                                     
41 The first time period (1994) was selected because it was the first wave of the 
ECHP. The second time period (1999) was selected to ensure that there were 
sufficient years between the two time periods such that most of the children that 
were enrolled in the educational system in 1994 had finished their studies and 
made an occupational choice by 1999.  
42 We only consider self-employed farmers because most of the farms in the EU-15 
are family farms for which succession usually takes place within the household 
(Stiglbauer & Weiss, 2000).  
43 We exclude children that are enrolled in the educational system in 1994 and are 
still enrolled in the educational system in 1999 to avoid censoring problems as 
these children have not yet made an occupational decision.  
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equations: the occupational choice equation, which estimates the direct 
impact of increased farm income on the decision to leave agriculture, given 
a certain education level; and the educational choice equation, which 
estimates the indirect impact of increased farm income on education.  
Our results show that an increase in farm income has a positive and 
significant effect on children’s education, which is consistent with the 
argument that farmers are credit constrained for investing in education. 
Controlling for education, an increase in farm income has a negative and 
significant impact on the probability of leaving agriculture.  
These results are consistent with the theoretical predictions. An 
increase in farm income has two effects on the probability to leave 
agriculture, a direct effect (through the occupational choice) and an indirect 
effect (through the educational choice). In our sample, the aggregate effect 
is significant, but small. Moreover, it is dependent on the level of farm 
income; for farmers with a low income the indirect, positive effect 
(educational channel) dominates, while for farmers with an intermediate or 
high income the direct, the negative effect dominates, which is consistent 
with our theoretical model. This is illustrated in Figure 17.2, which shows 
the aggregated impact of a 10% increase in farm income on the probability 
of leaving the agricultural sector at different levels of farm income. 
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Figure 17.2 Aggregated impact of a 10% increase in agricultural income on the 
probability to leave the agricultural sector at different levels of 
agricultural income 
 
* Agricultural income is the natural logarithm of the household farm income. 
Source: own calculations based on a subsample of the EHCP survey. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Agricultural employment in western countries has been steadily decreasing 
in the past decades, despite substantial agricultural subsidies which have 
increased farm incomes. Previous studies on the impact of subsidies on 
agricultural employment have arrived at contradictory conclusions, 
suggesting that the direct positive effect on agricultural employment is 
sometimes counterbalanced by indirect negative effects, such as labour 
substitution for capital.  
In this chapter, we provided an alternative explanation: the indirect 
negative effect of an increase in farm income on agricultural employment 
through the education of farmers’ children, in the presence of credit 
constraints. The evolution of agricultural employment largely depends on 
the willingness of farmers’ children to continue their parents’ farming 
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activities. An increase in farm income may enable farmers to increase 
investment in their children’s education. Children with higher education 
levels have access to better paid jobs in the industrial or services sectors. 
They are therefore less likely to be willing to work in the agricultural 
sector. We presented a theoretical model and empirical evidence 
supporting this argument.  
Our findings are relevant to explaining the limited impact of 
agricultural subsidies on agricultural employment observed in several 
studies on various OECD countries in the last 50 years. However, they may 
also have important implications for intergenerational farm transfers in 
transition and developing countries, where a large share of the rural 
population is still employed in agriculture.  
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18. THE IMPACT OF DECOUPLED 
PAYMENTS ON OFF-FARM LABOUR 
SUPPLY: EVIDENCE FROM IRELAND 
AND ITALY 
JASON LOUGHREY, THIA HENNESSY, 
KEVIN HANRAHAN, TREVOR DONNELLAN, 
VALENTINA RAIMONDI, DANIELE CURZI 
AND ALESSANDRO OLPER* 
his chapter examines the effect of the decoupling of farm direct payments on 
the off-farm labour supply decisions of farmers in Ireland and Italy. The 
authors use panel data from the Italian Farm Business Survey (REA) and 
the Irish Teagasc National Farm Survey database covering the period from 2002 to 
2009 to model these decisions. The model is the neo-classical agricultural household 
model described by Donnellan & Hennessy (2012) in Working Paper No. 31 of the 
Factor Markets project. Both models are developed at a national level. The model 
holds that the impact of decoupling on off-farm labour supply is dependent upon 
two competing forces i.e. the relative wage effect and the wealth effect. The decline 
in the farm wage relative to the off-farm wage makes off-farm work more attractive 
thus producing the relative wage effect. At the same time, the new decoupled direct 
payment provides a new non-labour source of income thereby generating a wealth 
effect. This may in turn have suppressed or eliminated the likelihood of increased 
off-farm labour supply for some farmers. Our hypothesis is that decoupling led to 
                                                     
* This chapter is based on Loughrey, Hennessy, Hanrahan, Donnellan, Raimondi & 
Olper, “Determinants of Farm Labour Use: A Comparison between Ireland and 
Italy”, Factor Markets Working Paper No. 60, August 2013. The working paper 
version includes a longer discussion of the conceptual framework and the 
methodology and includes a more detailed set of results. 
T 
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an increase in off-farm labour activity which would imply that the relative wage 
has dominated the wealth effect. We draw from the literature on female labour 
supply and use a sample selection corrected ordinary least squares model to 
examine both the decisions of off farm work participation and the decisions 
regarding the amount of time spent working off-farm. The results indicate that 
decoupling has not had a significant impact on off-farm labour supply in the case of 
Ireland but there appears to be a significantly negative relationship in the Italian 
case. 
 
1. Introduction 
Off-farm employment supports the living standards of a large proportion 
of farm households in Ireland and Italy, in part due to the small-scale 
nature of many family farm operations. For example, the smallest one 
quarter of farms in Ireland account for just about 3% of all gross 
agricultural output, and for about 10% of all gross agricultural output in 
the case of Italy (Moreddu, 2011). Many farm households therefore cannot 
rely upon farming as their only income source. This chapter summarises 
the findings from our work on the determinants of off-farm labour supply 
among farmers in both countries. We highlight in particular the potential 
impact of the decoupling of farm direct payments from labour supply 
decisions, both in terms of the participation decision and the number of 
hours supplied.  
The potential impact of decoupling is highlighted as it is a relatively 
recent policy development with the potential to have radically altered the 
incentives for farmers towards the supply of off-farm labour. The 2005 
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy ensured that farmers received 
support independent of their on-farm production decisions, as long as they 
complied with the “statutory management requirements” and maintained 
their land in “good agricultural and environmental condition”. According 
to neo-classical economic theory, this reform had the potential to either 
increase or decrease off-farm employment depending upon the relative 
strength of two opposing forces, i.e. ‘the wealth effect’ and ‘the substitution 
effect’. Decoupling provided a wealth effect via the introduction of a new 
non-labour source of income which incentivised farmers to relax their 
supply of off-farm work and devote more time to leisure. On the other 
hand, the introduction of decoupling made the coupled farm wage less 
rewarding relative to the prevailing off-farm wage. This substitution effect 
incentivised farmers to increase their off-farm employment.  
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This chapter uses an agricultural household modelling framework to 
consider the substitution and wealth effects of decoupled payments and the 
implications for the farm operators’ off-farm labour participation and 
supply decisions. The chapter provides an ex post assessment, in contrast 
to the ex ante analysis of Irish farms by Hennessy & Rehman (2008), which 
relied upon projections at the macro level. The arrival of the economic 
recession in 2008 substantially changed the macroeconomic picture in both 
Ireland and Italy, and it would be interesting to identify whether or not the 
introduction of decoupled payments achieved a significant impact against 
such a background. Ex post analysis of the effect of decoupling on off-farm 
employment in Italy has been carried out by Corsi & Salvioni (2012) with 
respect to a subset of crop farmers. A wider sample of farms is included in 
this study, stretching over a longer time period, and we have a greater 
consideration for many small farmers where, at least in theory, the off-farm 
income source should be more relevant.44 In addition, we have modelled 
the determination of off-farm labour hours and we provide a unique ex 
post cross-country analysis regarding the impact of decoupling on off-farm 
employment.  
In the next section, we provide a brief summary of the policy 
background. This is followed by the data section with a separate 
description of the data sources for each country. The next section discusses 
the results and this is followed finally by the conclusion. 
2. Policy background 
Ireland and Italy are among ten EU member states that decoupled EU 
direct payments from agricultural production in 2005 under the 
introduction of the Single Payment Scheme (SPS). A further seven member 
states followed this path in subsequent years while ten new member states 
embarked upon the Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS). Ireland, in 
common with Luxembourg, Malta and the UK (excluding Scotland), 
decoupled all direct payments from production while Italy retained some 
coupling payments for certain crop production, such as rice and tobacco. 
These reforms formed part of the Luxembourg Agreement on the reform of 
the CAP announced in September 2003.  
                                                     
44 For example, in the Corsi & Salvioni sample the average farm size is equal to 
53.37 ha of utilised agricultural area (UAA). Differently in our sample average size 
is 24.2 ha and 36.7 ha for the Italian and Irish sample, respectively. 
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On the introduction of the SPS, each member state had the option of 
choosing between three different implementation models: the historical 
model, the regional model, and the hybrid model. Ireland and Italy were 
among the majority of countries that chose to implement the historical 
model of payments. This meant that the allocation of entitlements became 
based on a historical reference period from 2000 to 2002.  
The adoption of the historical model limited the extent to which the 
reforms could impact directly on the distribution of farm income between 
farm households. In contrast to Ireland and Italy, the new member states 
(excluding Malta and Slovenia) implemented the regional model which set 
a uniform payment per hectare. A small number of countries (Denmark, 
England, Finland, Germany, Luxemburg, Northern Ireland and Sweden) 
embarked upon a hybrid version of the two models. 
Access to the SPS came with certain conditions for farmers. In order 
to access the scheme, farmers must have received direct payments during 
the reference period 2000-02 and the reference amount is based upon the 
three-year average of the total direct payments received in this reference 
period. Farmers were required to maintain the land ‘in good agricultural 
and environmental condition’ and furthermore that land under permanent 
pasture at the date of the area aid application must be maintained under 
permanent pasture. O’Neill & Hanrahan (2012) explained that these 
requirements may have incentivised some farmers to keep land in 
agricultural use and that without such requirements, the land would be left 
idle or converted to non-agricultural use. These conditions may in turn 
have some implications for the decision to enter off-farm employment. 
3. Data 
In this section, we briefly describe the data sources used for the analysis in 
both countries. Loughrey et al. (2013) describes these data sources in more 
detail. The Irish analysis utilises the Teagasc National Farm Survey data, 
which is essentially the Irish Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) 
database but containing richer data on off-farm labour supply. The attrition 
rate is relatively low and a sizeable proportion of the farms are contained in 
the dataset for all years concerned. New farmers are introduced during the 
period to maintain a representative sample and the sample size is usually 
kept to between 1,000 and 1,100 farms.  
The Italian analysis utilises the data from the Farm Business Survey 
(REA) carried out by the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). The database 
surveys yearly a sample of agricultural holdings representative of Italian 
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agriculture, stratified by region, farm type and economic size of holdings. 
Besides a detailed set of variables on farm structure, the database includes 
household composition variables as well as extra-farm source of income 
variables. The study covers an average of 3,573 farms per year, in a 
balanced panel that includes only farms surveyed for the entire period 
analysed.  
The data for both countries covers the period from 2002 to 2009 and 
therefore includes the three years prior to the decoupling reform in 2005 
and the four years immediately after the reform. We use approximately the 
same list of variables from both datasets and the mean values for these 
variables are presented in Table 18.1.45  
Table 18.1 Mean value statistics for Italian and Irish data 
 ITALY IRELAND 
Main variables Off-Farm 
employed  
Full 
sample 
Off-farm 
employed 
Full 
sample 
Off-farm job (Head)  23.0  36.3 
Off-farm hours per year 466.71 113.19 1572.35 570.65 
IndependentaVariables     
Age 53.40 55.78 48.98 54.35 
Sex (= 1 male; 2 female) 1.29 1.34 1.03 1.05 
Specialist dairy 0.0927 0.1388 0.0540 0.1571 
UAA (ha) 15.11 24.18 27.47 36.72 
Spouse (= 1 if work off-farm) 0.1146 0.0656 0.4190 0.3167 
Married (= 1 if married) 0.3709 0.4114 0.7449 0.6730 
Number of young in the family farm 0.0801 0.0465 0.8318 0.6278 
Number of family members living in 
the farm 
1.8457 1.9466 3.6214 3.2889 
Number of family members working 
in the farm 
0.2409 0.3482 N/A N/A 
Hired (= 1 if presence of hired 
workers) 
0.2099 0.2617 0.1097 0.1827 
Number of bovine on UAA 0.7564 0.8798 1.1429 1.3093 
                                                     
45 In the Italian sample, household characteristics such as the ‘number of family 
members living in the farm’ and the ‘number of young in the family farm’, could 
be seriously underestimated, as the available data mainly include family members 
working on- or off-farm. 
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Decoupled payments  2,529 5,441 7,237 9,059 
Coupled income 2,517 3,936 2,636 7,780 
Other subsidies (investment aids, 
organic payments, etc.) 
442 630 2,676 2,764 
Average number of farms each year 825 3,573 330 1,184 
Sources: see text. 
The mean values provided include both the dependent and 
independent variables from our analysis. The values are presented 
separately for the entire sample and for the sub-sample of farm operators 
engaged in off-farm employment. In terms of the dependent variables, it is 
clear that off-farm employment is much more common among Irish farm 
operators than among Italian operators. Among those with off-farm 
employment, the Irish operators participate in over three times the amount 
of off-farm labour relative to the Italian farm operators.  
Among the independent variables, the average age is very similar for 
farm operators in both countries. Italian farm operators have an average 
age of 55.78 years, compared to 54.35 years for Irish farm operators. The 
average age of Irish operators with off-farm employment is approximately 
four years younger than for the Irish sample as a whole. Italian farm 
operators are much more likely to be female than their Irish counterparts. 
The proportion of farms classified as specialist in dairy is relatively close in 
both datasets. We find that Irish farms have much larger farm incomes both 
in terms of coupled and decoupled incomes along with larger farms. In 
addition, Irish farm operators receive much greater amounts in the form of 
other subsidies. 
In terms of the remaining farm-level variables, it appears that the 
presence of hired workers is more common in the case of Italian farms, 
with 26.2% of farms hiring labour compared to 18.3% in the case of Irish 
farms. The number of bovine units per UAA hectare is much higher on 
Irish farms. Average farm size is much greater in Ireland. This finding is 
supported by Moreddu (2011), who provides results from the 2007 farm 
structure survey carried out in both countries. The farm structure survey 
includes farms of all sizes whereas the FADN database excludes farms of 
less than 4 European Size Units (ESU) in the case of Italian farms and less 
than 2 ESU in the case of Irish farms.  
In terms of household variables, we can see that the average 
household size is much smaller among the Italian farms than the Irish 
farms. While Irish farms have on average higher income, the Irish farm 
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household must support on average at least one more person. There are 
also deep differences in the proportion of farms where a spouse is engaged 
in off-farm employment. This proportion lies at just 6.6% for the Italian 
farms compared to 31.7% for the Irish farms. There appears to be some 
correlation between off-farm employment of the operator and the spouse in 
both countries. In both cases, the proportion of farms with a spouse 
employed off-farm is greater among the sub-sample of farms where the 
operator is employed off-farm than for the sample as a whole. The Irish 
data does not provide for a variable regarding the number of other family 
members working on the farm. 
Before proceeding to the results section, we first take a look at some 
of the trends in farm and off-farm wage rates in Ireland both before and 
after the decoupling of direct payments in 2005. The differences in wage 
rates between farm and non-farm labour can reflect the size of the 
incentives faced by farm operators in the allocation of labour. As explained 
previously, an increase in the off-farm wage rate relative to the farm wage 
incentivises farm operators to increase their off-farm employment. 
Figure 18.1 Off-farm and coupled farm wage rates in Ireland 
 
Source: Teagasc National Farm Survey and CSO (2013). 
It is evident from Figure 18.1 that the gap between off-farm wages 
and on-farm wages grew substantially during the period 2002 to 2009. We 
highlight both the average industrial wage and the average construction 
wage, as construction provided many farm operators with employment 
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during the economic boom. Wage rates in construction and industry grew 
continuously during the period, while the coupled farm wage rate declined 
overall. Some of this decline was concentrated around the time of 
decoupling in 2005, with the average on-farm wage rate falling from 
approximately eight euros per hour in 2004 to less than six euros in 2005.  
Irish farming experienced some difficult years post-decoupling, with 
2009 being a particularly difficult year as the average coupled on-farm 
wage entered negative territory. The coupled farm wage recovered to 
approximately five euros per hour in the following two years but remains 
two or three euros per hour less than the level pre-decoupling.  
We can conclude from the above that decoupling produced a shift in 
relative wages but much of the overall change in relative wages can be 
attributed to the improvement in off-farm wage rates during the period. 
The average industry wage was almost double that of the average coupled 
farm wage rate prior to decoupling. Many farm operators chose, for 
various reasons, to not enter into off-farm employment despite the 
incentive of higher off-farm wages in the pre-decoupling era. We should 
perhaps therefore not expect the decoupling-induced shift in relative wages 
to cause large increases in off-farm employment participation in the Irish 
case. 
The average coupled farm wage in Ireland varies according to the 
farm system. In addition, the decoupling-induced change in relative wages 
appears to have varied according to the system. From Figure 18.2, it 
appears that the shift in relative wages has been greatest for those farms 
which can be categorised within either the ‘drystock cattle’ or ‘mainly 
sheep’ categories. The relative wage effect is therefore most pronounced for 
farms in these systems. 
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Figure 18.2 Coupled farm wage rates by system in Ireland [post- and pre-
decoupling] 
 
Source: Teagasc National Farm Survey. 
 
4. Results 
In this section, we present the econometric results for the off-farm 
participation probit model and the hours of off-farm work model. More 
detailed results including the size of the coefficients are provided for both 
countries in Loughrey et al. (2013). For the Irish results, we strongly 
recommend Donnellan et al. (2013) as this particular paper provides 
analysis suggesting that the significance of the relationship between 
decoupled payments and off-farm work participation is quite sensitive to 
the choice of modelled variables and in addition the paper examines the 
relationship between off-farm employment and farm exit within an Irish 
context. In terms of the impact of decoupling on off-farm work 
participation, it appears from Table 18.2 that there was a significant 
negative impact in Italy but no significant impact in Ireland. We can imply 
from this that the wealth effect has dominated the relative wage effect in 
Italy and that off-farm employment participation has responded negatively 
as a consequence. 
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Table 18.2 Results for participation analysis 
Independent Variable Ireland  Italy 
Age Positive*** Positive*** 
Age squared Negative*** Negative*** 
Sex Negative Negative*** 
Specialist dairy  Negative*** Negative*** 
UAA (ha) Negative** Negative*** 
Spouse working off-farm Positive Positive*** 
Married Positive*** Negative*** 
Number of young in HH Negative*** Negative 
Household size Positive*** Positive*** 
Number of family members working on 
the farm 
N/A Negative*** 
Hired workers (1,0) Negative Negative*** 
Number of bovine Per UAA Negative*** Negative** 
Decoupled payments (in €10,000s) Negative Negative** 
Level of Significance: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
The differentiated impact of decoupled income on off-farm work 
participation in the two countries is interesting. The difference could 
perhaps lie in the combined effect of the level of average payments and off-
farm wages in the two countries. Indeed, in the Italian sample, the 
corresponding average amount of decoupled payments per farm is only 
59% of the Irish sample, a fraction that goes down to 35% when only the 
farms with off-farm work are considered.46 From this perspective, it is not 
simple to justify the above results. However, in several southern Italian 
South, the off-farm wage (unemployment rate) is typically lower (higher) 
than in Ireland, a consideration that can at least partially recompose the 
above evidence.  
For both countries, the presence of a specialist dairy farm reduces the 
likelihood of participation. We find that age is positively associated with 
participation in both countries, but in a non-linear fashion as age squared is 
negative and significant. The off-farm employment participation of the 
                                                     
46 Note that differences in farm size can only partially explain these numbers, 
suggesting that the reason could be attributable to differences in the types of farm 
activities. 
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spouse is found to have no significant impact upon the participation 
decision in Ireland, but a significant and positive one in Italy. Mariage 
status has a totally different effect in the two samples, pointing to a 
significant positive effect in Ireland but to a significant negative effect in 
Italy. The number of young in the household is a negative contributor 
towards off-farm employment participation, although it is statistically 
significant only in Ireland. Finally, household size and the presence of 
hired workers are positively and negatively associated, respectively, with 
off-farm employment participation, but the latter is statistically significant 
only for the Italian sample.  
Table 18.3 Results for hours equation 
Independent variables Ireland Italy 
Age Positive*** Positive*** 
Age squared Negative*** Negative*** 
Specialist dairy Negative*** Positive 
UAA (ha) Negative* Positive 
Spouse working off-farm Negative*** Positive*** 
Married Positive Negative** 
Number of young Negative* Negative* 
Number of family members living in the farm Positive Positive** 
Number of family members working in the farm  Negative* 
Hired workers (1,0) Negative Positive 
Number of bovine on UAA Negative** Negative*** 
Decoupled payments (x 10,000€) Negative Negative*** 
Mills ratio Positive** Positive 
Level of Significance: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
In the hours equation, and coherently with the Probit result, we find 
for Italy that decoupled payments have had a significant negative impact 
on the number of hours supplied off-farm. Decoupled payments are 
therefore found to have had a significant negative effect on both 
participation and hours supplied off-farm in Italy. In a neo-classical 
framework, this suggests a strong wealth effect. No significant impact is 
found in the Irish case, but the negative sign is also apparent. 
As in the case of the participation equation, the age variable is 
significantly positive and non-linear for both countries. Farm size has a 
negative and significant impact on hours supplied among Irish farmers but 
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no such relationship appears from the Italian results. The results also show 
that being a specialist dairy farmer has a significantly negative impact upon 
hours among Irish farmers but not among Italian farmers, a result that 
could be attributed to the way we are forced to estimate the dairy 
specialisation in the Italian sample. 
The off-farm work participation of the spouse appears to have a very 
strong positive effect in Italy, which is perhaps unexpected. The off-farm 
employment of the spouse has a significant negative effect in Ireland. This 
would imply some kind of trade-off taking place between the off-farm 
employment of the spouse and the number of off-farm hours supplied by 
the farm operator. We find that a being married has a significantly negative 
effect upon off-farm employment in the Italian data while in the Irish data 
there is a significant relationship between off-farm employment 
participation and marriage.  
The number of young in the household is a negative contributor 
towards off-farm employment in both samples, and the effect appears to 
have greater significance for participation than for hours. The intensity of 
livestock farming is unlikely to be among the stable covariates and it 
appears, as expected, to have a significantly negative impact upon hours 
supplied in both countries. 
Finally, in the Irish case, the significance of the inverse Mills ratio in 
the second stage means that sample selection is present. Farm operators 
engaging in off-farm employment are therefore found to have unobserved 
characteristics that make them more likely to engage in off-farm 
employment relative to the group not participating in off-farm work. This 
result is quite different from the Italian sample, where instead the Mills 
ratio is never significant. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter summarises our econometric analysis of the determinants of 
off-farm labour participation in Ireland and Italy with the aim of 
understanding the role played by decoupled payments in this important 
adjustment process. To this end, a neo-classical household model based on 
utility maximisation is used to model farm households’ labour allocation 
decisions. Under this framework, the effect of decoupling on off-farm 
participation is the result of two contrasting effects, namely, a wage effect 
that should increase the off-farm labour participation, and a wealth effect 
that should reduce it. Thus, overall, which of the two effects will prevail is 
an empirical question that we addressed through an hours off-farm labour 
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supply equation and an off-farm participation equation, to take care of the 
possible unobserved selection effects. 
Overall, many of the determinants of off-farm labour participation 
and off-farm labour supply suggested by the previous literature have the 
expected significant effect in both Ireland and Italy, although some notable 
exceptions are present. With regard to the main policy variable of interest, 
the results suggest that decoupled payments have a negative effect on the 
off-farm participation decision and on the hours supplied in the two 
samples, although this result is significantly different from zero only in the 
case of Italy. In light of the conceptual model framework, this result points 
to a wage effect that is dominated by the wealth effect.  
The characteristics of farms at the top and bottom of the coupled 
income distribution can therefore differ between the countries. In addition, 
farmers in both countries are likely to be affected by different income risks 
relating to weather, disease and other natural forces. In Ireland, the off-
farm job demands on average close to 30 hours of labour per week, 
whereas the average number of hours is much lower in Italy. Future 
refinement of the analysis calls for a deeper investigation of the 
differentiated factors that are at the root of the above findings. 
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19. OFF-FARM LABOUR MIGRATION, 
TRANSFER FRICTIONS AND THE 
PERSISTENCY OF INCOME GAPS 
ALESSANDRO OLPER, VALENTINA 
RAIMONDI, DANILO BERTONI, DANIELE 
CURZI AND DANIELE CAVICCHIOLI* 
he inter-sectoral migration of agricultural labour is a complex but 
fundamental process of economic development largely affected by the growth 
of agricultural productivity and the evolution of the agricultural relative 
income gap. Theory and some recent anecdotal evidence suggest that as an effect of 
large fixed and sunk costs of off-farm migration, the productivity gap between the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors should behave non-monotonically or 
follow a U-shaped evolution during economic development. Whether or not this 
relationship holds true across a sample of 38 developing and developed countries 
and across more than 200 EU regions was empirically tested. Results strongly 
confirm this relationship, which also emphasises the role played by national 
agricultural policy.  
 
1. Introduction 
Changes in resource allocation as a result of structural changes such as 
across-sector labour reallocation represent one of the most important 
engines driving economic growth and development. The most complex 
form of resource adjustment during economic development is the 
migration of labour out of the agricultural sector. Labour is the most 
                                                     
* This chapter is based on Olper, Raimondi, Bertoni & Cavicchioli, “Patterns and 
Determinants of Off-Farm Migration: Transfer frictions and persistency of relative 
income gaps”, Factor Markets Working Paper No. 36, February 2013. 
T
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important factor in determining national income. Therefore, countries that 
manage to pull themselves out of poverty are those that are able to 
diversify away from the agricultural sector. This occurs because labour 
moves from agriculture into the industrial sector, with overall productivity 
rising and income growing due to sector convergence in labour 
productivity. However, the speed with which this structural transformation 
takes place is a fundamental factor that differentiates successful countries 
and regions from unsuccessful ones (McMillan & Rodrik, 2011).  
One of the key variables that both governs and is affected by 
structural change is the existence of productivity gaps between sectors. 
Large differences in labour productivity across sectors are traditionally 
found in developing countries, but also across regions in more developed 
countries such as member states of the EU. These differences are at the 
heart of allocative inefficiencies that ultimately reduce overall GDP per 
capita. Consequently, understanding the magnitude and dynamics of the 
actual income gap between the agriculture and non-agricultural sector is 
useful in speculating about the potential gains from off-farm labour 
migration and the convergence process.  
As emphasised by dual-economy models (Lewis, 1954), the 
productivity gap between the agricultural and non-agricultural parts of the 
economy behaves non-monotonically during economic growth. It shows a 
gap that first increases and then falls, and forms a U-shaped pattern during 
economic development. One of the key reasons behind this pattern is found 
in the lower rate of agricultural labour reallocation compared to other 
production factors, as a consequence of the fixed and sunk costs that 
farmers incur when they move between sectors (Mundlak, 2000; Dennis & 
Iscan, 2007).47  
McMillan & Rodrik (2011) documented interesting stylised facts in 
support of this relationship for a sample of 38 developed and developing 
countries. Similarly, Hayami (2007) reports evidence of this relationship for 
high-performing economies in Asia, suggesting that their transition from a 
low-income to a middle-income stage through industrialisation has 
generated a widening income gap between farm and non-farm workers, 
                                                     
47 This ‘transfer problem’ of agricultural labour out-migration was documented 
several years ago by Shultz (1964) and Johnson (1951) among others. For a more 
recent assessment see Mundlak (2000), Timmer (1988), Williamson (1988), and 
Dennis & Iscan (2007). 
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corresponding to rapid shifts in comparative advantage from agriculture to 
manufacturing. The same author makes the point that in order to prevent 
this income disparity from culminating in serious social and political 
instability, policies have been reoriented toward supporting the income of 
farmers. 
On the other hand, a variety of evidence has been presented 
regarding China (see Yang & Zhou, 1999; Yang, 1999) with reports of how 
urban bias in government policy has been a fundamental determinant of 
the increase in rural-urban income disparity. Interestingly, these authors 
have shown that during the economic reforms of the 1970s, China 
substituted government constraints on rural-urban migration with urban-
biased policies. These policies contributed substantially to the increase of 
income inequality in China during the 1980s and 1990s.48  
These stylised facts, associated with policies that traditionally tax 
farmers in low-income countries and support them in developed countries, 
make it difficult to use observed sectoral incomes to document the non-
monotonic relationship between the relative agricultural income gap and 
economic development.  
This chapter has two aims. First, we analyse patterns of inter-sectoral 
agricultural labour migration as well as patterns of sectoral productivity 
growth and agricultural relative income gaps, across both countries and EU 
regions. Second, we test empirically whether or not the supposed U-shaped 
relationship between the relative agricultural productivity gap and the 
level of development represents a robust regularity, taking into 
consideration the role played by agricultural policy. 
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, data and variables 
used to estimate off-farm labour migration at both the international and EU 
regional level, as well as data on sectoral productivities and agricultural 
policy, are presented. Section 3 deals with the analysis of the patterns of 
off-farm migration and productivity growth. In Section 4, we perform an 
econometric test to see whether or not the relationship between the 
                                                     
48 Data on inequality decomposition in Chinese provinces indicates that rural-
urban income differentials constitute a large share of total inequality, and the 
widening sectoral gaps from 1985 to 1995 have caused rising inequality in China. 
Yang (1999) shows that the rise in sectoral disparity is due to increased urban-
biased policies such as subsidies, investments, and credits, which have resulted in 
higher rates of inflation on rural earnings. 
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agricultural productivity gap and development is robust to different 
specifications and country samples, and controlling for agricultural policy. 
Finally, Section 5 discusses the main implications and draws some 
conclusions. 
2. Data and variables 
To study the patterns of off-farm labour migration49 and the relationship 
between the relative agricultural income gap50 and economic development, 
data was collected at both the international and EU regional level. The 
dataset assembled by McMillan & Rodrik (2011) was used for international 
comparison with sectoral data on employment, value added, and labour 
productivity for 38 countries over the period 1990-2005 (annual data). The 
original dataset is based on data taken from the Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre (GGDC) integrated with 11 countries (9 African 
countries plus China and Turkey). The GGDC database has two sections: 
the 10-sector database (Timmer & de Vries, 2007) and the EU-KLEM 
database (Timmer et al., 2007). 
The 10-sector database provides sector-level information on 
employment and value added for 19 countries (10 Asian and 9 Latin 
American) over the period 1950–2005. The EU-KLEM database has been 
built with the same methodology and time coverage to integrate the 10-
sector database with data on 8 OECD countries (7 European countries plus 
the US). To take advantage of a wider number of observations, the dataset 
of McMillan & Rodrik was added to the observations of the 10-sector 
database and the EU-KLEM Database before 1990. Table A.1 in the 
                                                     
49 Using agricultural employment information from country (region) datasets, the 
off-farm migration rate was computed according to the following equation: 
mkt=(Awk(t-1)- Awkt)/Awk(t-1), where Awkt refers to ‘agricultural workers’ in the 
country/region k at the time t. This type of computation has positive values in the 
presence of off-farm migration and negative values with the migration of workers 
into agricultural sectors from other sectors. 
50 The income gaps between the agricultural and non-agricultural parts of the 
economy were computed by dividing agricultural by non-agricultural labour 
productivity. Therefore, a low ratio indicates huge differences in productivity 
between agricultural and other economic sectors (high productivity gap), and vice 
versa. Agricultural and non-agricultural productivity was computed by dividing 
the sectoral value added by the corresponding level of employment. 
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Appendix reports country and time coverage of the pooled dataset used in 
the analysis presented in this chapter. 
The international dataset is complemented with data of the 
agricultural nominal rate of assistance (NRA) from the World Bank 
“Agdistortions Database” (see Anderson & Valenzuela, 2008). The NRA is 
calculated as ൌ ሺ௉ି௉
భሻ
௉భ
 , where P is the actual domestic price in local 
currency and P1 is the estimated domestic price that would hold in the 
absence of any commodity-market or exchange-rate intervention. 
Consequently, the NRA is like an equivalent tariff measuring the total 
transfer to agricultural products (sector) as a percentage of the undistorted 
unit values. The NRA is positive when the product is subsidised, negative 
when it is taxed, and 0 when net transfers are zero.  
At the EU regional level, the data for the analysis of off-farm 
migration within the EU covers 154 regions of the 15 ‘old’ EU countries51 
and 56 regions of the 12 new member states throughout the period 1990–
2010.52 Table A.2 in the Appendix describes the number of regions used for 
each country according to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for 
Statistics (NUTS) and distinguishing between NUTS1 and NUTS2. The 
decision to use both NUTS1 and NUTS2 is motivated by the need to link 
data from different sources. Indeed, the Farm Accountancy Data Network 
(FADN) regional classification that was used to retrieve data about 
agricultural subsidies from the CAP does not always match the NUTS2 
level defined by Eurostat.  
The EU regional data are taken from Cambridge Econometrics’ 
Regional Database, which represents an improvement on and 
rationalisation of the Eurostat Regio series. Specifically, data on total and 
agricultural gross value added and sectoral employment was collected 
from this source to measure both off-farm migration and the relative 
agricultural income gap. Labour productivity is calculated as gross value 
added (GVA) per worker at constant and basic prices. The difference 
                                                     
51 Luxembourg is coded as a NUTS1 (and NUTS2) single region. Information could 
not be found for the four French overseas departments, the two Portuguese regions 
of Madeira and Azores, the two Greek regions of Voreio Aigaio and Notio Aigaio, 
and the Åland region in Finland due to lack of data. 
52 Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Malta are coded as NUTS1 (and NUTS2) 
single regions. 
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between total GVA and GVA in agriculture, also for non-agricultural 
employment, was used for the non-agriculture sector.  
Concerning the measurement of CAP payments at the EU regional 
level, the FADN data was exploited in accordance with Olper et al. (2012). 
Specifically, the amount of payments received by the ‘average farm’ in each 
year over the period 1990–2010 in every region covered by the FADN was 
obtained. The extent to which the average farm is representative of the 
farm population,53 and then the computation of the ratio between this farm 
CAP payments and the respective farm net income (including subsidies), 
means it is possible to measure a consistent regional level of farm 
protection due to different CAP policy measures. Note that in addition to 
only being based on farm subsidies, this indicator of agricultural protection 
measured at the regional level is conceptually different from the NRA used 
to estimate agricultural protection in the international dataset. However, 
this is the only source of data from which it is possible to measure the level 
of farm subsidies at regional level consistently.  
3. Patterns of off-farm labour migration, productivity and 
income gaps 
3.1 Off-farm migration 
Tables 19.1 and 19.2 report the mean value of off-farm migration rate, 
agricultural labour productivity, the relative income gap, and agricultural 
productivity growth for the 38 countries and 209 European regions, 
respectively. In order to understand the off-farm migration rate over time 
more clearly, Figures 19.1 and 19.2 plot migration values for each country 
and region, respectively. In the figures, the average migration rates of the 
two subsequent decades are reported on the y and x axis, respectively. As 
the farm migration can range from negative to positive values, each graph 
is divided into four quadrants.  
                                                     
53 For each region, the FADN sample is stratified according to the type of farming 
(TF) and the European size unit (ESU) class, while the same stratification is made 
on the regional farm population. Each stratum in the sample is then weighted to 
render its data representative of the underlying population. This procedure makes 
the FADN data representative at the regional level for TF and ESU and, indirectly, 
for Pillar I payments, while this is not the case for Pillar II payments. 
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Table 19.1 Migration rate and agricultural labour productivity at country group 
level (mean value for each decade)  
 
Source: Authors’ estimates from McMillan & Rodrik database (see text). 
N. Obs
Migration 
rate       
(%)
Agricultural 
labour 
productivity 
(US$)
Productivity 
Gap
Agricultural 
Productivity 
Growth      
(%)
1990-2000 83 -1.361 3,852 0.28 1.22
2000-2010 65 -0.743 6,221 0.35 2.67
1960-1970 30 -0.353 2,164 0.29 3.71
1970-1980 74 -0.494 5,130 0.34 2.59
1980-1990 91 1.143 7,980 0.39 2.64
1990-2000 109 1.850 8,992 0.35 2.01
2000-2010 72 0.031 10,040 0.32 2.97
1950-1960 56 2.163 5,146 0.25 4.57
1960-1970 89 4.070 8,231 0.32 5.79
1970-1980 90 2.536 13,252 0.39 4.33
1980-1990 90 2.584 20,784 0.53 5.23
1990-2000 90 2.424 32,298 0.71 3.91
2000-2010 54 2.002 41,830 0.83 2.32
1950-1960 72 -0.606 3,237 0.19 2.43
1960-1970 89 -0.464 4,087 0.19 2.84
1970-1980 90 -0.325 5,452 0.23 2.67
1980-1990 90 -1.667 6,490 0.30 0.90
1990-2000 90 0.101 8,241 0.39 3.29
2000-2010 54 -0.361 10,654 0.51 2.65
9 High-income 
countries
9 Latin American 
countries
9 African countries
10 Asian countries + 
Turkey
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Table 19.2 Migration rate and agricultural labour productivity at European 
regional level (mean value for each decade)  
 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Cambridge Econometrics Regional Database (see text). 
N. Obs
Migration 
rate       
(%)
Agricultural 
labour 
productivity 
(Euros)
Productivity 
Gap
Agricultural 
Productivity 
Growth      
(%)
1990-2000 2310 2.53 32,381 0.54 4.47
2000-2010 2100 1.71 37,533 0.65 2.39
EU15 regions
1990-2000 1694 2.68 41,184 0.56 5.06
2000-2010 1540 1.18 46,946 0.64 1.35
12NMSs regions
1990-2000 616 2.11 8,245 0.49 2.84
2000-2010 560 3.15 11,649 0.69 5.25
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Figure 19.1 Global off-farm migration rates during decades (1950s to 2000s) 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on McMillan & Rodrik database (see text). 
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Figure 19.2 Off-farm migration rates in EU regions during the 1990s and 2000s 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Cambridge Econometrics Regional Database. 
Starting from the international country dataset (see Figure 19.1), high-
income countries (OECD), which are symbolised in the graph by a square, 
always fall in the first quadrant and are characterised by a positive 
migration rate in both decades. In particular, all of these countries show 
average migration increasing during the 1960s (first graph) from 2.2% to 
4%, but in contrast, they experience a general reduction of migration rates 
during the 1970s (second graph) as highlighted by the observations above 
the diagonal line. Exceptions are France and Japan, maintaining the same 
migration rate in this period, and Spain where migration continued to 
increase. From the 1970s to the 1990s, the high-income countries had an 
evident and persistent off-farm migration rate as seen in their position very 
close to the diagonal line and by the average migration value permanently 
close to 2.5% (Table 19.1, third and fourth quadrants). The behaviour of 
low-income countries is very different and symbolised on the graph by 
circles, which generally fill the third quadrant (negative migration in both 
periods) and present an inflow of labour into the agricultural sector from 
1950 to 1990. By contrast, the 2000s saw a marked acceleration in the off-
farm migration rate in these countries, which has become a pervasive 
feature for most of them, showing a reversal of the trend.  
Examining the EU-27 regions, the off-farm migration rate presents a 
slight decrease over the last two decades (1990s and 2000s), falling from 
2.53% to 1.71%. However, when the EU-15 regions are considered 
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separately, there is a bigger drop in the average migration rate from 2.68% 
to 1.18% (Table 19.2). The individual region performance shows that most 
of the EU-15 regions have a migration rate that slows down between 
decades, as highlighted in Figure 19.2 by the observations above the 
diagonal line. Only a few regions had a different pattern, with migration 
increasing (especially in Spain and Belgium) or migration being reversed 
(in some UK regions). By contrast, regions in new member states show a 
strong average increase of migration rate through the two decades from 
2.11% to 3.15%, but with two different behaviours. One group of regions 
(Estonia, Cyprus, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) presents a decrease in 
off-farm migration, while in the other group of regions, especially 
Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and Lithuania, off-farm migration reversed, 
moving from a negative value in the 1990s, to high positive values in the 
2000s.  
3.2 Productivity and migration 
The choice to migrate from the agricultural sector is influenced by 
incentives such as sectoral income. Consequently, the larger the income gap 
between sectors, the stronger the migration rate (Mundlak, 2000), ceteris 
paribus. At the same time, when labour moves from less to more productive 
activities, the economy grows even if there is no growth in productivity 
within sectors. Note moreover that, when off-farm migration contributes to 
an increase in agricultural labour productivity and this increase is greater 
than the non-agricultural productivity growth, agricultural relative income 
brings about convergence in sectoral incomes. This positive relationship 
between migration and the speed of convergence is shown in Figure 19.3 
and Figure 19.4, where these variables are plotted at the country and 
regional level, respectively.54 Although this pattern is apparent in all 
country groups, the value of the average productivity gap over the decades 
highlights deep differences in the speed of convergence between 
agricultural versus non-agricultural income (see Tables 19.1 and 19.2). In 
particular, in developed countries, where the migration rate has always 
been above 2%, agricultural productivity growth over the last 60 years 
filled the large gap in labour productivity between the traditional and 
modern parts of the economy, with the highest productivity difference 
being in Japan and the lowest in the UK. Conversely, the process of 
reduction in the gap between sectoral productivity presents a different 
                                                     
54 Convergence speed is computed as the relative agricultural income gap growth. 
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speed in developing countries, where the possibility that displaced workers 
could finish in even lower-productivity activities cannot be ruled out 
(McMillan & Rodrik, 2011). This convergence process is more evident in 
Latin American countries, despite the negative value of the average 
migration, where the labour force seems to have moved from high- to low-
productivity activities. In contrast, the relative income gap in the Asian 
countries changes slightly and the agricultural labour productivity has 
continuously remained at one-third that of the non-agricultural sector over 
the last 50 years.  
Figure 19.3 Relationship between migration and labour productivity convergence 
speed in world countries 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on the McMillan & Rodrik database (see text). 
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Figure 19.4 Relationship between migration and labour productivity convergence 
speed in European regions 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Cambridge Econometrics Regional Database (see text). 
It is easier to see what has happened at the European regional level, 
where the dynamic reproduces what has already been described for high-
income countries in the last two decades. The exception are regions in new 
member states, where average off-farm migration and agricultural 
productivity markedly increased over the last decade, reducing the 
differentials in productivities despite the big differences in labour 
productivity levels. Indeed, the agricultural labour productivity of 
European regions during the 2000s ranged from a minimum in the 
Bulgarian region of Severozapaden, with a productivity of €2,072, to a 
maximum in the Dutch region of Groningen, where labour productivity is 
over €90,000, almost 45 times greater (see Table A.4 in the Appendix).  
4. The agricultural productivity gap and economic 
development  
Whether or not there is a U-shaped relationship between the relative 
agricultural income gap and development at both the international and EU 
regional level is now empirically tested. The economic logic behind this U-
shaped relationship is that if economic growth occurs, the modern and 
‘urban’ sectors of the economy expand and the gap between them and the 
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traditional agricultural sectors begins to widen. Therefore, up to a certain 
point, labour begins to move from traditional agriculture to the modern 
part of the economy. Beyond this point, productivity levels begin to 
converge within the economy and productivity diffuses throughout the rest 
of the economy, thereby reducing the productivity gap. 
Figure 19.5 shows the relationship between the country level of 
development, measured as the (log) of economy-wide labour productivity, 
and the ratio of agricultural to non-agricultural productivity with reference 
to all of the 38 countries and to a sub-sample of the nine high-income 
countries. As highlighted in Figure 19.5, the quadratic curve with its U-
shaped pattern fits the data very well, the turning point being at an 
economy-wide productivity level of around $7.259 (=exp(8.8)) per worker. 
This value corresponds to the development level of China and India in the 
2000s or Thailand in the mid-1980s, and represents the kind of turning 
point that most of the African countries included in the dataset are still 
waiting for. By contrast, all the high-income economies show labour 
productivity levels that started their convergence process between 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors many years ago. 
Figure 19.5 Relationship between economy development level and productivity gap 
 
Note: The line refers to the fitted value. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on the McMillan & Rodrik database (see text). 
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Is this relationship a robust pattern of development, or it is just a 
result of spurious correlation? Answering this question is particularly 
important because, as discussed by Hayami (2007), the turning point of the 
relationship often coincides with a marked change in agricultural policy 
patterns, moving from taxation to subsidisation of the agricultural sector. If 
this is the case, then clearly problems emerge in empirically testing the 
relationship because of the role played by agricultural policies. Indeed, 
because these subsidies or taxes are sometimes very large, these policy 
transfers can clearly affect the measurement of the agricultural relative 
income gap. Specifically, with transfers going from the agricultural to the 
non-agricultural sectors in poor countries (and vice versa in rich countries), 
the pre-transfer rural-urban income ratio will be lower (higher) than that 
observed in poor (rich) countries. In medium-income countries, the 
transfers are comparatively low and so the observed income ratio is closer 
to the pre-transfer ratio.  
Consequently, the most important issue in testing the relationship 
between the agricultural relative income gap and the level of development 
is the need to control for the large transfers induced by agricultural 
policies. However, as clearly shown by Hayami (2007) and the large body 
of literature on the political economy of agricultural protection, the policy 
itself is affected by the agricultural rural income gap (see Swinnen, 1994). 
This raises the issue of the endogeneity of the policy transfer to the 
agricultural income gap.  
So it is important to bear in mind that the inclusion of the agricultural 
policy variable in the empirical estimation below cannot be interpreted as 
the effect of policy on the sectoral income gap. In fact, it is included in 
order to estimate the ‘true’ relationship between the pre-transfer or pre-tax 
agricultural income gap and development. Put differently, our main 
objective is to test if, after controlling for the agricultural policy transfer 
and tax and other unobserved factors, the U-shaped relationship continues 
to hold and if so, how it changes with respect to a specification where we 
do not control for agricultural policy. In fact, the particular direction of the 
changes can offer new insight into the effect of agricultural policy on the 
process of convergence in sectoral productivity. 
4.1 Empirical evidence 
In order to verify the robustness of these relationships, the productivity gap 
is regressed on economy-wide labour productivity and country-fixed 
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effects to control for any other omitted factors. The results of this exercise 
are reported in column 1 of Table 19.3. 
Table 19.3 Relationship between agricultural relative productivity gap and 
economic development at the international level 
 
Notes: country-fixed effects included in each regression. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
The estimated coefficients of the linear productivity level and its 
square are negatively and positively related to the income gap, 
respectively, and both are very significant. Therefore, results strongly point 
toward the existence of a U-shaped relationship between the productivity 
gap and the development level. The relationship estimated shows that 
agricultural relative income is negatively related to the level of economy-
wide labour productivity until it reaches a level of $10,405. This level 
represents the turning point of the relationship.55 A process of convergence 
in sectoral productivity starts after this point, with a rapid increase in the 
agricultural relative income gap. Moreover, note that given the inclusion of 
country-fixed effects in the specification, the results suggest that the 
relationship between the agricultural income gap and economic 
development holds true within countries. 
                                                     
55 The estimated turning point is a little higher than that obtained from Figure 5, 
simply because country-fixed effects are always controlled for in the specifications 
of Table 3. 
Dependent variable: Productivity gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Log(labour productivity) -3.33*** -3.29*** -1.71*** -1.97*** -0.93*** -0.76*** -11.17*** -10.78*** -4.36*** -4.68***
(0.16) (0.15) (0.54) (0.54) (0.15) (0.15) (0.58) (0.58) (0.85) (0.83)
Log(labour productivity)sq 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.57*** 0.55*** 0.25*** 0.27***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
NRA -0.06*** 0.10* 0.11*** -0.09*** 0.25***
(0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
Constant 14.93*** 14.68*** 7.63*** 8.81*** 4.38*** 4.09*** 55.12*** 53.09*** 18.86*** 20.51***
(0.72) (0.70) (2.46) (2.48) (0.70) (0.68) (2.94) (2.96) (4.04) (3.89)
No.of Obs. 1030 1030 126 126 301 301 398 398 205 205
R-Sq 0.74 0.74 0.79 0.80 0.85 0.88 0.81 0.81 0.73 0.76
Turning point [= exp (a/2b] 10,405 9,310 5,167 7,743 10,938 13,360 18,002 18,034 6,124 5,806
All Countries African Asian High income Latin American
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Column (2) adds the level of protection to the relationship, which is 
measured as NRA. Its estimated coefficient is significant and negative, 
confirming that agricultural policy affects relative income. However, what 
is important is that the U-shaped relationship is only marginally affected. 
Due to endogeneity issues discussed above, it does not make much sense to 
give a structural interpretation to the NRA coefficient. However, it should 
be noted that the inclusion of NRA purges the income gap-development 
relationship of the effect of policy. Therefore, by comparing the change in 
the turning point on passing from regression (1) to regression (2), the extent 
to which agricultural policies have accelerated or retarded the process of 
convergence in relative productivity can be evaluated. Controlling for 
policy, the turning point of the relationship falls slightly to $9,310. A literal 
interpretation of this result would be that agricultural policy has slightly 
retarded the process of convergence in productivity level between 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors in the overall sample, ceteris 
paribus.  
Columns (3), (5), (7), and (9) of Table 19.3 test the relationship by 
respectively considering the sub-sample of African, Asian, high-income, 
and Latin American countries. The relationship is very robust for all the 
country groups considered. Unsurprisingly, the turning point of the 
relationship is very sensitive to the level of development, tending to 
increase on moving from poor African countries ($5,167) to Latin American 
countries ($6,124) and Asian countries ($10,938), to high-income countries 
($18,002). Controlling for policy as in columns (4), (6), (8), and (10), the 
estimated turning point moves to the right for African and Asian countries, 
but slightly to the left for Latin American ones, and remains the same for 
high-income countries. Therefore, the effects of taxation and/or 
subsidisation of the agricultural sector do not display a clear pattern. There 
is some evidence that agricultural policy in African and Asian countries 
worked in favour of the process of convergence in relative income as the 
process of labour adjustment was probably accelerated. However, this 
effect is less apparent for the high-income country group, and appears to 
have had the opposite effect in Latin American countries.  
Table 19.4 reports the results of estimating the income gap-
development relationship for the EU regions (columns 1 and 2), with the 
old EU-15 regions (columns 3 and 4) and the 12 new member state regions 
(columns 5 and 6) being considered separately. Results at the EU regional 
level are impressively similar to those obtained across countries, once again 
confirming that the relationship between the dynamic of the relative 
income gap and economic development represents an important and 
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robust regularity in the development process. Within the EU regions, 
controlling for policy induces a relevant shift of the turning point to the 
right, from €9,094 to €15,783, an effect largely driven by the EU-15 regions 
(compare results in columns 3 and 4). This is not surprising as the 
agricultural subsidies for the new member state regions are of several 
orders of magnitude lower than in the EU-15 regions, and appeared only in 
the second part of the period considered here. Note that after controlling 
for agricultural policy transfers, the shifting of the turning point in the EU-
15 regions is consistent with the idea that government policies have 
accelerated the process of convergence in relative productivity.  
Table 19.4 Relationship between agricultural relative productivity gap and 
economic development at the EU regional level  
 
Notes: Columns (1) to (4) only include observations with existing ‘Total payments’ values; 
columns (5) and (6) include all new member state observations, replacing not reported 
payment with zero value in the years before accession. Country-fixed effects are 
included in each regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
indicate statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This chapter reviews the key mechanisms that affect the process of off-farm 
labour reallocation during the process of economic development and its 
relationship with the evolution of the relative income gap. The variation in 
off-farm migration obtained from two different datasets was analysed, one 
relating to 38 countries from all continents, the other relating to 210 EU 
regions. This data was used to study the patterns of off-farm migration 
Dependent variable: Productivity gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(economy-wide labour productivity) -2.37*** -2.32*** -3.26*** -3.17*** -2.09*** -1.95***
(0.62) (0.62) (0.82) (0.82) (0.29) (0.27)
Log(economy-wide labour productivity)sq 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.13***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Total payments 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 11.47*** 11.29*** 15.88*** 15.56*** 8.11*** 7.61***
(3.24) (3.23) (4.36) (4.34) (1.21) (1.14)
No.of Obs. 2943 2943 2706 2706 1176 1176
R-Sq 0.84 0.85 0.81 0.81 0.65 0.65
Turning point [= exp (a/2b] 9,094 15,783 14,592 20,055 1,745 1,808
All EU regions EU15 regions 12NMSs regions
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over the last 50 years. The analysis has documented interesting and robust 
correlations between the rate of labour reallocation, convergence in the 
relative income gap, and economic development. First, it was found that 
there is a strong positive correlation between the rate of off-farm migration 
and the convergence process in across-sector per capita productivity 
growth. Second, whether or not the supposed U-shaped relationship 
between the relative income gap and economic development is a robust 
stylised fact was empirically tested. Strong support for this relationship 
was found across both samples and also within countries and regions. 
Third, the role played by agricultural policy has also been highlighted, 
giving broad confirmation to the idea that the pattern of taxation and 
subsidisation of agriculture policy affects, and is affected by, the turning 
point of the relationship. Starting from the robust stylised facts established 
in this chapter, future research should analyse how fixed labour relocation 
costs or other potential mechanisms are responsible for the long-term trend 
in the observed agricultural income gap.  
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Appendix 
Table A.1 Number of countries and time coverage of the dataset 
 
 
Table A.2 Sample of European country regions considered 
 
  
Groups of countries N. countries Time coverage Database
Asia 9 1950-2005 GGDC - 10 sector 
Latin America 9 1950-2005 GGDC - 10 sector 
High Income 9 1950-2005 GGDC - Eu-Klem
Africa + 2 Asia (China +Turkey) 11 1990-2005 McMillan and Rodrik 
TOTAL 38
EU15 Countries NUTS
Number of 
regions 12 NMSs Countries NUTS
Number of 
regions
Belgium (2) 10 Latvia (1) 1
Denmark (2) 5 Lithuania (1) 1
Greece (2) 11 Estonia (1) 1
France (2) 22 Malta (1) 1
Germany (1) 14 Cyprus (1) 1
Ireland (2) 2 Bulgaria (2) 6
Italy (2) 21 Czech Republic (2) 8
Luxembourg (2) 1 Hungary (2) 7
The Nederland (2) 12 Poland (2) 16
Austria (2) 9 Romania (2) 8
Portogal (2) 5 Slovenia (2) 2
Finland (2) 4 Slovakia (2) 4
Sweden (2) 8
Spain (2) 17
United Kingdom (1) 12
EU15 regions 153 NMSs regions 56
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Table A.3 Agricultural labour productivity: summary statistics (US$) 
 
Source: estimates based on McMillan & Rodrik database. 
Table A.4 Agricultural labour productivity in European regions (€) 
 
Source: estimates based on Cambridge Econometrics Regional Database. 
Mean
1980-1990 nd
1990-2000 3,852         355           Malawi 22,198      Mauritius
2000-2010 6,221         521           Malawi 25,878      Mauritius
1960-1970 2,164         1,102        Thailand 3,866        Korea
1970-1980 5,130         1,526        Thailand 21,733      Honk Kong
1980-1990 7,980         1,735        India 25,729      Honk Kong
1990-2000 8,992         1,311        China 29,285      Honk Kong
2000-2010 10,040       1,943        China 24,639      Singapore
1950-1960 5,146         1,627        Italy 13,364      United States
1960-1970 8,231         2,685        Italy 19,334      United States
1970-1980 13,252       5,545        Spain 24,067      United Kingdom
1980-1990 20,784       8,667        Japan 36,946      United States
1990-2000 32,298       12,818      Japan 49,300      United States
2000-2010 41,830       13,308      Japan 65,306      United States
1950-1960 3,237         1,021        Brazil 7,424        Argentina
1960-1970 4,087         1,326        Brazil 10,242      Argentina
1970-1980 5,452         1,674        Brazil 14,299      Argentina
1980-1990 6,490         2,247        Bolivia 14,617      Argentina
1990-2000 8,241         2,362        Bolivia 23,023      Argentina
2000-2010 10,654       3,424        Bolivia 28,003      Argentina
10 Asian countries + 
Turkey
9 High-income 
countries
9 Latin American 
countries
Agricultural labour productivity
Min Max
9 African countries
Mean
1990-2000 32,381 138     Latvia 74,331 Luxenbourg
2000-2010 37,533 2,072  Severozapaden (BG) 92,049 Groningen (NL)
EU15 regions
1990-2000 41,184 9,852  Centro (PT) 74,331 Luxembourg
2000-2010 46,946 16,777 Centro (PT) 92,049 Groningen (NL)
12NMSs regions
1990-2000 8,245   138     Latvia 29,613 Cyprus
2000-2010 11,649 2,072  Severozapaden (BG) 31,327 Cyprus
Agricultural labour productivity
Min Max
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20. RETURNS FROM INCOME STRATEGIES 
IN RURAL POLAND 
JAN FAŁKOWSKI, MACIEJ JAKUBOWSKI 
AND PAWEŁ STRAWIŃSKI* 
n order to stabilise and improve their income situation, rural households are 
strongly encouraged to diversify their activities both in and outside the 
agricultural sector. Often, however, this phenomenon takes on only moderate 
proportions. This chapter addresses issues of rural households’ income 
diversification in the case of Poland. It investigates returns from rural households’ 
income strategies using propensity score matching methods and extensive datasets 
spanning 1998-2008. Results suggest that returns from combining farm and off-
farm activities were lower than returns from concentrating on farming or on self-
employment outside agriculture. This differential is stable over time although 
returns from diversification have improved relatively since the accession of Poland 
to the EU. This is also visible in the fact that since 2006, returns from combining 
farm and off-farm activities have evened with returns from relying solely on hired 
off-farm labour, thus smoothing away the difference observed before the accession. 
Further, over the analysed period households pursuing a diversification strategy 
performed better than those relying solely on unearned income. Finally, in general, 
incomes in households combining farm and off-farm activities were higher than in 
those combining two off-farm income sources. 
 
                                                     
* This chapter summarises the key insights on returns from various income 
strategies used by rural households in Poland in the period 1998-2008. The full 
paper with relevant background information, methodology and analysis is 
available as Fałkowski, Jakubowski & Strawiński, “Returns from Income Strategies 
in Rural Poland”, Factor Markets Working Paper No. 64, August 2013. 
I
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1. Research question and motivation 
Rural areas in Poland face significant challenges. The average income per 
capita of rural households is close to 70% of the average income in urban 
areas (CSO, 2007), while the service sector is less developed. The 
dependence on agriculture is one of the highest in the EU. Most remote 
areas are being depopulated due to a lack of economic and social 
opportunities and the unfavourable demographic situation is likely to limit 
their growth opportunities and sustainability.  
In response to this, one of the main objectives of the Polish rural 
development policy is to improve the quality of life in rural areas by 
encouraging diversification of the rural economy. It is believed that 
promoting diversification of economic activities in rural areas may 
indirectly contribute to a decrease in hidden unemployment, reduce 
fragmentation of land holdings, and stimulate their modernisation and 
improve their competitiveness and commercialisation (RDP, 2010). Thus, 
advocating diversification often rests on two premises. First, it is likely to 
improve efficiency of resource allocation. Second, it should help reduce 
poverty (for a background discussion, see Reardon et al., 2000; Lanjouw & 
Lanjouw, 2001). In the case of transition countries, diversification has been 
additionally advocated since farms in these countries have been expected 
to achieve a post-EU-accession increase in productivity with a net decline 
in agricultural employment (Chaplin et al., 2004). In this context, 
diversification has been promoted as a measure to absorb some of the 
surplus of farm labour. The policy measures aimed at achieving this 
include support for diversification into non-agricultural activities, support 
for the creation and development of micro-enterprises, provision of basic 
services for the economy and rural population, and support for village 
renewal and development. These measures have been implemented both 
during the pre-accession period as well as after Poland joined the EU and 
was embraced by the Common Agricultural Policy.  
While support for income diversification in rural areas has gained 
remarkable popularity, especially within political circles, these 
programmes are of only moderate proportion (Wilkin, 2003; Błąd, 2006). 
For example, in the period 2002–06 income diversification measures 
implemented within the pre-accession SAPARD programme and post-
accession SPO programme provided funds for roughly 5,600 applicants 
(SAPARD, 2007; SPO, 2008). For comparison, it was expected that the 
number of beneficiaries from these two programmes would be 13,000. 
While this relatively low participation rate (42%) was mainly explained by 
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problems with administrative implementation (SAPARD, 2007; SPO, 2008), 
there is also evidence that some households are resistant to diversification 
strategies due to a preference for agriculture (Chaplin et al., 2004).  
Moreover, the benefits of programmes encouraging farms to 
undertake non-agricultural activities are often questioned. Some experts 
argue that rural inhabitants are rational profit-maximisers and nudging 
them to diversify outside agriculture will distort rural and agricultural 
markets away from their optimal levels. Furthermore, it may lead to 
overdependence of rural inhabitants on government support. Last but not 
least, it should also be noted that according to official statistics, starting 
from 2005, farmers’ income is constantly above the average observed in 
rural areas. This again questions the legitimacy of encouraging farmers to 
look for income outside agriculture from a profit-maximisation perspective.  
Given that the Poland’s rural areas contain over 38% of its population 
(roughly 14 million), it seems important to gain a better understanding of 
the returns to various income strategies and to evaluate these two 
contrasting views using evidence from the data. Interestingly, while there 
has been some work investigating the barriers to diversification in rural 
Poland (e.g. Wilkin, 2003; Chaplin et al., 2004), there have been hardly any 
attempts to compare returns to income strategies of rural households. In 
this chapter, we attempt to at least partly fill this gap and provide a 
comparison of returns to various income strategies adopted by Polish rural 
households during transition. More specifically, we examine returns from 
various ways of combining farm and off-farm income sources (i.e. relying 
on diversified income) and four single-source strategies: relying solely on 
farm income, relying solely on hired off-farm labour, relying solely on self-
employment outside agriculture, and relying solely on unearned income 
except pensions. Such information is needed to evaluate the rationale of 
government programmes aimed at encouraging farmers to diversify 
outside agriculture. It should also help in explaining labour adjustments in 
rural areas that were observed in Poland during transition period (Dries & 
Swinnen, 2002; Swinnen et al., 2005). Finally, by highlighting the most 
profitable rural income sources, we aim to contribute to the ongoing 
discussion about the design of new rural development policy, both in 
Poland and at the broader EU level. 
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2. Data and empirical method 
2.1 Data 
Our analysis uses data from Household Budget Surveys (HBS) conducted 
annually by the Central Statistical Office (CSO) in Poland. This extensive 
survey includes information on household characteristics as well as details 
of their income, expenditure and assets. The HBS is a cross-sectional 
sample with around 32,000 households interviewed each year. For the 
purposes of our study, only rural households were taken into account. 
Moreover, to reduce selection based on labour force participation we 
consider only households without people eligible for pensions (that is also 
why one of our single-source strategies is relying solely on unearned 
income without pensions). Finally, to simplify the analysis and to reduce 
the number of potential comparison groups, we consider only households 
pursuing either a single income source strategy or combining two income 
sources. Overall, we have roughly between 5,300 and 8,400 observations, 
depending on the year, with data covering the period from 1998 to 2008. 
Given that Poland accessed to the EU in May 2004, our dataset spans both 
the pre-accession as well as the post-accession period. It thus allows us to 
trace the relative positions of diversified-income strategy both before and 
after Polish rural areas were embraced by the Common Agricultural Policy.  
To ensure that our diversified households (i.e. those combining two 
income sources) have more or less balanced contributions from each 
income source (to avoid treating as diversified those households with two 
income sources but with one contributing, say, just 5% to the total budget), 
we do the following. For each household that has two income sources, we 
calculate the Herfindahl Index (HHI), which is the sum of squared shares of 
each income source in a total budget. We classify households with HHI 
smaller than or equal to 0.58, which corresponds to the situation where the 
less important income source contributes at least 30% to the total, as 
diversified. Where it is possible and we have enough observations, we test 
the robustness of our findings to alternative definitions where we take 
more restrictive values for HHI (smaller than or equal to 0.545 or 0.52). The 
former (latter) threshold corresponds to a situation where the less 
important income source contributes at least 35% (40%) to the total. As we 
are focusing on households that are involved in agricultural activities, we 
concentrate on diversified households where one of the two sources of 
income is farming.  
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2.2 Empirical approach 
Our aim is to quantify the average impact of a given income strategy on 
rural household income. A decision to follow an income strategy is possibly 
non-random. One should rather assume that selection of a given strategy 
depends on household characteristics. Thus, the unadjusted difference in 
average income across various groups will give a biased estimate of the 
returns to income strategies. To make meaningful comparisons, 
characteristics should be balanced across groups for which financial returns 
are compared (e.g. Lee, 2005). Building on the microeconometric evaluation 
literature and given the nature of our data, we estimate income differentials 
across rural households using a propensity score-matching method, which 
adjusts for observable differences in household characteristics and 
endowments (e.g. Blundell & Costa-Dias, 2008). The basic idea is to mimic a 
randomised experiment. In our context, receiving the ‘treatment’ is equal to 
pursuing a given income strategy. A counterfactual control group would 
consist of otherwise similar households pursuing a different income 
strategy. To our knowledge, this is the first study concerned with rural 
areas in Central and Eastern Europe that uses such an approach to balance 
background characteristics before comparing incomes.  
It should be noted that this procedure assumes that after conditioning 
for observable characteristics, there are no systematic differences between 
households pursuing different income strategies. However, as noted by 
Heckman et al. (1997), this might not be true and treated and untreated 
households may differ in unobserved covariates. A potential solution is a 
difference-in-difference matching estimator. In our case, however, this 
strategy is not feasible since longitudinal information on households is not 
available in our data. Nevertheless, our set of covariates includes crucial 
characteristics that are decisive for income strategies. Therefore, we assume 
that by balancing these characteristics across income groups we control for 
selection in the majority of cases. 
Our applied empirical strategy consists of two steps. First, using a 
probit regression, we calculate the propensity scores. Second, we use these 
propensity scores to find good matches for treated subjects in the pool of 
untreated. From several different matching algorithms used in applied 
research, we employ two that are commonly used by economists: nearest 
neighbour one-to-one matching and local linear regression matching 
(Heckman et al., 1997). Comparing results from both methods serves as a 
robustness check. The latter matching estimator is also more consistent 
when using a bootstrap to calculate standard errors, which is our case. To 
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improve matching quality and ensure that we compare similar households, 
we use a calliper with a rather restrictive value of 0.005.  
Our dependent variable is a monthly disposable equivalent income 
per capita deflated to 2005 prices. To assure the representativeness of our 
calculations, differences in incomes between treated and untreated 
households were adjusted by household probability survey weights. Our 
set of covariates used when calculating the propensity score (i.e. in the first-
stage probit model) includes variables capturing the level of education, age 
and gender of the head of the household; we also control for the level of 
education of other household members, household size (distinguishing 
between people below and above 15 years of age), gender ratio of 
household members, and a set of dummies denoting each of the six Polish 
macro-regions (NUTS 1). To test the robustness of our analysis, in some 
specifications, we also control for interaction terms between the 
independent variables mentioned above.  
3. Main findings and conclusions 
We start by reporting the results for comparisons where we do not 
distinguish between various diversification strategies but instead pool all 
diversified households into one group. As mentioned earlier, we focus on 
households earning income from two sources with one being farming. This 
group is subsequently compared to households relying solely on one of the 
single income source strategies mentioned above (i.e. farming, hired off-
farm labour, self-employment outside agriculture and unearned income 
excluding pensions). Several points are worth noting based on these 
comparisons. First, our results suggest that if we pool all diversified 
households together, the strategy based on combining two income sources 
(one of which is farming) performed better only when compared to 
households relying solely on unearned income (excluding pensions). In 
contrast, households relying solely on farming or households relying solely 
on self-employment outside agriculture fare better than diversified ones. 
What is important is that these patterns seem to be consistent over time and 
could have been observed in practice during the whole period under study. 
As regards the comparison with households relying solely on hired off-
farm labour, on the other hand, diversified households seemed to fare 
worse until 2005–06. Since then, we do not find statistically significant 
differences between these two strategies. A possible explanation for this 
pattern is related to Poland's accession to the EU and the benefits brought 
by the CAP. According to this argument, the farmers in rural areas 
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benefited the most relatively from joining the EU. In effect, farming’s 
contribution to total budgets might have improved the relative position of 
diversified households as compared to their counterparts relying solely on 
hired off-farm labour. This explanation gains some credence when 
combined with more detailed analysis of earning differentials between 
diversification and self-employment. Here again, with the accession to the 
EU we observe a relative improvement in returns to the former strategy. In 
specifications where we define diversified households as those with HHI 
smaller than or equal to 0.58, however, this improvement was insufficient 
to fully equate remuneration from these two strategies. In specifications 
where we use more a restrictive definition, though, the difference between 
returns from these two strategies since 2006 was statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. Importantly, the abovementioned patterns are 
consistent across different matching estimators and robust to bootstraping 
standard errors.  
In the next step, we investigate the diversification strategy in more 
detail and distinguish between a strategy based on combining farming and 
hired off-farm labour and a strategy based on combining farming and 
unearned income. We compare these two strategies with strategies based 
on specialising in hired off-farm labour and unearned income, respectively. 
Accounting for a more detailed study of the third strategy, i.e. that based 
on combining farming and self-employment outside agriculture, is not 
possible due to an insufficient number of observations. These new results 
complement the picture sketched above. In particular, we observe that 
combining farming with unearned income appears to be a more profitable 
strategy than relying solely on the latter source. This conclusion appears to 
hold for the period 2001-08 (for the previous three years, the difference, 
although still positive, is small in magnitude and statistically 
indistinguishable from zero). As regards the comparison between 
combining farming and off-farm labour with specialising in off-farm 
labour, we have slightly different results from those reported before. The 
difference is in two key points. First, this time we do not find that 
specialising in hired off-farm labour performed better than combining two 
income sources before the accession to the EU. Our results tend to show 
that the two strategies brought similar remuneration. If anything, 
households using the latter strategy performed somewhat better. Second, 
our results tend to suggest that a diversification strategy outperforms 
specialising in hired off-farm labour since 2006. This pattern comes out also 
from specifications where we define diversified households as those with 
HHI threshold smaller than or equal to 0.545. These results, combined with 
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those shown earlier, point to an important observation that analysing the 
diversification strategy may lead to different conclusions depending on 
whether we adopt a more general or a more detailed perspective with 
regard to what really contributes to a diversified household budget.  
In a final step, we report the main findings regarding comparisons 
between strategies based on combining two income sources including 
farming with strategies based on combining two income sources but 
without relying on farming. Within the former group, we distinguish two 
strategies as before (farming plus off-farm labour and farming plus 
unearned income). For the control group, we pool all households 
combining two non-farming income sources. Two key points arise from 
this analysis. First, households combining farming and hired off-farm 
labour appear to perform better than those combining two non-farming 
income sources. This pattern could be observed in practice over the whole 
analysed period. In contrast, and this is the second main point that we want 
to make here, relying on two non-farm incomes seem to be more profitable 
than combining farming and unearned income. Again, this result holds 
over the whole period under investigation.  
To conclude, it is generally believed that economic diversification of 
rural areas may contribute to more efficient resource allocation and help 
reduce poverty. In this chapter, we presented results that are only partly in 
line with this view. Based on the micro-level data from rural Poland over 
the period 1998–2008, we show that households combining farm and off-
farm income performed better than households relying solely on unearned 
income. We also report some evidence that the former strategy, especially 
after Poland joined the EU, seems to present an alternative to specialising 
in hired off-farm labour. However, the remuneration from diversification 
appears to be consistently lower than that from relying solely on self-
employment or farming. This latter result is particularly interesting as a 
diversification strategy is often advocated for farm households. Our 
findings in turn tend to suggest that, holding other things constant, 
households relying solely on farming have higher returns than those 
combining agricultural activities with off-farm income. Following this 
result, one could argue that without additional incentives from the state, 
farm households may not be willing to diversify outside agriculture. On the 
other hand, this finding prompts the question of whether stimulating 
diversification with financial support is a viable strategy in the long run. 
This is because it has to be assumed that state support would be only 
temporary. If the patterns depicted above and the environment within 
which rural households operate would not change, then diversified 
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households may be motivated to return to relying solely on farming once 
the support is removed.  
Our results also suggest that joining the EU in May 2004 may have 
been particularly beneficial to people leaving farming. The exact 
transmission mechanism through which this effect might have happened is 
an interesting area for future research. Other potential extensions of our 
approach include, for instance, more careful examination of where the non-
agricultural activities take place (whether in domicile/towns/abroad). 
Similarly, a closer look at wage employment could allow the inclusion of a 
distinction between agricultural and non-farm wage employment. 
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unctioning institutions are crucial for an efficient credit market. The 
institutions can be both formal (rules, regulations, authorities and actors) 
and informal (norms, values and relations). They also interact and in a 
situation where the formal institutions are weak, the informal ones increase in 
importance. In this chapter, the authors compare the institutional situation in 
selected European countries and attempt to develop indicators to measure the 
performance of the institutions. The study is based on a questionnaire sent to 
agricultural financial experts in selected countries and on FADN data. 
 
If farmers cannot borrow as much as they would wish to finance sound 
investments, their growth possibilities are impaired. Well-functioning 
credit markets are, accordingly, essential for the growth and prosperity of 
the agricultural sector and institutions play a major role in this context. 
Agency problems (asymmetric information, moral hazard and adverse 
selection), uncertainty and credit constraints are typical in an inefficient 
(malfunctioning) credit market. Agency problems might be more prevalent 
in closely held agricultural firms compared with closely held firms in other 
                                                     
* This chapter is based on Jansson, Huisman, Lagerkvist & Rabinowicz, 
“Agricultural Credit Market Institutions: A Comparison of Selected European 
Countries”, Factor Markets Working Paper No. 33, January 2013 and Jansson & 
Lagerkvist, “Performance indicators in Agricultural Financial Markets”, Factor 
Markets Working Paper No. 43, June 2013. 
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sectors of the economy, mainly due to the legal form of the organisation. A 
proprietary farm is generally not obliged to publicly disclose its financial 
situation, except its annual tax statement, and this might increase the risk of 
especially adverse selection and moral hazard. Hence, it is crucial for the 
bank to either trust the farm seeking a loan in light of a long-term 
relationship or to be able to accurately assess its financial status through a 
credit rating, business rating or a sufficient amount of collateral.  
In this chapter, we review credit market institutions in 13 countries. 
Formal institutions are, for instance, rules and regulations, including 
monitoring by the state and law enforcement. Examples of informal 
institutions are behaviours, norms and relations. Formal and informal 
institutions are connected. A key issue is the possible prevalence of credit 
constraints – a low level of loan-to-value (LTV), as well as the active 
involvement of governments in the credit market, are used as possible 
indicators of credit rationing. 
The analysis is based on expert knowledge gathered through a 
questionnaire completed by national experts concerning important 
creditors, local regulations, risk assessment practices, and so on (Jansson et 
al., 2013).56 The expert assessments are complemented with calculations of 
economic indicators, LTV and economic sustainability based on data from 
the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) (Jansson & Lagerkvist, 2013). 
Based on Lagerkvist (2001), we build an indicator of economic 
sustainability showing what the farmer has left for private consumption 
and taxes after all costs have been covered. LTV is the ratio of total 
liabilities/total assets, also called the debt-to-asset ratio, which shows the 
financial risk of a company by measuring how much of the assets have 
been financed through debt. This enables us to investigate whether expert 
opinions coincide with the results of the calculations and whether there is 
any relation between economic sustainability indicators and the 
performance of the financial institutions. 
The regulation of financial markets is mostly general; only a few 
countries have specific regulations for the agricultural sector, and even then 
they are regarding particular subsidies for agriculture. Government 
involvement varies widely among the countries – in Ireland and the UK, 
                                                     
56 The case study countries were: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, the UK and the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).  
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there is no involvement at all by governmental credit institutions, whereas 
in Germany and FYROM, for example, there are several different types of 
governmental institutions involved in the agricultural credit market. This 
indicates that the agricultural credit markets are not perceived as requiring 
specific regulations. On the other hand, many governments – in fact, all but 
four57 – give some sort of credit support to agriculture, implying a belief 
that the capital market for agriculture is not functioning efficiently. This 
seemingly contradictory situation might be caused by the fact that there are 
different ministries and authorities dealing with the financial sector and the 
agricultural sector; finance ministries do not consider that there is a need 
for special regulations for agriculture, but agricultural ministries introduce 
various types of support. 
The dominant loan providers for farmers are commercial banks and 
farmers’ cooperative banks. However, in two countries – Slovakia and 
FYROM – suppliers have a relatively high share of the market, though this 
is decreasing. In Greece, on the other hand, suppliers seem to be increasing 
in importance. It is a more efficient strategy for the farmer to have 
traditional bank loans rather than debts to suppliers because a farmer has 
no way of reallocating resources and if he or she is unable to pay, suppliers 
can reclaim machinery at a short notice. Another positive effect of long-
term loans is that they build a long-term relationship, which according to 
the questionnaire is an important factor when it comes to extending loans. 
Long-term relations tend to reduce the effects of asymmetric information, 
as the bank’s knowledge of a firm increases over time. A long-term 
relationship will also reduce the risk of moral hazard, since it is easier for 
the bank to trust someone after a longer relationship. 
In asset-based lending, the credit decision is based on the availability 
and quality of collateral of the firm. At the other end of the scale, a credit 
decision can be based on the investment itself: will it provide enough cash 
flow to pay the interest and repay the full amount? A majority of the case 
studies show a tendency towards cash-flow-based lending. In Greece, Italy 
and the UK, asset- and cash-flow-based lending have equal weight and in 
Poland, asset-based lending is more important than expected cash flow. In 
the UK, while the ‘estimated farm business profit’ (cash flow) has a high 
weight in risk assessments relating to a first-time credit evaluation, in 
                                                     
57 These are Ireland, Slovakia and the UK plus Sweden; the only involvement in 
Sweden is that the state is a shareholder in one of the biggest banks, NORDEA. 
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applications for extending an existing loan the asset (collateral) and cash 
flow are given the same weight. Results for the Netherlands show the 
opposite: cash flow is more important when extending a loan.  
Cash flow is, according to the experts, assigned the highest weight 
when performing a risk assessment. This is particularly true for Finland, 
Sweden, the UK and FYROM. In the Netherlands, the estimated business 
profit is not given as high a weight as ‘available household income’. In 
Greece, there seems to be little difference between the characteristics; 
business aspects and personal characteristics are all important. In Italy, 
‘appropriate farming or management experience’ is emphasised. Slovakia 
also shows a generally even distribution of weight for all characteristics 
except ‘available business collateral’ and ‘available household income’, 
which are assigned no weight at all. 
When it comes to reasons for rejecting credit applications, personal 
factors, such as education, experience and previous relations with the 
creditor, carry less weight than lack of collateral, insufficient farm business 
income and poor credit history. 
LTV can be an indicator of how different operators perceive the risks 
of investing in agriculture. According to the experts, the typical LTV varies 
between the countries and asset types, from 30% for equipment and 
machinery in Slovakia to 100% for any assets in the Netherlands. Fixed 
assets show similar levels of LTV across all countries, whereas equipment, 
machinery and operating capital varies more between countries and 
sometimes also between creditors. However, LTV calculated using the 
FADN data are lower than the experts estimated. This could be explained 
by differences in accounting standards in agriculture and non-agriculture, 
but also by the characteristics of the assets making them harder to liquidise. 
Belgium, France and Greece obtained the best results from the 
economic sustainability (ES) indicator. Accordingly one could expect, based 
on the results from the questionnaire, that it should be easier for farmers in 
these countries to borrow, resulting in high LTV. Greece, however, has very 
low levels of LTV, while Belgium and France have rather high levels of 
LTV. All three countries have specific government support to the 
agricultural credit market and some level of investment support (through 
Greece has very low levels), which may reduce the need to borrow for 
investments.  
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Ireland, Finland, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden and the 
UK all have negative results on the ES indicator for a majority of the 
years.58 Here, one might expect low LTV, indicating the possibility of credit 
rationing. But that is only partly true; Ireland, Poland, Slovakia and the UK 
all have rather low LTV, whereas Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden 
have rather high LTV. In this group, we also find all countries with no or 
low levels of support to the agricultural credit market – Ireland, Slovakia, 
Sweden and the UK. Accordingly, no clear pattern emerges and one can 
conclude that there does not seem to be a clear relation between the 
prevalence of credit rationing, as measured by LTV, and economic 
sustainability. 
As pointed out above, the calculated LTV values appear to be much 
lower than the levels estimated by the experts in the questionnaire. 
Therefore, actual lending is lower than the financial experts in the 
individual countries would expect in general for the sector. This implies 
that credit levels could be higher. Curtiss (2012) sees low LTV as an 
indicator of credit constraints. Extremely low values are found in Poland 
and Slovakia; does this imply that farms in these two countries are severely 
under-capitalised? Credit rationing has been shown to exist in Poland 
(Petrick, 2004), so it is not far-fetched to conclude that a low LTV ratio also 
implies that agriculture is under-capitalised. An interesting, and surprising, 
outcome of the survey is that firms in the agricultural sector are believed to 
be more likely to obtain credit than other small rural firms. Thus, 
agricultural firms should be better off and probably less credit-rationed 
than other firms. However, this may also imply that credit rationing 
applies on a wider scale to other small proprietary firms. 
Requirements for collateral can reduce the risk of the investment and 
hence reduce uncertainty effects. Assets, however, are not considered as 
important as the expected cash flow of the planned investment when 
extending an existing loan. Only in Poland is asset-based lending more 
widespread than lending based on cash flow (this is in line with the 
findings of Petrick & Latruffe, 2006). When undertaking a risk assessment 
for a first-time loan application, the situation is slightly different; in most 
countries, a higher weight is given to cash flow, except in the Netherlands, 
where the emphasis is on collateral. In the Netherlands, assets are the most 
                                                     
58 The years referred to are based on the time series available for the individual 
countries in FADN. The available years are: for Ireland and the Netherlands 1990-
2009, for Sweden and Finland 1995-2009 and for Poland and Slovakia 2005-2009. 
THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR AGRICULTURAL CREDIT MARKETS IN THE EU | 259 
significant factor at the beginning of a creditor–debtor relationship, while 
later on the investment itself is more decisive. The survey also shows that 
(for most countries) the financial situation of the firm or the economic 
potential of the investment are more influential factors in risk assessments 
than personal characteristics. 
To summarise, this study has attempted to link the performance of 
financial institutions to the performance of the credit markets and to the 
performance of the agricultural sector, focusing, in particular, on the 
possible prevalence of credit rationing. Low levels of LTV indicate that 
agricultural firms in a particular country may be credit constrained. 
However, national experts believed that agricultural firms do not face more 
severe credit constrains than other small firms. This may imply that credit 
rationing applies on a wider scale. Low levels of LTV for economically 
viable farms may be deemed particularly worrisome, especially as the 
national experts have reported that estimated business profit is assigned a 
higher weight when banks are assessing credit worthiness. However, no 
clear relation emerges between economic sustainability and LTV. Hence, it 
is difficult to draw firm conclusions on the relation between economic 
sustainability of farms and the performance of financial institutions. 
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22. AGRICULTURAL CREDIT IN THE EU 
SAMI MYYRÄ* 
n average, the sum of debts on EU farms was €50,022 in 2008. At the 
same time, equity totalled €229,046. The financial leverage varies 
considerably between countries. However, the distribution of the financial 
leverage of agriculture across countries does not reflect the distribution of country-
specific risk premiums in the manner they are observed in government bond yields. 
This will provide, as such, some hedge for the European agricultural sectors 
against the financial problems in the public sector. The agri premium (the 
difference between the agricultural loan rate and the rate paid for household loans) 
ranges between -4.9% and +4.4%. The highest agri premiums must be related to 
excessive risks or a strong demand for loans in agriculture compared to other 
industrial sectors. A negative agri premium might indicate some sort of public 
intervention on financial markets.  
 
1. Introduction 
Because money moves fast, modern capital markets should be better 
integrated across different market regimes than labour and commodity 
markets. Thus, local, rural capital markets should be closely linked not only 
to the domestic financial market within the country but increasingly to the 
EU and even to global financial markets. Recently, it has become evident 
that under the modern financial systems, information, large economic 
shocks and instability observed in the international market are inevitably 
                                                     
* This chapter is based on two Factor Markets Working Papers. The full papers 
with details on data, methodology, analysis and conclusions are available as 
Pietola, Myyrä & Heikkilä, “The Penetration of Financial Instability in Agricultural 
Credit and Leveraging“, Factor Markets Working Paper No. 2, September 2011 and 
Myyrä, Pietola & Heikkilä, “Farm Level Capital: Capital positions, structures, the 
dynamics of farm level investments, capital accumulation and leverage positions“, 
Factor Markets Working Paper No. 7, October 2011.  
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transmitted to the local capital markets. The sector- and country-specific 
financial risks are additionally reflected by international investors, and 
these risks quickly transmit to the price of money that each country and 
entrepreneur has to pay.  
This chapter attempts to fill the gap in descriptive statistics by 
computing certain indicators of rural capital markets from public data 
sources. The key indicators of financial market data are provided to 
highlight how rural capital markets are linked to country-specific capital 
markets. Also, the financial leverage structure in EU agriculture is 
described to give weights for country-specific comparisons.  
2. The price of money for EU farmers  
In describing the price of money, indicators of the supply and demand 
sides of the market are constructed. The benchmark data on the aggregate 
supply side are measured by two types of interest rate. The first is the 
short-term interbank offered rate. For the Eurozone, these Euribor rates 
were accessed from the Statistical Data Warehouse of the ECB. The second 
supply-side indicator is a selection of 10-year government bond rates paid 
in the secondary market. These data were also collected from the ECB 
websites and the countries’ own central bank websites. The government 
bond rates describe the country-specific price of money, including the 
country-specific risk premiums, while excluding borrower-specific effects, 
such as the funded sector.  
On the borrower and demand sides, two distinct indicators are 
presented. The first is the interest paid by households on new loans for 
housing purchases. The maturity of these loans varies between five and ten 
years. Nevertheless, these data do not represent the rural capital market 
alone. To the best of our knowledge, no separate data on public financial 
data sources are available that are specific to the rural capital market. The 
second set of demand-side data is specific to the rural capital market and 
imputed from the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN). These data 
represent the effective interest rates paid on all outstanding loans, both 
short- and long-term, in agriculture and farming households as recorded in 
the FADN. However, taking into account the distribution of loans between 
those with a short and long duration, these data actually represent quite 
well the other long-term indicators, as described above. About 82% of all 
agricultural debts are classified as long- or medium-term loans in the 
FADN, and these loans by definition have a duration of at least one year. 
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The effective interest rates are computed from the amount of outstanding 
loans and the total amount of interest paid within each calendar year.  
For each country, the difference between the household loan rate and 
the interest paid by farmers is computed. The difference is later on referred 
to as the ‘agri premium’. In these comparisons, only the December 2008 
data are used, since this was the last available year in the FADN at the time 
of performing this part of the factor markets study.  
The FADN is a survey carried out by the member states of the EU. It 
collects accountancy data from about 80,000 agricultural holdings every 
year. The FADN is the only source of microeconomic data that is 
harmonised so that the bookkeeping principles are the same in all EU 
member states. Only commercial agricultural holdings, defined by 
economic size (RI/CC 882 Rev.8.1), are included in the FADN, and the data 
therefore cover not more than 39% of all agricultural holdings. However, 
these farms account for more than 90% of all commercial agricultural 
production in the EU.59 The empirical data were collected from a database 
maintained by MTT Economic Research, Finland (www.mtt.fi/eufadn). 
The original data source is FADN-EC-DG AGRI/L3. In the FADN, the 
debts are presented in two variables: 1) long- and medium-term loans, and 
2) short-term loans. The loans sum up to the total debt. Total external 
factors reduced from farm net value added to produce the farm net income 
are divided into three items: wages paid, rent paid and interest paid. Our 
interest focused on interest paid.  
Our first indicator on the borrowing side is the household rate paid in 
lending for house purchases, excluding revolving loans and overdrafts, 
convenience and extended credit card debt. These loans are classed as 
having a maturity of over 5 and up to 10 years. These interest rates suggest 
that the current capital market, or at least the risk premiums included in 
the borrowing rates, substantially differ between European countries. The 
Eurozone does not seem to define a homogeneous market regime or draw a 
line between euro countries and countries outside the Eurozone. The rates 
display large variation across the countries within the Eurozone, and most 
of the borrowing rates in national currencies closely follow the euro 
average. Thus, the deviations seem to be country-specific rather than 
currency-market-specific.  
                                                     
59 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/analysis/fadn/index_en.htm 
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As mentioned above, the public domains do not have, at least to our 
knowledge, consistent statistics amongst the European countries on interest 
rates that have been paid in agriculture and in rural capital markets. 
Therefore, we imputed an approximation for these interest rates using the 
financial accounts in the FADN. The interest rate paid for agricultural loans 
is computed by dividing the total annual interest payments by the total 
amount of outstanding loans at the end of the year. The resulting 
approximation of the interest rate does not distinguish between short- and 
long-duration credits, but it roughly corresponds to the duration of the 
above-reported long-term household borrowing rates, since most 
agricultural loans are long-term loans. On top of the interbank-offered 
rates, these rates should involve country-specific risk premiums, 
comparable to those of bond yields and household borrowing rates. In 
addition, they account for the sector-specific characteristics of local 
agricultural capital markets in rural areas. These characteristics include risk 
premiums on agricultural funding, the implications of potential credit 
constraints, and in some countries also interest rate supports paid through 
their structural adjustment and investment programmes in agriculture. The 
standard is that EU accession has resulted in extensive structural 
adjustment programmes in agriculture in new member countries. 
The average interest rate paid on all EU agricultural loans over the 
20-year period from 1989–2008, as recorded in the FADN, was 5.6%. This 
rate has been as low as 4.0% in 2005 and 2006 and as high as 7.9% in 1991.  
The data further suggest that the interest rates paid for agricultural 
loans have followed quite closely the general financial patterns and other 
interest rates in Europe (Figure 22.1). There have, nevertheless, been a few 
deviations. First, agricultural loan rates were substantially below the 
government bond rates in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The discrepancy 
then gradually shrank until 1997, when agricultural loan rates and bond 
rates coincided. Thereafter, agricultural rates have been at the same level as 
bond rates. One reason may be that increasing liquidity and decreasing 
market rates have not only transmitted to the agricultural loan rates, but 
they have also reduced the efficient interest rate supports involved in 
agricultural loans. Second, agricultural interest rates seem to exhibit 
smoother patterns than the other interest rates for long-maturity bonds and 
loans. However, this seemingly significant difference may result from 
computational differences. In agricultural loans, the borrowing rate 
represents the stock of all outstanding loans, whereas the other indicators 
are based on new household loans and current interest rate quotations for 
government bonds. The rates for new loans and quotations in the 
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secondary market probably reflect the changing market environment more 
rapidly than the corresponding rates for old loans. If financial institutions 
change their margins, for example, the new margins will transmit faster to 
new loans than to the outstanding stock of all loans.  
Similarly to government bond and household borrowing rates, the 
rates for agricultural loans already turned to an upward-sloping trend in 
2007, even though the interbank rates continued to decrease. These data 
suggest that the first signals of the systemic government risks in overall 
European economies emerged in 2007. These risks also started to embed in 
the agricultural credit market and interest rates. Thus, even though the 
agricultural and food sector could at least potentially exhibit counter-
cyclical characteristics when compared to other economic sectors, the 
counter-cyclicality is not reflected in the agricultural credit market and 
interest rates.  
Figure 22.1 The interest rates for agricultural loans in the EU, the ECB 10-year 
bond yield, the lending rate for household purchases (2003–2008), and one-year 
Euribor (1994–2008). The latter three rates are based on July quotations for each 
year.* 
 
* We also computed geometric averages for each year from the monthly 
quotations. These averages give a similar picture of interest rate movements to the 
July quotations. 
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The data on agricultural loan rates and bond rates only overlap for 
the three years from 2006–08. These overlapping years nevertheless suggest 
that agricultural loan rates have varied substantially more across countries 
than bond rates. Thus, either the distribution of risks embedded in the 
agricultural capital market has been larger than in the market for 
government bonds or, alternatively, the local credit constraints or policy 
interventions have varied between countries, implying large country-
specific deviations in agricultural loan rates. It is notable that the new 
member states joining the EU in 1995 and 2004 have not had a large impact 
on the standard errors of agricultural loan rates across countries. It remains 
to be seen how the recent developments in the European financial market 
will finally transmit to the agricultural credit market. It is likely that the 
increasing variation in government bond rates between countries will also 
transmit to the agricultural credit market, which initially already had 
substantially larger variation across countries than, for instance, the 
household borrowing rates.  
For country comparisons, geometric means of agricultural loan rates 
for each member country were computed over the years 2004–08. For this 
period, the average rate paid for the total EU agricultural loan stock was 
estimated at 4.2%. Even though most of the country-specific rates were 
close to the average of 4.2%, the spread of the rates was large at the tails. 
The rate has been highest in Greece (11%) and lowest in the Czech Republic 
(2.0%). Thus, the highest rate is more than twice the average and the lowest 
remains at less than half of the average.  
Since general loan rates and bond rates vary between countries, the 
absolute country-specific differences do not, as such, reveal the agriculture-
specific deviations from the general credit markets in different countries. 
Therefore, we further computed an interest rate premium that had been 
paid in agricultural loans in each country in 2008. This agricultural 
premium, the agri premium, is defined as the difference between the 
agricultural loan rate and the rate paid for household loans (Figure 22.2).  
The agri premium ranges between -4.9% and +4.4% and is negative in 
seven countries. The lowest agri premiums are observed in Lithuania (-
4.9%), Latvia (-4.3%), Hungary (-3.8%) and Poland (-2.8%). In the Czech 
Republic, the agri premium is also negative (-2%) and since the country’s 
general loan rates are also low, the negative agri premium has reduced the 
agricultural interest rates to the lowest level among EU countries. These 
figures clearly evidence investment aid programmes based on loan rate 
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subsidies for agriculture. This aid is not necessarily transparent and 
reachable in either the income statement or the balance sheets.  
The agri premiums are highest in Greece (+4.4%), Denmark (+3.5%), 
Slovakia (+3.0%), Cyprus (+2.6%) and Sweden (+2.4%). However, even 
though the agri premiums are lower in Ireland and Portugal, for instance, 
than in Sweden, their agricultural loan rates are substantially higher than in 
Sweden, since the overall loan rates in these countries are high. Such high 
agri premiums must be related to excessive risks or a strong demand for 
loans in agriculture compared to other industrial sectors. In Denmark and 
Slovakia, the size of farms has increased very rapidly. Thus, banks might 
feel uncertainty when financing this growth. On the other hand, farms in 
Greece and Cyprus are operating almost solely based on their own capital. 
This might indicate that farms are credit-rationed by some institutional 
setting.  
Figure 22.2 The interest rates for agricultural loans across the EU in 2008 
 
Sources: ECB; long-term interest rates for assessing convergence among the EU Member 
States and FADN-EC-DG AGRI/L3 (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rica/). 
21.3.2011. 
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clearly paid the highest price for their loans, but the interest rates came 
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not yet show in these loan rates, except possibly in Denmark where the 
interest rates turned to an upward-sloping trend in 2006. In the Danish 
case, the increased sector-specific risks due to high leverage rates may also 
have been the key factor that turned the rates to an increasing trend. A 
similar but milder upturn is also observed on arable farms in some other 
countries, such as the Netherlands, Italy and Finland. The lowest and the 
most stable loan rates on arable farms are observed in Germany and 
France. The loan rates of dairy farms have followed similar patterns to 
those for arable crop farms, described above. The rates converge close to 
each other over time, the upturn observed in Denmark being the exception 
to this development. In the granivore sector, the loan rates again follow the 
same patterns as above with other production lines. Here, however, the 
rates in Italy peaked in the mid-1990s to an extent not observed in other 
production lines or in other countries. The main finding from the 
production-line-specific study is that there are no major differences 
between production lines within member states. Apart from a few 
exceptions the loan rates faced by EU farmers are thus mostly the result of 
country- and industry-specific risks and not production-line-specific risks. 
However, it is also shown in a Finnish case study that farm- and farmer-
specific conditions have an influence on price of money faced by farmer.  
3. Amount and structure of loan money on EU farms  
The geometric average of financial leverage (gearing60) for EU agriculture 
was 14.6% from 1989–2008. It rose by more than 2 percentage points during 
the 1980–90 recession. Thereafter, it decreased to a low of 13% and started 
to increase again in 1999. In 2008, the financial leverage soared from 14.1% 
to 17.9%. The jump of almost 4 percentage points within a year was the 
largest during our sampling period and twice the size of the jump in the 
1980–90 recession. The jump was due to significantly increased debts. On 
average, debts on EU farms increased from €39,118 in 2007 to €50,022 in 
2008. At the same time, equity decreased slightly from €235,574 to €229,046. 
These results may provide the first signals of how the recent financial crisis 
also hit the agricultural sector in the EU. The financial leverage varies 
considerably between countries (Figure 22.3). In 2008, it was lowest in 
Greece (0.6%) and highest in Denmark (49%).  
                                                     
60 Gearing is calculated as the debts divided by the sum of debts and equity.  
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Figure 22.3 Financial leverage (gearing) of agriculture in EU countries in 2008, % 
 
 
Most of the debts in EU agriculture are concentrated in a very small 
number of countries, and in some cases also in a small geographical area. 
Farmers operating in France, the Netherlands and Denmark carry 60.3% of 
all liabilities, but the collateral value61 of their farm enterprises covers only 
19.4% all agricultural capital owned by farmers in the EU. In Denmark, 
where the debts per farm are the highest, the average farmer pays annual 
interest payments of €82,233 on his/her average total debts of €1,174,426. 
At the other end of the scale are farmers operating in Spain, Ireland and 
Greece; they account for 34.5% of all capital owned by farmers in the EU 
but carry only 3.5% of all debts. The proportions of debts and capital are 
almost equal in the Baltic countries of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. In 
Luxemburg, Slovakia, Malta and Bulgaria, these shares are also in balance. 
Spain differs clearly from other EU countries. Spanish farmers account for 
20.2% of all agricultural capital, but only 2.1% of all agricultural debts 
(Figure 22.4).  
                                                     
61 Based on FADN valuation methods. 
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Figure 22.4 The distribution of outstanding loans and the total farmer capital in 
EU agriculture between the member states in 2008 
 
There are considerable differences in agricultural debt structures 
among the EU member states. These structures could be represented by the 
ratio of short- to long-term debts. In new member states such as Romania, 
Hungary, Slovakia and Lithuania, a major proportion of total debts consist 
of short-term loans and credits. These credits are needed for the day-to-day 
operating of farms. The share of short-term loans is also sizable in the UK 
because the total debt compared to the turnover of UK farms is small. 
Belgium represents those member states in which all loans are long- or 
medium-term loans and are thus probably used for funding agricultural 
investments. Long- or medium-term loans also predominate in Finland, 
Denmark and Slovenia.  
On the sampled arable crop farms, the equity ratio62 has been 79% on 
average. It has been lowest in Denmark (49%) and highest in Italy (99%). 
The equity ratio is also low on French arable crop farms, but the low equity 
ratios in Denmark and France have completely different underlying 
reasons in the accounting systems. In Denmark, the arable farms have total 
assets per ESU that are 8.5 times higher than the corresponding ESU-
                                                     
62 Equity ratio = (total assets – liabilities) / total assets. 
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
M
al
ta
C
yp
ru
s
Sl
ov
en
ia
G
re
ec
e
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Po
rtu
ga
l
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Es
to
ni
a
Li
th
ua
ni
a
La
tv
ia
Bu
l g
ar
ia
R
om
an
ia
C
ze
ch
 …
Ire
la
nd
Au
st
ria
H
un
ga
ry
Fi
nl
an
d
Sp
ai
n
Be
lg
iu
m
Sw
ed
en
Po
la
nd
U
ni
te
d …
G
er
m
an
y
D
en
m
ar
k
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Fr
an
ce
Outstanding 
loans
All farm capital
270 | SAMI MYYRÄ 
normalised assets of arable farms in France. The asset values have 
increased faster compared to debts in Denmark than in France. Based on 
this, the observed equity ratio trends are favourable to Denmark. Naturally, 
the turnover-to-assets ratio is in favour of France. Italian arable farms, 
having an average equity ratio close to 100%, in practice operate fully on 
their own capital, and their economic resilience does not directly depend 
on the performance of the financial market. Liabilities recorded for Italian 
farms are just a few thousand euros per farm (e.g. €4,485 in 2007). The high 
equity ratio may, however, signal that the access of farmers to credit and 
agricultural production assets may have been more constrained in Italy 
than in other countries. The equity ratios are also high on Irish arable crop 
farms, but these farms differ from their Italian counterparts since they have 
average liabilities of €40,000 per farm. The asset values in Ireland have been 
high and have increased faster than debts, and the equity ratio reached 
98.6% in 2007. In the UK, the trend in the equity ratio has been very similar 
to that in Ireland, but the level of the equity ratio has remained somewhat 
lower. The trend has been mixed on arable farms in Germany. First, the 
ratio increased in the early 1990s, reaching the highest level in 1995. From 
the late 1990s onwards, the debts have increased faster than asset values. In 
the more or less recently joined member states (Finland and Hungary), 
membership has not induced any significant trend in the equity ratio of 
arable farms.  
The equity ratio on the sampled dairy farms is estimated at 76%, 
which is slightly lower than on the arable crop farms. As with the arable 
crop farms, the ratio has been lowest in Denmark (39%) and highest in Italy 
(97%). Equity ratios do not exhibit clear trends, but they appear to display 
one-off jumps and drops in some countries. The most striking changes have 
been recorded in Hungary, where large investments by dairy farms have 
almost tripled the total liabilities within four years, but the asset values 
have not increased with the same pace. The liabilities on Hungarian dairy 
farms currently equal those in Germany, France, Ireland, Finland and the 
UK. If the current trend continues, the aggregate equity ratio of Hungarian 
dairy farms will soon reach levels equally low to those on Danish dairy 
farms. The largest liabilities on dairy farms are €2,159,726 in Denmark and 
€666,167 in the Netherlands. Only Denmark still clearly differs from the 
rest of the countries as measured by the equity ratio, since on Danish dairy 
farms the majority of the financing comes from financial institutions and 
not from the farmer. The equity ratio on Danish dairy farms has varied 
between 32.7% and 44.7%. Italian dairy farms operate almost solely based 
on their own capital, the equity ratio being as high as 98%.  
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Farms with granivores have lower financial buffers compared to 
arable and dairy farms – their average equity ratio is estimated at 61%, 
which is 15 percentage points lower than on dairy farms. In Denmark, 
France and the Netherlands, these farms mostly operate based on loaned 
capital and their equity ratios have decreased to less than 50%. A 
decreasing trend in the equity ratio is also present in Germany and the UK. 
As above, Italy is an exception, since Italian farms operate almost solely 
based on their own capital. 
4. Conclusions 
The emerging financial crisis was not yet reflected in increasing variance in 
agricultural borrowing rates across countries for two reasons. First, the 
country-specific variation in agricultural borrowing rates has also been 
large in the past. Second, in a large number of countries, agricultural loan 
rates did not yet increase much and the rates remained close to the EU 
average. Dramatic changes were only observed in the tails of the 
distribution, where the interest rate discrepancies were the largest. At the 
uppermost end of the tail the agricultural loan rate increased to about 11% 
(Greece), while at the lowest end of the distribution the corresponding rate 
remained at 2.3% (Czech Republic). 
The distribution of the financial leverage of agriculture across 
countries does not reflect the distribution of country-specific risk premiums 
in the manner that they are observed in government bond yields. 
Therefore, in those countries that have the weakest financial situation in the 
public sector and in which the local interest rates are embedded with high 
country-specific risk premiums, the agricultural sector is not directly 
exposed to a very large risk of increasing interest rates, since it is not so 
highly leveraged. An example of these countries is Spain, where the 
financial leverage (gearing) is only 2.2%, while the average gearing among 
all EU countries is 18% and the highest country averages reach 50%. The 
different distributions of government and agriculture leverages will thus 
provide some hedge for the European agricultural sectors against the 
financial problems in the public sector. Nevertheless, the dynamic financial 
spillover effects and economic implications through revised budget policies 
will also expose agricultural sectors to large risks in these countries.  
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23. CAPITAL OWNERSHIP AND 
INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR: 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CZECH 
CORPORATE FARMS 
JARMILA CURTISS, TOMÁŠ RATINGER 
AND TOMÁŠ MEDONOS* 
ooperatives and corporate farms have retained an important role in 
agricultural production in several central and eastern European countries. 
Despite their importance, these farms' ownership structures and 
particularly the ownership's effect on their investment activity, which is vital for 
efficient restructuring and the sector's future development, are still not well 
understood. This chapter explores the ownership-investment relationship using 
data on Czech farms from 1997 to 2008. The authors allow for ownership-specific 
variability in farm investment behaviour, which is analysed using an error-
correction accelerator model. Empirical results suggest significant differences in 
the level of investment activity, responsiveness to market signals, and investment 
sensitivity to financial variables among farms with different ownership 
characteristics. These differences imply farm-internal financial constraints related 
to high agency costs of dispersed and external ownership. The results suggest that 
competitive pressures will force Czech cooperatives and corporate farms to improve 
corporate governance mechanisms and adjust ownership structures towards 
internal ownership and higher ownership concentration.  
                                                     
* This chapter is an excerpt from Curtiss, Ratinger & Medonos, “Ownership and 
Investment Behaviour in Transition Countries: A Case Study of Collective and 
Corporate Farms in the Czech Republic”, Factor Markets Working Paper No. 17, 
February 2012. See this publication for more detailed deliberation of theoretical 
predictions, and description of the methodology, estimation results and their 
interpretation. 
C
CAPITAL OWNERSHIP AND INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR: CZECH CORPORATE FARMS | 273 
1. Introduction 
Cooperative and corporate farms have retained an important role for 
agricultural production in several of the new EU member states, including 
the Czech Republic. Transformation policies have provided a wide scope 
for ownership and organisational adjustments that have resulted in a 
unique diversity of corporate farms ownership structures and governance 
constellations. Despite the importance of corporate farms in agricultural 
production, their ownership structure and particularly its effect on the 
farms’ investment activities, which is vital for efficient restructuring and 
the sector's future development, have received insufficient attention from 
the academic community. 
Compared to corporate firms in mature economies, corporate farm 
governance in post-communist countries was formed under conditions of 
weak legal protection of renewed property rights and minority 
shareholders’ interests (Mueller & Peev, 2007), as well as strong bargaining 
positions of former collective farms’ management (Schlüter, 2001). These 
conditions hindered many claimants of historic ownership (restituents) in 
withdrawing their property shares from agriculture (Schlüter, 2001). As a 
direct consequence, the property rights reforms initially led to highly 
dispersed ownership of cooperatives and corporate farms with a great 
representation of insider (employee and managerial) as well as external 
ownership. Successive ownership development has been further cramped 
by only slowly emerging internal corporate environments and 
underdeveloped markets for agricultural ownership shares. This 
environment indicates a high probability of inefficient property rights 
allocation and high agency costs, which could be partially lowered by 
efficient firm governance instruments such as management bonding and 
monitoring mechanisms. The ‘new’ owners, however, generally possess no 
knowledge of corporate bonding and control mechanisms, or their 
knowledge is limited to only the brief experience accumulated post-
privatisation. Each of these aspects amplifies the agency problems of 
corporate governance in transition agriculture. The separation of 
ownership and control over the corporate farms and underdeveloped 
corporate mechanisms suggest that the most distinguishing characteristic 
of corporate governance in transition agriculture is the large scope for 
managerial discretion. The area in which the scope for managerial 
discretion comes into greatest effect is in firm performance and investment 
decisions, including generated internal fund use and distribution. The latter 
represents an issue often referred to as agency costs of free cash flow, 
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which affect firm-productive investment and restructuring. This 
relationship between the structure of large farm ownership and investment 
decisions lies at the heart of this study.  
This chapter aims to assess the differential investment effect and 
long-run viability of various ownership characteristics using data from 
Czech cooperative63 and corporate farms. For this purpose, we apply 
unique survey data on ownership structure collected in 2004 and data from 
the Farm Accountancy Data Network from 1997–2008. 
2. Theoretical background 
Conceptualising the ownership-investment relationship necessitates 
surpassing the boundaries of the neoclassical theory of firm investment 
behaviour (Modigliani & Miller, 1958; Jorgenson, 1963) and acknowledging 
the existence of financial constraints. Financial constraints are discussed in 
the literature as having two main origins: (i) asymmetric information 
between the firm and the providers of external finance (e.g. Stiglitz & 
Weiss, 1981; Myers & Majluf, 1984); and (ii) agency costs borne by the firm, 
which arise from the divergent goals of managers and owners of the firm 
(e.g. Grabowski & Mueller, 1972; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). It is widely 
accepted among financial economists that financial constraints which 
originate in either of the two theoretical issues – information asymmetries 
and incentive conflicts between (i) the firm and financiers or (ii) the owners 
and managers – result in investment sensitivity to changes in firm internal 
funds. The latter issue is of main interest to our study. 
Why is separation of ownership and control of a firm thought to lead 
to non-optimal investment decisions and why should this be reflected in 
higher investment sensitivity to internally generated funds (cash flow)? 
Agency theory and corporate governance literature posit that information 
asymmetries between owners and managers give managers a scope for 
discretion that can be utilised for pursuing goals and interests that deviate 
from the goals and interests of the owners (Williamson, 1963; Grabowski & 
                                                     
63 In this study, cooperatives are treated as farms with corporate governance, since 
neither the obligation of connecting cooperative membership to work in the 
cooperative, nor the one member-one vote voting rule are included in the actual 
commercial law of the Czech Republic (Law nr. 513/1991 of the Code of Law, 
Commercial Code). Most Czech agricultural cooperatives do not choose the rules 
traditionally defining producer cooperatives in academic literature (Curtissová et 
al., 2006). 
CAPITAL OWNERSHIP AND INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR: CZECH CORPORATE FARMS | 275 
Mueller, 1972; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Managerial discretion can thus 
lead to non-optimal decisions from the owners’ perspective and to agency 
costs borne by corporate owners. One reason that managers behave less 
optimally than owners is that their personal wealth is not at stake (Jensen, 
1986; Ang et al., 2000). Also, seeking higher appraisal, managers tend to 
present their work, and thus the firm's performance and its market 
standing, positively, and follow a strategy of growth independent of the 
real returns on capital and investment (Grabowski & Mueller, 1972). In 
contrast to information asymmetries in the capital market that result in 
under-investment, the internal information asymmetries in firms provide 
incentives to over-investment (Mueller & Peev, 2007). Moreover, managers 
are assumed to prefer financing the less optimal projects from internally 
generated funds (bargaining with owners over free cash flow) to avoid 
external scrutiny (for example, by banks) of less optimal investment 
projects, and to show a tendency to waste some of these funds on 
perquisites (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Therefore, analogically to 
information asymmetries in the capital market, agency costs should result 
in investment sensitivity to generated internal funds. 
The effects of managerial discretion on the use of funds and resource 
allocation can be assumed to be partially modified by the conditions that 
are characteristic to post-communist economies. The effect of credit 
constraints can be expected to be amplified by lower liquidity of capital 
markets, and agency costs to be higher due to the weak protection of 
property rights and the legal framework for corporate governance. 
Predictions of the managerial discretion effect can also be altered by the 
cramped internal fund generation in agriculture during transition (e.g. 
Doucha et al., 2002). The lower liquidity of capital markets and insufficient 
free cash flow can be perceived to limit the tendencies of managers to over-
invest, even when a large scope of discretion is available, such as in the case 
of weak governance. Furthermore, the lower liquidity and high transaction 
costs of an unsuccessful credit application could increase managers’ 
positions over owners in bargaining over free cash flow. The investment 
effect of agency costs of joint ownership and delegated control can be 
assumed to be higher in transition, as managers are expected to address 
low-productivity problems through investments (modernisation) rather 
than internal restructuring to avoid conflicts with employed owners.  
Despite any well-founded rationale for the expectation of a significant 
effect of agency costs on the investment behaviour of large farms in 
transition, their empirical investigation is challenged by many other factors 
that are possibly captured in the investment sensitivity to cash flow or 
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other financial variables. The investment sensitivity to financial variables 
(cash flow) can simultaneously depict the effect of financial constraints 
from information asymmetries between the firm and suppliers of external 
finance, as well as constraints of less liquid capital markets. Furthermore, 
Kaplan & Zingales (1997) argued that the investment sensitivity to financial 
variables can also be justified purely by the fact that external funds are 
more costly than internal funds for all firms, as long as some transaction 
costs are involved. Similar to Poterba (1988), they also argued that since 
current investment depends on both current and expected future changes 
in the desired capital stock, information on cash flow can help to forecast 
future profitability and investment opportunities. This, again, would result 
in higher investment sensitivity to cash flow. Because of the various 
sources of investment sensitivity to financial variables, the interpretation of 
empirical findings remains ambiguous. Only sufficiently detailed empirical 
data underpinning the firm ownership variability investigated within a 
relevant investment model and a comprehensive theoretical discussion can 
help to shed more light on the determinants of corporate farm investment 
behaviour and to capture the ownership (agency) effects.  
3. Methodology and data 
Following the Mairesse et al. (1999) deliberation on the development of 
investment models and the Bokusheva et al. (2009) discussion on 
investment models’ suitability for the case of modelling investment 
behaviour in transition agriculture, we chose to apply the error-correction 
accelerator model. The advantage of the error-correction specification of the 
accelerator model is that it allows for a separation of the long-run 
investment determinants from the short-run investment adjustments. The 
error-correction specification of the investment accelerator model nests the 
demand for capital equation (Jorgenson, 1963) with the dynamic 
(accelerator) investment equation with autoregressive-distributed lags. 
Similarly to numerous investment studies, we add to the basic error-
correction investment model the current and lagged cash flow scaled by the 
previous period’s value of fixed capital to test the investment sensitivity to 
internally generated funds. To analyse the ownership effect on farm 
investment behaviour, we further allow the effect of investment 
determinants (short-run as well as long-run adjustments) to vary across 
three ownership variables – ownership concentration, external ownership, 
and number of owners. 
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To address the econometric issues resulting from the model 
specification, we apply the fully efficient generalised method of moments 
(GMM). For the estimation of empirical models with autocorrelation and 
other possible endogeneities in explanatory variables, Arellano & Bover 
(1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998) suggest using the system GMM, which 
allows a combination of two equations and two samples of instrumental 
variables on transformed and untransformed data. Because of the relatively 
large number of instruments compared to the number of observations, we 
estimate a one-step system GMM.  
Data used in this study originate from the official balance sheets, 
income statements and supplementary forms of the Farm Accountancy 
Data Network of the Czech Republic (FADN CZ) survey for the years 1997-
2008. Data on farm ownership structure comes from a structured data 
collection in the Czech Republic in 2004. This data survey was organised 
and funded by the Institute for Agricultural Development in Central and 
Eastern Europe (IAMO) in Halle, Germany, together with the Institute of 
Agricultural Economics and Information (UZEI) in Prague. The sample 
contains 117 agricultural companies with a combined crop and animal 
production of a legal entity status (cooperatives, joint stock companies 
(JSC) and limited liability companies (LLC)) for a minimum of seven years 
of consecutive annual data between 1997–2008. From these, data on 41 
farms are available for the entire 11-year period. The complete model 
estimations are carried out on a sample of 529 observations.  
4. Results 
Farm ownership group comparison and results from estimation of the 
error-correction accelerator model suggest that ownership structure has a 
significant effect on farms’ economic performance as well as investment 
behaviour.  
Joint farm ownership by a large number of shareholders, which 
contributed to preserving large-scale production, is not found to be 
motivated by economies of scale, but rather reflects managers’ 
transformation strategies. Besides preserving production size,64 this 
strategy also secured continuity of employment for former management 
and many employees, and prevented an immediate loss of value of 
                                                     
64 See significantly higher sale volume, St, in the group of farms with higher 
number of owners in Table 23.1.  
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restitution claims (shares) (see Curtissová et al., 2004). The significantly 
lower investment activity, It/Kt-1, observed for the farms with a larger 
number of owners could be a rational response to lower returns to capital 
and an indication of a need for restructuring. Without effective 
restructuring, farms with such ownership dispersion cannot be expected to 
successfully compete in the sector in the long run.  
Table 23.1 Mean statistics and two-group mean comparison t-test for farm 
ownership groups  
 Owners’ number Ownership 
concentration1) 
External ownership2) 
 < 
median 
≥ 
median 
p-
value* 
< 
median 
≥ 
median 
p-
value* 
< 
median 
≥ 
median 
p-
value* 
It/Kt-1 0.137 0.119 0.059 0.121 0.135 0.143 0.128 0.128 0.947 
St/Kt 1.021 0.896 0.000 0.991 0.935 0.035 0.980 0.906 0.012 
It/St-1 0.126 0.130 0.754 0.112 0.142 0.024 0.131 0.127 0.825 
CFt/Kt-1 0.180 0.133 0.000 0.143 0.171 0.001 0.168 0.136 0.001 
∆St/Kt-1 0.004 0.006 0.829 -0.004 0.012 0.091 0.003 0.009 0.595 
Kt 3)  36.431 80.237 0.000 49.775 63.592 0.000 56.490 62.674 0.023 
St 3) 30.828 69.628 0.000 43.678 53.434 0.000 48.493 52.912 0.077 
Nr. of owners 85 555 - 402 234 0.000 188 501 0.000 
Ext. own. 2) 0.652 0.839 0.000 0.794 0.705 0.000 0.605 0.894 - 
Transf. 
debt4)  
0.439 0.142 0.000 0.385 0.203 0.000 0.378 0.179 0.000 
Cap. con. I1) 0.753 0.149 0.000 -0.017 0.900 - 0.606 0.113 0.000 
Cap. con. II5) 0.111 0.126 0.001 0.076 0.166 0.000 0.134 0.116 0.000 
Note: I = investment, K = capital, S = sales, CF = cash flow, t = time period; * p-value for a 
two-group mean comparison t-test; 1) per owner share in equity (in millions of CZK); 2) 
share of the number of external owners in total number of owners; 3) in millions of 
CZK; 4) indebtedness rate from ownership transformation (debts toward eligible 
persons from transformation in value of total assets); 5) per owner share in legal capital 
(in millions of CZK).  
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Table 23.2 Parameters of the error-correction accelerator model  
 Parameters with respect to: 
Dependent 
variable 
It/Kt-1 
 
x 
x x * Owners’ 
number  
x * Ownership 
concentration1) 
x * External 
ownership2) 
 (1 = owners’ 
number ≥ median, 
0 = otherwise) 
(1 = ownership 
concentration ≥ median, 
0 = otherwise) 
(1 = external 
ownership ≥ median, 
0 = otherwise) 
It-1/Kt-2 -*** +** 0 0 
It-2/Kt-3 0 +* -* 0 
∆St +* -* 0 0 
∆St-1 0 0 -** 0 
∆St-2 +** 0 -** -** 
St-3 0 -** 0 0 
kt-3-st-3 -*** 0 +** 0 
CFt/Kt-1 +** 0 -** +* 
CFt-1/Kt-2 0 0 +*** 0 
Note: I = investment, K = capital, S = sales, CF = cash flow, t = time period, k = logarithm of 
K, s = logarithm of S; *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance 
level, respectively; “0”, “+” and “-“ represent no, positive and negative significant 
effect of a given variable on farm investment activity. 
Table 23.1 further illustrates that farms with a higher share of external 
owners are less productive and less profitable than farms owned to a 
greater degree by insiders. The estimates of the error-correction investment 
model presented in Table 23.2 show significantly higher investment 
sensitivity to the ratio of cash flow to capital for the group of farms with 
higher share external ownership. This suggests external ownership-specific 
financial constraints. Since lower productivity of farms with more owners 
was found not to result in greater financial constraints, the higher 
investment sensitivity to internal funds in the case of farms with a higher 
share of external ownership can be interpreted in relation to the ownership 
characteristic rather than to productivity differences and external financial 
constraints. The higher sensitivity to generated cash flow thus suggests a 
greater scope for financial decisions given to farm management in farms 
with a higher share of external ownership. In other words, external owners 
are more constrained in their control over management than employed 
owners, which leads to managers having greater discretion over the use of 
generated profit. The empirical results are thus in line with the theoretical 
expectation that a higher share of external ownership provides more scope 
for managerial discretion, which can lead to less optimal investment 
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decisions, overall lower economic performance, and thus higher agency 
costs borne by the owners. Employee ownership, which is found to 
contribute to the performance of the farms, is, however, not warranted in 
the future, as employee ownership was mainly a result of the 
transformation law. The share of employed owners can be expected to 
rather decrease with the retirement of currently employed owners, since 
retirees are mostly interested in the financial settlement of their ownership 
shares.  
Results for ownership concentration (equity per owner) imply a 
significant effect of ownership concentration on farms’ economic 
performance as well as on investment decisions. Concretely, farms with 
more shares in farm equity per owner display far higher profitability 
among considered groups of farms (see Table 23.1). Results in Table 23.2 
indicate that investment activity of farms with more concentrated 
ownership is significantly more cyclical, which could be explained by 
larger lump investments. Moreover, the investment activity of farms with 
more concentrated ownership is significantly less dependent on current 
internal funds, which suggests that these farms rely to a higher degree on 
credit financing. Past profitability is, on the other hand, found to stimulate 
current investment activity in this group of farms. These observations 
support the theoretical expectation that higher ownership concentration 
provides incentives for more effective corporate governance, better 
performance and more optimal investment decisions.  
5. Conclusions 
The study of the ownership-investment relationship in corporate farms 
delivered valuable insights into internal governance challenges of the 
corporate farm type and indicated possible future developments of Czech 
farm ownership structures. Empirical results suggest significant systematic 
differences in the level of investment activity, responsiveness to market 
signals, investment lumpiness, and investment sensitivity to financial 
variables among farms with different ownership characteristics. Farms with 
highly dispersed ownership (a large number of owners and simultaneously 
smaller equity shares) display significantly lower investment activity. 
Farms with a higher share of external ownership and lower values of 
shares per owner are found to have a higher investment sensitivity to 
internal funds, which points to the existence of internal financial 
constraints related to less efficient governance structures and managerial 
discretion. Farms with a large number of owners, a high share of external 
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ownership or predominantly small ownership shares will require marked 
restructuring to improve lagging economic performance and investment 
decisions. This might require gradual buy-outs of small shares that would 
lead to higher ownership concentration. External owners will be required 
to implement tools of more efficient corporate governance, which is also 
more likely to be realised with incentives of higher shares at stake. All these 
results point to high agency costs of the current ownership structure and 
future development towards higher ownership concentration (i.e. a 
decreasing number of owners and increasing equity size) in today's 
cooperative and corporate farms. Developing institutions that would 
support an organised agricultural equity share market could contribute to 
the speed and effectiveness of the farm ownership restructuring process, 
and increasing legal protection of small shareholders could bolster its 
fairness. 
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24. THE IMPACT OF THE 2013 CAP 
REFORM ON FARM INVESTMENTS 
GIOVANNI GUASTELLA, DANIELE MORO, 
PAOLO SCKOKAI AND MARIO VENEZIANI* 
his chapter aims to analyse the investment behaviour in the quasi-fixed 
inputs farm buildings and machinery and equipment for a sample of farms 
specialised in the production of arable crops from selected EU states. It 
models investment demand as a function of, inter alia, the type and amount of 
Pillar I direct payments received under the Common Agricultural Policy of the 
European Union. The preferred modelling technique accounts for the possibility of 
zero net investment being a separate equilibrium achieved while dynamically 
maximising farmer’s utility. Results suggest that that the range of zero investment 
is clearly and consistently identified for Germany for both investment types and 
Common Agricultural Policy support schemes and for Hungary for both 
investment types under the sole relevant type of direct payments received. Three 
regimes also appear to characterise machinery and equipment investment in 
France, irrespective of the type of support received. Moreover, the estimation of the 
investment models provides the necessary data to simulate the farms’ future and 
expected investment behaviour arising because of the implementation of the direct 
payments reform proposals recently discussed and aiming at a more fair 
                                                     
* The authors would like to acknowledge constructive comments received by the 
partners involved in the Factor Markets project. Moreover, the authors are grateful 
to Bruce E. Hansen and Thanasis Stengos for useful advices. The remaining errors 
and omissions are the authors’ sole responsibility. 
This chapter is based on Guastella, Moro, Sckokai & Veneziani, “Simulation 
Results on the Impact of Changes in the Main EU Policy Tools on Farm Investment 
Behaviour”, Factor Markets Working Paper No. 56, June 2013 and Guastella, Moro, 
Sckokai & Veneziani, “Investment behaviour of EU arable crop farmers in selected 
EU countries and the impact of policy reforms”, Factor Markets Working Paper 
No. 42, May 2013. 
T 
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distribution of Pillar I direct payments across member states. Only a few pieces of 
evidence contrast the anticipated worsening of investment prospects following a 
cut in the Common Agricultural Policy support levels. In fact, the investment 
prospects in machinery and equipment in France and Italy appear to improve 
following the widespread reduction in support levels induced by the policy 
scenarios considered. Likewise, an improvement in investment levels occurs in the 
UK which, under one of the possible implementations of the reform of the Pillar I 
direct payments of the Common Agricultural Policy, is expected to receive a more 
substantial amount of funds. 
 
1. Introduction 
Farmers’ decisions to invest in physical capital (i.e. farm buildings (FB) or 
machinery and equipment (ME)) might be the result of economic 
considerations regarding the likely difference between the purchase and 
resale price of an asset (Johnson, 1956) as well as the uncertain nature of 
farm output price and government support (i.e. CAP provisions in the EU) 
(Serra et al., 2009; Boetel et al., 2007). The latter might influence the 
fluctuations in relative prices through coupled support and/or increase the 
contribution of non-output related income to total farm income through 
decoupled subsidies. Both types of subsidies might relax existing budget or 
credit constraints (Sckokai, 2005) and/or diminish price/revenue 
uncertainty resulting in higher physical investment. Nonetheless, the 
decision to avoid investing may still be optimal if irregularities in the 
adjustment cost function arise. 
In Guastella et al. (2013a), drawing on Serra et al. (2009), we estimate 
a reduced form investment demand function for FB and ME allowing for 
threshold-type behaviours compatible with several types of capital market 
imperfections – i.e. differences between assets’ purchase and resale prices 
(Johnson, 1956); asymmetries in fixed capital adjustment costs (Abel & 
Eberly, 1994); real options (Huttel et al., 2010) – in an attempt to explain the 
frequent occurrence in farm-level data of zero and negative gross 
investment levels. We do so by carefully implementing the threshold 
regression model developed by Hansen (1996, 1999, 2000) to endogenously 
and consistently determine and test whether the investment model is 
characterised by multiple regimes, specifically a positive investment 
regime, a zero-investment regime or a negative investment regime. In turn, 
this would highlight the optimal nature of the recorded investment values 
rather than an occurrence strictly dependent on the presence of 
imperfections in a number of connected markets. Since conditions and 
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constraints are likely to vary significantly across the EU, also due to the 
different implementation of decoupled subsidies between old and new 
member states, a comparative analysis of the dependence of agricultural 
investment on CAP payments in France, Germany, Hungary, Italy and the 
UK might unveil interesting peculiarities calling for a country-level tuning 
of more general policy provisions. This exercise constitutes an innovative 
contribution to an existing literature which, adopting these theoretical and 
empirical tools, has previously focused mainly on only one geographic 
region at a time (Boetel et al., 2007; Serra et al., 2009). Moreover, relying on 
the long time span covered by the Farm Accountancy Data Network 
(FADN) dataset, the different effects of coupled and decoupled subsidies 
on agricultural investment are highlighted. 
In Guastella et al. (2013b), building on the estimates carried out in 
Guastella et al. (2013a) and employing some of the methodology in Hansen 
(1999), we calculate the expected percentage changes in agricultural 
investments due to the reductions in CAP Direct Payments (DPs) currently 
discussed in the negotiations defining the features of the CAP in the 2014-
2020 budget period (European Commission, 2011). The “CAP towards 
2020” policy reform proposal is built upon three main scenarios for DP 
disbursement levels: the adjustment, the integration and the refocus scenarios. 
In turn, the adjustment scenario comprises three different implementations: 
the EU flat rate, the min 80% and the min 90% and objective criteria. The EU 
flat rate envisages an EU-wide flat rate per hectare payment on the whole 
potential eligible area. In the min 80% scenario, each member state would 
obtain a flat rate payment equal to at least 80% of the current EU average. 
In the min 90% and objective criteria implementation, the minimum payment 
would reach 90% of the EU average, but farmers would face additional 
environmental and economic criteria to be eligible for the payments. In the 
integration scenario, each member state receiving less than 90% of the EU-27 
average DPs would experience a one-third reduction in their gap over the 
2014–2020 period. Lastly, the refocus scenario would imply a radical shift in 
the CAP support policies, since the funds allocated to Pillar-II measures 
would be doubled. In this chapter, attention is focused on the effects of a 
change in Pillar I DPs only, thus excluding this last scenario. The level of 
DPs associated to each policy scenario is evaluated in European 
Commission (2011) with respect to a 2020 status quo scenario implying a 
full phasing-in (i.e. 100%) of DPs in the EU-12 paid to both small and large 
farms. Moreover, the percentage changes in DPs are determined as if a 
regional model at the member state level were applied and considering a 
limited provision of coupled payments (mainly for livestock production 
286 | GUASTELLA, MORO, SCKOKAI & VENEZIANI 
and cotton). Table 24.1 presents the relevant percentage change in DPs 
under the different policy scenarios. 
Table 24.1 Percentage change in DPs under different CAP policy reform scenarios 
 EU flat rate (1) 
Min 80% 
(2) 
Min 90% and objective criteria 
(3) 
Integration 
(4) 
FR -17 -12 -13 -2 
DE -23 -13 -16 -4 
HU -10 -7 -8 0 
IT -37 -10 -22 -6 
UK 6 -10 -5 -2 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on European Commission (2011). 
Having laid out the scope of this chapter and referring the reader 
interested in exploring the data and methodology further to Guastella et al. 
(2013a, 2013b), in what follows the estimates from the econometric models 
are summarised alongside the presentation of the changes in investment 
levels due to the above CAP reform scenarios. The last section presents a 
final summary of the main results. 
2. Results 
2.1 Models’ estimates 
Table 24.2 presents the main econometric evidence for the countries of 
interest from Guastella et al. (2013a). 
Table 24.2 Synoptic table of the models’ results 
 
 
 
Regimes k-1 expoutpi Subsidies varoutpi 
FR 
Coup. 
FB D-I - (***) + (¥/**) - - (***) 
ME D-Z-I - (***) + (***) + + 
Decoup. 
FB D-I - (***) - (***) + (*) + 
ME D-Z-I - (***) - (¥/*/¥) - - 
DE 
Coup. 
FB D-Z-I - (***) + (***) + (***) - 
ME D-Z-I - (***) - + (***) - (**) 
Decoup. 
FB D-Z-I - (**/***/¥) + (*/¥/¥) + (***) - (***) 
ME D-Z-I - (***) + (¥/*/¥) + (**) + (*) 
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HU 
Coup. FB D-Z-I - (***) - + § 
Decoup.     + (***)  
Coup. ME D-Z-I - (¥/***/***) - (***/**/***) + § 
Decoup.     + 
 
IT 
Coup. 
FB D-I - (***) - - (***) - 
ME D-I - (¥/***) - + - 
Decoup. 
FB D-Z-I - (¥/**/**) - (¥/***/***) + - 
ME § - (***) - (*) - - (**) 
UK 
Coup. 
FB D-I - (***) - + (**) - 
ME § - (***) + + + 
Decoup. 
FB D-I - (***) + + - 
ME § - (***) + + (*) + 
Notes: *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level 
based on two tailed tests; ¥ denotes Not Significant in estimation; § denotes Not 
Applicable in estimation; k-1 is the lagged quantity of capital stock, expoutpi and 
varoutpi are the expected value and variance of the output price index, respectively, 
calculated according to Chavas & Holt (1990); bold typeface denotes the regime which 
concentrates the largest number of farms for the majority of the years considered, bold 
and italicised typeface identifies the two regimes which concentrate the largest 
number of farms for two years each, italicised typeface identifies the regime which 
concentrates the largest number of farms in one sole year; regime dependent 
coefficients (k-1 and expoutpi) are presented with the sign which occurs more often 
while significance (their superscript) is presented multiple times if it differs across the 
Disinvestment (D), Zero-investment (Z) and Investment (I) regimes. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on models’ estimates from Guastella et al. (2013a). 
The “Regimes” column suggests that investment demand is clearly 
characterised by three regimes only in Germany and Hungary, irrespective 
of the actual type of investment and agricultural support under which it 
occurs. In France, only ME investment appears to feature zero investment 
as a separate and optimal equilibrium, under both types of agricultural 
support. Moreover, it appears that the zero-investment regime is also 
concentrating the largest number of farms for several years, suggesting an 
economic – above and beyond statistical – significance of this equilibrium.65 
                                                     
65 See the notes to Table 24.2 for the estimation variables’ definitions. 
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The coefficient for k-1 is expected to range in the [-1; 1] interval 
determining the rate of adjustment of current capital stock to its long-run 
equilibrium. In turn, negative values would suggest that farms disinvest to 
reach a lower long-run stock of capital (Sckokai & Moro, 2009) while 
positive ones should suggest that farms are under-capitalised and are 
required to invest in capital assets to reach their long-run equilibrium. The 
relevant column in Table 24.2 provides the (somewhat surprising and 
statistically precise) testimony that the farms analysed in this study are 
over-capitalised both in FB and ME, as well as over the implementation of 
both types of subsidies and across all the possible regimes. This finding 
appears to be confirmed by other recent studies employing different 
methodologies also (Petrick & Kloss, 2012; Sckokai & Moro, 2009). 
The model allows for short-run adjustments in the stock of capital 
following fluctuations in expoutpi. Contrary to the consistent sign and 
significance occurring for ݇ିଵ, the dependence of investment on expoutpi is 
largely statistically insignificant, negative – over the period 2005–08 after 
the introduction of decoupled support – in France and Hungary while it 
also achieves statistical significance in Italy under the same type of support. 
Germany and the UK feature a largely positive short-run relationship 
between investment and expoutpi, although significant only in the former. 
While k-1 and expoutpi express a behavioural and a market-based 
reaction of farm investment, respectively, the remaining columns in Table 2 
highlight the relationship between investment and variables which might 
be affected by public policy. Among them, subsidies, differentiated between 
their coupled and decoupled implementation, constitute one of the most 
relevant sources of financial resources for the investing farm, while the 
dependence of investment on varoutpi is of interest since it traces the impact 
of risk on farmers’ decisions to invest in the assets concerned. The effect of 
CAP subsidies on investment in both asset types is almost exclusively 
positive and statistically significant in about half of the cases. Nonetheless, 
decoupled subsidies appear to have a more significant impact on capital 
investment since their estimated coefficients achieve statistical significance 
– at conventional levels – in half of the models, with a 25% increase 
compared to the coupled case. Agricultural support of both types has a 
consistently positive and statistically significant effect on investment only 
in Germany. The transition to a decoupled system of agricultural support 
does not seem to have induced any dramatic change in farmers’ attitudes 
towards capital investment, suggesting that the two different 
implementations of CAP subsidies are perceived as being de facto very 
similar. Exceptions may include the effect of support becoming positive 
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and significant for FB investment in France and Hungary, and for ME 
investment in the UK. On the contrary, significance is lost for FB in the UK. 
While remaining insignificant, the effect of CAP support turns from 
positive to negative for ME in France and Italy. 
The last column in Table 24.2 presents the estimates of the effect of 
output price variability on the level of investment in FB and ME. Roughly 
70% (11 out of 16) of the estimated models are characterised by a negative 
coefficient for the effect of risk on both types of investment and across the 
two types of support scheme. Nonetheless, only in roughly a third of these 
cases (4 out of 11) is the effect statistically significant at conventional levels. 
ME investment under decoupled payments in Germany is the only type of 
investment to be positively and statistically significantly (although at 10%) 
affected by a rise in the varoutpi. France and the UK appear to be evenly 
characterised by positive and negative relationships between risk and 
investment. In turn, in the UK the signs of this relationship vary by 
investment type with FB displaying a negative and ME a positive sign, 
respectively. 
2.2 Expected investment changes 
Table 24.3 presents the percentage changes in average yearly and regime-
specific levels of investment (∆ଓ݊ݒఫതതതതത(#)) in FB and ME, applying the 
methodology described in Guastella et al. (2013b) to the expected 
percentage changes in DPs recorded in the corresponding (#) column in 
Table 24.1. 
To facilitate the interpretation of the results in Table 24.3, expected 
changes are presented alongside the ancillary columns for the sign of the 
coefficient tracing the effect of decoupled payments on investment (ߚௗ) as 
well as the values for the associated 2008 j-regime specific elasticity (ߦଶ଴଴଼,௝௦௨௕ ) 
and the average value of investment (ଓ݊ݒఫതതതതത). Except for the UK under the EU 
flat rate and Hungary under the integration scenarios of DPs reform, all the 
remaining expected policy changes are characterised by a percentage 
decline in the level of DPs. In turn, the resulting sign for the ∆ଓ݊ݒఫതതതതത (#) is 
opposite to that of the calculated elasticity ߦଶ଴଴଼,௝௦௨௕ . To define the qualitative 
effect of the impact of ∆ଓ݊ݒఫതതതതത (#) on the regime-specific average investment 
level ଓ݊ݒఫതതതതത, the column “Dir. effect” reports whether ଓ݊ݒఫതതതതത should decline or 
rise because of the related policy change. A negative sign for the “Dir. 
effect” in each regime, suggesting a worsening of the investment prospects 
of the farms, is the result of a positive calculated percentage change in 
average net investment when the latter is negative (namely, negative 
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investment becoming even more negative) or of a negative percentage 
change in the presence of positive average investment levels. A positive 
sign for the “Dir. effect” in each regime, suggesting an improvement in the 
investment prospects of a farm in a given regime, is the result of a negative 
percentage change in average net investment when the latter is negative 
(namely, negative investment becoming less negative) or of a positive 
percentage change in the presence of positive average investment levels. 
Note that no sign is associated with the zero percentage change in net 
investment levels expected in Hungary if the integration scenario were 
implemented. The switch in the “Dir. effect” for investment in both asset 
classes in the UK, from positive to negative, is due to the UK expecting an 
increase in DPs under the EU flat rate policy reform scenario. Every other 
country appears to be subject to a consistent “Dir. effect” across the reform 
scenarios. The generalised reduction in support levels induced by the 
scenarios in Table 24.1 leads to the expected worsening, across countries 
and asset classes, of the prospects for the average net investment levels. 
This expectation is met in all cases under all policy scenarios, except for ME 
in France and Italy. 
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Table 24.3 Expected changes in average net investment levels due to proposed CAP policy reform scenarios 
   Sign of ࢼࢊ ࣈ૛૙૙ૡ,࢐ࢊ  ଙ࢔࢜ଚതതതതതത ∆ଙ࢔࢜ଚതതതതതത (1) Dir. effect ∆ଙ࢔࢜ଚതതതതതത (2) Dir. effect ∆ଙ࢔࢜ଚതതതതതത (3) Dir. effect ∆ଙ࢔࢜ଚതതതതതത (4) Dir. effect 
FR 
FB 
D + -32.3828* -3.9044 550.51 - 388.59 - 420.98 - 64.77 - 
I + -0.7822* -129.1957 13.30 - 9.39 - 10.17 - 1.56 - 
ME 
D - 0.4684 -229.9723 -7.96 + -5.62 + -6.09 + -0.94 + 
Z - -2.0199 73.8329 34.34 + 24.24 + 26.26 + 4.04 + 
I - -0.5037 232.8085 8.56 + 6.04 + 6.55 + 1.01 + 
DE 
FB 
D + 0.9286*** 3500.7560 -21.36 - -12.07 - -14.86 - -3.71 - 
Z + 6.6697*** 510.9320 -153.40 - -86.71 - -106.72 - -26.68 - 
I + 1.9740*** 1320.0380 -45.40 - -25.66 - -31.58 - -7.90 - 
ME 
D + -6.9760** -232.6132 160.45 - 90.69 - 111.62 - 27.90 - 
Z + 4.8517** 319.2914 -111.59 - -63.07 - -77.63 - -19.41 - 
I + -99.7007** -9.6516 2293.12 - 1296.11 - 1595.21 - 398.80 - 
HU 
FB 
D + -3.9729*** -332.7315 39.73 - 27.81 - 31.78 - 0.00 § 
Z + -78.7439*** -33.5046 787.44 - 551.21 - 629.95 - 0.00 § 
I + 4.1002*** 470.7855 -41.00 - -28.70 - -32.80 - 0.00 § 
ME 
D + 0.5359 332.2688 -5.36 - -3.75 - -4.29 - 0.00 § 
Z + -1.7400 -202.1463 17.40 - 12.18 - 13.92 - 0.00 § 
I + -2.2612 -99.5305 22.61 - 15.83 - 18.09 - 0.00 § 
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IT 
FB 
D + -0.1385 -366.8578 5.12 - 1.39 - 3.05 - 0.83 - 
Z + -0.1873 -365.0720 6.93 - 1.87 - 4.12 - 1.12 - 
I + -0.1148 -550.8514 4.25 - 1.15 - 2.53 - 0.69 - 
ME 
D 
- 0.0389 -374.5699 -1.44 + -0.39 + -0.86 + -0.23 + Z 
I 
UK 
FB 
D + -0.3717 -327.1312 -2.23 + 3.72 - 1.86 - 0.74 - 
I + 3.4698 44.6537 20.82 + -34.70 - -17.35 - -6.94 - 
ME 
D 
+ 4.2798* 428.3541 25.68 + -42.80 - -21.40 - -8.56 - Z 
I 
Note: ଓ݊ݒఫതതതതത expressed in real euros, (1) denotes the EU flat rate scenario of CAP DPs reform, (2) denotes the min 80% scenario of CAP DPs 
reform, (3) denotes the min 90% and objective criteria scenario of CAP DPs reform, (4) denotes the integration scenario of CAP DPs 
reform; § denotes Not Applicable since no sign can be clearly associated to a zero percentage change variation. 
Source: authors’ compilation based on Guastella et al. (2013b). 
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3. Conclusions 
The peculiar characteristics of the agricultural sector across the EU member 
states and over time call for a comparative analysis of the developmental 
effects of agricultural policies. Among the domains affected by agricultural 
policies, farmers’ investment decisions are targeted at combating the often 
rapid obsolescence of capital assets as well as at advancing the 
technological dimension of the production process, whenever a major 
innovative breakthrough is embodied in commercial capital goods. In turn, 
adaptation of the capital stock to varying economic and policy conditions is 
likely to increase further the profitability of the agricultural sector, 
enhancing countries’ economic prospects. 
The work carried out as part of the Factor Markets project has 
investigated the role of coupled and decoupled CAP subsidies in 
determining the investment demand for farm buildings and machinery and 
equipment of farms specialised in arable crops. Applying a theoretical 
model of investment choice featuring irregularities in the adjustment cost 
function and an econometric technique capable of identifying the existence 
of separating equilibria, the estimated model has assessed whether zero 
investment in both asset classes is an optimal choice in the presence of a 
precise range – rather than point value – of the shadow asset prices. The 
policy evaluation exercise has calculated the expected changes in farm 
building and machinery and equipment investment levels due to the 
envisaged reductions in the levels of the CAP Direct Payments. 
Empirical estimates suggest that the range of zero investment is 
clearly and consistently identified for Germany across asset classes and 
CAP support schemes and across asset classes only for Hungary. Three 
regimes appear to characterise machinery and equipment investment in 
France, irrespectively of the type of support received. This evidence might 
help in devising new regime-specific policy interventions. Since evidence 
suggests that specialised arable crop farms are disinvesting towards lower 
levels of long-run capital endowments, the frequent anecdotal evidence 
that agriculture is undercapitalised is not supported by the data. 
Nonetheless, except for the UK and Germany, these trajectories may lead 
towards non-stationary long-run equilibria, implying the possibility of 
further and different future dynamics. While the trajectories towards the 
long-run equilibria appear precisely determined, short-run adjustments in 
capital stocks due to changes in output prices appear largely insignificant 
and, at times, aiming in opposite directions. The association between both 
types of investment and both types of CAP subsidy is mostly positive, with 
294 | GUASTELLA, MORO, SCKOKAI & VENEZIANI 
the dependence on decoupled support barely more significant. The 
expectation of a negative association between the variance of the expected 
output price index – accounting for some of the uncertainty farmers face in 
commercialising their outputs – is largely met, although rarely in a 
statistically significant manner. 
The analysis of the expected changes in the regime-dependent 
investment levels due to the implementation of some of the debated reform 
scenarios of CAP Pillar I payments reveals that only few pieces of evidence 
contrast the anticipated reduction in investment levels following a cut in 
the CAP support levels. In fact, investment in machinery and equipment in 
France and Italy appears to respond positively to the widespread reduction 
in support levels induced by the policy scenarios considered. Likewise, an 
increase in investment levels following the reform scenarios occurs for the 
UK which, under the EU flat rate reform of Pillar I payments, is expected to 
receive higher payments. This evidence is, in turn, consistent with the 
estimation results implying that the expected policy changes should drive 
investment along its long-run adjustment paths towards the respective 
equilibrium. 
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25. THE IMPACT OF CAP SUBSIDIES ON 
BANK LOANS 
JAN POKRIVCAK, PAVEL CIAIAN AND 
KATARINA SZEGENYOVA* 
n this chapter, the authors estimate the impact of agricultural subsidies granted 
under the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on bank 
loans extended to farms. According to their theoretical analysis, subsidies may 
either stimulate or crowd out bank loans depending on the timing of subsidies, 
severity of credit constraint, type of subsidies and bank loans, and the relative cost 
of internal and external financing. In empirical analysis the authors use the Farm 
Accountancy Data Network (FADN) farm level panel data for the period 1995-
2007. They employ the fixed effects and generalised method of moment (GMM) 
models. The estimated results suggest that i) big farms tend to use subsidies to 
increase long-term loans, whereas small farms tend to use subsidies to obtain short-
term loans; ii) subsidies tend to crowd out short-term loans for big farms and long-
term loans for small farms; iii) when controlling for the endogeneity, the crowding 
out effect becomes smaller, but the positive causal effect of subsidies on bank loans 
remains significant. 
 
1. Introduction 
Annually, the EU spends around €50 billion on the Common Agricultural 
Policy with the aim of supporting farmers’ income and the production of 
                                                     
* The chapter draws heavily on the research published by Ciaian et al. (2012). The 
authors are grateful to the European Commission for granting access to the FADN 
data.  
This chapter is based on Ciaian, Pokrivcak & Szegenyova, “Do agricultural 
subsidies crowd out or stimulate rural credit institutions? The Case of CAP 
Payments”, Factor Markets Working Paper No. 4, September 2011. 
I
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agricultural public goods such as the landscape and a clean environment. 
The majority of CAP subsidies are disbursed in the form of decoupled 
direct payments from the EU budget to farms, which are not linked to 
current and future quantities of agricultural production but are related only 
to past production levels. Within the CAP, there are also subsidies which 
are coupled to the production of specific crop or animal commodities. For 
example, higher production or use of inputs leads to more subsidies for 
farms. Finally, financial support is also provided for rural development 
projects.  
Agricultural subsidies have important impacts on agricultural 
markets. Besides affecting farmers’ income, studies have shown that 
agricultural subsidies affect input and output markets and thus, among 
others, alter rents of other agents active in the agricultural sector (Alston & 
James, 2002; Ciaian & Pokrivcak, 2004; Ciaian & Swinnen, 2009; de Gorter 
& Meilke, 1989; Gardner, 1983; Guyomard et al., 2004; Salhofer, 1996), 
impact environmental performance of farms (Beers Van Cees & Van Den 
Bergh, 2001; Khanna et al., 2002) and induce productivity changes and 
market distortions (e.g. Chau & de Gorter, 2005; Goodwin & Mishra, 2006; 
Rizov et al., 2013; Sckokai & Moro, 2006). 
With few exceptions (e.g. Ciaian & Swinnen, 2009), most of the 
previous studies investigate only the direct impacts of agricultural 
subsidies (on prices, quantities, income, environment, etc.) by assuming 
that subsidies do not alter the structure of agricultural markets and do not 
interact with market institutions. In reality, government policies may have 
various indirect effects. They can change market structure or crowd out 
some market institutions. An analysis of such effects goes beyond the focus 
of the current policy analysis literature. In other contexts, however, the 
‘crowding-out effect’ of government programmes has been extensively 
analysed. For example, the interaction between private transfers and public 
welfare programmes has attracted considerable attention among academic 
writers (Barro, 1974; Cox et al., 2004; Galuscak & Pavel, 2012; Lampman & 
Smeeding, 1983; Maitra & Ray, 2003; Roberts, 1984).  
The objective of this chapter is to assess the impact of the current EU 
CAP on bank loans extended to the agricultural sector. First, we 
theoretically analyse how agricultural subsidies affect bank loans. Then, 
employing unique farm-level Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) 
panel data for the period 1995–2007, we empirically estimate the interaction 
between CAP subsidies and farm loans.  
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A better understanding of the dynamic interaction between CAP 
subsidies and credit market institutions can provide important insights for 
policy-making. One of the key priorities of the EU agricultural policy, as 
outlined in the European Commission’s strategic document for the future 
Common Agricultural Policy, is to promote competitiveness and 
innovation, and to maintain viable rural communities. These policy 
objectives in the EU’s CAP stem from increased international competition, 
higher uncertainty on global commodity markets, economic crisis, and 
structural problems persistent in rural EU areas (European Commission, 
2010). Farmers’ access to credit, especially during a financial crisis, plays a 
prominent role in achieving some of these policy objectives. For policy-
makers, understanding the interaction between subsidies and credit 
markets is of upmost importance; whether the CAP stimulates or crowds 
out credit markets. It is well documented that the agricultural sector faces 
significant credit constraint problems, mainly due to the nature of 
production and the risk specific to agriculture that is present to a lesser 
extent in other sectors of the economy (Barry & Robison, 2001). Studies 
have shown that this is also the case in developed countries such as in the 
EU and the US (Blancard et al., 2006; Fałkowski et al., 2012; Färe et al., 1990; 
Lee & Chambers, 1986). Agricultural subsidies may improve farms’ credit 
position and thus may partially address market imperfections.  
2. The impact of decoupled subsidies on short-term bank 
loans 
In this study, we use the theoretical framework of Feder (1985), Carter & 
Wiebe (1990) and Ciaian & Swinnen (2009) to analyse how subsidies affect 
short-term bank loans extended to farms. The theoretical framework relies 
on profit-maximising behaviour of farms with the possibility of constrained 
access to short-term credit (bank loans) used for financing variable inputs 
of farms.  
An important issue for analysing bank loans is the timing of costs and 
revenues. In general, variable costs are incurred at the beginning of the 
production season when the farm has to pay for seeds, fertilizer and other 
variable inputs. Meanwhile, revenues are realised at the end of the season 
when output is sold. Because of the time lag between the payment for 
variable inputs and obtaining revenues from the sale of output, the farm 
has a demand for short-term credit. The demand for credit can be satisfied 
either internally (e.g. cash flow, savings or subsidy) or externally (e.g. bank 
loans or trade credit). The demand for credit might not be fully satisfied, 
THE IMPACT OF CAP SUBSIDIES ON BANK LOANS | 299 
which means that the farm can be credit constrained in the short run. Short-
term credit constraint implies that the farm might be limited with respect to 
the use of variable inputs such as fertilizer, that is, the credit constraint may 
prevent the farm from using the optimal amount of variable inputs. We 
assume that variable inputs are financed exclusively through bank loans.  
The expected impacts of decoupled subsidies on short-term bank 
loans are summarised in the following three hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1: If farms are not credit constrained, (a) decoupled subsidies 
paid at the beginning of the season may reduce farms’ bank loans, whereas (b) 
decoupled subsidies paid at the end of the season have no effect on bank loans. 
Subsidies may reduce bank loans if the opportunity cost of subsidies 
for the farm is lower than the cost of the loan and when subsidies are paid 
at the beginning of the production season. In such a case, farms will 
substitute the more expensive bank loan with a cheaper subsidy. The 
equilibrium variable input use is not affected by relatively small subsidies. 
Only if subsidies crowd out all bank loans, which occurs for sufficiently 
high subsidies, will the equilibrium variable input use increase.  
If the subsidies are paid at the end of the season, they have no impact 
on the use of variable inputs. With perfect markets, farms can also obtain 
sufficient credit without subsides.  
Hypothesis 2: If farms are credit constrained and if decoupled subsidies are 
paid at the beginning of the season, (a) farms will use the same amount of loans 
with or without subsidies if subsidies are sufficiently small, whereas (b) farms 
reduce bank loans if subsidies are sufficiently large. 
If subsidies are paid at the beginning of the season, farms can use 
them directly to finance the purchase of variable inputs. With small 
subsidies, farms still remain credit constrained and the amount of bank 
loans remains unaffected. However, if the subsidies are sufficiently high, 
farms will reduce the amount of bank loans because some bank loans will 
be replaced by cheaper subsidies. Sufficiently high subsidies will also relax 
the credit constraint of the farm. 
Hypothesis 3: If farms are credit constrained and if decoupled subsidies are 
paid at the end of the season, farm bank loans increase.  
Farms may use the subsidy paid at the end of the season as collateral 
for obtaining a bank loan for the purchase of variable inputs at the 
beginning of the season. Sufficiently high subsidies can increase the 
collateral to the level that the farm becomes credit unconstrained.  
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3. Decoupled versus coupled subsidies and bank loans 
The impact of coupled subsidies on bank loans relative to the impact of 
decoupled ones is ambiguous. Coupled subsidies lead to increased input 
prices and decreased output prices to a greater extent than decoupled 
subsidies. These leakages reduce the value of coupled subsidies relative to 
decoupled ones and, therefore, the possibility of subsidy use for credit is 
also reduced. Furthermore, coupled subsidies involve more risk as they are 
attached to the production of specific commodities and also require more 
monitoring on the side of banks to insure the farm has a production 
structure and levels that give rise to the payment of planned subsidy 
amounts at the end of the season. These features of coupled subsidies 
(leakages, higher risk and cost of monitoring) reduce bank loans relative to 
decoupled subsidies. On the other hand, coupled subsidies are paid at the 
end of the season after the production of subsidised commodities is 
realised, which means that they can be used as collateral for obtaining bank 
loans. Decoupled subsidies do not need to be paid at the end of the season 
as they are not linked to current and future production. This feature of 
coupled subsidies leads to increased bank loans. Overall, the impact of 
coupled subsidies relative to decoupled ones shown in Hypotheses 1-3 is 
therefore ambiguous.  
4. Long-term loans and subsidies 
The expectation of markets regarding a multi-annual flow of subsidies is 
important for long-term loans because such loans tend to be repaid by 
farms over period of longer than just one year. Market expectations about 
the continuation of CAP subsidies affect the ability of farmers to obtain 
long-term loans. If lenders perceive CAP subsidies as uncertain and subject 
to change, this may reduce their incentive to provide long-term loans 
collateralised by subsidies. Over its history, the CAP has been reformed 
several times. Some reforms involved the change of subsidy levels while 
others altered subsidy types (Kay, 2000; Pokrivcak et al., 2006; Swinnen, 
2008). Changing subsidy levels affects the value of collateral for obtaining 
loans, which increases the risk for farmers and banks. On the other hand, 
altering the types of subsidy affects administration and monitoring costs 
for banks and increases the risk because different activities might be 
subsidised in the future from those that were in the past.  
Furthermore, the value of long-term investment tends to be 
substantially larger than the annual value of subsidies, i.e. annual subsidies 
may not be sufficient to cover the full value of investment. Instead, 
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expected future subsidies may be used indirectly to enhance the value of 
collateral for long-term loans. Following Hypotheses 1-3, subsidies increase 
long-term loans to a larger extent than they increase short-term loans. Since 
subsidies are not sufficiently high to be used for long-term investments, the 
potential crowding-out effect on long-term loans is reduced (Hypotheses 1 
and 2). Therefore, subsidies might be used as collateral for long-term loans 
(Hypothesis 3). 
In summary, the impact of subsidies on long-term loans relative to 
short-term loans shown in Hypotheses 1-3 is ambiguous. Due to the 
uncertainties associated with the future CAP, one may expect a lower 
impact of subsidies on long-term loans compared to short-run loans. On the 
other hand, due to the fact that the value of long-term investment tends to 
be substantially larger than the annual value of subsidies, the reverse may 
hold (i.e. long-term loans may be more stimulated by subsidies than short-
term loans).  
5. Econometric specification 
Theoretically, the impact of decoupled subsidies on agricultural loans is 
ambiguous. The relationship between subsidies and bank loans is therefore 
an empirical question.  
Following our theoretical analysis, the amount of farm loan depends 
on the farm’s subsidy, profitability, and assets:  
jtjtxjtajtsjjt XassetsSbloan εβββββ π ++Π++++= 0  (1) 
where subscripts j and t represent farm and time, respectively, 
xas βββββ π ,,,,0  are coefficients to be estimated, loan stands for farm bank 
loans, jtS  are subsidies received by farm, assets are farm assets, jtΠ  is farm 
income and jtX  is a vector of observable covariates such as farm 
characteristics, regional, and time variables. Coefficient jb  is the fixed 
effect for farm j , which captures time-unvarying farm-specific 
characteristics. As usual, jtε  is the residual term.  
We are especially interested in estimating the parameter sβ , which 
measures the impact of subsidies on bank loans. A statistically significant 
negative value of the coefficient confirms either Hypothesis 1a or 
Hypothesis 2b. A statistically significant positive coefficient confirms 
Hypothesis 3. Finally, if the coefficient is statistically insignificant, then 
either Hypothesis 1b or 2a holds. However, a statistically insignificant 
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coefficient may also imply that there is no relationship between subsidies 
and farm credit behaviour.  
We expect that the data will confirm either Hypothesis 2 or 3 because 
there is overwhelming evidence that farms are credit constrained (Blancard 
et al., 2006; Carter, 1988; Färe et al., 1990; Lee & Chambers, 1986). Further, 
anecdotal evidence indicates that (at least a share of) subsidies are paid at 
the end of the season, which implies that Hypothesis 3 should hold.  
The estimation of equation (1) is subject to the omitted variable bias 
and particularly to the endogeneity problem of CAP subsidies. We use 
panel data and estimate the fixed effects model which helps us to control 
for the unobserved heterogeneity component that remains fixed over time, 
thus reducing considerably the omitted variable bias problem. In order to 
control for endogeneity, we also estimate the generalised method of 
moment (GMM) model (Arellano & Bond, 1991).  
6. Data and variable construction 
The main source of the data used in the empirical analysis is the Farm 
Accountancy Data Network (FADN), which is compiled and maintained by 
the European Commission. The FADN is a European system of sample 
surveys that take place each year and collect structural and accountancy 
data on farms. The FADN data is a panel dataset. In this study, we use 
panel data for 1995-2007 covering all EU member states except Romania 
and Bulgaria.  
7. Results and conclusions 
The empirical estimates are reported in Tables 25.1-25.3 and the main 
findings are summarised in Table 25.4. They suggest the following impacts 
of subsidies on farm loan use: (i) Subsidies influence farm loans and the 
effects tend to be non-linear and heterogeneous among farms. (ii) Large 
farms tend to use subsidies to increase long-term loans, whereas small 
farms use subsidies to increase short-term loans. A crowding-out effect 
may occur in the reverse situation – subsidies tend to reduce short-term 
loans for large farms and long-term loans for small farms. (iii) Coupled 
subsidies tend to affect loans differently from decoupled subsidies. Both 
coupled and decoupled subsidies may reduce long-term loans to small 
farms (crowding-out effect), whereas they may stimulate long-term loans to 
large farms. Short-term loans are affected only by decoupled subsidies. 
They increase the short-term loans of small farms more than those of large 
farms. For large farms, the effect of decoupled subsidies may even result in 
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a crowding-out effect. (iv) When controlling for endogeneity, the crowding-
out effect tends to be reduced in favour of a positive effect of subsidies on 
loans. (v) In general, our empirical results indicate that Hypothesis 3 
(positive impact) may hold although the crowding-out effect cannot be 
completely excluded. 
Our results suggest that the impact of the EU’s CAP on agricultural 
credit markets is complex and varies by credit type and size of farm as well 
as by type of subsidy. Overall, our estimates indicate that CAP subsidies 
offset the credit tightening accompanying the financial crisis and, in a time 
of increasing global market volatility, they stabilise agricultural production 
by correcting credit market imperfections. However, one should be careful 
in drawing general policy implications from this, since a complete analysis 
should include the deadweight cost of taxation as well as the comparison of 
agricultural subsidies with other policy instruments that address the credit 
market imperfections directly. 
A second important finding of this study is that we cannot 
completely exclude the crowding-out effect of agricultural subsidies on 
bank loans. The crowding out tends to be stronger for small farms and for 
short-term loans. Therefore, different policy measures have varying 
impacts depending on the structure of farms and the type of financial 
instruments used. Based on these results, agricultural policies can be better 
targeted. Subsidies can be designed in such a way that the crowding-out 
effect is reduced to minimum and only credit-constrained farms are 
supported. This would result in a more efficient use of public money.  
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Table 25.1 Fixed effects estimates for bank loans (total subsidies) 
 Total loans Long-term loans Short-term loans 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Total subsidies 
per ha 
0.0656 -0.995** -1.075*** 0.0762 -1.943*** -1.662*** 0.00813 -0.142 -0.142 
Total subsidies 
per ha squared 
  0.000143**   0.000164**   -7.02e-07 
Total subsidies * 
Farm size 
 0.142* 0.0967  0.255** 0.158**  0.0204 0.0206 
          
Observations 237372 237372 237372 195496 195496 195496 206108 206108 206108 
R-squared 0.489 0.489 0.490 0.484 0.484 0.485 0.106 0.106 0.106 
Number of 
individual farms 
60904 60904 60904 51360 51360 51360 54382 54382 54382 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: coefficients for the rest of explanatory variables are not reported but are included in the estimated equations. 
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Table 25.2 Fixed effects estimates for bank loans (disaggregated subsidies) 
 Total loans Long-term loans Short-term loans 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Decoupled 
subsidies per ha 
-0.0325 -2.712*** -2.182** 0.131 -6.451*** -5.383*** -0.164*** 1.120*** 1.183*** 
Decoupled 
subsidies per ha 
squared 
  -0.000383   -0.000878*   -8.10e-05 
Decoupled 
subsidies per ha * 
Farm size 
 0.339** 0.260  0.801*** 0.676***  -0.153*** -0.155*** 
Coupled 
subsidies per ha 
0.0696 -0.945** -1.046*** 0.0740 -1.731** -1.450*** 0.0139 -0.196 -0.198 
Coupled 
subsidies per ha 
squared 
  0.000142**   0.000162**   -2.63e-06 
Coupled 
subsidies per ha * 
Farm size 
 0.136* 0.0960  0.229** 0.136**  0.0282 0.0297 
          
Observations 237372 237372 237372 195496 195496 195496 206108 206108 206108 
R-squared 0.489 0.489 0.490 0.484 0.484 0.485 0.106 0.107 0.107 
Number of 
individual farms 
60904 60904 60904 51360 51360 51360 54382 54382 54382 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: coefficients for the rest of explanatory variables are not reported but are included in the estimated equations. 
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Table 25.3 Arellano and Bond estimates for bank loans (disaggregated subsidies) 
 Long-term loans Short-term loans 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Decoupled subsidies per ha 2.434*** -4.792 0.294 0.328 -0.677 -0.415 
Coupled subsidies per ha 2.471*** -1.644 -0.214 0.279 -0.101 -0.189 
Decoupled subsidies per ha * Farm size  0.861**   0.118  
Coupled subsidies per ha * Farm size  0.482   0.0449  
Decoupled subsidies per ha squared   -0.000630   0.000792 
Coupled subsidies per ha squared   0.000317***   0.000185*** 
       
Observations 92328 92328 92328 95448 95448 95448 
Number of individual farms 26792 26792 26792 28380 28380 28380 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: coefficients for the rest of explanatory variables are not reported but are included in the estimated equations. 
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Table 25.4 Summary of empirical results: impact of subsidies on bank loans 
 Fixed effect estimates  GMM estimates 
 Long-term Short-term  Long-term Short-term 
Decoupled subsidies       
Small farms Negative Positive  Positive Zero 
Large farms Positive Negative  Positive Zero 
      
Coupled subsidies      
Small farms Negative Zero  Non-linear positive Non-linear positive 
Large farms Positive Zero  
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26. FACTOR MARKETS IN APPLIED CGE 
MODELS 
MARTIN BANSE, ANDREA ROTHE 
AND LINDSAY SHUTES* 
his chapter gives an overview of the implementation of factor markets in 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. Given the heavy data 
requirements needed, many global CGE models use the Global Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) database and are descendants of the GTAP global CGE 
model (see Hertel, 1997). Therefore the implementation of labour, land and capital 
markets in GTAP is briefly described here as a starting point for further 
developments of factor market modelling in the CGE model MAGNET, which uses 
the GTAP database. A description of the MAGNET model and extensions to the 
modelling of factor markets are components of other chapters in this volume. This 
chapter is based on publications by Dervis et al. (1982), Lofgren et al. (2002) and 
Burfisher (2011), which provide a comprehensive description of the structure of a 
standard CGE and factor market modelling.  
 
1. The circular flow in the economy 
A CGE model is a system of equations that describes the whole economy 
and the interactions between markets and institutions. A conceptual 
starting point for understanding CGE models and the integration of factor 
markets within them is an understanding of the circular flow in the 
economy. The circular flow represents the flow of goods and services in 
one direction through an economy and the flow of funds in the other, i.e. 
                                                     
* This chapter is based on Banse, Shutes, Dixon, van Meijl, Rimmer, Tabeau, 
Woltjer & Rothe, “Factor Markets in General Computable Equilibrium Models”, 
Factor Markets Working Paper No. 47, May 2013. 
T
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the payment for the goods and services, where services also include factors 
services (Hertel & Tsigas, 2000).  
In an economy, industries are responsible for the production of goods 
and services. In the product markets, the industries sell intermediate goods 
and services to other industries and goods for final consumption to 
institutions. Institutions comprise households, corporations and the 
government. Final goods can be used during the accounting period, or can 
be accumulated as stocks for future use. Production, consumption, 
accumulation and distribution are the basic forms of economic activity in a 
closed economy. In an open economy, imports and exports are also 
considered. Transactions can take place with the rest of the world through 
product and factor markets. In the case of products, these transactions 
include imports and exports. Factor markets are represented through 
institutions, which sell factor services to industries, which act as 
purchasers. Factor services typically include labour, capital and land. 
Payments to labour, capital and land constitute salaries and wages, returns 
to capital and returns to land, respectively.  
2. Factor markets in the database  
One central element of a CGE model is the database. The GTAP database 
records the annual flows of goods and services for the whole world in a 
defined year. It contains bilateral trade, transport and protection data. It 
shows all the economic activities among regions and individual national 
input-output data. The GTAP database is updated regularly; Version 8 is 
currently available. It contains 57 commodities and 129 regions. The 
different factor markets are recorded as skilled and unskilled labour, 
capital and natural resources (Narayanan et al., 2012).  
3. The model and behavioural assumptions of factor 
market modelling  
While the database only provides all transactions of the agents of an 
economy that have taken place, a CGE model includes all the payments 
recorded in the database. The model itself consists of a set of simultaneous 
equations, of which many are non-linear. The equations also include 
constraints that can cover markets or macroeconomic aggregates. The 
behavioral relationships of the model determine how the agents will react 
to exogenous changes in the parameters of the model. 
Factor markets in GTAP are characterised through the following 
behavioural assumptions. Producers maximise profits using technology 
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characterised by nested production functions, which combine constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) and Leontief production functions. As part 
of the profit maximisation, each producer uses a set of factors, depending 
on the industry structure and the factor price. The producer will increase 
the factor input up to the point at which the marginal revenue product of 
each factor is equal to its wage. This is also called factor price or rent. Factor 
wages can be different between producers because of segmented markets 
or factor mobility. 
Factors of production are divided into two groups. The first group 
includes the mobile factors, which are perfectly mobile across industries in 
each region. The second group contents the sluggish factors, which are 
imperfectly mobile or immobile. In the GTAP standard database, labour 
and capital are mobile, while land and natural resources are declared as 
sluggish factors.  
Factor markets can also be modelled through alternative factor 
market closures. With these closures a modeller can decide which variables 
are exogenous or endogenous. Relevant variables for factor market 
modelling are the demand and supply of factors or economy-wide and 
specific factor prices to model full employment or unemployment of 
factors, industry-specific factor markets or factor mobility (Lofgren et al., 
2002).  
The way labour, capital and land are implemented in the GTAP 
standard database is described below. 
3.1 Labour 
Labour is classified as a mobile factor in the standard GTAP model. As 
such, labour is free to move between sectors in a country or region in 
response to changes in relative prices, which leads to an equalisation of the 
increase or decrease in the wage rate across all sectors. Two types of labour 
are included in the standard GTAP model: skilled labour and unskilled 
labour. Each type of labour has its own wage rate determined by the 
interaction of the supply of labour (usually exogenous) and the demand for 
labour as a factor of production. Skilled and unskilled labour are 
substitutable both for the other type of labour and the other factors of 
production, capital and natural resources, in the formation of the value-
added composite which, in turn, is substitutable with composite (domestic 
and imported) intermediate goods in the production of the output of each 
sector. 
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3.2 Capital 
In the standard GTAP model, capital can move between industries within a 
region, but not between regions. The capital flow is immobile in the short 
run and mobile in the long run. In the standard GTAP-model, investors are 
represented by a single agent – the global bank. The global bank receives 
savings from the households and invests these savings. Investments are 
represented by the purchase of a commodity named capital goods. Capital 
goods are not tradable. Because GTAP is a comparative static model, 
savings are incorporated as a fixed share of the representative households’ 
utility function. All income is split between private household 
consumption, government consumption and savings. At the global level, 
investments and savings are equal. Because there is no mechanism from 
capital markets to savings, the amount of investments is the sum of savings 
in each region. Time preferences for investments or influences on the 
decision of saving levels are not captured.  
3.3 Land 
The standard assumption of land markets in the GTAP database is one of 
sluggish, sector-specific land. Land, together with the ‘natural resources’ 
factor, which is also included in the database, is assumed to be imperfectly 
mobile across alternative uses. The agricultural sectors are the only land-
using sectors in the database.66 With the assumption of land as sluggish, 
land prices differ across the land-using sectors in agriculture. As with the 
standard presentation of land and capital, land use is presented in value 
terms in the GTAP database as a part of sectoral value added. Land use 
presented in physical units is not modelled in the standard version of 
GTAP. 
4. Summary 
There are different ways to model specific factor markets characteristics in 
a CGE model. Important factor market concepts in CGE models are factor 
mobility assumptions, factor endowment and productivity growth, 
complementary and substitution of factors, and also the model closures like 
full-employment versus unemployment of factors. But factors supply, the 
structure of the industry and the relations between industry structure and 
                                                     
66 Land use in forestry is covered under the factor ‘natural resource’. 
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factor prices are also important in analysing the impact of changes in factor 
markets on the economy (Burfisher, 2011). 
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27. FACTOR MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND 
PRODUCTIVITY IN EU AGRICULTURE 
MARTIN PETRICK AND MATHIAS KLOSS* 
his chapter examines the drivers of productivity in EU agriculture from a 
factor markets perspective. Based on a farm model with a constrained factor 
market, the authors present estimates of production elasticities and shadow 
prices of factors for a set of eight EU member states. They focus on field crop farms 
represented in the FADN database for the years 2002-08. As it turns out that 
output reacts most elastically to materials input, they investigate this factor further 
and find different rationing regimes represented in different member states. 
Marginal return on materials is low in Denmark and West Germany, but 
significantly above typical market interest rates in East Germany, Italy and Spain. 
In the latter countries and in Denmark, it also increased towards the end of the 
observed period. This finding is consistent with a perception of tightening funding 
access, possibly induced or reinforced by the unfolding financial crisis. Marginal 
returns to land, labour and fixed capital are generally low. We conclude that the 
functioning of factor markets plays a crucial role for productivity growth, but that 
factor market operations display considerable heterogeneity across EU member 
states. 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, exploding food prices on world markets have 
conspicuously signalled that global resources for agricultural production 
are indeed scarce (FAO, 2009). How farm productivity could be raised has 
recaptured the attention of the global media (e.g. Parker, 2011) and food 
                                                     
* The authors are grateful to comments made by participants of the June 2013 
IATRC symposium in Seville. 
This chapter is based on Petrick & Kloss, “Synthesis Report on the Impact of 
Capital Use”, Factor Markets Working Paper No. 57, August 2013. 
T 
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riots have been reported in several developing countries. Compared to 
other world regions, agricultural productivity growth has been stagnating 
in Europe and especially the EU (Coelli & Rao, 2005; Piesse & Thirtle, 2010). 
In this contribution, we take on a factor market perspective on productivity 
and structural change and ask: Which factors are the bottlenecks for 
productivity growth? What does micro-data tell us about the efficiency of 
factor markets in EU agriculture?  
In order to tackle these questions we empirically estimated 
production elasticities and shadow prices of factors, based on individual 
farm data from eight EU member states. As detailed in Petrick & Kloss 
(2013a), we incorporate recent innovations in the estimation of production 
functions. We focus on field crop farms represented in the FADN database 
for the years 2002-08. Our empirical estimates suggest that the output 
elasticity of materials is quite high, above 0.6, while labour, land and fixed 
capital display much lower output elasticities (Petrick & Kloss, 2013a; 
2013b). The assumption of constant returns to scale is widely supported 
empirically. The shadow price analysis reveals considerable heterogeneity 
across EU countries. In France, Spain, Italy and East Germany, we observe 
marginal returns on materials much above typical market interest rates, 
especially towards the end of the observed period. This is consistent with a 
perception of constrained access to funding, possibly induced by the 
unfolding financial crisis (Petrick & Kloss, 2013c). For Denmark, West 
Germany and Poland, returns on materials are low, which suggests an 
over-utilisation of inputs. In general, the remuneration of labour, land, and 
fixed capital is quite low, except for in Denmark. 
In Section 2, we present a conceptual framework as a motivation for 
the further analysis. Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Factor allocation under a generalised input constraint 
A simple model of farm production that is subject to a generalised input 
constraint can usefully illustrate our factor market perspective on 
agricultural productivity. Assume a farmer maximises profit by producing 
one output with one input. Profit is then defined as revenue minus the 
costs of the input: 
 
max௫ ߨ ൌ ݂ሺݔሻ െ ݌ݔ, subject to (1) 
 ݔҧ െ ݔ ൒ 0, (2) 
where π  is profit, ݂ the production function, x input use, p the input 
price observed in the market and ݔҧ the generalised input constraint. This 
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input constraint captures the general observation that most agricultural 
production factors cannot be adjusted instantaneously but are rather 
subject to more or less pronounced adjustment costs. For example, land is 
often available in limited quantities only and subject to long-term rental 
agreements. Agricultural credit markets suffer from informational 
asymmetries and may be characterised by rationing and high transaction 
costs (see, for example, Benjamin & Phimister, 2002; Petrick & Latruffe, 
2006; Curtiss, 2012).  
We assume that f is monotonically increasing and concave in x. 
Solving this optimisation problem through the Lagrangean L yields 
ܮ ൌ ݂ሺݔሻ െ ݌ݔ ൅ ߣሺݔҧ െ ݔሻ, where ߣ is the Lagrange multiplier. Assuming 
that (2) is binding, we obtain the first-order condition డ௅
డ௫
ൌ డ௙
డ௫
െ ሺ݌ ൅ ߣሻ ൌ 0. 
Rearranging leads to 
 
డ௙
డ௫
ൌ ݌כ ൐ ݌, with ݌כ ؠ ݌ ൅ ߣ. (3) 
We define ݌כ as the shadow price of the production factor on the 
farm; it represents the willingness to pay for it. With a more severe input 
constraint, the decision price for input use is increasing and use of that 
factor is reduced.  
The above model serves as a useful motivation for the empirical 
measurement of factor productivity and factor market imperfections in 
agriculture. The practical implementation involves the use of an estimate of 
the shadow price to study drivers and impacts of factor use. It requires a 
consistent estimate of the production function as well as reliable data on 
input use and factor prices. The empirical relation ݌כ ൐ ݌ is a measure of 
on-farm input productivity and the severity of supply rationing.  
By similar reasoning, a release constraint could be also modelled. 
݌כ ൏ ݌ would then be evidence of a resource over-utilisation. This may, for 
example, be due to non-pecuniary benefits of input use (e.g. tractors as 
prestige objects) or the wish to provide safeguards against production risk 
(use of insurance contracts, precautionary investment in powerful 
machinery to mitigate production peaks; Witzke, 1993, p. 157). Aurbacher 
et al. (2011) have recently shown that farmers trapped in small agricultural 
structures may be unable to coordinate on machinery sharing and thus may 
hold inefficiently high stocks of machinery. Furthermore, agriculture in 
Europe is typically organised in family farms on which labour is often 
highly immobile (Tocco et al., 2012) and may be influenced significantly by 
life-cycle considerations of the farm family (Glauben et al., 2009). 
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3. Data 
In this study, we employ data from the EU’s Farm Accountancy Data 
Network (FADN). We only use field crop farms (TF1), to justify the 
assumption of a homogenous state of technology across farms. We show 
separate results for the following countries: 
• Denmark (DK) 
• France (FR) 
• Germany East (DEE) 
• Germany West (DEW) 
• Italy (IT)  
• Poland (PL) 
• Slovakia (SK) 
• Spain (ES) 
• United Kingdom (UK) 
For every country and sector in the study, we created a panel data set 
covering the years from 2001 to 2008. For Poland and Slovakia, we use only 
data for 2006–08 for the estimation, although shadow prices are also 
computed for 2005.67 A small number of duplicates in the data were 
dropped. In total, 27,639 observations were included in the EU-wide 
sample. Table 27.1 summarises the variable definitions and gives the actual 
FADN codes. 
Table 27.1 Selection of variables 
FADN code Variable description 
Outputs  
SE131 Total output (EUR) 
Inputs  
SE011 Labour input (hours) 
SE025 Total utilised agricultural area (ha) = land 
SE275 Total intermediate consumption (EUR) = materials 
L.SE450 + 
L.SE455 
Opening valuation of machinery and buildings (EUR) = fixed 
capital 
Note: L. denotes the one-year lag. 
Source: Authors, FADN data. 
                                                     
67 This was done to maintain data consistency with the dynamic panel data models 
analysed in Petrick & Kloss (2013a). 
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All monetary values are deflated to real values in 2005 prices using 
price indices by Eurostat. Output was deflated by the agricultural output 
price index. Fixed capital and investment were deflated by the agricultural 
input price index for goods and services contributing to agricultural 
investment, and materials by the agricultural input price index for goods 
and services currently consumed in agriculture. 
Outliers were identified on the basis of the fixed capital productivity 
per farm: real SE131/(real (L.SE450 + L.SE455)). Observations were 
dropped for the production function estimation if their value was beyond 
the median ± 1.5 the interquartile range (IQR). Furthermore, we only 
included farms which had some minimum panel representation in the data. 
Farms had to be present in the data for at least four consecutive years, for 
Poland and Slovakia for at least three consecutive years. Descriptive 
statistics including the data patterns of the panels are given in Petrick & 
Kloss (2013a; 2013b). 
4. Results 
For the present study, we estimated five models per country (Petrick & 
Kloss, 2013a, b): OLS Cobb-Douglas, OLS ‘within’, Translog Cobb-Douglas, 
Translog ‘within’, and a Cobb-Douglas estimator taken from Levinsohn & 
Petrin (2003). Generally, the aim was to detect systematic differences across 
estimators and countries, and to assess their practical implementation. 
Detailed results tables are presented in the accompanying working papers, 
which include detailed tables for each country containing the results for the 
five models. All estimations were performed with Stata 12. For the 
Levinsohn-Petrin estimators we employed the user-written routine levpet 
(Petrin et al., 2004). 
The ‘within’ Translog was obtained by interacting the groupwise 
demeaned logs of factors and using an appropriate degree of freedom 
correction. Other than by simply calling a panel estimation command with 
the interacted variables in logs, this procedure ensures that levels are 
effectively eliminated from the regression. Our estimates displayed 
remarkably uniform features across countries. The OLS Translog produced 
unreasonable results throughout, e.g. reflected in the coexistence of 
negative production elasticities for some factors and elasticities bigger than 
one for others (at sample means). The ‘within’ Translog elasticities, on the 
other hand, were typically close to the ‘within’ Cobb-Douglas at sample 
means, and the interaction terms of the Translog were often not jointly 
different from zero.  
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4.1 Comparison of estimators 
As a general tendency, factor elasticities were found to be low for labour, 
land and capital, and high for materials (Figure 27.1). Estimates for the first 
three of these factors are in the range of 0.2 and lower, sometimes not 
significantly different from zero or even significantly negative. The 
production elasticity of materials ranges from 0.55 to 1.0 (Figure 27.2).  
Figure 27.1 Cobb-Douglas production elasticities in comparison 
 
Notes: Results for field crop farms in EU countries based on Levinsohn-Petrin estimator. 
Source: Authors.  
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Figure 27.2 Elasticities of materials per country 
 
Notes: Results for field crop farms in EU countries based on Levinsohn-Petrin estimator. 
Source: Authors. 
Since output reacts most elastically to materials, we analysed the bias 
to this estimate introduced by the choice of estimator. As noted in the 
literature (Petrick & Kloss, 2013a), OLS estimates of the output elasticity 
tend to be upward and ‘within’ downward biased for particularly variable 
factors. They may thus be considered as an upper and lower boundary for 
the true value. Figure 27.3 indicates that indeed the Levinsohn-Petrin 
estimator commonly produces elasticities of materials which are just 
between OLS and ‘within’. The two exceptions are Denmark and the UK. 
For the UK, the OLS elasticity exceeds the Levinsohn-Petrin elasticity by 
just 0.01. This result supports the view that the Levinsohn-Petrin estimator 
may be taken as a plausible alternative to the received estimators.  
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Figure 27.3 Elasticity of materials: comparison of estimators 
 
Source: Authors. 
Point estimates for the elasticity of scale (i.e. the sum of the four 
output elasticities) fluctuate around 1.0, with higher values for Denmark 
and the UK (Figure 27.4, left panel). However, statistically, only Spain 
differs significantly from one at the 5 per cent level (Figure 27.4, right 
panel). Given the previous findings on production elasticities, OLS 
estimates of scale elasticities tend to be higher than 1.0 while ‘within’ 
elasticities tend to be lower. Overall, the scale elasticity in European crop 
farming appears to be close to one.  
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Figure 27.4 Returns to scale per country 
  
Notes: Results for field crop farms in EU countries based on Levinsohn-Petrin estimator. 
Left: Point estimates. Right: Not significantly different from 1 displayed as 1. 
Source: Authors. 
 
4.2 Distribution of shadow prices 
To ease the economic interpretation of the findings, we computed farm-
individual shadow prices for all farms used in the estimations. To this end, 
we multiplied the production elasticities obtained from the Levinsohn-
Petrin estimator with the farm-specific average factor productivities. For 
the two capital variables, net returns equal to the marginal value product 
minus one were calculated, so that they can be compared with market 
interest rates for credit (see our theoretical model above and Petrick & 
Kloss, 2012). The distribution of the shadow prices for the four factors and 
seven particularly interesting subsamples is illustrated in Figures 27.5–27.8 
by using plots displaying the median, first and third quartile of the 
distribution. 
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Figure 27.5 Distribution of shadow wages per country and year 
 
Notes: Results for field crop farms in EU countries based on Levinsohn-Petrin estimator. 
Source: Authors.  
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Figure 27.6 Distribution of shadow land rents per country and year 
 
Notes: Results for field crop farms in EU countries based on Levinsohn-Petrin estimator.  
Source: Authors. 
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Figure 27.7 Distribution of shadow interest rates of materials per country and year 
 
Notes: Results for field crop farms in EU countries based on Levinsohn-Petrin estimator. 
Source: Authors.  
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Figure 27.8 Distribution of shadow interest rates of capital per country and year 
 
Notes: Results for field crop farms in EU countries based on Levinsohn-Petrin estimator. 
Source: Authors. 
The findings from the plots are not too surprising given the results 
presented in the previous section. The shadow prices of three of the factors 
– labour, land and fixed capital – tend to be quite low. The median shadow 
wage in agriculture is below 9 euros per hour in France and West Germany 
throughout the years; in Italy and Spain it is below 5 euros per hour for 
most of the period. East Germany and Poland even exhibit values below 2 
euros per hour. Denmark stands out with a value fluctuating at around 20 
euros per hour. Shadow land rents are only minimally different from zero 
throughout. Shadow prices of fixed capital are negative in all subsamples, 
with medians per country and year in the range of -85 to -100%. 
Furthermore, there is considerable variation for some of the subsamples. 
The distributional plots on the marginal return to materials deserve a 
closer look (Figure 27.7). As materials use is variable on a short-term basis, 
it reacts quickly to fluctuations in the economic environment. In the 
observed study period, the financial crisis was epitomised by the emerging 
US subprime crisis in 2007 and the collapse of the investment bank Lehman 
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Brothers in 2008. The shock waves of the crisis hurt the various EU member 
states quite differently, and there is little analysis available so far of how 
they affected access to working capital in agriculture. Indeed, both the 
cross-country as well as the dynamic variation reveals interesting patterns 
in this regard. Across countries, West Germany is the only region where the 
median farm exhibited negative marginal returns on working capital 
throughout the entire period. This is consistent with an excess capital use 
and the absence of funding constraints, and possibly reflects the strong 
position of the German agricultural banking sector during the crisis. A 
similarly strong banking sector based on a mortgage banking model is 
present in Denmark, where farms also displayed negative shadow prices 
for materials until 2006. However, Danish farms are typically leveraged 
much higher than their European counterparts (Petrick & Kloss, 2013c). 
Danish farms were thus hit harder by the emerging financial crisis, 
consistent with notably rising shadow rates for the years 2007 and 2008 in 
Figure 27.7. At the other end of the spectrum, farms in Spain and East 
Germany show high shadow rates on working capital, with an upward 
tendency over the observed period. Also, many Italian farms are in the 
range above 50% interest. Spain and Italy are countries with very low 
leverage in the agricultural sector, but also with banks suffering from the 
crisis. Farms may thus have been forced to reduce their use of working 
capital, particularly after the onset of the crisis. East German agriculture is 
dominated by corporate farms which are often based on rented land. 
Capital access is less easy to obtain for them than for West German family 
farms, and may have become more difficult to obtain during the crisis. 
France and Poland are somewhere in the middle of the field. 
Figure 27.9 plots the marginal return on working capital against the 
average market interest rate for Spain over the observed period, calculated 
as the annual interest payments in percentage of outstanding loans. In the 
two crisis years 2007 and 2008, the shadow price is notably higher than the 
market rate. This finding supports the view that quantity rationing on the 
credit market was prevalent in these years.  
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Figure 27.9 Spanish field crop farms: marginal return on materials vs. market 
interest rate 
 
Notes: Results for field crop farms in EU countries based on Levinsohn-Petrin estimator. 
‘Market rate’ is ratio of annual interest payments to all outstanding loans. 
Source: Authors. 
We conclude this section with another comparison of estimators. 
Figure 27.10 plots marginal returns on working capital based on the 
‘within’ and Levinsohn-Petrin estimators against the average market 
interest rate as defined before. The figure indicates that the choice of 
estimator can lead to completely opposite conclusions: whereas the 
Levinsohn-Petrin estimator suggests quantity rationing throughout, the 
supposedly downward biased ‘within’ estimator is consistent with smooth 
capital access over the entire period. 
-4
0
-2
0
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
S
ha
do
w
 in
te
re
st
 ra
te
 %
 p
.a
.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
 
Return on materials Market rate %
Dots denote median; bars 3./1. quartiles.
FACTOR MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND PRODUCTIVITY IN EU AGRICULTURE | 331 
Figure 27.10 Comparison of estimators: East German field crop farms – marginal 
return on materials 
 
Note: Results for field crop farms in EU countries based on Levinsohn-Petrin estimator. 
Source: Authors. 
5. Conclusions 
The aim of this study was to examine the drivers of productivity in EU 
agriculture from a factor markets perspective. We provide results for OLS 
Cobb-Douglas and Translog, ‘within’ Cobb-Douglas and Translog, as well 
as Levinsohn-Petrin Cobb-Douglas models. Each model was estimated 
separately for panels of field crop farms in Denmark, France, East and West 
Germany, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Spain and the United Kingdom. We also 
provide shadow price calculations for all four factors per country, based on 
the Levinsohn-Petrin estimates. From the applied perspective, OLS and 
‘within’ display the biases expected from the literature. OLS typically 
overestimated the materials coefficient, while ‘within’ underestimated it. 
Extending the received Cobb-Douglas specification to a Translog generally 
did not generate illuminating insights. Either the results were obviously 
implausible or little different from Cobb-Douglas. Levinsohn-Petrin 
produced more plausible results and may be taken as an easy-to-implement 
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alternative to the received estimators. However, given the conceptual 
problems in identifying the supposedly flexible inputs labour and land, 
which the other estimators share, this is still only a second-best choice (for 
details, see Petrick & Kloss, 2013a). Additional information, such as that 
coming from the direct elicitation of input supply constraints, may be used 
in the future to solve this remaining identification problem. 
Our estimates show a consistent picture of very low production 
elasticities for labour, land and fixed capital, whereas the elasticity of 
materials is above 0.6 for most of the countries. As a consequence, shadow 
prices for the three fixed factors are also very low. The median shadow 
wage in agriculture is below €9 per hour in France and West Germany 
throughout the years; in Italy and Spain it is below €5 per hour for most of 
the period. East Germany and Poland even exhibit values below €2 hour. 
Shadow land rents are typically close to zero. The net return on fixed 
capital is in the range of -85 to -100%. This finding suggests an excess 
utilisation of fixed production factors in EU agriculture. Further outflow of 
factors may be necessary to bring returns up to factor remuneration in 
other sectors. 
The Levinsohn-Petrin estimates used to calculate these figures shed a 
different light on the shadow price of working capital (materials). The 
findings suggest that credit rationing is an issue for agricultural finance 
markets in the EU, particularly with regard to short-term lending in East 
Germany, Italy, and Spain after the onset of the financial crisis in 2007. In 
other words, improving the availability of working capital is the most 
promising way to increase agricultural productivity, whereas land, labour 
and fixed capital are not among the bottleneck factors of EU arable farming. 
We conclude that the functioning of factor markets plays a crucial role for 
productivity growth, but that factor market operations display considerable 
heterogeneity across EU member states. 
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28. THE IMPACT OF CAP REFORM ON THE 
PRODUCTIVITY OF EU FARMS 
MARIAN RIZOV, JAN POKRIVCAK 
AND PAVEL CIAIAN* 
his chapter investigates the impact of subsidies from the Common 
Agricultural Policy on the total factor productivity of farms in the EU. The 
authors employ a structural, semi-parametric estimation algorithm, directly 
incorporating the effect of subsidies into a model of unobserved productivity. They 
empirically study the effects using samples from the Farm Accountancy Data 
Network for EU-15 countries. Our main findings are clear: subsidies had a 
negative impact on farm productivity in the period before the decoupling reform 
was implemented; after decoupling the effect of subsidies on productivity was more 
nuanced, as in several countries it turned positive. 
 
1. Introduction 
There are two competing policy-relevant arguments regarding the impact 
of agricultural subsidies on productivity.68 On the one hand, in the context 
of the WTO trade liberalisation agenda, the discussion centres on the 
                                                     
* The chapter draws heavily on the research published by Rizov et al. (2013). The 
authors are grateful to the European Commission for granting access to the FADN 
data. The chapter is also based on Rizov, Pokrivcak & Ciaian, “CAP Subsidies and 
the Productivity of EU Farms”, Factor Markets Working Paper No. 37, March 2013. 
68 Annually, the EU spends around €50 billion on the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) with the primary goal to support farmers’ income and improve the 
environmental impact of agricultural production. The majority of CAP subsidies 
are disbursed in the form of decoupled direct payments from the EU budget, 
which are not linked to current and future quantities of agricultural production. 
Within the CAP, there are also subsidies which are coupled to the production of 
specific crop or animal commodities or allocated for rural development projects.  
T 
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distortionary impact of subsidies on agricultural markets (including on 
productivity) and how the effects differ between different types of 
subsidies. Following the WTO agreements, many countries decoupled their 
agricultural subsidies with the aim of reducing distortionary agricultural 
support (Meléndez-Ortíz et al., 2009). On the other hand, recent 
developments in world markets leading to increasing volatility of global 
food commodity prices and rising food security concerns, especially in 
developing countries, have led to calls to maintain agricultural support, 
stimulating farm investment and the adoption of productivity enhancing 
modern technology (FAO, 2011). The European Commission explicitly 
mentions in its proposal for the CAP post-2013 revision the challenge of 
food security and the EU’s goal to support long-term food supply potential 
and meet the growing world food demand (European Commission, 2010; 
2011). 
The impact of subsidies on agricultural production, input allocation 
and income distribution is well documented in the literature, but 
significantly less attention has been devoted to the impacts of subsidies on 
farm productivity. Theoretical studies suggest that subsidies may have a 
positive impact on farm production and, at the same time, a negative 
impact on farm productivity (Hennessy, 1998; Ciaian & Swinnen, 2009). 
However, these studies are inconclusive in predicting the exact relationship 
between agricultural subsidies and productivity, while the empirical 
literature finds mixed effects. The existing empirical studies usually 
employ a two-stage approach whereby productivity measures are 
estimated in the first stage without controlling for subsidy effects and then 
these productivity measures are regressed on subsidies in the second stage 
(e.g., Giannakas et al., 2001; Latruffe et al., 2009; Lakner, 2009; Sauer & 
Park, 2009; Zhu & Oude Lansink, 2010; Mary, 2012). The disadvantage of 
the two-stage approach is that it does not incorporate subsidies explicitly 
into a structural estimation algorithm and thus cannot capture their full 
effect on productivity. The two-stage approach therefore may lead to 
biased estimates of the overall impact of subsidies on productivity. 
We aim to fill this gap in the literature by investigating the impact of 
CAP subsidies on (aggregate) farm productivity using a structural 
productivity estimation approach based on Olley & Pakes (1996). We 
explicitly model the unobserved productivity and directly incorporate the 
effects of subsidies into a structural semi-parametric estimation procedure. 
We apply the procedure to the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) 
dataset and estimate total factor productivity (TFP) for large and 
representative samples of farms in each of the EU-15 countries over the 
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period 1990-2008. Furthermore, special attention is paid to the significant 
change of regime with the decoupling of subsidies by the 2003 CAP reform. 
The chapter compares the impact of subsidies on farm productivity before 
and after decoupling. We find that subsidies are negatively associated with 
productivity until the implementation of the decoupling reform. After the 
reform, the link between subsidies and farm productivity became more 
nuanced as in several EU-15 countries it turned positive.  
2. Subsidies and productivity 
Theoretical studies show that there are various channels through which 
subsidies impact (aggregate) productivity (De Long & Summers, 1991; 
Blomstrom et al., 1996; Rajan & Zingales, 1998). Subsidies may either 
increase or decrease productivity and thus the net effect may be either 
positive or negative. The negative impact of subsidies on productivity may 
result from allocative and technical efficiency losses due to distortions in 
production structure and factor use, soft budget constraints and the shift of 
subsidies to less productive enterprises. The positive impact of subsidies 
may be due to investment-induced productivity gains caused by interactions of 
credit and risk attitudes with subsidies (subsidy-induced credit access, 
lower cost of borrowing, reduction in risk aversion, increase in productive 
investment). 
Subsidies may negatively affect farm productivity because they 
distort the production structure of recipient farms leading to allocative 
inefficiency. Recipient farms may modify their behaviour and start 
investing in subsidy-seeking activities that are relatively less productive 
(Baumol, 1990; Alston & James, 2002). Allocative inefficiency may also be a 
result of distortions in input use. Subsidies give recipient farms an 
incentive to change their input ratios, which can lead to allocative 
inefficiency, i.e. over-investment in subsidised inputs. Subsidies may also 
give rise to technical inefficiency if they are captured by the farms as higher 
profits leading to slack, lack of effort and competitive pressures to seek 
cost-improving methods (Leibenstein, 1966). Similarly, Kornai (1986) 
argues that subsidisation might give rise to soft budget constraints which 
would lead to inefficient use of resources. If the budget constraint is hard, 
the farm will continuously adjust to (unfavourable) external conditions by 
behaving in an entrepreneurial manner. If the budget constraint is soft, 
productive efforts are no longer imperative; the subsidy provider acts like 
an insurer taking over the moral hazard while the insured (recipient farms) 
are less careful in protecting their wealth. Finally, subsidies may end up 
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being transferred to less productive farms by policy-makers ‘with special 
interest’ or, as Olson (1982) asserts, subsidies may reduce the rate at which 
resources are reallocated from one activity to another in response to new 
technologies or market conditions. 
The literature on credit constraints and risk behaviour in agriculture 
(e.g. Blancard et al., 2006; Ciaian & Swinnen, 2009; Kumbhakar & 
Bokusheva, 2009; Hüttel et al., 2010) asserts a positive relationship between 
subsidies and productivity. If farms are credit rationed, then subsidies may 
provide an additional source of finance either directly by increasing farms’ 
financial resources, or indirectly through the improved access to formal 
credit. In other words, for credit-rationed farms, subsidies may serve as a 
substitute for credit. Studies find that credit-constrained farms invest less 
and have lower allocative and technical efficiency which would improve as 
a result of subsidies (Feder, 1985; Feder et al., 1990; and more recently, 
Blancard et al., 2006; Kumbhakar & Bokusheva, 2009; Hüttel et al., 2010). 
Cheaper credit would stimulate investments and input use, thus leading to 
improved farm performance. Credit-unconstrained farms may also be 
affected if subsidies present a cheaper source of financing than the credit 
available from the financial markets. Furthermore, Hennessy (1998) 
suggests that under uncertainty, subsidies affect markets through a wealth 
effect; subsidies affect farmers’ wealth and thus their risk attitudes. For 
example, farmers may be more willing to expand production with certain 
type of activities or employ additional factors which would otherwise be 
viewed as too risky (Roche & McQuinn, 2004).  
The negative effect of subsidies (allocative and technical efficiency loss) is 
likely negatively correlated with decoupling, whilst the positive effect 
(investment-induced productivity gain) is likely positively correlated. 
Consequently, we expect that coupled subsidies will have a smaller 
positive or a larger negative impact on productivity relative to decoupled 
subsidies. First, the efficiency loss is likely to be stronger for coupled 
subsidies than for decoupled ones because farm eligibility for coupled 
payments is directly linked to farm factor and production decisions, and 
thus is likely to lead to distortions in input and/or output allocation. 
Coupled subsidies may motivate farmers to expand subsidised activities at 
the expense of otherwise more productive activities. For the decoupled 
subsidies, the link to farm activities is weaker. Farms receive CAP 
decoupled subsidies irrespective of their production decisions, so the 
subsidies are less likely to induce allocative and technical inefficiency 
effects (Floyd, 1965; Dewbre et al., 2001; Alston & James, 2002; Guyomard 
et al., 2004; Courleux, et al., 2008). Second, the investment-induced 
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productivity gain through the credit and risk channels is likely smaller for 
coupled than for decoupled payments (Ciaian & Swinnen, 2009; Hennessy, 
1998). The conditionality of coupled subsidies increases the monitoring 
costs of financial institutions if subsidies are used by credit-constrained 
farms as collateral for investment loans. Financial institutions have to check 
what farms produce to learn about their future eligibility for coupled 
subsidies. For decoupled payments, the certainty of payments is higher due 
to their link to land assets, which are relatively costless to monitor and less 
subject to production risk. Thus, decoupled payments are more suitable as 
collateral to financial institutions (Barry & Robinson, 2001; Ciaian et al., 
2012). 
3. Estimation strategy, data, and results 
Our strategy for estimating productivity is built on the Olley & Pakes 
(1996) approach, which entails modelling unobserved productivity (TFP) 
while directly controlling for the effects of subsidies in the estimation 
algorithm.69 The strength of the approach lies in its flexibility in 
accommodating the specificities of the economic problem of interest and its 
efficiency in dealing with simultaneity and selection biases. Furthermore, 
we extend the Olley & Pakes (1996) algorithm, in a manner similar to Rizov 
& Walsh (2011), by explicitly allowing farm decisions and market 
environment (factor markets and demand conditions) to be affected by the 
CAP subsidies, which we directly introduce into the underlying structural 
model of the farm. 
We apply our estimation algorithm to the FADN country samples. 
The panel we employ in the study covers the period 1990–2008 and 
includes the commercial farms in all EU-15 countries.70 Our first goal is to 
estimate unbiased and consistent farm and time specific TFP measures (
), within six farm-type samples, for each country, and to document the 
                                                     
69 We do not estimate the effect of any particular channel through which subsidies 
interact with productivity; we estimate the net effect of allocative and technical 
efficiency loss and the investment-induced productivity gain caused by subsidies. 
70 For Austria, Finland and Sweden, which joined the EU in 1995, the period of 
analysis is 1995-2008. 
jttfp
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aggregate productivity levels and changes over time and by farm type.71 
We run regressions within the six farm-type samples for each country, 
which leaves us with 83 farm-type country samples, with a sufficient 
number of observations to apply our estimation algorithm.  
Our ultimate goal in the analysis is to verify the effect of subsidies on 
farm productivity using the farm TFP measures (tfpjt) estimated by our 
semi-parametric algorithm. Subsidies are widely used in EU agriculture 
and the large majority of farms have received subsidies in one way or 
another, so we do not have an easy way to identify treatment and control 
groups. Therefore, we verify the relationship by means of a regression 
analysis using the same FADN country samples that we used to estimate 
farm productivity. We note that this verification analysis is different from 
the two-stage analysis in previous productivity studies because in our 
productivity estimation algorithm we have explicitly accounted for the 
effects of subsidies and thus, our productivity measures are not biased.  
We specify an estimating equation, linking farm productivity and 
subsidies using as a basis the productivity function (inverted investment 
demand), formulated in Olley & Pakes (1996). We estimate two 
specifications where the dependent variable is measured in levels (log(tfpjt)) 
and in growth rates ( ) respectively. The explanatory variables are 
investment (I), capital (K), subsidies (S) and subsidies interacted with a 
dummy capturing the effect of decoupling (SX); sets of year and farm 
sector controls are also included in every specification. Given that the main 
explanatory variables in the estimating equations are not strictly exogenous 
and likely serially correlated, we treat them as predetermined; considering 
the regressors as endogenous does not change the results reported.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
71 The six farm types comprise field crop farms, horticultural and vine farms, 
specialised dairy farms, other grazing livestock farms, poultry and pig meat farms, 
and mixed farms. 
jttfpΔ
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Table 28.1 GMM estimates of the impact of subsidies on productivity 
Country Specification bI 
(s.e.) 
bK 
(s.e.) 
bS 
(s.e.) 
bSX 
(s.e.) 
AR(2) 
Hansen J 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Belgium Level 0.010 
(0.005) 
0.075 
(0.045) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
0.121 
(0.324) 
 Growth 0.002 
(0.001) 
0.040 
(0.024) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
0.178 
(0.461) 
Denmark Level 0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.314 
(0.074) 
-0.012 
(0.002) 
0.010 
(0.003) 
0.205 
(0.194) 
 Growth 0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.180 
(0.056) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.012 
(0.004) 
0.183 
(0.344) 
Germany Level 0.008 
(0.002) 
-0.103 
(0.018) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.082 
(0.229) 
 Growth 0.004 
(0.001) 
-0.104 
(0.018) 
-0.003 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.114 
(0.215) 
Greece Level 0.006 
(0.002) 
-0.105 
(0.055) 
-0.037 
(0.006) 
-0.017 
(0.007) 
0.181 
(0.402) 
 Growth 0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.036 
(0.016) 
-0.035 
(0.005) 
-0.020 
(0.010) 
0.286 
(0.537) 
Spain Level 0.003 
(0.001) 
-0.179 
(0.057) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.015 
(0.002) 
0.228 
(0.198) 
 Growth 0.003 
(0.001) 
-0.130 
(0.050) 
-0.008 
(0.002) 
0.007 
(0.002) 
0.361 
(0.399) 
France Level 0.004 
(0.002) 
0.063 
(0.031) 
-0.005 
(0.001) 
0.008 
(0.002) 
0.111 
(0.295) 
 Growth 0.004 
(0.002) 
0.047 
(0.026) 
-0.007 
(0.001) 
0.011 
(0.002) 
0.115 
(0.312) 
Ireland Level 0.008 
(0.004) 
0.067 
(0.036) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.029 
(0.015) 
0.221 
(0.418) 
 Growth 0.008 
(0.004) 
0.030 
(0.015) 
-0.008 
(0.003) 
0.019 
(0.012) 
0.104 
(0.372) 
Italy Level 0.002 
(0.001) 
0.014 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.094 
(0.120) 
 Growth 0.005 
(0.003) 
0.048 
(0.021) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.017 
(0.005) 
0.195 
(0.210) 
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Table 28.1 continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Luxembourg Level 0.003 
(0.001) 
0.021 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.001) 
0.054 
(0.016) 
0.225 
(0.580) 
 Growth 0.004 
(0.002) 
0.030 
(0.011) 
-0.005 
(0.002) 
0.042 
(0.016) 
0.098 
(0.321) 
Netherlands Level 0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.188 
(0.036) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.001) 
0.080 
(0.229) 
 Growth 0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.281 
(0.071) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.117 
(0.198) 
Austria Level 0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.084 
(0.029) 
-0.009 
(0.002) 
-0.009 
(0.010) 
0.224 
(0.154) 
 Growth 0.009 
(0.004) 
-0.062 
(0.009) 
-0.012 
(0.002) 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
0.168 
(0.188) 
Portugal Level 0.002 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.106 
(0.115) 
 Growth 0.015 
(0.007) 
0.024 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.008 
0.008) 
0.241 
(0.298) 
Finland Level 0.007 
(0.003) 
0.070 
(0.028) 
0.015 
(0.017) 
0.039 
(0.020) 
0.221 
(0.351) 
 Growth 0.008 
(0.004) 
0.058 
(0.022) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
0.055 
(0.018) 
0.102 
(0.282) 
Sweden Level 0.009 
(0.003) 
0.086 
(0.036) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.248 
(0.526) 
 Growth 0.006 
(0.002) 
0.036 
(0.018) 
-0.019 
(0.008) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
0.150 
(0.138) 
UK Level 0.013 
(0.006) 
-0.150 
(0.043) 
-0.013 
(0.002) 
-0.005 
(0.002) 
0.219 
(0.438) 
 Growth 0.010 
(0.003) 
-0.153 
(0.035) 
-0.009 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.193 
(0.278) 
Notes: The estimated samples cover the period 1991-2008 (1996-2008 for Austria, Finland and 
Sweden). Diagnostics reported are the p-values for the AR(2) test and for the Hansen J 
test (in parentheses). In all estimated equations year and farm type controls are 
included. Coefficients of the subsidy variables(pre and after decoupling) when 
significant at 5 percent or better are denoted in bold.  
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We estimate the productivity and subsidies relationship by the 
Blundell & Bond’s (1998) two-step system generalised method of moments 
(GMM). Table 28.1 reports the regression results for levels and growth rates 
for each of the EU-15 countries.72 We find clear evidence that the effect of 
subsidies before decoupling is negative even though the magnitude of the 
coefficients is quite small (between zero and a 3.7% decrease in TFP when 
subsidies double). Overall, for all countries except Portugal and Finland, 
subsidy coefficients both in the level and in the growth equations have 
negative signs. In terms of the level of productivity, we find a negative and 
statistically significant effect for seven of the EU-15 countries. In terms of 
productivity growth, the effect is negative and statistically significant for 
ten of the EU-15 countries. Thus, for the period before decoupling of 
subsidies, no significant negative effect is found in only four of the EU-15 
countries, and in no country is a positive effect evident. These results are 
consistent with findings in previous productivity studies which employ a 
two-stage approach to identify the CAP subsidy impact on farm efficiency 
(Latruffe et al., 2009; Lakner, 2009; Zhu & Oude Lansink, 2010). 
For the period after decoupled subsidies were introduced, the effect 
on farm productivity is more diverse.73 In fact, for ten of the EU-15 
countries the subsidy coefficient is positive even though it is statistically 
significant for only six countries in the level equation as well as in the 
growth equation. We find a statistically significant negative effect for only 
two countries – about 2% (when subsidies double) both in the level and in 
the growth equation for Greece, while for the UK we find a small negative 
effect of 0.5% (if subsidies doubled) only in the level equation.74 
Interestingly, the group of countries for which a switch of effect, from 
negative to positive after decoupling is observed is mixed, including both 
                                                     
72 For all regressions the diagnostic tests for no second-order autocorrelation, AR(2) 
and for validity of instruments, Hansen-J are satisfied. 
73 Decoupling of subsidies was formally implemented in 2005-06 across the EU-15 
countries. We note that the decoupling is likely to have had effect on the behaviour 
of farms (and markets) well before the time of formal implementation, i.e. since the 
details on the policy were made public. Thus, we expect that from 2005-06 tangible 
effects of decoupling on productivity can be observed.  
74 For the cases where a negative effect of subsidies after decoupling is still 
observed, this could be due to either insignificant market imperfections (credit 
problems) in the agricultural sector (e.g. Germany, Sweden, the UK), partial 
decoupling (e.g. Greece) or the combination of the two factors (e.g. Austria). 
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northern and southern EU member states. Overall, after decoupling we 
find that subsidies have either no effect or a small positive effect on 
productivity in the majority of EU-15 countries. Our findings are consistent 
with Zhu et al. (2012) and Mary (2012).75  
4. Summary and conclusions 
The focus of this chapter is on evaluating the link between CAP subsidies 
and total factor productivity of EU commercial farms. We build a structural 
model of the unobserved productivity incorporating directly the effects of 
farm subsidies and adapt the semi-parametric estimation algorithm 
proposed by Olley & Pakes (1996) to estimate the parameters of production 
functions within the FADN farm-type samples, for each of the EU-15 
countries, for the period 1990–2008 (or 1995–2008). We control for 
differences in the economic environment across narrowly defined spatial 
units and model productivity as a non-parametric function of investment 
and state variables, including as additional control farm subsidies, which 
greatly enhances our ability to obtain consistent estimates of the production 
function parameters and thus, back out unbiased TFP measures at farm 
level.  
Our farm-level regression analysis for each of the EU-15 countries 
clearly demonstrates the impact of CAP subsidies on productivity. We find 
that subsidies impact negatively farm productivity in the period before the 
decoupling reform was implemented. After decoupling, in 2005-06, the 
effect of subsidies on productivity is more nuanced as in several countries 
it turned positive. Theoretically, the impact of subsidies on productivity is a 
net effect of allocative efficiency losses and the investment-induced 
productivity gains caused by the interaction of market imperfections with 
subsidy. We do not identify the two effects separately, we only infer their 
relative importance from the net effect.  
Our findings are consistent with the literature emphasising the 
inefficiencies of public subsidisation of production and at the same time 
lend support to the EU policy for decoupling of CAP subsidies. The results 
suggest that the decoupled payments are less distortive and enhance 
productivity, which is consistent with the WTO priorities. From the food 
security perspective, the evidence indicates possible improvement in future 
                                                     
75 They do not investigate the decoupled payments per se but consider the impact of 
partial decupling (e.g. the introduction of the Agenda 2000). 
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food availability through increasing the productive capacity of the EU 
agricultural sector. The CAP reform proposal for the post-2013 period 
suggests maintaining the decoupled subsidies system after 2013 (European 
Council, 2013), thus likely ensuring the continued future enhancement of 
EU farm productivity. However, one should be careful in drawing 
conclusions regarding general welfare implications from this, since the 
analysis does not account for distortions of taxation funding the subsidy. 
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29. RURAL FACTOR MARKETS IN THREE 
CANDIDATE COUNTRIES: 
CROATIA, MACEDONIA AND TURKEY 
ŠTEFAN BOJNEC* 
n a spite of the fact that the role of agriculture in the economies of Croatia, the 
Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia and Turkey has declined over 
time, it is still important in absolute and relative terms compared with the 
western economies. The prevailing small-scale farm structures provide official and 
hidden employment and incomes for a large part of rural population. The 
substantial reduction of rural population is an indication of outflow of labour to 
urban areas and abroad. Inflows of remittances can only partly mitigate the 
                                                     
* This chapter (and the research behind it) was written during Croatia’s accession 
process. Although Croatia has now acceded to the EU, the chapter refers to the 
country as a candidate for EU membership since the analysis refers to the period 
leading up to the accession. The analysis remains valid now that Croatia has joined 
the EU. 
This chapter is based on the following Factor Markets Working Papers: Bojnec, 
“Agricultural and Rural Capital Markets in the EU Candidate Countries of Croatia, 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey”, Factor Markets 
Working Paper No. 8, October 2011; Angelova & Bojnec, “Agricultural and Rural 
Capital Market Developments in the Republic of Macedonia”, Factor Markets 
Working Paper No. 9, October 2011; Bojnec, “Agricultural and Rural Labour 
Markets in the EU Candidate Countries of Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and Turkey”, Factor Markets Working Paper No. 6, September 2011; 
Bojnec, “Land Markets in the EU Candidate Countries of Croatia, Former 
Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia and Turkey”, Factor Markets Working Paper 
No. 1, September 2011; Janeska & Bojnec, “Rural Labour Market Developments in 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Factor Markets Working Paper No. 
5, September 2011; Petroska Angelovska, Ackovska & Bojnec, “Agricultural Land 
Markets and Land Leasing of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Factor 
Markets Working Paper No. 11, February 2012. 
I
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emerging rural capital markets. A specific situation exists in Turkey with 
sharecropping arrangements among families and informal land-leasing 
arrangements based on trust. A relatively large agricultural sector, particularly in 
Turkey, lower productivity in agriculture than in the rest of the economy, and 
other developmental gaps between urban and rural areas are expected to have 
important policy implications. 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter reviews and summarises the findings on the empirical facts 
about and the institutional and policy developments in rural factor markets 
(land, labour and capital) in three candidates for EU membership – Croatia, 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey. The chapter is 
based on Angelova & Bojnec (2012), Bojnec (2012, 2013a, 2013b), Janeska & 
Bojnec (2012) and Petroska Angelovska et al. (2012), but adds additional, 
recent empirical facts on the changing role of agriculture in the economies 
of the three candidate counties and some main empirical facts on land, 
labour and capital markets with explanations and policy implications. 
2. The changing role of agriculture in the economy 
The role of agriculture in the economy is one indicator of economic 
development. A relatively low share of agriculture in the economy 
indicates a higher level of economic development. The most widely used 
measure of economic development is GDP per capita. As shown in Figure 
29.1, GDP per capita in constant prices in the three candidate countries has 
increased over the past 20 years. It is the highest in Croatia, followed by 
Turkey and then the FYR of Macedonia. A decline is seen in 2009 for 
Croatia and Turkey, but less so for the FYR of Macedonia. Since 2009, 
Turkey has caught up slightly with Croatia, but the FYR of Macedonia has 
not. 
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Figure 29.1 GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005, international $) 
 
Source: Wold Bank (2013). 
The analysed countries differ in the size of their economies (i.e. the 
size of GDP) and the size of their agricultural sectors. The Turkish economy 
and agricultural sector are much bigger than those of Croatia and the FYR 
of Macedonia. 
Table 29.1 The role of agriculture in the economy 
1960 1970 1980 1990 1996 2002 2008 2011 
Croatia 
GDP (billion constant 2000 
US$) 19.3 23.4 30.1 27.6 
Gross value added at factor 
cost (billion constant 2000 
US$) 16.0 19.5 25.2 23.0 
Agriculture, value added 
(billion constant 2000 US$) 1.08 1.24 1.38 1.27 
Agriculture, value added 
(% of GDP) 10.9 7.1 6.4 5.0 5.1 
Industry, value added 
(% of GDP) 35.8 30.8 27.7 27.7 26.5 
Services, value added 
(% of GDP) 53.4 62.2 65.9 67.3 68.4 
Manufacturing, value 
added (% of GDP) 29.3 20.6 18.8 15.8 16.2 
Food, beverages and 
tobacco (% of value added 
in manufacturing) 21.9 
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FYR of Macedonia 
GDP (billion constant 2000 
US$) 3.9 3.1 3.5 4.5 4.7 
Gross value added at factor 
cost (billion constant 2000 
US$) 3.2 2.6 2.9 3.8 4.0 
Agriculture, value added 
(billion constant 2000 US$) 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.38 0.41 
Agriculture, value added 
(% of GDP) 8.5 13.2 12.4 11.6 11.1 
Industry, value added 
(% of GDP) 44.5 29.6 30.2 29.8 27.5 
Services, value added 
(% of GDP) 47.0 57.2 57.5 58.7 60.9 
Manufacturing, value 
added (% of GDP) 35.7 23.0 19.1 19.8 17.7 
Food, beverages and 
tobacco (% of value added 
in manufacturing) 20.1 32.0 
Turkey 
GDP (billion constant 2000 
US$) 44.6 75.2 112.0 186.6 234.7 266.9 375.1 422.8 
Gross value added at factor 
cost (billion constant 2000 
US$) 67.9 103.3 166.7 208.2 237.8 333.2 375.0 
Agriculture, value added 
(billion constant 2000 US$) 17.7 20.8 23.3 25.2 26.9 28.7 32.1 
Agriculture, value added 
(% of GDP) 55.9 40.2 26.5 18.1 17.4 11.7 8.6 9.1 
Industry, value added 
(% of GDP) 17.6 22.5 23.8 32.2 31.6 28.7 27.7 27.9 
Services, value added 
(% of GDP) 26.4 37.3 49.7 49.8 51.0 59.6 63.7 63.0 
Manufacturing, value 
added (% of GDP) 13.0 16.5 17.3 22.7 21.8 20.2 18.3 18.6 
Food, beverages and 
tobacco (% of value added 
in manufacturing) 16.0 16.1 17.3 
Source: World Bank (2013). 
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The relative share of agricultural value added as a percentage of GDP 
has tended to decline in each of the three analysed countries, but 
differences can be seen in the dynamics of this decline and in cyclical 
variations for each of the countries (Table 29.1 and Figure 29.2). The 
declining relative role of agricultural value added in GDP suggests a higher 
level of economic development. Since 2008, the economic recession with an 
accompanying decline in GDP size in constant prices can been seen for 
Croatia. 
In the initial stage of transition to a market economy in the FYR of 
Macedonia and in Croatia, agricultural value added as a percentage of GDP 
increased. This share then declined in Croatia, which is consistent with a 
declining relative role of agriculture in the economy during economic 
growth as an indicator of a higher level of economic development. This 
decline is also seen for Turkey and the FYR of Macedonia. In the latter, 
agricultural value added represents more than 11% of GDP. The lowest 
share is in Croatia, though the share in both Croatia and Turkey has 
increased slightly during the recent economic recession. 
Figure 29.2 Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Wold Bank (2013). 
With regard to the structure of their economies, the relative 
importance of the service sector has increased in each of the countries. The 
role of the industrial sector varies between the three: it has declined in 
Croatia and most recently in the FYR of Macedonia, and to a lesser extent 
in Turkey. In addition, within the industrial sector, the role of the 
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manufacturing sector has tended to decline. Food, beverages and tobacco 
activities seem to be important in the manufacturing sector in each of the 
three countries, but evidence for this is not available for the most recent 
years. 
3. Land market issues 
There are substantial differences in the geographic size of the three 
countries, and differences in the structure of land use for agricultural 
production and yields both between the countries (Bojnec, 2013a) and 
within them (Petroska Angelovska et al., 2012). Turkey is much larger than 
Croatia and the FYR of Macedonia. Albeit with some differences, crop 
production is the most important in terms of land use in each of the 
analysed countries. Cereals yields are highest in Croatia (Figure 29.3) due 
to a higher use of chemical inputs. At the same time, Croatia has 
experienced higher cyclical volatility in cereals yield development, with 
some similarities in cereals yields volatility for the FYR of Macedonia. 
Cereals yields in Turkey are lower, but have tended to increase slightly 
without substantial volatility. Cereal yield volatility can be related to 
adverse (particularly dry) weather conditions. 
Figure 29.3 Cereal yields (kg per hectare) 
 
Source: Wold Bank (2013). 
Agricultural land structures are the result of historical evolution in 
land markets and of land-leasing developments, with additional differing 
institutional environments and agrarian and land reforms. However, from 
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the conceptual relevance, the countries are different: Croatia and the FYR of 
Macedonia are post-socialist countries, but Turkey is not. Some similarities 
existed between the territories of the FYR of Macedonia and Turkey during 
the Ottoman Empire, but not with Croatia. 
In each of the three candidate countries, the share of crop production 
is at least twice as high as that of livestock production. The share of 
livestock production is highest in Croatia, while the share of crop 
production is highest in the FYR of Macedonia, which had the lowest share 
of cereals in crop production. In the FYR of Macedonia and Turkey, other 
crops (vegetables and long-term plantings of fruit and vineyards) represent 
an important share of production. Turkey is the richest country by hectares 
of arable land per person. 
Turkey is a substantial wheat producer. Wheat yields in Croatia are 
slightly lower than in the enlarged EU-27, but more than twice those of 
Turkey and slightly less than twice those of the FYR of Macedonia. 
Maize production in Turkey is around twice that of Croatia, while 
maize production in the FYR of Macedonia is a few times smaller than in 
Croatia. Maize yields in Turkey and particularly in Croatia have increased 
rapidly and are at, or even above, the levels for the enlarged EU-27. 
Fragmented farm structures and small plots are one of the major 
obstacles to the modernisation of agricultural production. Family 
household subsistence farming takes an important role. There is a need for 
farm restructuring, which can be supported by the creation of 
opportunities for off-farm employment with off-farm incomes 
opportunities. 
There is no a minimum or a maximum price for land sale transactions 
in the three countries. Agricultural land sale prices vary between the 
countries and within the countries by location within regions and by 
quality of the land. In Croatia, the sale of agricultural land needs to be 
approved by a government agency and the tenant has pre-emption rights. 
In the FYR of Macedonia, co-owners have a priority right and neighbours 
have a priority purchase right. In Turkey, there are restrictions regarding 
the subdivision and sale of a plot below a certain minimum size, and the 
sale of agricultural land needs to be approved by the government. The 
tenant in Turkey has pre-emption rights and co-owners have priority 
rights. There are also restrictions for land sale transactions in border areas 
and in specific protected areas. Some additional restrictions regarding the 
acquisition of agricultural land apply to foreign legal entities in each of the 
three countries. 
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Except for state-owned land in the FYR of Macedonia, land rental 
transactions in the three countries are not constrained by the government 
setting minimum or maximum rental prices. Former state land has been 
transformed into state management and largely continues to be operated 
by privatised agricultural enterprises. 
In Turkey, rental prices are not regulated and land renting is often 
agreed orally between owner and tenant without defining monetary rental 
prices. The owner and tenant usually agree on how to share the products. 
An oral rental agreement is possible due to a high level of trust between the 
owner and tenant, who are often relatives, neighbours or similarly trusted 
persons. 
4. Labour market issues 
Similarly to the size of the land market, the Turkish labour market is much 
larger than that of Croatia or the FYR of Macedonia. However, there are 
differences in the patterns of development, with a substantial absolute 
increase in the labour force in Turkey, a slight absolute increase in the FYR 
of Macedonia, and a slight absolute decline in Croatia (Table 29.2). These 
patterns are associated with past fertility rates and, to a lesser extent, are 
mitigated by outward migration. 
Table 29.2 Labour market development and the role of employment in agriculture 
1990 1996 2002 2008 2010 
Croatia 
Labour force (million) 2.17 2.02 1.94 2.00 1.97 
% of employment in agriculture 19.9 15.2 13.4 14.9 
% of employment in industry 29.1 29.7 30.7 27.3 
% of employment in services 50.9 55.1 55.6 57.6 
FYR of Macedonia 
Labour force (million) 0.77 0.82 0.85 0.92 0.95 
% of employment in agriculture 23.9 19.7 
% of employment in industry 33.3 31.3 
% of employment in services 42.8 49.1 
Turkey 
Labour force (million) 19.95 21.66 22.67 24.59 26.52 
% of employment in agriculture 46.9 42.8 34.9 23.7 23.7 
% of employment in industry 20.7 22.9 23.0 26.8 26.2 
% of employment in services 32.4 34.3 42.1 49.5 50.1 
Source: Wold Bank (2013). 
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In each of the three analysed countries, the relative share of 
employment in agriculture is higher than the relative share of GDP from 
agriculture (Tables 29.1 and 29.2). This suggests that labour productivity in 
agriculture is lower than in the rest of the economy in all three countries. 
The share of employment in agriculture has declined, particularly from 
higher relative levels in the FYR of Macedonia and Turkey, and has 
increased slightly during the recent years of economic recession. 
It is interesting to note that the share of agriculture in economy-wide 
employment declined up to 2007 (Figure 29.4). With the economic and 
financial recession, it has stabilised or even slightly increased, suggesting 
difficulties in finding employment outside of agriculture. 
The share of employment in industry is volatile across individual 
years, but has tended to decline, more so recently. The share of 
employment in services has increased, but is lower than the share of GDP 
in services. This suggests that labour productivity in services is higher than 
in the rest of the economy. One of the sources of labour productivity 
increases can be the reallocation of labour to the service sector. 
Figure 29.4 Share of employment in agriculture (% of total employment) 
 
Source: Wold Bank (2013). 
A substantial decline can be seen in the rural population in Turkey 
(Figure 29.5). Since the mid-1990s, the percentage of rural population has 
stabilised in the FYR of Macedonia. Interestingly, since the mid-1980s 
Croatia – the most economically developed of the three countries – has had 
the highest percentage of rural population, but there has been some recent 
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convergence with the FYR of Macedonia. The more balanced rural-urban 
development in Croatia can be explained by a relatively developed 
transportation infrastructure, networks of local and regional towns, and an 
important role for the non-agricultural rural economy, including tourism. 
Figure 29.5 Rural population (% of total population) 
 
Source: Wold Bank (2013). 
The rural labour market continues to be less attractive to the younger 
and educated population (Janeska & Bojnec 2012; Bojnec, 2013b). Each of 
the three countries has made efforts to improve both the literacy levels and 
educational attainments of their populations. The skills and educational 
levels of agricultural employees are lower than those of non-agricultural 
workers. 
The three countries have been adjusting their labour legislation and 
labour market policies to those of the EU. This particularly holds for 
Croatia, as the first due to become an EU member state. 
Living conditions in villages and rural areas (except in tourist areas) 
are seen as less attractive than in urban areas. This is an additional factor 
pushing young and educated people not only away from agriculture, but 
also from rural areas. 
5. Capital market issues 
Capital markets differ between the three countries in terms of interest rates 
for loans by the commercial banks and subsidy schemes (Bojnec, 2012). In 
Croatia, all commercial banks are owned by foreign banks. In the FYR of 
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Macedonia, special subsidy schemes have been introduced to support 
certain productions (Angelova & Bojnec, 2012). In Turkey, loans by 
commercial banks at market conditions are also important for agriculture. 
In addition, sharecropping arrangements between landowners and tenants 
are also important in the Turkish agricultural sector. 
There is no substantial difference between the functioning of the 
banking sector for agriculture and the rural economy and its general 
functioning and operation. Agriculture and the rural economy may face 
more severe capital market imperfections and credit constraints with rent 
differentiation due to asset and production specificities, which limit access 
to credit for restructuring and further development. 
Each of the three countries experienced very high rates of inflation or 
even hyperinflation during the 1990s. In recent years, inflation rates as 
measured by consumer prices have reduced substantially, to close to the 
EU-27 level in Croatia and above the EU-27 level in Turkey. 
Lending interest rates, interest-rate spreads and real interest rates in 
the three countries are relatively high, which could be explained by higher 
investment risks and less competitive banking and finance sectors. 
The three countries first experienced foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows during the 1970s and 1980s. Most often, these were in the form of 
joint ventures. During the last two decades, they have experienced greater 
net inflows than net outflows of FDI, but with substantial variations over 
time, particularly in FDI net inflows. 
An inflow of workers’ remittances to each of the three candidate 
countries associated with the outflow of labour from rural areas to 
countries abroad, particularly to Germany and some other western 
European countries, took place during the 1960s and the 1970s. Of the 
three, the FYR of Macedonia is more dependent on workers’ remittance 
inflows. 
Donations from different funds have been granted to each of the 
three countries. Among these donations, development agencies have 
supported agricultural and farm-sector restructuring and modernisation. 
During the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, development assistance was important 
for Turkey, but in more recent years the country has also become an 
important driver of economic development and other assistance abroad. 
For Croatia, the inflows of development assistance increased during the 
first half of the 1990s, after the end of the war in Croatia. Development 
assistance recovered as the Croatian economy has adjusted in anticipation 
of EU membership. Development assistance has been particularly 
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important for the FYR of Macedonia, and has been targeted towards 
agricultural and rural areas. 
There is no agricultural bank present in Croatia to provide specialised 
credit for agriculture. Apart from one Croatian-owned and operated bank, 
all banks in the country are foreign-owned and operated. They provide 
credit for agriculture and rural development under the same, market-
driven interest rates as for the rest of the Croatian economy. 
In Turkey, there are both domestic and foreign-owned and operated 
banks, which provide commercial credit to agriculture and other rural 
economic activities. A special agricultural bank provides credit for 
agriculture and rural areas under slightly more favourable conditions than 
those of commercial banks. Sharecropping plays a significant role in 
agricultural investment activities and business between landowners and 
tenants in Turkey, and is also important for the agricultural and rural credit 
and loan markets. 
Commercial banks and sellers of input supplies are among the main 
active providers of credit to farms’ primary production operations in the 
FYR of Macedonia are. Credit to agriculture was largely allocated to 
agricultural enterprises, and less often to individual small-scale family 
farms, which are predominant among farming structures in the country. 
Individual family farms in the FYR of Macedonia face credit constraints, 
due to the unsettled legal ownership of assets and thus collateral problems, 
a lack of appropriate farming or management education, insufficient 
household income and a weak previous relationship with the creditor. 
The EU’s Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) funds have 
been important in each of three candidate countries. EU and donors’ funds 
have assisted in agriculture and in rural areas by allowing greater use of 
capital equipment and more capital-intensive technologies, as well as in 
adjustments to international agro-food and other development standards, 
EU policies and practices.  
6. Conclusion 
This chapter reveals a number of differences in the countries under study. 
The absolute size of the countries is different; in terms of land and labour 
markets, the Turkish agricultural sector is much bigger than that of Croatia 
or the FYR of Macedonia. There are also differences in the relative 
importance of agriculture and rural areas for the economy as a whole. 
Apart from with regards to the percentage of rural population, the relative 
importance of agriculture is lowest in the more economically developed 
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Croatia, and highest in the less economically developed Turkey. The 
changing role of agriculture and rural areas has been important in each of 
the three countries analysed. Apart from rural tourist resorts, which of 
varying importance in each of the countries, rural areas are less attractive 
due to less developed infrastructure and fewer employment and income 
opportunities. 
Farms are small (in terms of land) with prevailing fragmented land 
pieces. The evolution of farms has been based on the traditions of family 
farm households. In Croatia and the FYR of Macedonia, the communist 
family farm and land collectivisation failed up to a certain land maxima, 
while other land, such as that of bigger landowners, was nationalised. This 
land has now either been restored to the original owners, rented and 
cultivated largely by corporate farms, partly rented and cultivated by other 
farmers, or has even been left uncultivated. In Croatia, some land is also 
under mines. Different historical developments and land reforms can 
explain the similarities and differences in inheritance practices, land 
markets and land-leasing transactions. Demand factors with land location 
have been important in determining land prices and land rental values. 
Agricultural land prices per hectare of similar soil qualities are the highest 
in Turkey, which can largely be explained by demand factors in areas with 
smaller farms, smaller pieces of land and more labour-intensive 
agriculture. 
Farm restructuring can make important contributions to improving 
the efficiency of agriculture. This process can be particularly important 
now, with the recovery in the rest of the economy being followed by 
increasing employment opportunities in non-agricultural activities.  
Improving the quality of labour is an ongoing process that takes place 
through generational changes. Small and fragmented farms, a lower quality 
of labour in agriculture and lower technological intensity can explain lower 
labour productivity in agriculture than in the rest of the economy. 
Investments in agriculture are less attractive for banks due to lower 
profitability of investments, collateral problems, and so on. Substantial 
changes in rural capital markets are less likely during economic recession 
and financial constraints. 
The EU pre-enlargement support can partly overcome some financial 
constraints in rural areas for profitable businesses. The Croatian EU 
membership on 1st July 2013 will also provide opportunities for EU 
structural and cohesion funds as well as access to other common policy 
measures in agriculture and rural areas. 
360 | ŠTEFAN BOJNEC 
References 
Angelova, B. and Š. Bojnec (2012), “Capital Market, Subsidies, Agricultural and 
Rural Developments in the Republic of Macedonia”, African Journal of 
Agricultural Research, 7(16):2412–2424. 
Bojnec, Š. (2012), “Agricultural and Rural Capital Markets in Turkey, Croatia and 
the FYR of Macedonia”, Agricultural Economics – Czech, 58(11):533–541. 
Bojnec, Š. (2013a), “Land Endowments and Land Market Policies in Croatia, FYR of 
Macedonia and Turkey”, Bulgarian Journal of Agricultural Science, 19(3):387–
397. 
Bojnec, Š. (2013b), “Rural Labour Market Policies in Croatia, FYR of Macedonia 
and Turkey”, Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 16(2):179–197. 
Janeska, V. and Š. Bojnec (2012), “Rural labour market developments in the 
Republic of Macedonia”, African Journal of Agricultural Research, 7(32):4474–
4488. 
Petroska Angelovska, N., M. Ackovska and Š. Bojnec (2012), “Agricultural Land 
Markets and Land Leasing in the Republic of Macedonia”, African Journal of 
Agricultural Research, 7(18):2729–2740. 
World Bank (2013), World Development Indicators, Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
 
| 361 
 
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS 
Alastair Bailey is Reader in Agricultural Economics, at the School of 
Economics, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK.  
Martin Banse is a Senior Agricultural Economist and Director of the 
Institute for Market Analysis at the Federal Research Institute for 
Rural Areas, Forestry and Fisheries in Braunschweig, Johann 
Heinrich von Thünen-Institut, Germany. 
Fabio Bartolini is Researcher at the Department of Agriculture, Food and 
Environmental, University of Pisa, Italy. 
Ruxanda Berlinschi is Assistant Professor at the European University 
Brussels, Europese Hogeschool Brussel, Brussels, Belgium. 
Danilo Bertoni is Researcher at the University of Milano, Department of 
Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods, Italy. 
Štefan Bojnec is Professor of Economics at the University of Primorska, 
Faculty of Management, Koper, Slovenia. 
Daniele Cavicchioli is Researcher at the University of Milano, Department 
of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods, Milan, Italy. 
Pavel Ciaian is Researcher at the Institute for Prospective Technological 
Studies, Joint Research Centre, European Commission, Sevilla, Spain. 
Jarmila Curtiss is Senior Researcher at the Leibniz Institute of Agricultural 
Development in Central and Eastern Europe in Halle (Saale), 
Germany.  
Daniele Curzi is Post-Doc Researcher at the University of Milano, 
Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods, 
Milan, Italy. 
Sophia Davidova is Professor of European Agricultural Policy, at the 
School of Economics, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK.  
Peter Dixon, is Professor at Monash University, Centre of Policy Studies, 
Clayton, Australia. 
362 | CONTRIBUTORS 
Trevor Donnellan is an Economist and Principal Research Officer in the 
Agricultural Economics and Farm Survey Department at Teagasc 
Rural Economy and Development Programme, Galway, Ireland. 
Pierre Dupraz is Senior Researcher in agricultural and environmental 
economics at INRA in the SMART research unit located in Rennes, 
France. 
Jan Fałkowski is Assistant Professor at the University of Warsaw and 
CEAPS, Faculty of Economic Sciences, Warsaw, Poland.  
Paul Feichtinger is a PhD student at the Technische Universität München, 
Germany. 
Giovanni Guastella is post-doctoral researcher at the Dipartimento di 
Economia Agroalimentare, Facoltà di Agraria and Dipartimento di 
Scienze Economiche e Sociali (DiSES), Facoltà di Economia e 
Giurisprudenza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Piacenza, Italy.  
Kevin Hanrahan is a Principal Research Officer in the Teagasc Rural 
Economy Research Centre (RERC), Galway, Ireland. 
Thia Hennessy is an Economist and Head of the Agricultural Economics 
and Farm Survey Department at Teagasc Rural Economy and 
Development Programme, Galway, Ireland.  
Maciej Jakubowski is Assistant Professor at the University of Warsaw, 
Faculty of Economic Sciences, Warsaw, Poland.  
Kristina Hedman Jansson is Research and Administrative Assistant at the 
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Department of 
Economics, Uppsala, Sweden. 
Eleni A. Kaditi, at the time of preparing her chapter, was an affiliate 
Research Fellow at CEPS (Centre for European Policy Studies) in 
Brussels, Belgium and a Research Fellow at KEPE (Centre of Planning 
and Economic Research) in Athens, Greece.  
d’Artis Kancs is Researcher at the Institute for Prospective Technological 
Studies, Joint Research Centre, European Commission, Sevilla, Spain. 
Mathias Kloss is a Doctoral Student at Leibniz Institute of Agricultural 
Development in Central and Eastern Europe, Germany. 
Louise Knops is Research Assistant at the Centre for European Policy 
Studies (CEPS), Brussels, Belgium. 
Carl Johan Lagerkvist is Head of the Department of Economics and 
Professor of Business Economics at the Swedish University of 
Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala, Sweden. 
CONTRIBUTORS | 363 
Laure Latruffe is Researcher in agricultural economics at INRA in the 
SMART research unit located in Rennes, France. 
Chantal Le Mouël is Senior Researcher in agricultural economics at INRA 
in the SMART research unit located in Rennes, France. 
Jason Loughrey is an Economist and Research Officer in the Agricultural 
Economics and Farm Survey Department at Teagasc Rural Economy 
and Development Programme, Galway, Ireland.  
Tomas Medonos is Senior Researcher and Head of the Department 
Economics of Agrarian Sector at the Institute of Agricultural 
Economics and Information in Prague, Czech Republic. 
Daniele Moro is Associate Professor in Agricultural Economics at the 
Dipartimento di Economia Agroalimentare, Facoltà di Agraria, 
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Piacenza, Italy. 
Sami Myyrä is Professor at MTT Economic Research, Economics and Social 
Sciences, Helsinki, Finland. 
Alessandro Olper is Associate Professor at the University of Milano, 
Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods, 
Italy, and Associated Researcher at LICOS - Centre for Institutions 
and Economic Performance, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, 
Belgium.  
Martin Petrick is the Deputy Head of the Agricultural Policy Department at 
the Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and 
Eastern Europe (IAMO), Halle (Saale), Germany.  
Laurent Piet is a research analyst in agricultural economics at INRA in the 
SMART research unit located in Rennes, France. 
Jan Pokrivcak is Professor of Agricultural and International Economics at 
the Slovak University in Nitra, Slovakia. 
Marco Puddu is a PhD candidate at the Department of Agricultural 
Sciences (DipSA), University of Bologna, Italy. 
Ewa Rabinowicz is Professor of Agricultural Economics at Swedish 
University of Agricultural Sciences, Department of Economics, 
Uppsala, Sweden. 
Meri Raggi is Researcher at the Department of Statistical Sciences, 
University of Bologna, Italy. 
Valentina Raimondi is Researcher at the University of Milano, Department 
of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods, Milan, Italy.  
364 | CONTRIBUTORS 
Tomas Ratinger is Senior Researcher at the Technology Centre of the 
Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic in Prague, Czech 
Republic. 
Maureen Rimmer is Professor at Monash University, Centre of Policy 
Studies, Clayton, Australia. 
Marian Rizov is Professor of Economics at the Middlesex University 
Business School, London, UK.  
Andrea Rothe is PhD student at the Institute for Market Analysis at the 
Federal Research Institute for Rural Areas, Forestry and Fisheries in 
Braunschweig, Johann Heinrich von Thünen-Institut, Germany. 
Klaus Salhofer is Professor at the Technische Universität München, 
Germany. 
Paolo Sckokai is Associate Professor in Agricultural Economics at the 
Dipartimento di Economia Agroalimentare, Facoltà di Agraria, 
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Piacenza, Italy. 
Lindsay Shutes is Researcher at LEI, Wageningen University and Research 
Centre (LEI-WUR), The Hague, The Netherlands. 
Paweł Strawiński is Assistant Professor at the University of Warsaw, 
Faculty of Economic Sciences, Warsaw, Poland.  
Johan Swinnen is Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy 
Studies (CEPS), Brussels, and Director of the LICOS Centre for 
Institutions and Economic Performance, Katholieke Universiteit 
Leuven, Leuven, Belgium.  
Katarina Szegenyova is Researcher at the Department of Economics of 
Slovak Agricultural University, Slovakia. 
Andrzej Tabeau is Researcher at LEI, Wageningen University and Research 
Centre, The Hague, The Netherlands. 
Barbara Tocco is PhD student, at the School of Economics, University of 
Kent, Canterbury, UK. 
Kristine Van Herck is PhD student at LICOS, Katholieke Universiteit 
Leuven, and Research Assistant, Centre for European Policy Studies 
(CEPS), Brussels, Belgium. 
Hans van Meijl is Senior Researcher at LEI, Wageningen University and 
Research Centre, The Hague, The Netherlands. 
Mario Veneziani is post-doctoral researcher at the Dipartimento di 
Economia Agroalimentare, Facoltà di Agraria and Dipartimento di 
CONTRIBUTORS | 365 
Scienze Economiche e Sociali (DiSES), Facoltà di Economia e 
Giurisprudenza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Piacenza, Italy. 
Davide Viaggi is Associate Professor at the Department of Agricultural 
Sciences (DipSA), University of Bologna, Italy. 
Mauro Vigani is Researcher at the European Commission, Joint Research 
Centre (JRC), Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS), 
Sevilla, Spain. 
Liesbet Vranken is Assistant Professor at LICOS, K.U. Leuven, and 
Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences, Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium. 
 
366 | 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AMTA US Agricultural Market Transition Act 
AWU annual work units 
CAP Common Agriculture Policy 
CEECs central and eastern European countries 
CES constant elasticity of substitution 
CET constant elasticity of transformation 
CGE computable general equilibrium 
CSO Central Statistical Office 
DiD difference-in-differences 
DP direct payment 
ECHP European Community Household Panel 
ES economic sustainability 
ESU European size units 
EU-LFS EU Labour Force Survey 
FADN Farm Accountancy Data Network 
FB farm buildings 
GAEC Good Agricultural and Environmental Condition 
GHG greenhouse gas 
GMM generalised method of moment 
GTAP Global Trade Analysis Project 
GVA gross value added 
HBS Household Budget Surveys 
HHI Herfindahl Index 
IPA Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance 
IQR interquartile range 
ISTAT Italian Institute of Statistics 
JSC joint stock companies 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS | 367 
LFA less-favoured areas 
LLC limited liability companies 
LTV loan-to-value 
MAGNET Modular Applied GeNeral Equilibrium Tool 
ME machinery and equipment 
NoBFM No Biofuel Mandate 
NPV net present value 
NRA rate of assistance 
NUTS Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics 
OLS ordinary least squares 
PSE producer subsidy equivalent 
PSE Producer Support Estimate 
REA Farm Business Survey 
RED renewable energy directive 
SAFER Sociétés d’Aménagement Foncier et d’Etablissement Rural 
SAPS Single Area Payment Scheme 
SFP single farm payment 
SMR Statutory Management Requirements 
SPS Single Payment Scheme 
SUR seemingly unrelated regression 
TPI tenant protection indicator 
TRI total regulatory index 
UAA utilised agricultural area 
ZES zone d’excédent structurel 
 
368 | 
 
LIST OF FACTOR MARKETS WORKING 
PAPERS 
[FM WP1] Land Markets in the EU Candidate Countries of Croatia, Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey, Štefan Bojnec  
[FM WP2] The Penetration of Financial Instability in Agricultural Credit 
and Leveraging, Kyösti Pietola, Sami Myyrä & Anna-Maija Heikkilä  
[FM WP3] Productivity and Credit Constraints: Firm-Level Evidence from 
Propensity Score Matching, Pavel Ciaian, Jan Fałkowski, d’Artis Kancs & 
Jan Pokrivcak  
[FM WP4] Do Agricultural Subsidies Crowd out or Stimulate Rural Credit 
Institutions? The Case of CAP Payments, Pavel Ciaian, Jan Pokrivcak & 
Katarina Szegenyova 
[FM WP5] Rural Labour Market Developments in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Verica Janeska & Štefan Bojnec  
[FM WP6] Agricultural and Rural Labour Markets in the EU Candidate 
Countries of Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
Turkey, Štefan Bojnec  
[FM WP7] Farm Level Capital: Capital Positions, Structures, the Dynamics 
of Farm Level Investments, Capital Accumulation and Leverage 
Positions, Sami Myyrä, Kyösti Pietola & Anna-Maija Heikkilä  
[FM WP8] Agricultural and Rural Capital Markets in the EU Candidate 
Countries: Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
Turkey, Štefan Bojnec 
[FM WP9] Agricultural and Rural Capital Market Developments in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Biljana Angelova & Štefan 
Bojnec  
[FM WP10] The Valuation of Agricultural Land and the Influence of 
Government Payments, Paul Feichtinger & Klaus Salhofer  
LIST OF FACTOR MARKETS WORKING PAPERS | 369 
[FM WP11] Agricultural Land Market and Land Leasing in the Republic of 
Macedonia, Neda Petroska Angelovska, Marija Ackovska & Štefan Bojnec  
[FM WP12] Key Issues and Developments in Farmland Sales Markets in the 
EU Member States and Candidate Countries, Pavel Ciaian, d’Artis 
Kancs, Jo Swinnen, Kristine Van Herck & Liesbet Vranken  
[FM WP13] Key Issues and Developments in Farmland Rental Markets in 
EU Member States and Candidate Countries, Pavel Ciaian, d’Artis 
Kancs, Jo Swinnen, Kristine Van Herck & Liesbet Vranken  
[FM WP14] Sales Market Regulations for Agricultural Land in EU Member 
States and Candidate Countries, Pavel Ciaian, d’Artis Kancs, Jo 
Swinnen, Kristine Van Herck & Liesbet Vranken  
[FM WP15] Rental Market Regulations for Agricultural Land in EU 
Member States and Candidate Countries, Pavel Ciaian, d’Artis Kancs, 
Jo Swinnen, Kristine Van Herck & Liesbet Vranken  
[FM WP16]Institutional Factors Affecting Agricultural Land Markets, Pavel 
Ciaian, d’Artis Kancs, Jo Swinnen, Kristine Van Herck & Liesbet Vranken  
[FM WP17] Ownership and Investment Behaviour in Transition Countries: 
A Case Study of Collective and Corporate farms in the Czech 
Republic, Jarmila Curtiss, Tomáš Ratinger & Tomáš Medonos  
[FM WP18] Drivers of Agricultural Physical Capital Development: 
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses, Karin Kataria, Jarmila Curtiss 
& Alfons Balmann  
[FM WP19] Determinants of Financial Capital Use: Review of theories and 
implications for rural businesses, Jarmila Curtiss  
[FM WP20] Key Issues in Agricultural Labour Markets: A Review of Major 
Studies and Project Reports on Agriculture and Rural Labour 
Markets, Barbara Tocco, Sophia Davidova & Alastair Bailey  
[FM WP21] Supply and Demand Side Limitations Affecting the Structure of 
Agriculture and the Rural Economy, Barbara Tocco, Sophia Davidova & 
Alastair Bailey  
[FM WP22] Commonalities and Differences in Labour Market 
Developments and Constraints in Different EU Regions, Barbara 
Tocco, Sophia Davidova & Alastair Bailey  
 
370 | LIST OF FACTOR MARKETS WORKING PAPERS 
[FM WP23] Factor Markets in Applied Equilibrium Models: The current 
state and planned extensions towards an improved presentation of 
factor markets in agriculture, Lindsay Shutes, Andrea Rothe & Martin 
Banse  
[FM WP24] Defining an Institutional Framework for the Labour Market, 
Trevor Donnellan, Kevin Hanrahan & Thia Hennessy  
[FM WP25] The Institutional Framework of the Labour Market: Completed 
Labour Market Questionnaire, Trevor Donnellan, Kevin Hanrahan & 
Thia Hennessy  
[FM WP26] Labour Supply Curves for EU Member and Candidate States: 
An applied general equilibrium analysis, Lindsay Shutes  
[FM WP27] Simulation of Land Use and Investment Behaviour under 
Different Policy Scenarios: Results of the extended farm/household 
model, Marco Puddu, Fabio Bartolini & Davide Viaggi  
[FM WP28] Does the Common Agricultural Policy Reduce Farm Labour 
Migration? Panel data analysis across EU regions, Alessandro Olper, 
Valentina Raimondi, Daniele Cavicchioli & Mauro Vigani  
[FM WP29] Income Distributional Effects of Decoupled Payments: Single 
Payment Scheme in the European Union, Pavel Ciaian, d'Artis Kancs & 
Jo Swinnen  
[FM WP30] Drivers of agricultural capital productivity in selected EU 
member states, Martin Petrick & Mathias Kloss  
[FM WP31] The Labour Allocation Decision of Farm Households: Defining 
a Theoretical Model, Trevor Donnellan & Thia Hennessy  
[FM WP32] Effects of Economic Factors on Adoption of Robotics and 
Consequences of Automation for Productivity Growth of Dairy 
Farms, Anna-Mija Heikkilä, Sami Myyrä & Kyösti Pietola  
[FM WP33] Agricultural Credit Market Institutions: A comparison of 
Selected European Countries, Kristina Hedman Jansson, Chelsey Jo 
Huisman, Carl Johan Lagerkvist & Ewa Rabinowicz  
[FM WP34] Identifying Factor Productivity from Micro-data: The case of 
EU agriculture, Martin Petrick & Mathias Kloss 
[FM WP35] The Market for Tractors in the EU: Price Differences and 
Convergence, Christian Jörgensen & Morten Persson  
LIST OF FACTOR MARKETS WORKING PAPERS | 371 
[FM WP36] Patterns and Determinants of Off-Farm Migration: Transfer 
frictions and persistency of relative income gaps, Alessandro Olper, 
Valentina Raimondi, Danilo Bertoni & Daniele Cavichioli 
[FM WP37] CAP Subsidies and the Productivity of EU Farms, Marian Rizov, 
Jan Pokrivcak & Pavel Ciaian  
[FM WP38] The influence of the Common Agricultural Policy and 
Heterogeneous Land Quality on Land Rend and Land Allocation, 
Paul Feichtinger & Klaus Salhofer  
[FM WP39] Trapped in Agriculture: The Impact of Credit Constraints on 
the Educational and Occupational Choice of Farmers’ Children, Jo 
Swinnen, Kristine Van Herck & Ruxanda Berlinschi  
[FM WP40] Does land fragmentation affect farm performance? A case 
study from Brittany, Laure Latruffe & Laurent Piet 
[FM WP41] RED vs. REDD: Biofuel Policy vs. Forest Conservation, Peter 
Dixon, Hans van Meijl, Maureen Rimmer, Lindsay Shutes & Andrzej 
Tabeau 
[FM WP42] Investment behaviour of EU arable crop farms in selected EU 
countries and the impact of policy reforms, Giovanni Guastella, Daniele 
Moro, Paolo Sckokai & Mario Veneziani 
[FM WP43] Performance Indicators in Agricultural Financial Markets, 
Kristina Hedman Jansson & Carl Johan Lagerqvist 
[FM WP44] The Theoretical Framework and Methodology to Estimate the 
Farm Labour and Other Factor-Derived Demand and Output Supply 
Systems, Barbara Tocco, Alastair Bailey & Sophia Davidova  
[FM WP45] The Reallocation of Agricultural Labour across Sectors: An 
Empirical Strategy for Micro Data, Barbara Tocco, Alastair Bailey & 
Sophia Davidova  
[FM WP46] Determinants to Leave Agriculture and Change Occupational 
Sector: Evidence from an Enlarged EU, Barbara Tocco, Alastair Bailey & 
Sophia Davidova  
[FM WP47] Factor Markets in General Computable Equilibrium Models, 
Martin Banse, Lindsay Shutes, Peter Dixon, Hans van Meijl, Maureen 
Rimmer, Andrzej Tabeau, Geert Woltjer & Andrea Rothe  
 
372 | LIST OF FACTOR MARKETS WORKING PAPERS 
[FM WP48] Will improved access to capital dampen the need for more 
agricultural land? A CGE analysis of agricultural capital markets and 
world-wide biofuel policies, Martin Banse, Andrea Rothe , Andrzej 
Tabeau, Hans van Meijl & Geert Woltjer 
[FM WP49] Agricultural Labour Market Flexibility in the EU and 
Candidate Countries, Jason Loughrey, Trevor Donnellan, Kevin 
Hanrahan & Thia Hennessy 
[FM WP50] A Spatial Analysis of Agricultural Land Prices in Bavaria, Paul 
Feichtinger & Klaus Salhofer  
[FM WP51] Influence of Agricultural Support on Sale Prices of French 
Farmland: A comparison of different subsidies, accounting for the 
role of environmental and land regulations, Laure Latruffe, Laurent 
Piet, Pierre Dupraz & Chantal Le Mouël 
[FM WP52] The Role of Environmental and Land Transaction Regulations 
on Agricultural Land Price: The example of Brittany, Laure Latruffe, 
Jean Joseph Minvie & Julien Salanié 
[FM WP53] The Empirical Content of the Present Value Model: A survey of 
the instrumental uses of farmland prices, Jean-Sauveur Ay & Laure 
Latruffe  
[FM WP54] Farm/Household-level Simulation Results of Testing Policy 
and Other Scenarios, Davide Viaggi, Fabio Bartolini, Marco Puddu & 
Meri Raggi 
[FM WP55] Simulation Results of AgriPoliS about Diminishing Capital 
Subsidies and Restrictions, Christoph Sahrbacher, Amanda Sahrbacher & 
Arlette Ostermeyer 
[FM WP56] Simulation Results on the Impact of Changes in the Main EU 
Policy Tools on Farm Investment Behaviour, Giovanni Guastella, 
Daniele Moro, Paolo Sckokai & Mario Veneziani 
[FM WP57] Synthesis Report on the Impact of Capital Use, Martin Petrick & 
Mathias Kloss  
[FM WP58] Empirical Evidence of the Distributional Effects of the CAP in 
the New EU Member States, Pavel Ciaian, d'Artis Kancs & Ján Pokrivčák  
[FM WP59] Does it matter how much land your neighbour owns? The 
functioning of land markets in Poland from a social comparison 
perspective, Jan Fałkowski  
LIST OF FACTOR MARKETS WORKING PAPERS | 373 
[FM WP60] Determinants of Farm Labour Use A Comparison between 
Ireland and Italy, Jason Loughrey, Thia Hennessy, Kevin Hanrahan, 
Trevor Donnellan, Valentina Raimondi & Alessandro Olper  
[FM WP61] Off-farm Labour Decision of Italian Farm Operators, Valentina 
Raimondi, Daniele Curzi, Danilo Bertoni & Alessandro Olper  
[FM WP62] Direct Payments and Land Rents: Evidence from New Member 
States, Kristine Van Herck & Liesbet Vranken 
[FM WP63] The Impact of CAP Reforms on Farm Labour Structure, Eleni A. 
Kaditi 
[FM WP64] Returns from Income Strategies in Rural Poland, Jan Fałkowski, 
Maciej Jakubowski & Paweł Strawiński 
[FM WP65] The Impact of the SFP System on Italian Farmland Prices and 
Tenure Contracts, Davide Viaggi, Fabio Bartolini, Marco Puddu, 
Francesca Minarelli & Meri Raggi 
[FM WP66] The Impact of CAP Payments on the Exodus of Labour from 
Agriculture in Selected EU Member States, Barbara Tocco, Sophia 
Davidova & Alastair Bailey 
[FM WP67] The Role of Pluriactivity in Farm Exit and Labour Supply 
Decisions, Jason Loughrey, Trevor Donnellan, Thia Hennessy and Kevin 
Hanrahan 
[FM WP68] An Analysis of the Capitalisation of CAP Payments into Land 
Rental Rates in Ireland, Stephen O’Neill and Kevin Hanrahan 
 
